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
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THE LIFE OF JOHN A. RAWLINS



11



BRIG.-GEN. JOHN A. RAWLINS
CHIEF OF STAFF U. S. A.

1869

Frontispiece

THE LIFE *of* JOHN A. RAWLINS

Lieutenant Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of
Staff, Major General of Volunteers,
and Secretary of War

BY

JAMES HARRISON WILSON

Major-General U.S.A., Late Major-General U.S.V.; Engineer and Lieutenant-General on
Grant's Staff; Commander Third Cavalry Division, Army of the Potomac; Commander
Cavalry Corps, M.D.M.; Commander of the Sixth and First Army Corps and
the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara, in the Spanish War
Second in Command of the U. S. forces in the Boxer Rebellion
Author of Under the Old Flag, etc., etc.



THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY

440 FOURTH AVENUE :: :: NEW YORK

1916



GEN. JOHN A. RAWLINS
CHIEF OF STAFF U.S.A.
1869

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Lawyer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of
Staff, Major General of Volunteers,
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New York**

MS. A. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

Only one course is left for us. We will stand by the Flag
of our Country and appeal to the God of Battles!

Rawlins's speech at Galena, April 16, 1861.

I believe more in the infallibility of numbers than in the
infallibility of generals, no matter how great their reputation.

Letter of March 28, 1864.

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OF THE LIFE AND SERVICES OF JOHN A. RAWLINS

- Candidate for Elector on the Douglas Democratic Ticket.....1860
- Appointed Captain Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers.....*August 30, 1861*
- Accepted*September 26, 1861*
- Appointed Major and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers.....*May 14, 1862*
- Served as Lieutenant Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers by assignment.....*November 1, 1862, to August 30, 1863*
- Appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers*August 11, 1863*
- Accepted*August 30, 1863*
- Appointed Brigadier General United States Army and Chief of Staff to the Major General Commanding*March 3, 1865*
- Brevetted Major General of Volunteers for gallant and meritorious services.....*February 24, 1865*
- Appointed Major General United States Army for meritorious service during the campaign terminating with the surrender of the insurgent army under General Robert E. Lee.....*April 9, 1865*
- Resigned from the Army.....*March 12, 1869*
- Appointed Secretary of War.....*March 11, 1869*
- Died while Secretary.....*September 6, 1869*

PREFACE

THE purpose of this narrative is fully set forth in the following pages, the preparation of which was begun, at his request, shortly after the death of General Rawlins, and has been continued at various intervals of a busy life up to the present time. I have explored every possible source of information which promised to throw any light whatever on the services and relations of General Rawlins with General Grant. I have consulted the Official Records, the "Memoirs" of General Grant, General Sherman, and General Sheridan; the "Personal History" of General Grant by Badeau, as well as those by Coff  , Richardson, Deming, Dana and Wilson; the "Recollections of Charles A. Dana"; the newspapers and magazines of the period, and especially the correspondence of General Rawlins.

I am particularly indebted to S. Cadwallader, Esquire, of California, formerly war correspondent of the *New York Herald*, for access to his valuable work in manuscript, entitled "Four Years with Grant"; to Hempstead Washburne, Esq., of Chicago, for copies of his father's correspondence with Rawlins, and to David Sheean, Esq., of Galena, Illinois, for collecting the letters of Rawlins to the various members of his family, for furnishing me with the family records, and for giving me his assistance with the manuscript and proofs at every stage of their preparation.

I am also greatly indebted to the late J. Russell Jones, of Chicago, and to the late Major General John E. Smith and the late Doctor E. D. Kittoe, of Galena, who were all lifelong friends of Rawlins and Grant and familiar with the history of their relations in both military and civil life.

I am under special obligation to Major General Grenville M. Dodge, who from the rich stores of his memory and his records has helped me with valuable facts and references, covering many incidents in Rawlins's career from the time he entered the army till his death as Secretary of War.

To each of these gentlemen I extend my grateful thanks, with the statement that I have used the matter furnished me according

to my own judgment, and that I am solely responsible for the statements and opinions contained in this book, as well as for the time of its publication.

Finally, having served with Rawlins on the staff of General Grant from the beginning of the operations against Vicksburg until the close of the Chattanooga and Knoxville campaigns and having maintained the closest intimacy with him to the end of his career, I had ample opportunity to become acquainted with his services and to form a correct estimate of his extraordinary character. As will be more fully explained in its proper place, Rawlins asked me shortly before his death to become his literary executor and to see that justice should be done to his memory when he was gone. This touching and solemn request is my special warrant for becoming his biographer.

JAMES HARRISON WILSON.

Wilmington, Delaware, January, 1916.

LIFE OF JOHN A. RAWLINS

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN AARON RAWLINS

I

INTRODUCTORY

Rawlins's Relations with General Grant—Grant's Resignation and Return to the Army—His General Characteristics—Rawlins's Qualifications as a Staff Officer.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, all things considered, was the most remarkable man I met during the Civil War, and although he came from the plain people and always held a subordinate position in the army, it was his good fortune to exert a tremendous influence not only upon persons of high rank but upon events of transcendent importance. He never commanded troops in the field nor became charged with the supreme control of great movements. Whatever he did was upon and through others, as aid, counsellor, and Adjutant General to General Grant, as Chief of Staff of the Army, and as Secretary of War. It is certain that in all these positions he exerted a very great influence upon men and events. This was especially the case during the war for the reestablishment of the Union.

While Rawlins was a man of extraordinary qualities and character, it cannot be claimed that he was to General Grant what Berthier was to Napoleon, or even what Gneisenau and

Müffling were to Blücher. It will be remembered that Berthier was a professional soldier of great experience in both America and Europe, and that Gneisenau and Müffling were highly-educated Prussian regulars who were expected to guide and direct their sturdy but thick-headed chief. According to the history of the times, they conceived the plans and worked out the details which he executed. He was from first to last merely a typical dragoon of the old school, always ready to march and fight even when beaten, as well as after he had become worn down with years. It is said that he scarcely knew either how to use a map or write an order, but had the good sense to submit himself to the guidance of those officers of his staff who were able to make plans and frame the instructions for carrying them into effect. Rawlins was but a country lawyer who had had no military training whatever when he entered the volunteer army, and never, even to his dying day, made the slightest pretensions to technical education in the profession of arms. His was a special and peculiar field, which will be defined with the progress of this narrative. It is believed that it was in many respects unlike that of any other man recorded in history.

Grant was a soldier of another sort. It will be recalled that he was a graduate of West Point and had served inconspicuously but with credit in the regular army during the Mexican War, after which he had the usual tour of duty in the Indian Country, and then had left the service under a cloud. It is a part of the history of the times that he had fallen for a season into the evil ways of military men serving on the remote frontier and that his return to civil life was commonly believed to have been a choice between resignation and a court-martial. Rejoining his family in Missouri, Grant settled on a farm, which after a series of minor business disappointments he gave up in order to accept the position of clerk at six hundred dollars per year in the leather and harness store of his kinsmen at Galena, Illinois. After the outbreak

of the war between the States, his public services became too important and too well known to require recital here, but I shall show in the course of this narrative that in some respects his character had not been fully understood and that in certain particulars it was happily supplemented by that of his friend and adjutant, John A. Rawlins.

Grant was of course proficient in the military profession as taught at West Point. While his services with the troops had made him familiar with the use of maps and plans, as well as with the details of army administration, it has never been claimed that he was learned in military history or in the higher branches of tactics, logistics, and strategy as set forth in the military textbooks. Indeed, it is improbable that he had ever, during his active service, read any military treatise more complex than the drill book or the army regulations. That he had not done so was doubtless due to the fact that the higher branches of the art of war were not taught at the Military Academy in his day, and it had not become the fashion for infantry officers to read such authors at any time up to the outbreak of the War between the States. After that it was impossible for him to give attention to the theoretical study of his profession. He was, from the first day of his participation in the war, occupied with the routine work of administration and of active campaigning, in which he got no help except from his own experience, or from current observation, or from others who had read and studied more than had he himself.

But it was not in respect to technical or strictly professional matters that Rawlins or any other officer contributed materially to Grant's success, and indeed it was not in respect to these that he required assistance, or that his character was supplemented by others. He had as much of the education supposed to be essential to the exercise of high command as had most of his contemporaries; yet this is paying him no great compliment, for it cannot be claimed that either our

government or our generals habitually conducted war either economically or in accordance with the practice and precept of the great masters of the art. It is well known that our military policy and volunteer system, largely inherited from the mother country, were crude and costly in the highest degree, that our administration was capricious and extravagant, and that our plans of campaign and their execution were frequently unscientific to an extent rarely exceeded in modern warfare. Finally, the tactics of our battles were as a general rule of the simplest and most primitive description. But, notwithstanding all this, we were victorious over the public enemy, whose inexperience was as great as our own, and came out of the four years' struggle with both success and honor. We owed our triumph primarily, however, to our superiority in numbers and resources, and secondarily to the exalted spirit of patriotism and love for the Union which inspired our people and impelled our army to renewed exertions after repeated failure and defeat.

It was in respect to the qualities that constitute character in the individual, as well as in the nation at large, that Rawlins as their exponent became a potent factor in the struggle, and supplemented and sustained the general to whom his services were given and with whom his fortunes were allied from the first to the final hour of the conflict. The relations which existed between him and his Chief were unusually close and intimate. They were due to his fidelity, his intense earnestness, his severe morals, his aggressive temper, his unselfish devotion to the duties of his position, his clear perception of what ought to be done from time to time, his sound and unfailing judgment, his quick and unerring grasp of the needs of the army, his keen insight into character, his fearless contempt for vice and vicious men, his love of justice and fair dealing, his prodigious energy, his resolute will and his unfaltering self-denial and patriotism, and especially his natural capacity for war. In these high qualities, he had

few equals and no superiors. In all the great emergencies they conspired to make his influence irresistible.

It cannot be maintained that Rawlins was, or ever became, a tactician, for he not only never set a squadron in the field but never read a book on either grand tactics or strategy. He was not learned in military administration nor military organization, and he knew absolutely nothing of the duties of either the staff or of the line when he entered the army. He was merely a plain citizen of average education and a lawyer by profession, all of whose thoughts, aspirations, and pursuits were those of peace up to the outbreak of the war between the States. He was not even in sympathy with the party whose candidate had been elected to the Presidency, and yet it may be doubted if it was the lot of any man who did not actually reach the command of an army, or become a member of the Cabinet, to render the country greater or more valuable services than did Rawlins in the four years' war for the Union.

Holding always the position of a confidential staff-officer, it was Rawlins's pleasure as well as his duty, so far as possible, not only to efface himself but to merge his individuality in that of his Chief. The Official Records contain but few reports over his own name. It is true that that name appears frequently on the returns to the War Department and on the records of the armies with which he served, but in nearly every case as the Adjutant or the Chief of Staff of General Grant. For this reason the events of his life and the influence exerted by him must be gathered mostly from family records, private correspondence, and the recollections of his comrades and personal friends.

It is not to be thought that an officer of Rawlins's impatient and aggressive temper should have entirely escaped the enmity of smaller souls, for such is not the case. There were those who were doubtful of his great qualities, and did what they could to minimize his influence and to belittle his services.

had strengthened him with his command and raised him in the public confidence. The newspapers had apparently become less inimical to him. The trade regulations drawn up by Rawlins were vigorously enforced, order was restored, and the supremacy of the Union was acknowledged throughout the district, but withal it is certain that Grant had not yet gained the entire confidence of the Administration. The advent of Halleck as General-in-Chief in Washington neither relieved his lieutenant from distrust nor protected him from the intrigues of political and professional rivals, as it must have done had he given Grant unqualified commendation and support.

It was during this period that Grant issued his drastic order expelling all Jews from the limits of his command, but it is worthy of note that this was done against the advice of Rawlins, who pointed out its objectionable features and called attention to the fact that only two weeks before a similar order issued by one of his post commanders had been countermanded. Grant, who was perhaps unduly incensed by the fact that his own father was interested at the time in carrying on trade within the limits of his department, said with unusual firmness: "Well, they can countermand this from Washington if they like, but we will issue it anyhow." Great excitement was aroused by it throughout the country. The newspapers denounced it in unmeasured terms. Congress took notice of it and a long debate followed, but the ever-watchful Washburne headed off a vote of censure by a motion to lay the subject on the table, which was carried. Meanwhile the President in the exercise of his own prerogative as Commander-in-Chief countermanded the order, but without expressing any direct censure of Grant. It may be assumed, however, that the incident did not strengthen Grant either with the Administration or with Congress, but rather tended to prolong the suspension of judgment which had previously shown itself in reference to him.

Before passing to the consideration of the Vicksburg campaign, it is proper to call attention to the fact that Grant, on April 7 and 8, 1862, reported to Halleck at St. Louis by telegraph and on April 9 by letter the result of the battle which had taken place near Pittsburgh Landing.² These communications were both crude and incomplete. They were evidently the work of Grant's hand alone, unaided by his adjutant general, or any other member of his staff. They were not followed, as afterwards became customary, by a careful and exhaustive report, based upon the reports of the subordinate commanders, for the reason stated by Grant himself as follows:

. . . Although I was in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh, I was not permitted to see one of the reports of General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the War Department long after the event. For this reason I never made a full report of this engagement.³

In this connection it should be noted that no battle of the war gave rise to so many controversies, nor to so much professional criticism and discussion as did the battle of Shiloh. The case of Lew Wallace, who failed to reach the battle field in time to take part in the first day's fighting, gave rise to a long and bitter discussion, in which McPherson, Rawlins and Rowley all filed statements in compliance with Grant's instructions.

These statements are fully set forth in the "Official Records,"⁴ and were carefully summarized by Rawlins in a communication dated April 1, 1863. The controversy has long since ceased to be interesting and need not be further considered, except by the student of military history, but no one can read Rawlins's clear and convincing account of the efforts made to get Wallace into that battle, without reach-

² Official Records, Vol. X, Part 1, p. 108 *et seq.*

³ "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. I, p. 370.

⁴ Vol. X, Part 1, p. 178 *et seq.*

ing the conclusion that Wallace was not only inexcusable for taking the wrong road, but was culpably slow in all his movements that day. It seems to be equally clear that if he had moved with the rapidity that his men, who were "marching light," and were besides in "buoyant spirits" and "eager to get forward," were capable of marching, after they got on to the right road, which was "in good condition," they would certainly have reached the field "in time to engage the enemy before the close of Sunday's fight." Rawlins gave clear and unequivocal testimony to support this conclusion, and sets it forth in a way which shows that he perfectly understood every military consideration involved in the controversy. In spite of all that was afterwards said in behalf of Wallace, it is to be observed that Rawlins, whatever others may have done, never changed his statement of the facts nor the conclusions based upon them, but stood by both to the day of his death. As he and McPherson actually joined Wallace at 3:30 P. M. and accompanied him during the march *au canon*, it is not to be presumed that they were mistaken as to the facts which they reported, or as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom.

VIII

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST, 1862

Rawlins Explains Conditions at Grant's Headquarters—Case of David Sheean—Plans of President and Secretary of War—Tallahatchie Campaign—Vicksburg Campaign—Origin of Plan—Preliminary Operations—Charles A. Dana Joins Headquarters—Letter to Washburne—Letter to Grant—Relief of McClernand—Rawlins Promoted.

IN pursuance of orders issued by the War Department, I reported for duty at Grant's headquarters at LaGrange, West Tennessee, November 8, 1862. I had come straight through from temporary service on the staff of McClellan during the Antietam campaign. Although I was at the time only a first lieutenant, I had received flattering overtures for service and promotion and had knowledge of certain important plans which had been adopted by the Administration for raising additional troops in the Northwestern States, to be used in opening the Mississippi through to the Gulf of Mexico.

On reaching headquarters I was shown into the adjutant general's office, where I met for the first time John A. Rawlins, the subject of this narrative. He was seated at his desk with his back to the door, with no one else in the room. As I entered he swung around with a look of inquiry upon his dark and serious face. I told him who I was, and, handing him a copy of my orders, said I had come to report to General Grant for duty. He replied at once that the general was absent at Memphis, but would be back shortly, that I had been expected for several days, and that I would probably be sent temporarily to McPherson, with whom I was intimate,

and who would lead the advance with the right wing of the army towards Central Mississippi. After adding that he knew all about me and my people, that I was from Illinois, as he was, that regular engineer officers were much needed in that army, and that I should be fully employed, he explained the situation at headquarters with startling frankness, disguising nothing and extenuating nothing.

He said in substance that Grant had been more or less justly criticised at one time or another, and emphasized this by handing me a written pledge in Grant's own handwriting, which he had received some time before. He dwelt upon the danger which this pledge was intended to guard against, and marked his apprehensions in a most dramatic manner by referring to the sword of Damocles. Having thus revealed the worst aspect of the case, he turned swiftly to the other side, and with words equally frank, he assured me that he regarded Grant as a good man, an experienced and courageous officer, who did his whole duty loyally and well, and always told about it plainly and truthfully; that he was cool, level-headed and sensible, of sound judgment, singular modesty, loyalty, and patriotism, and could certainly lead us to victory, if his friends could "stay him from falling." Rawlins then added that there were some good officers on the staff, but more bad ones, and that he wanted me to help clean them out. With this done he concluded by declaring that he wanted to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with me for the purpose of weeding out worthless officers, guarding the general against temptation and sustaining him in the performance of the great duties which he would be called on to perform.

The entire conversation was a serious and unusual one, but I was by no means surprised at its tenor. The newspapers and the officers I had met on the way had partly prepared me for it. What Rawlins said not only gave the key

to the actual situation, but put me on the alert for additional facts.

We naturally renewed our conversation as occasion offered, and I was soon thoroughly informed not only as to Grant's personal habits but as to his very great and substantial merits as well. The character of his staff officers and leading generals, together with the inner history of the army and of its campaigns, speedily became as familiar to me as if I had served with it from the beginning of the war. I need not add that the acquaintance thus begun with Rawlins grew day by day and month by month into the closest intimacy, which existed unbroken to the day of his death, seven years later. From this time forth I shall naturally speak largely from my own knowledge of events as they took place, and from personal observation of Grant and the officers who served under him.

Aided as I was by the clear head and vigorous character of Rawlins, I was not long in arriving at a full understanding of the problems confronting Grant as well as the army which he commanded. He was expected by the Government to march through Holly Springs and Oxford to Grenada, and to operate from the latter place in such manner as to cause the evacuation of Vicksburg, or to bring about its capture.

Immediately after I joined, movements were begun to that end, but the winter, with its frequent rains, was too near at hand, the roads which were of the most primitive kind were in bad condition and the streams much swollen. To make matters worse, the Confederate cavalry under Van Dorn promptly swept around our flank, threw itself on our rear, captured our depot at Holly Springs, destroyed our reserve supplies and broke our railway to the rear. The result was that the overland campaign became paralyzed before it was fairly under way, and it was apparent to all that the line on which we were operating was not only impracticable but would have to be abandoned, and the sooner the better.

About this time a personal incident occurred which deeply aroused the feelings of Rawlins. On entering the army he left his professional business with his partner David Sheean, a friend from boyhood, who had studied law in his office, whose brother married his sister, and, like himself, was a Democrat of decided views. It was a period of arbitrary practices. The writ of Habeas Corpus had been suspended even in the North, and those having influence with the Federal authorities not infrequently paid off personal scores by procuring the arrest and incarceration of peaceable citizens whom they could not otherwise silence. An outrage of this sort was inflicted upon Mr. Sheean in the fall of 1862. While in the peaceful pursuit of his profession he was arrested on the charge of disloyalty, carried to New York and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. This arbitrary act led to much local excitement, during which Rawlins took a short leave of absence and made an investigation of the circumstances. On his return to the army, he drew up a full statement of the case, and sent it to the Secretary of War with letters from Grant, Hurlbut, and Logan, and also from his fellow-townsmen, Maltby and Rowley, asking for the release of his friend. Impatient at the delay of the Secretary in acknowledging his communication, and taking favorable action, he wrote urgently to Washburne, asking for his intercession. Late in December, Mr. Sheean was released and a statement of the fact was published in the newspapers, whereupon Rawlins wrote to Sheean, assuring him with genuine feeling that nothing had occurred since the outbreak of the war which had pleased him more than to learn that his friend from childhood had been restored to liberty and to the rights that every American citizen is entitled to enjoy. As this manly letter glows not only with patriotism but with the feeling of determination which characterized the best officers of the time, its conclusion is given in full:

. . . I am as firm to-day in the support of my Government and yours as ever. I believe if the war is properly conducted it must finally end in the triumph of the Government established by our fathers, and whether it ends in one year or ten, I am for its vigorous prosecution; but to the arrest and imprisonment of loyal citizens without trial, I am opposed and shall be opposed to the end of my life. For the maintenance of my country's honor and the upholding of the Constitution, I am willing to take my chances on the field of battle, but for the destruction of individual liberty, never. We can have but one Government on this Continent north of Mexico and south of the St. Lawrence and that must be the United States of America. There is little if any difference of opinion in the army. All are for the success of our flag, and but little is said of Proclamations.

Soon after arriving at Grant's headquarters, I made it known to Rawlins, as I had been informed at Washington, that the President had directed McClernand to proceed to the Northwest with orders to recruit and organize an independent force to be commanded by himself, for the purpose of capturing Vicksburg and opening the Mississippi, so that "it might flow unvexed to the sea." This was the first authentic information received at Grant's headquarters in regard to the scope of McClernand's instructions, although the newspapers had already mentioned them as foreshadowing what they designated with unseemly levity "the Castor Oil Expedition." Evidence was leaking out through the politicians that the Administration regarded it as one of the first importance.

Immediately after our railroad supply line was broken at Holly Springs, the superiority of the great river as a line of operations against the Confederacy became evident to me, as well as to others whose duty it was to consider such matters. It was perceived that although the river might be commanded by strong fortifications, as at Island Number Ten, and on the bluffs at Vicksburg, it could not, like a common railroad, be permanently cut or successfully obstructed. I pointed out and

emphasized this important fact to both Rawlins and Grant, contending that the Overland Campaign should be abandoned, and that the entire army should be transferred to Memphis, embarked upon transports, and sent by water as far as possible towards Vicksburg. I also contended that it would not be sufficient to send the raw levies, which McClernand was raising, or even a strong detachment of the seasoned troops against Vicksburg by water. I dwelt upon the fact that this strongly fortified city was conceded by all to be the chief strategic point in that theatre of operations, that therefore its capture should be made certain by sending all the available forces against it, and that Grant himself, as the senior general of the department, should of right go in chief command. Rawlins became the earnest advocate of this policy from the first. Grant fully concurred, and as soon as he could lay the matter before Halleck, and get the Government's consent, set vigorously about the task of carrying it into effect. Had he delayed or hesitated, it is obvious that the honor of playing the principal part in that great undertaking would have fallen to the lot of a subordinate, not only because he was next in rank, but because both the Secretary of War and the President had virtually promised it to him.¹

In face of the President's promise to McClernand, Grant designated Sherman, in whom he had greater confidence, to lead the movement and sent him forward with a strong force to Chickasaw Bayou, near the mouth of the Yazoo River, where he effected a landing, made an attack through the swamp against the enemy's strongly fortified position on the bluffs overlooking the river valley, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Before he could make further dispositions there, he was joined and superseded by McClernand, who had learned from the press or from Washington what was going on below, and had hastened to the front. The united force

¹ O. R. Serial No. 36, p. 11 *et seq.*

was then transferred, under Sherman's advice, by McClelland to Arkansas Post on the Arkansas River, and, by the aid of the gunboats under Admiral Porter, captured that place with several thousand prisoners. As might have been expected, these movements and the formidable difficulties to be overcome, arrested the attention of the country and made it apparent that Grant's entire army must be transferred to the scene of active operations.

Grant, having meanwhile obtained Halleck's permission, hastened to the front himself, joined the army at Milliken's Bend, some twenty miles above Vicksburg, and took the direction of further operations under his own control. This was clearly within his right as the department commander, but McClelland, an ambitious, high-strung man, who had done gallant and effective service at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh, resented it as a direct violation of the President's promises to him. He had not concealed the fact that he had but a poor opinion of Grant at best and regarded his assumption of command as an act of special injustice. This was followed during the campaign by such open ill-feeling and such disregard of military amenities as finally made it necessary for Grant to relieve him from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, to which he had been assigned by the President, after it had taken a leading part in driving back the enemy and in shutting him up within the fortifications of Vicksburg. Rawlins was of course an active and watchful spectator and adviser in all this. Like McClelland, he was a War-Democrat and naturally wanted to promote harmonious relations between Grant and his subordinates, especially those from his own State. Recognizing its wisdom, I did what I could to encourage him in that course. Although McClelland was a native of Kentucky and a much older man than I, I had known him from my boyhood. He had lived in my native county and he had been a private soldier in my father's company in the Black Hawk War. He was besides

a lawyer and politician of national character, a distinguished member of Congress, and candidate for Speaker, who had much influence at home, and hence I found a double pleasure in making it my special mission to smooth over the rough spots, and do all in my power to promote friendly relations between him and Grant. In recognition of this disposition on my part I was frequently entrusted with verbal instructions for him and did what I could to mitigate the smart of his wounds as well as to present him and his services in a favorable light at headquarters. I had encouraging success for a while, but McClernand, with all his merit, was a man of hasty and violent temper, with whom it was difficult for one of even Grant's self-control to get on smoothly. The end came at last under circumstances which will be more fully explained in its appropriate place.

As the only regular officer then present with the staff, I left Memphis by special boat with Grant and Rawlins, January 16, 1863, for the purpose of visiting the army which had been operating against Vicksburg. The trip down the Mississippi and back lasted four days, during which every question connected with the campaign, its magnitude and importance, the organization and efficiency of the army, and the policy of the Government in connection with the war in that theatre of operations, was fully discussed. Grant, without the slightest show of reserve, took the lead in the conversation and showed an active interest in all that was said. Without showing the slightest reserve he treated Rawlins and myself as equals, and encouraged us to express ourselves with the utmost freedom. It was during this trip that I commented specially upon the geographical unity of the Mississippi Valley, the inter-dependence of the States lying within it, and the necessity for a single military command to cover and include them all. Both Grant and Rawlins were favorably impressed with my views and asked me to draft a letter on the subject, which I did, and which Grant shortly afterwards

embodied in a letter to Halleck. It is worthy of note that the suggestion finally received Halleck's official approval and was in substance embodied in the order promulgated by the War Department, after the battle of Chickamauga, establishing the Military Division of the Mississippi.

In consequence of the conference on this trip, I was, shortly after getting back to Memphis, sent ahead of Grant and the rest of the staff to rejoin the army in the field. Fortunately, it had meanwhile captured the Confederate Post of Arkansas, which, so long as it was held by the enemy in force, was a menace to the navigation of the river between Memphis and Vicksburg. Having captured that post and its garrison of nearly five thousand men, McClelland and Sherman returned with their troops by transport to Milliken's Bend. My instructions were to look over the ground about Vicksburg and to study the question of capturing that important place as fully as circumstances would permit, in order that I might be prepared to advise with the general on his arrival. I reached the front January 27, and at once made a reconnaissance of Vicksburg and the heights upon which it is situated, from the lowlands in front of it. I made a careful study of the surrounding country and conditions, and became deeply impressed with the strength of the enemy's position, of its inaccessibility directly from the lowlands, and of the almost insuperable difficulty of carrying on military operations through the bottoms and swamps, cut up on both sides of the great river by a network of bayous, creeks, and tributary streams. Without roads, or bridges, this country with its unfordable water courses, even if undefended, could hardly be traversed by an army with its impedimenta. None but the larger bayous was navigable, except in times of flood, and at such times the country was widely submerged on both sides. The problem was to get a footing on the uplands of Mississippi, so that the army could maneuver against the enemy, maintain a base on the river, and keep up an un-

broken connection with the upper country from which it must draw its supplies and reinforcements.

Grant arrived the next day at Young's Point, and, accompanied by Sherman, McPherson, Blair, and Steele, and several staff officers, rode across the point in front of Vicksburg along the line of the proposed cut-off, or canal, to the bank of the river below the town. While he and they were discussing the problem before them for solution, Rawlins and I sat down on the trunk of a cottonwood tree which had been undercut and had fallen into the river. In response to a question as to what I thought of the situation, I pointed out that we could not defeat the enemy unless we could get at and engage him on fair terms at close quarters, and that we could not do that unless we could secure a footing with freedom to maneuver on the uplands. To that end we must either turn the enemy's position on the Yazoo at Hains's Bluff, effect a surprise by landing under cover of darkness on the waterfront of the city, or pass below Vicksburg and move into the interior against its rear from the first place on the east side of the river, at which a landing could be made.

During the conversation I called attention to the fact that another great army was about ready to advance from Middle Tennessee, under Rosecrans, that it would be almost impossible to time its movement with ours, or to make either army support the other; that they were separated by some three hundred miles, as the crow flies, and that it ought to be the policy of the Central Government to unite these armies and make their success certain, rather than to keep them separated and to risk the defeat of either. With the river transports at hand, it was evident that this might be done by using the lower Ohio and Tennessee rivers. But as Grant was operating on a line he had chosen himself, and was not over-strong in the confidence of the Government, it was thought that such a suggestion coming from him would be looked upon as evi-

dence that his own campaign had failed, and might therefore result in his removal. Manifestly he must confine himself to the solution of the problem in his own front, and in view of all the difficulties to be overcome by moving to the left, or trying to capture Vicksburg by a *coup-de-main*, the best way to solve the complicated problem, according to my judgment, was to march the troops across the point in front of Vicksburg, and run the batteries with the gunboats and transports under the cover of darkness. Once below the city, they could take the troops on board and ferry them to such landing place on the enemy's side as might be chosen further down the river.

Rawlins showed the deepest interest in my views as thus expressed and fully agreed with me at once in reference to the difficulties and dangers of carrying out either of the other plans. He recognized the practicability of the land march across the Peninsula west of the river, where there were open fields and no enemy to oppose, but expressed serious doubt as to the feasibility of running the batteries with the gunboats and transports. Fortunately he did not reject the idea as impracticable, but asked me to explain why I thought it could be carried into effect. Whereupon I told him I had come recently from Port Royal, where I had served as chief topographical engineer with Hunter and T. W. Sherman, that I had seen the earthen fortifications at Hilton Head made untenable by the fire of the wooden ships and gunboats, which had maneuvered nearly all day up one side and down the other between them without losing a single vessel or suffering material damage, and that I had become thoroughly convinced from what I had seen in person that our Mississippi fleet, although composed of comparatively light river steamers, could run by the Vicksburg batteries under cover of darkness without serious loss. I emphasized my opinion by dwelling upon the fact that the operations at Port Royal were conducted in a narrow harbor in open daylight, and lasted

several hours, during which each ship passed three or four times between sea-coast batteries on either side under the fire of heavy guns, and that in the case under consideration, the passage would be made at night, under fire from one side only. So confident was I of the result that I ventured the prediction that we should not lose more than one boat out of five. The sequel afterwards showed that no gunboats were lost or injured, that only one transport was burned, and one disabled so she could not use her own machinery. She was, however, afterwards lashed to another, and served with entire efficiency as a transport. The actual loss was only one in nine.

Rawlins became convinced, and before we got back to the headquarters' steamboat *Magnolia* assured me that he should advocate that plan without doubt or hesitation. After a visit the same afternoon to Admiral Porter, who was on his flagship in the mouth of the Yazoo River nearby, I started by a swift steamboat, under orders from Grant, to Helena, with instructions to take charge of such engineering operations as might be connected with cutting the Mississippi levee across the entrance to Moon Lake, the Yazoo Pass, the Coldwater, and the Tallahatchie rivers. It was hoped that a strong detachment of the army might be conducted by that intricate and crooked route of several hundred miles into the Yazoo and thereby to a footing on the Mississippi uplands above Hains's Bluff. The route was found to be practicable for gunboats and transports to the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha rivers, which form the Yazoo, and two divisions of infantry reached that place without material delay; but further progress was barred by fortifications and obstructions which could neither be battered down nor turned.

During my absence I kept Rawlins fully informed, both personally and officially, in reference to the needs and progress of the expedition, and in return received his most earnest

encouragement and support. On February 16 he sent me a letter, from which I quote as follows:

. . . Your letters have been duly received. I am delighted with your success but chagrined that we had not things in readiness to have taken an earlier advantage of it. By that probably the enemy's obstruction of the Pass might have been prevented. I have taken the liberty to show our General your private letters. Knowing his appreciation of your abilities, alone induced me to do this. It has done immense good I assure you. He has ordered Ross with ten regiments of infantry, in addition to the force now with you, for the Yazoo Expedition, and is bending every energy for an early move. Orders have been given for collecting a sufficient number of steamers, etc., and they have the right ring. All may yet be well. Some great success must be soon had or everything may be lost to us. This growing opposition to the war at home (judging from the papers) is much to be regretted. "Old Brains"² says you are to remain for active duty. I rather think you are, on that. I have great hopes of the "Canal" here. In ten days it ought to be completed. Lake Providence looks well and they are guarding against the misfortune that befell you³ in your enterprise. Another gun-boat ran the batteries at Vicksburg on Friday night last. We now have two below here, one of which, however, is a ram. They will communicate with General Banks if possible. Only twenty-two shots were fired as the last boat passed. . . .

Notwithstanding the slow progress of the Yazoo Pass expedition, due mainly to the obstruction of the Coldwater, which the enemy ahead of us caused by felling forest trees from its banks into the streams, Rawlins continued to have faith in our ultimate success. But while this route for a time seemed to be the only one holding out substantial hope of leading us through the enemy's outer defences, it is evident from the quotations given above that Rawlins had not lost sight of the turning movement across the peninsula in front of Vicksburg. But that the interest and anxiety felt at

² The army name for General Halleck.

³ The obstruction of the stream below while we were clearing it out above.

headquarters in the expedition through the Yazoo Pass were unabated is well shown by another letter from Rawlins, written at Young's Point, February 28, as follows:

. . . Yours of the 26th instant came duly to hand, official as well as private. Every one here is delighted with your success, in getting into the Coldwater, for whatever light we may hope for in the movement against Vicksburg comes from that direction. I send you the instructions to General Ross and to the naval officers, which should have been done before, but supposed as a matter of course General Ross would communicate them to you, as you were one of the principal parties mentioned in them. I also send you a report from General Dodge, received through General Hurlbut. Your report was forwarded to Old Brains who will discover from it that you are on active duty. A despatch boat, according to your suggestion, is ordered to report to General Prentiss by which I send this. General Grant will use every means necessary to make your expedition a success, rest assured of that. Your views on the subject strike me as the most feasible of any I have yet heard, and I assure you it is with much anxiety I look after you and pray for your success. I wish to God I were with you. I could at least sympathize with your plans and views.

We have had a terrible misfortune below, lost both the ram *Queen of the West* and the splendid gun boat *Indianola*, the result of positive disobedience of orders in each case. Had they kept together they must have kept the Mississippi River below here clear and each protected the other. The ram fell into the hands of the rebels with her armament complete, and with her and their other boats, they went down and sunk the *Indianola*. I say sunk the *Indianola*, but of this latter we are not positively certain. We know she is captured and only from rebel sources have we heard that she is sunk. You know, Wilson, they are smart and would like to deceive us into the belief that she is sunk whether she is or not.

The river has risen very much and impeded the work on the Canal here considerably, but we shall be able to resume it tomorrow. It is bound to succeed as a canal. You know I have taken large stock in its success.

I am glad to know that General Washburne pleases you so well. I have every confidence in his energy and ability, for energy is generally the introduction to ability and success.

McPherson's corps is or will be soon at Lake Providence. A more enthusiastic little army is nowhere to be found. Logan, God bless him, maintains the honor of our glorious state of Illinois. A truer patriot lives nowhere on the earth. Bowers is well and enthusiastic over your success. He is one of the diamonds. I send you copy of Brains's despatch. Let us hear from you often. Napoleon sends your letters. Good-bye old friend.

Notwithstanding the failure of the expedition through Yazoo Pass, as became certain in a few days, Sherman and Admiral Porter undertook to conduct a coöperating expedition of naval and land forces into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton by the bayous further south, but after incredible labor, they were also compelled to turn back. Renewed and more strenuous efforts were then made to dig a canal across the point in front of Vicksburg, while still another into Lake Providence was begun some seventy-five miles above, with the hope of reaching a navigable bayou further inland, and connecting with the river further down; but these plans failed one after the other, and, what was worse, took up so much time that the country began to cry out that the movement down the river was a failure and that Grant should be removed for incompetency. The old charges were renewed against him with increased violence, and although without foundation the situation was fast becoming desperate. Every possible route through the bayous, creeks and lateral rivers had been tried and failed. Swamp fevers and smallpox broke out, and while the army was growing in strength by virtue of the reënforcements coming forward, its progress seemed to be stayed by obstacles that could not be overcome.

On the statement of Rawlins to me, it is known that on the evening of Grant's first reconnaissance across the point in front of Vicksburg, he invited the generals, who had gone with him, to dinner on board the *Magnolia*, after which they naturally fell into a discussion of the important problem before them. It was not a formal council, but a long and anxious

conversation followed, during which various routes to the highlands north of Vicksburg were considered, without developing great confidence that any of them would prove practicable. It was agreed that the certainty of the spring rise in the great river and the difficulties which must result from the overflow sure to follow would necessarily add to the difficulties to be overcome. While the flood would make the bayous navigable, it would also make the adjacent lowlands impassable. It could hardly be hoped that the season between high and low water would be of just the right length nor that the water would come just high enough to serve without crippling the necessary movements. It was conceded that every possible route presented too many difficulties to permit accurate calculations or to justify certain hopes, and yet every route and plan must be fully tried.

After listening patiently to the discussion and noting carefully the difficulties to be overcome, Rawlins broke in with the remark that there was another and a more promising plan than any yet mentioned, but as it involved the boldest movement that could possibly be made, he hesitated to bring it forward. He was, however, encouraged by both Sherman and McPherson to give his views, and did so clearly and distinctly, in favor of marching the army across the peninsula and running the batteries with the gunboats and transports to a common meeting place below. He gave the reasons which had been developed in our conversation for believing that the movement could be successfully carried out; but, as he expected, the plan received but slight consideration from those present.

At the time Grant expressed no opinion in regard to it, but Sherman was particularly outspoken against it. He pronounced it clearly impracticable, and declared that neither the gunboats nor transports could live under the fire that would certainly be turned against them by the Confederate batteries on the bluffs. Rawlins strenuously adhered to his

views and contended that they would prevail in the end, but the non-professional volunteer staff officer was overborne for the time being. Each of the other possible plans received the preference over his; but as each in turn proved abortive, it strengthened him correspondingly in the advocacy of and the ultimate success of the one which he brought forward. He lost no opportunity thereafter of advocating it, and finally, when every other plan had been tried and failed, he had the satisfaction of seeing Grant openly adopt this one and carry it to a brilliant conclusion. Notwithstanding Grant's silence about the matter while it was under discussion, he tells us many years afterwards that he favored it from the first.⁴ While he does not explain his reticence, he doubtless felt that the very boldness of the plan and the success with which two gunboats afterwards ran the batteries imposed upon him the necessity of trying every other plan before venturing upon one so full of danger, but which, as it turned out, led to a series of extraordinary victories and secured for him a place among the greatest captains of modern times.

There can be no doubt that the foregoing gives correctly the origin and history of this plan, nor is there any reasonable doubt that Rawlins's persistent advocacy of it was finally one of the most important factors in its adoption and execution. The responsibility, however, was entirely Grant's. He was the chief commander and must have realized that if the plan failed it would ruin him, bring disaster upon the army, and jeopardize the Union cause. He doubtless understood from the first that he could not turn his back on Vicksburg, or withdraw his army from the advanced position it had maintained so long, without sealing his own doom. With unerring instinct, he realized that ruin was still more certain behind him than in his front, and like a brave and imperturbable man whose fate and fame were at stake, he resolved at the right moment "to put it to the touch, and win or lose it all!"

⁴ Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. I, p. 100.

When it was certain that the expedition through Yazoo Pass had failed, and orders were sent for the troops and gunboats to withdraw from that line, I returned to headquarters. Arriving there April 7, I found the army still working patiently, but making no satisfactory progress in any direction. The deadlock was complete, and how to break it was the question. After careful inspection and still more careful consideration, followed by nightly conferences with both Rawlins and Grant, the conclusion was reached that none of the canal projects could succeed, and that there was no alternative but to run the batteries and march the army below, or to confess ourselves beaten and the campaign at an end. Grant, in face of all the facts and of the continual pressure upon him, fully concurred in the conclusion, but Sherman, in whom Grant's confidence was unshaken, opposed it strongly from the first, and could not be brought to give it his approval till it was successfully under way. He thought the risks were too great, and paid me the compliment of asking me to join him in a final effort to convince Grant that he should not venture upon it, because, as he alleged, it would result in severing our communications with the North and might end in the destruction of the army in case of defeat.

After an earnest discussion in which the actual situation of the army, the state of the campaign, and the pressing necessity for success, together with all the dangers, were recounted, Sherman, without the slightest encouragement from me, remained firm against the plan, till after it was well under way. Shortly after we parted he wrote his celebrated letter against the plan, but fortunately he did not succeed in shaking Grant's resolution, though it may now be stated that it was mainly because of Sherman's opposition to the plan that he was left behind to protect the communications and to bring up the rear with his army corps when the success of the turning movement should no longer be in doubt.

McClelland, although never consulted by Grant, had in a

general way favored the idea from the first. Indeed, he had informed me before I left Washington to join Grant that he thought the true plan of operation would prove to be a turning movement to the south of Vicksburg, followed by a march eastward into the heart of Mississippi, and thence against the enemy's fortifications commanding the river and covering the town of Vicksburg. But this was obviously a speculation without details, based upon inadequate knowledge of the enemy's position, or means of defence, or even of the natural obstacles to be overcome. He had no accurate information of the facts as they were gradually developed by the successive steps of the campaign. As has been shown, those steps seem to have been necessary to convert what might have occurred to any experienced officer into a definite and distinct plan as well as to fully justify its adoption. The preliminary movements, resulting one after the other as they did in failure, were doubtless important factors in throwing the enemy off his guard and preventing that concentration of resources necessary to a successful defence.

As it turned out, the plan finally adopted was carried into effect without a single important mishap, but, strangely enough, the newspapers could hardly believe that the modest and discredited Grant had worked it out himself, but concurred with singular unanimity in suggesting that McPherson, the distinguished engineer, must have done it. This view was strengthened by the commendation that the professors at West Point persisted in bestowing upon that rising officer, as the one of all others most capable of conceiving such a plan and arranging its details, when in fact he had nothing whatever to do with either beforehand. He was present at the conference when Rawlins first brought it forward, but expressed no opinion nor was he ever consulted about it separately, and so far as known he neither favored nor opposed it till it was under way. His attitude up to that time was one of neutrality, but as was his custom, when the time came

for action, he threw himself into it with all his might. Although he did, at one time and another, some grumbling at the amount of work falling to his lot, especially after the affair at Raymond, he generally put forth his best efforts to make the campaign a success. Quite contrary to the estimation in which he was commonly held, he was in fact a cautious leader who regarded it as no part of his duty as a subordinate commander to work out general plans for the army. While he always gave prompt and willing obedience to those in authority over him, it should be observed that his high intelligence, his cheerful demeanor, aided by engaging personality, made him not only one of the best and most popular corps commanders in the army, but won for him the ardent and unvarying friendship of Grant, Rawlins, and Sherman, as well as of his own division and brigade commanders.

It is an interesting circumstance that, while the army was still floundering among the bayous and lowlands of Mississippi, several of the officers, who had more time than work on hand, were using their influence to secure promotion before they had earned it. Among them was one whose case is fully set forth in a letter without date from Rawlins to Mr. Washburne. As it illustrates the writer's independence as well as his sense of justice and his ideas of good policy, it is given in full as follows:

Headquarters Dept. of the Tenn.,
Before Vicksburg.

DEAR SIR:

I see by the papers the name of Napoleon Bonaparte Buford before the Senate for confirmation as Major General, which confirmation would be so unjust to the many brave and deserving men and officers of the "Army of the Tennessee" that I feel it my duty to call your attention, "as the friend of the Army" and the one to whom it owes so much for proper representation at Washington, to the fact that if possible so great a calamity, if it has not already fallen, may be prevented.

General Buford is a kind hearted and affectionate old gentle-

man, entertaining views at variance with our republican institutions, and believing the Government of England, because of its titled nobility, much preferable, and further, that the final result of this war will be the overthrow of our present system and give us dukes and lords and titled castes, and that his family will be among the nobility. This may seem idle talk and unmeaning declamation, but nevertheless he urged it with great vehemence and earnestness to General Richard Oglesby and myself as long ago as 1861 at Cairo, Illinois. General Oglesby will remember it, I have no doubt, just as I have stated it. To me, however, it evinced a diseased and addled brain, a weak and foolish old man.

His disobedience of positive orders given him on the field of battle at Belmont came near losing to the country his entire regiment, which was only saved from such fate by the fire from our gunboats driving him off of the main road, and thereby avoided meeting the enemy. Had he obeyed the orders given him by both Generals Grant and McClelland he would have helped defeat the enemy in the fight coming out of Belmont, saved the lives of many gallant men and embarked his regiment with the other troops, before reinforcements for the enemy could have crossed from Columbus. As it was, it was the merest accident by which he was saved. For his conduct at Belmont he was never afterwards trusted by Generals Grant or McClelland.

He was left behind on the expedition into Kentucky, and also against Forts Henry and Donelson. How he demeaned himself under General Pope I am unable to say, but know that since he returned to this command he has been absent from one cause or another most of the time, and when here is continuously insisting on the command of some post not in the field, and has at last succeeded in getting himself assigned by order from Washington to the command of Cairo, displacing General Tuttle, an officer who by his bravery and good conduct while leading the 2nd Iowa to the assault of the enemy's works at Donelson won the admiration of that best soldier of the Republic, the late lamented Major General C. F. Smith. From physical infirmities consequent upon exposure in the field, General Tuttle is unable for active field duty, but might well command the post of Cairo. Besides, the promotion of such men as General Buford is establishing too high a rate of pensions for the Government long to stand. But the greatest calamity to the army is the dissatisfaction it creates among men who remain in the field and do their duty under all

circumstances. He is placed over such men as Logan, Oglesby, Lauman and Dodge, and others too numerous to mention, all his superiors in everything that constitutes the soldier.

Logan deserves promotion for his unflinching patriotism and desire to whip the enemy by any route or means practicable. He should be made a Major General by all means, and if Buford is promoted, should be dated back to rank him. The same can be said of Oglesby and Dodge of Iowa by every officer or soldier in the army.

General Grant has written the President on the subject of promotions to-day. I am glad to see John E. Smith's appointment confirmed. His star will never lighten a coward's path or be disgraced by the one whose shoulder it adorns.

Everything here is as favorable as could be expected considering the high water. Work on the canal is progressing. Jones is here, making himself generally useful.⁵

Trusting that that which is for the best interests of the country may prevail, I remain, etc."

That this letter was known to, if not inspired, by Grant there can be but little doubt.

During the final stages of the Vicksburg Campaign, and after the tentative movements through the bayous had been abandoned, because of the insuperable difficulties encountered or the vigilance and enterprise of the enemy, a most important person appeared upon the scene and became one of Grant's most earnest supporters. I refer to Charles A. Dana, who had been sent to Grant's headquarters as the confidential representative of the War Department. He afterwards became Assistant Secretary of War. He joined headquarters on April 9, by which time aggressive operations had come to a temporary standstill. The conviction was growing throughout the country that Vicksburg could not be taken by the route upon which the army was operating and that both Grant and his plans were a failure. The temperance men, encouraged by his lack of success, were renewing their ef-

⁵ J. Russell Jones, then U. S. Marshal for Illinois, and afterwards Minister to Brussels during Grant's entire administration.

forts to secure his removal. The newspapers were criticising him again severely. The situation was a critical one. Rawlins was deeply concerned, and on my return to headquarters, April 11, at once acquainted me with the basis of his anxiety and of his hopes. He was one of the few men acquainted with the actual condition of affairs who had not been altogether cast down by the failure of the various operations which had been tried, but rather regarded them as necessary preliminaries to the great turning movement which he had brought forward and strenuously supported from the first. He fully concurred in my suggestion that we should take Dana into our confidence, not only in reference to the plan of operations which must now be carried into effect, but in regard to the real state of affairs at headquarters and to the basis of our own unshaken faith in Grant's capacity to lead the army to victory. We had early reached the conclusion that, if Grant should be relieved, the President would appoint McClelland or Sherman as his successor, and that neither of these generals, however patriotic or capable, would bring superior judgment, steadiness, or leadership to the great task which would thus devolve upon him.

Accordingly we made Dana our messmate, took him into our offices and tents, or had his own tent pitched adjacent to ours.

We invited Dana to ride with us on every occasion, and long before the campaign ended he became our constant companion. We confided in him without reservation, and he in turn confided fully in us. At that time he was suffering from weak or overworked eyes and found it difficult to write by the light of the usual camp candle, or lantern. Hence, it soon became customary for me to act at night as his amanuensis, a service which for obvious reasons I was always glad to render. He had met Grant first at Cairo, and later at Memphis, whither he had gone before entering the service for the purpose of buying cotton, but as yet no intimacy had

grown up between them. His position had now become both official and influential, and, although he was regarded by some with disfavor, it is but just to add that Grant, who fully shared our views, at once recognized their soundness, expressed his full concurrence in them, and thenceforth treated Dana with all the respect and confidence that his official position and personal qualities entitled him to expect. A genuine friendship, free from concealment or reservation, grew up between them and lasted without a break or cloud till after Grant became President, when he in a measure cut loose from his military counsellors and friends and entered upon the troubled sea of political and personal government.

In this connection it should be observed that Dana proved himself to be in every way worthy of the confidence reposed in him, and at no time ever modified his views as to Grant's real and substantial merit as a virtuous, competent and successful general, or ever permitted his campaigns and battles to be unjustly criticised or condemned in the columns of the journals he controlled. He had learned from personal observation the real facts about Grant and his fitness for command, and became a firm and efficient supporter of his plans, of his continuance in office, and of his final promotion to the chief command of our armies with the rank of lieutenant general.⁶

As the correspondent and intimate associate of Secretary Stanton and the President at Washington, there can be no doubt that Dana did all in his power to remove the prejudice against Grant from the minds of those high officials, and to build up in its place a feeling of respect and confidence. It is as praiseworthy as it is remarkable that he did this without concealing or minimizing the peculiarities of the general, or of his staff, or of his subordinate commanders. His position was a delicate one, but he filled it with such tact and

⁶ For a full account of his services and character, as well as his relations with Grant, see Wilson's "Life of Charles A. Dana," Harper & Bros., 1907.

ability as to satisfy the Government, to strengthen the hands of Grant, and at the same time to win his personal friendship. Rawlins from the first recognized this even more fully than did Grant. He honored and respected Dana to the last, and when Grant became President, exerted his influence, as he thought, successfully in behalf of Dana's appointment to the principal government office at New York. Indeed, on the strength of what must have passed between the President and himself, he authorized me in a personal interview to notify Dana that his appointment as Collector of Customs would be made. But unfortunately Washburne, who was called temporarily to the Cabinet as Secretary of State, for some reason, never explained, interfered with the arrangements, and, either on his own account or by direction of the President, caused the appointment to be given to Moses Grinnell, a far less able and efficient man.

Thirty years afterwards, Dana published his "Recollections of the Civil War,"⁷ giving many interesting details of his relations with Grant and many graphic sketches of the general and staff officers he met during the various campaigns in which he took part, but as these sketches are not germane to this narrative, I confine myself to the following quotations:

After Grant, I spent more time at Vicksburg with his assistant adjutant general, Colonel John A. Rawlins, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, than with anybody else. Rawlins was one of the most valuable men in the army, in my judgment. He had but a limited education, which he had picked up at the neighboring school and in Galena, Illinois, near which place he was born and where he had worked himself into the law; but he had a very able mind, clear, strong, and not subject to hysterics. He bossed everything at Grant's headquarters. He had very little respect for persons, and a rough style of conversation. I have heard him curse at Grant when, according to his judgment, the general was doing something that he thought he had better not do. But he was entirely devoted to his duty, with the clearest judg-

⁷ D. Appleton & Co., 1898, p. 27 *et seq.*

ment, and perfectly fearless. Without him Grant would not have been the same man. Rawlins was essentially a good man, though he was one of the most profane men I ever knew; there was no guile in him—he was as upright and as genuine a character as I ever came across.

James H. Wilson I had first met at Milliken's Bend, when he was serving as chief topographical engineer and assistant inspector general of the Army of the Tennessee. He was a brilliant man intellectually, highly educated, and thoroughly companionable. We became warm friends at once and were together a great deal throughout the war. Rarely did Wilson go out on a specially interesting tour of inspection that he did not invite me to accompany him, and I never failed, if I were at liberty, to accept his invitations. Much of the exact information about the condition of the works which I was able to send to Mr. Stanton, Wilson put in my way.

Shortly after the capture of Vicksburg, Dana returned to Washington; but on the way North sent Stanton two notable letters, from the second of which, dated at Cairo, Illinois, July 13, 1863, I quote as follows:

. . . Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlins, Grant's assistant adjutant general, is a very industrious, conscientious man, who never loses a moment, and never gives himself any indulgence except swearing and scolding. He is a lawyer by profession, a townsman of Grant's, and has a great influence over him, especially because he watches him day and night, and whenever he commits the folly of tasting liquor hastens to remind him that at the beginning of the war he gave him (Rawlins) his word of honor not to touch a drop as long as it lasted. Grant thinks Rawlins a first-rate adjutant, but I think this is a mistake. He is too slow, and can't write the English language correctly without a great deal of careful consideration. Indeed, illiterateness is a general characteristic of Grant's staff, and in fact of Grant's generals and regimental officers of all ranks.

Major Bowers, judge-advocate of Grant's staff, is an excellent man, and always finds work to do.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, inspector general, is a person of similar disposition. He is a captain of engineers in the regular army, and has rendered valuable services in that capacity. The

fortifications of Hains's Bluff were designed by him and executed under his direction. His leading idea is the idea of duty, and he applies it vigorously and often impatiently to others. In consequence he is unpopular among all who like to live with little work. But he has remarkable talents and uncommon executive powers, and will be heard from hereafter.

I now return to the Vicksburg campaign which Rawlins had done so much to get started in the right direction. In addition to supervising the duties of the Adjutant General's office, he had succeeded Webster as ex-officio Chief of Staff, and as such took an active interest in everything connected with the campaign, as well as with the relations between Grant and his subordinates.

At the battle of Port Gibson, fought mainly by McClernand and the Thirteenth Army Corps, Rawlins made a special effort to bring about a reconciliation between Grant and that ambitious but irascible general, but failed. McClernand, although slow in getting across the river and starting to the front, had behaved with his usual gallantry from the time he got in reach of the enemy. Without waiting for orders or for reënforcements he attacked vigorously and gained a substantial victory, which was specially important at that stage of the campaign. It not only made good our advanced position on the Mississippi Uplands, and resulted in driving the enemy back, but gave increased confidence to McPherson's corps, and to the invading army. Rawlins naturally agreed with me that it was a good occasion to establish a better feeling between Grant and his next in rank, but the breach was too great to be bridged over in that manner. Grant, who arrived on the field after the action was practically at an end, refused with an unusual show of feeling to make any advance towards a reconciliation, and in the meeting which soon occurred with McClernand displayed no cordiality whatever, but contented himself with formally extending his thanks and directing him to push forward at once in pursuit. This

was done, but the advance halted for the night at the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre, where the retreating enemy had destroyed the highway bridge. McClernand, who was expected to repair it and move on, also halted, because, as he claimed, his troops were worn out with marching and fighting. On receiving information of this fact, I hastened to the front as acting chief engineer, and took the repair of the bridge in hand.

As soon as the repairs were finished, which was before dawn the next morning, the troops advanced to the north fork of the bayou, some five miles further on. Here they found that a second but still more important bridge had been burned, and again halted till it could be repaired. This was done during the night while the generals and the troops were sleeping. As before, Rawlins gave his active assistance and support, both in helping at the work and in detailing and bringing forward the necessary detachments to carry it on. Having been reared as a woodsman, he was quick to see what could be done with simple tools and the rude materials at hand. He neither rested nor slept till the breaches in the bridge were repaired, and the troops were again in motion. No man knew better than he that under such circumstances time was of the utmost value. Hence he made it his personal business to see that not a minute should be lost, either in the repair of the bridges or in sending the troops across them in pursuit of the enemy. Most adjutants would have contented themselves with issuing the necessary orders and leaving others to see that they were carried out, but this was not Rawlins's way of doing business. He had committed himself too earnestly in favor of the plan of campaign and had labored too long to get it adopted to rest supinely while others were working out the details upon which its success depended. Besides, he had the true instincts of a soldier, and lost no opportunity to learn from others how the practical work of an army should be done. At this time he was as robust

and hardy as any man in the service, and while he was not and perhaps never became a model adjutant general or "paper man," he was fast learning the higher duties which were to devolve upon him thereafter as chief of staff.

During the advance to Hankinson's Ferry, and the concentration of the army near that place, Rawlins shared all the anxieties and labors of his chief. Every order, whether verbal or written, passed through his hands and was delivered on time. Not one went astray, was badly expressed, or was in any degree uncertain in tenor or obscure in meaning. In the advance through Raymond to Jackson, which resulted in the capture of the latter place, with its military depots and railroad crossing, as well as in the splendid countermarch by which the united army threw itself upon the enemy at Champion's Hill, drove him from the field, forced him across the Big Black, and finally shut him up in Vicksburg, Rawlins was the inseparable companion and counsellor of the commanding general. Realizing, as before, the value of time, after the victory at Champion's Hill and the pursuit of the enemy to the Big Black, he assisted in repairing the railroad bridge and in locating and constructing three floating bridges across which the troops were pushed without delay, to close in upon the fortifications of Vicksburg. As at Bayou Pierre, these bridges were laid under cover of darkness while the generals and the troops were resting from the exhausting work of the day. But again Rawlins helped the engineers without taking the slightest rest till the bridges were completed and the troops were again on the march to the scene of their final victory.

Like his chief, Rawlins was making tremendous strides in the art of war. Both had learned lessons and gained experience of extraordinary value, not the least of which was that each was in a measure necessary to the other. Perfect confidence existed between them. Rawlins's fears for his friend had become measurably allayed and, so long as active

operations were going on, there seemed to be neither temptation nor danger in the way. But when communication had been reestablished with the river, and the chance of ultimate failure was at an end, although the tentative assaults upon the enemy's fortifications at Vicksburg had failed, the army necessarily settled down into the toilsome occupations of a regular siege. The exhilaration of victory gradually disappeared. The hot weather of a Southern summer came on and a feeling of lassitude, if not of exhaustion, took possession of both officers and men. One day was like another, where all were hot, depressing, and disagreeable. The surrounding country had been cleared of its green food supplies, and all were compelled to live entirely on soldier's rations.

Early in June, Grant, like the rest, began to feel the relaxing effects of hard work and exposure, and while on an expedition by steamer up the Yazoo River to visit an outlying detachment in the neighborhood of Satartia, "fell sick,"⁸ whereupon Dana, who had been invited to go, took charge of the boat and turned it about, to its starting point. The trip was abandoned and the party returned to headquarters about midnight. An hour or more later Rawlins, who had learned the details of the excursion from those who had participated in it, and having made discoveries of his own, wrote Grant a remarkable letter, which has passed into history. As it produced a profound impression on all who knew about it, and was fraught with the greatest consequences to the country besides, it is given here in full:

Before VICKSBURG, Miss., June 6th, 1863, 1 A. M.

DEAR GENERAL:

The great solicitude I feel for the safety of this army leads me to mention, what I had hoped never again to do, the subject of your drinking. This may surprise you, for I may be, and trust I am, doing you an injustice by unfounded suspicion, but if in

⁸ Dana's "Recollections of the Civil War," pp. 82-83.

error, it had better be on the side of the country's safety than in fear of offending a friend.

I have heard that Dr. McMillan at General Sherman's a few days ago induced you, notwithstanding your pledge to me, to take a glass of wine, and to-day when I found a box of wine in front of your tent, and proposed to move it, which I did, I was told you had forbid its being taken away, for you intended to keep it until you entered Vicksburg, that you might have it for your friends; and to-night, when you should, because of the condition of your health, if nothing else, have been in bed, I find you where the wine bottle has just been emptied, in company with those who drink and urge you to do likewise; and the lack of your usual promptness and decision, and clearness of expressing yourself in writing, conduces to confirm my suspicion.

You have the full control over your appetite, and can let drinking alone. Had you not pledged me the sincerity of your honor early last March, that you would drink no more during the war, and kept that pledge during your recent campaign, you would not to-day have stood first in the world's history as a successful military leader. Your only salvation depends upon your strict adherence to that pledge. You cannot succeed in any other way. . . .

As I have before stated, I may be wrong in my suspicions, but if one sees that which leads him to suppose a sentinel is falling asleep on his post, it is his duty to arouse him; and if one sees that which leads him to fear the General commanding a great army is being seduced to that step which he knows will bring disgrace upon that General and defeat upon his command, if he fails to sound the proper note of warning, the friends, wives and children of those brave men whose lives he permits to remain thus in peril, will accuse him while he lives, and stand swift witnesses of wrath against him in the day when all shall be tried.

If my suspicions are unfounded, let my friendship for you and my zeal for my country be my excuse for this letter; and if they are correctly founded, and you determine not to heed the admonitions and prayers of this hasty note, by immediately ceasing to touch a single drop of any kind of liquor, no matter by whom asked or under what circumstances, let my immediate relief from duty in this department be the result. I am, General,

Yours respectfully,

JOHN A. RAWLINS.

Rawlins, who was deeply moved, at once made the action he had taken known to Dana and myself, as well as to Bowers, who was his inseparable companion and principal assistant throughout the war. He later told McPherson and Sherman about the letter and the occasion for it. They were Grant's closest friends, and deeply interested in every circumstance which could in any way affect his success. But the context of the letter was not made public till after the death of both Rawlins and Grant, when it was given to the newspapers and received the widest circulation. Its authenticity is undoubted. It has since been frequently cited by writers and orators as reflecting equal credit upon the courage of the man who wrote it and the good sense of the man who received it.

It appears from an endorsement which Rawlins placed on his retained copy of the letter, in the possession of his family, that his admonitions were not resented, but were heeded for a season. This was certainly the case till after the capture of Vicksburg, but it is well known that his apprehensions were never entirely dismissed. Through succeeding campaigns and to the last day of his life he was haunted by the fear that the appetite might at any time break loose again and endanger Grant's military plans or bring discredit upon his civil administration.

Lincoln, who doubtless received from Dana in due time a correct understanding of Grant's real merits, as well as of the influences which were constantly at work to undermine and overthrow him, seems to have dismissed all serious apprehensions after Vicksburg, and to have given unquestioning confidence and support to him till the end of the war. Rumors of irregularities at New Orleans, and at rare intervals during the final campaign in Virginia, did not fail to reach Washington. It is known, besides, that McClernand, as did others later, prepared a statement immediately after he was relieved from duty in the field, reflecting upon Grant's

personal habits, and threatened more than once to publish it. But this was not done, and whatever may have been the underlying facts, it is certain that both the Government and the country at large concurred in ignoring them, and in giving the General a free hand with increased rank and unlimited means for the overthrow of the Confederate armies.

After his courageous letter, the part played by Rawlins had still more to do with Grant's personal fortunes and policies than with the adjutant general's office or with the details of army administration. Ably seconded by Bowers in preparing and issuing orders and in keeping the records, he devoted himself unceasingly to building up and maintaining harmonious relations between his chief and his subordinate commanders, as well as with the Government at Washington.

As has been seen, McClelland and his attitude towards the army commander, as well as towards the other corps commanders, had been a subject of solicitude from the first. His intimate relations with the President, his fellow-townsmen, had doubtless laid him under suspicion of being one of the channels of communication through which information prejudicial to Grant reached the Government as well as the newspapers from time to time, and this suspicion was in a certain degree strengthened by his congratulatory order to the Thirteenth Army Corps, and its publication in a St. Louis newspaper before it was received at army headquarters. As it seemed to claim undue credit for the Thirteenth, and to reflect unfairly upon the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps, both Sherman and McPherson protested officially against it. The case was a serious one on its merits, but it had been preceded by an outburst of anger and threatened disobedience of orders on the part of McClelland, which precipitated a crisis that Rawlins neither desired to stay nor could have stayed had he tried.

Shortly after the investment of Vicksburg I carried a verbal order from Grant to McClelland, directing him to

send more troops to the crossings of the Big Black, for the purpose of strengthening the defences in that direction; but instead of yielding cheerful compliance with the order, the choleric general declared emphatically that he would not obey it, and would not be dictated to any longer by Grant or anybody else. He intimated that he considered himself in supreme command, and punctuated this with violent language, which appeared to be intended as much for me as for those in higher authority. I expressed my amazement not only at the general's insubordination but at the language in which he had chosen to express it. This was at once followed by a declaration that the oaths he had used were not intended for me, but simply as an expression of his "intense vehemence upon the subject-matter." But the impression produced was an unfavorable one, which I felt it my duty not only to resent but to communicate to Rawlins, and which he in turn communicated to Grant.

The effect of this incident was further to heighten the discontent at headquarters with McClernand. It convinced Rawlins at least that an open rupture would soon take place, which would necessarily result in the relief of the subordinate, no matter what might be his claims upon the Government or his relations with the President. Grant had already shown himself to be a patient and prudent man, of unusual reserve and self-possession, with whom a more impulsive man was always at a disadvantage. His modesty and self-control were at times considered as an indication of weakness, whereas they were really the cover of a firm and resolute will. He was naturally kind and conciliatory, without being effusive. He was, above all, considerate towards both subordinates and equals. Indeed, he was the last man to blame those under his command inconsiderately or unjustly or to look for a purpose on the part of any one to treat him personally with disrespect or officially with insubordination, but when his suspicion was

once aroused, he was quite as slow to forget or to forgive an offence as he was to perceive it.

As before intimated, McClelland was not only under suspicion but was regarded by many as a rival whose pretensions might under certain conditions receive the backing of the Government. Grant therefore appealed to Halleck to know how far he could count upon the support of his official superiors. Dana, who had become fully informed as to the merits of the case, about the same time sounded the Secretary of War. Both received the assurance that Grant was in full authority and must exercise his own judgment in reference to every question arising within the limits of his command.

Strengthened and reassured in this way, Grant was swift to act upon McClelland's congratulatory order as soon as he could satisfy himself of its authenticity and of the reasonableness of the protests which had been made against it. The frank avowal of McClelland that it was genuine, and that he was prepared to maintain every statement it contained, gave Rawlins, who had become much more impatient than his chief, a sound basis upon which to urge instant action. Grant, now thoroughly aroused, needed but little pushing, and at once directed the issuance of an order relieving McClelland from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, instructing him to proceed to such point in Illinois as he might select, and to report thence to the Secretary of War for further orders. The order was written on the night of June 17, with the intention that I should deliver it the first thing the next morning. It so happened that my duties had kept me out that day till about midnight, but on my return to camp I found Rawlins up and waiting for me. As this was a somewhat unusual circumstance, I made haste to ask what it meant, and was informed of the general's order relieving McClelland and his wish that I should deliver it as soon after daylight as possible. As I was in full accord with its purposes, and felt that delay might be fatal, I asked permission

to take it to McClelland that night, late as it was, and to notify the general next in command, on my way, of its import.

We were at that time expecting a sortie of the beleaguered garrison, for the purpose of breaking through our lines and forming a junction with Johnston, who was maneuvering in the open country with a view to compelling us to raise the siege. It was thought that the sortie, if made, would probably be directed against the front held by the Thirteenth Corps, which covered the two principal roads leading to the interior of the State, and it was regarded as certain that, whatever might be his infirmities of temper or of character, McClelland would make a gallant resistance. His troops were veterans and, although somewhat loose in discipline, had never been beaten. They were justly regarded as among the best in the army and sure to hold their lines of circumvallation even against a night sortie in force, if any soldiers could. It was also regarded as certain that McClelland, who with all his shortcomings was an officer of undaunted courage, would be in the thick of the fight; in which event Grant would probably overlook his past offences and withhold the order, which would merely defer the trouble to another day. This statement of the case seemed to be conclusive, and without referring the matter again to Grant, Rawlins authorized me to deliver the order of relief at once.

McClelland's headquarters were four miles to the south, the night was dark, and the roads both crooked and obscure, but accompanied by the provost marshal, Colonel Marsh, with a detachment of four mounted men and a non-commissioned officer, I reached there at 1 A. M., and after a few minutes' interview, attended by all the formalities appropriate to the occasion, I received an acknowledgment from the general that he understood that the order went into effect immediately, and that under no circumstances which could arise was he to exercise any further command in that army. It was sup-

posed that his confidence in the support of the President and Secretary of War might cause him to contest the order or even to resist it, but fortunately this supposition was unfounded. It was, however, an occasion of grave importance, which filled Rawlins with anxiety and kept him up till I returned at half-past two in the morning with the report that the order had been delivered, and that the general had given proper assurances that he understood it, and would observe its provisions in accordance with the verbal instructions which I had given in explanation thereof.

From that time till the surrender of Vicksburg, which occurred on the 4th of July, perfect harmony prevailed in the investing army. Indeed, harsh as it may seem at this time, the example which had been made of McClernand, the aggressive and ambitious leader, the powerful and popular politician, the friend of the President, and by no means without friends in the army, had a good effect upon the discipline of the higher officers, and did much towards making the Army of the Tennessee, composed as it was entirely of volunteers, many of whom were politicians, ever afterwards one of the most subordinate, cheerful and effective organizations that ever upheld the national cause.

While Grant's great but hazardous campaign had resulted in defeating the enemy in detail at Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and the Big Black; in the capture of a strongly fortified city with its defending army of over thirty thousand men; in the opening of the Mississippi River from Cairo to the Gulf; and in effectually severing the Confederacy into two great parts, neither of which could coöperate with or support the other, that of Rosecrans, after a most brilliant opening, followed by the expulsion of the enemy from Tennessee, finally came to an unfortunate end a few weeks later at Chickamauga.

In looking back upon the events of this year, we can now see, however, that they did not yield all the advantages that

should have flowed from them. The national Government was strangely negligent of its opportunities and of the dangers by which it was beset. Grant's victory, resulting first and last in the destruction and capture of an army of sixty thousand men, was in itself both Napoleonic and complete. Coming as it did on the heels of the great disappointment felt by the country at the escape of Lee's army, with its organizations and trains intact, from the field of Gettysburg, it was received without question as ending the war in the Southwest, and yet the victory was seriously marred by the lenient terms of the surrender by which the captured garrison of Vicksburg was paroled and allowed to march back into the Confederacy with its haversacks filled and its regimental, brigade and division organizations unbroken.

It will be recalled by those familiar with the history of the War that in consequence of the deadlock, which had taken place in the East between the National and Confederate authorities in regard to the exchange of prisoners, the Confederate Government made haste to ignore and repudiate this capitulation and to order the entire force covered by it back to their colors. Consequently it was but a few weeks till every Confederate regiment paroled by Grant at Vicksburg was rearmed and again doing duty in garrison, or on detachment in Eastern Mississippi and Alabama, in place of troops drawn from those regions and sent to reënforce Bragg in Northeastern Georgia. On the other hand, it is apparent that if the Vicksburg prisoners had been sent to the prison camps of the North, as Rawlins and others advised, and nearly everybody expected, or had two corps of Grant's army been sent at once, as could easily have been done, to reënforce Rosecrans, as Longstreet was sent to reënforce Bragg, the overwhelming disaster of Chickamauga would have certainly been avoided.

When it is remembered that Vicksburg surrendered July 4, that the battle of Chickamauga was fought September 19,

or fully six weeks later, and that the distance between those two important points by water and rail could have been easily covered in ten or twelve days, as was the much greater distance from Washington to Chattanooga a couple of months afterwards, it will be seen that the Government at Richmond greatly outgeneraled the Government at Washington during that eventful summer. Grant and Rosecrans, commanding independent armies, did their part well enough with the means at their disposal, but neither had discretion to go to the assistance of the other. To make such a concentration of force pertains to the higher functions of the General-in-Chief or of the War Department, and that neither had the sagacity to order it is one of the most unaccountable facts of the war. Grant was allowed to visit Banks at New Orleans, entirely outside the field of active military operations, while Sherman, with the bulk of Grant's army, was sent on a wild-goose chase via Demopolis in the direction of Montgomery.

The Confederates meanwhile were making war on more scientific principles. Longstreet had been detached from Lee's army and was on the way to reënforce Bragg on the Chickamauga, in Northwestern Georgia, in consequence of which a desperate battle was fought, and a great defeat was inflicted upon the over-confident Rosecrans and his army at Chickamauga.

This calamity thoroughly aroused the authorities at Washington, and convinced them that they must concentrate without delay at Chattanooga, a few miles to the rear, an overwhelming force with which to stay the Confederate advance and make good the hold of the Union army upon that great strategic centre.

It was also seen at once that, if the Confederates could send Longstreet's corps from Virginia by their poorly constructed and poorly equipped railroads, the Union administration could send a corresponding force from the same theatre of operations without any greater risk than their opponents had taken.

Accordingly they sent Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, an aggregate force of twenty-three thousand men, by rail from Bristow Station, Virginia, to Stevenson, Alabama, near Chattanooga, a distance of twelve hundred and thirty miles, in eleven and a half days.⁹ It was now seen that Grant's army, resting at or near Vicksburg, could also be drawn upon, and after the loss of much time, the greater part of it under Sherman was ordered by the way of Memphis to reinforce Rosecrans at Chattanooga.

Meanwhile the enemy had closed in upon Chattanooga and broken its railway connection with the North. Winter was approaching, the rainy season had begun, the roads to the rear were rough and muddy, food and supplies were becoming scarce, the horses of the artillery and the mules of the wagon trains were starving, and the necessity of a further retreat had already been conceded, unless a way could be found to regain possession of the railway to the rear, and to reopen "the cracker line." But what was most important of all was that it had at last become apparent that a supreme commander was necessary on the ground to give direction and unity to the operations which must at once be undertaken. Under these circumstances the hero of Vicksburg was naturally assigned to the chief command. The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were now united into the Military Division of the Mississippi, as Grant had recommended in the opening days of the Vicksburg campaign. The modest general had played his part with consummate ability and success, but, as has been shown, his friend and adjutant general had contributed a full and unusual share not only towards the adoption of the plan which had led to such splendid results but to the maintenance of that authority over his subordinates, and to the establishment of that discipline among the rank and file without which

⁹ For particulars, see "Lincoln in the Telegraph Office," by David Homer Bates, pp. 192 *et seq.* Century Co., 1907.

neither tactics, however good, nor strategy, however brilliant, could prevail.

That Grant harbored no ill-feeling on account of Rawlins's manly letter of June 6 is conclusively shown by the fact that he not only continued Rawlins in the confidential position of adjutant general but recommended him, on July 27, for promotion, along with a number of others whom he also praised for "gallant and meritorious services," and for "extreme fitness for higher command." It was no slight honor for any one to find his name coupled with those of Dodge and William Sooy Smith, who were selected for promotion to the rank of Major General, or with those of such fighting colonels as Gresham, Corse, and Force, who were designated for the rank of Brigadier General. Much to his surprise and gratification, Rawlins found his name in this distinguished list, and it is worthy of notice that, although he was only a staff officer, he was singled out of the entire lot for special mention in the concluding paragraph of the General's letter, as follows:

. . . Lieutenant Colonel Rawlins has been my assistant adjutant general from the beginning of the Rebellion. No officer has now a more honorable reputation than he has; and I think I can safely say that he would make a good corps commander. This promotion I would particularly ask as a reward of merit. . . .

The appointment of Brigadier General was promptly made, but notwithstanding the unusual terms in which it had been asked for, the Senate was slow to give its consent. Indeed, it did not do so until the middle of the next year, and then only in response to a personal appeal made by Grant, April 4, 1864, after his own appointment as Lieutenant General, to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, as follows:

. . . I would most respectfully but earnestly ask for the confirmation of Brigadier General John A. Rawlins by your honor-

able body. General Rawlins has served with me from the beginning of the Rebellion. I know he has most richly earned his present position. He comes the nearest being indispensable to me of any officer in the service. But if his confirmation is dependent on his commanding troops, he shall command troops at once. There is no department commander, near where he has served, that would not most gladly give him the very largest and most responsible command his rank would entitle him to.

Believing a short letter on this subject more acceptable than a long one, I will only add that it is my earnest desire that General Rawlins should be confirmed; . . .

In conclusion Grant ventured to express the fear that the Senate's failure to confirm this worthy officer would work injury to him as well as to the service, because it might fairly be considered as due to the fact that the officer had made himself too valuable in a lower position. But this is not all. When the news that the President had acted favorably in regard to Rawlins's promotion was received at Vicksburg, where Rawlins remained with the headquarters of the Department during the summer after the capture of Vicksburg, Grant made haste, August 13, 1863, to write to their fellow-townsmen and representative in Congress, E. B. Washburne, as follows:

. . . Rawlins and Maltby have been appointed brigadier generals. These are richly deserved promotions. Rawlins especially is no ordinary man. The fact is, had he started in this war in the line instead of the staff, there is every probability that he would be to-day one of our shining lights. As it is he is better and more favorably known than any other officer in the army who has filled only staff appointments. Some men—too many of them—are only made by their staff appointments, while others give respectability to their position. Rawlins is of the latter class.¹⁰

These letters show beyond question that Grant had the highest regard for the fidelity and usefulness of Rawlins,

¹⁰ Richardson's "Personal History of U. S. Grant," pp. 343-346.

and while it may be contended that they overestimate his fitness in point of technical knowledge and experience at that time for the command of an army corps, there can be no doubt that they bear the best possible testimony to his military aptitude, as well as to the soundness of his judgment and the elevation of his character. They bear equally conclusive testimony both to Grant's own magnanimity and to the delicacy with which he expressed his appreciation of the services which his friend had rendered to him, and which his adjutant general had rendered to the country at large.

That the letter last quoted put the ever-vigilant Washburne on his mettle to procure the favorable action of the Senate on Rawlins's promotion is well known to their common acquaintances. He had been from the first the devoted friend of both Grant and Rawlins. They were his neighbors and constituents at Galena, where their advancement was regarded as his advancement. He had seen them at work in the field, and had heard in what estimation they were held by those who served with and under them. He had especially come to know how necessary Rawlins was, not only to Grant's self-control but to his military career as well. They stood absolutely together in his mind, and the success of one was the success of the other. It was for this reason that he worked at all times willingly and cheerfully for the promotion of Rawlins, by the same steps, if not to the same degree, that Grant was promoted or showed himself to be worthy of it.

We may now pause to consider more fully what sort of man Rawlins, the charcoal burner, had become. Attending the neighborhood school for eight terms, transferring to the town High School for a single term, working alternately at the charcoal pits and the farm, and gradually saving money enough, he entered the Rock River Seminary. Here he studied the higher branches for two academic years and hoped to graduate, but as his money gave out, he was forced to

return to charcoal burning for a season. But in doing so he was conscious that his education, though not complete, was as good as that of the average young man of the period.

We have seen how he lighted his pits again, how his team gave out as he was hauling his charcoal to market, how he sold his load, his wagon, and his oxen to the railroad contractors, and then how he pushed on to Galena, where he studied law and in due time was admitted to the bar, became city attorney, and made himself known as a good lawyer and a rising man. He had already developed a strong taste and considerable skill in public speaking. Although lacking in city polish and refinement, he was far from being rough or illiterate. He had a genuine taste for good books, and had read such as were within reach. He sought good company, as became a sober, serious, and ambitious youth, and, like many of his friends at the Seminary, he early developed a decided taste for public affairs.

As the times were stormy and "the noble controversies of politics" uppermost in everybody's mind, he soon began to take a leading part in the community of which he was a citizen. A Democrat by conviction as well as by inheritance, he became an ardent supporter of Douglas and his doctrine of "popular sovereignty," and when the Presidential election of 1860 came on he was chosen by his party in the Galena district as its candidate for the honorable position of Presidential elector. Challenged by his opponent to a joint debate, he accepted the challenge and stumped the district, with the result that his eloquence and moderation certified him to the State at large as one of its most promising young men.

After all efforts to prevent civil war had failed, and the South Carolinians had precipitated the conflict by firing upon the flag at Fort Sumter, Rawlins's patriotic speech at the Galena mass meeting had produced a genuine surprise and a genuine sensation. It aroused the faint-hearted, dissipated

the fears of the doubtful and stirred a raging fever in the minds of every loyal citizen who was fortunate enough to hear him. It made Grant his friend, and brought them both to the threshold of a new career, in which one became the leading general of his time, and the other his adjutant and finally his chief of staff.

We have seen how Rawlins, without military knowledge or experience but with a full sense of his own unfitness, took up the duties of his new position, patiently and persistently learning them one by one, till all were creditably performed. We have seen how at the threshold of his military life he was brought face to face with serious charges against his chief; how he refuted them, and made himself responsible for his good behavior; how he became his monitor and watchful guardian, the enemy of those who pandered to his weakness, and the friend of all who helped to stay him from falling.

No one can read the narrative, from Belmont to Vicksburg, in which Grant's star was rising to its zenith, without perceiving that Rawlins's task was scarcely less difficult than Grant's, or without acknowledging that he performed it with such tact, cleverness, firmness, and patriotism as to merit not only all that Grant could do for him but to entitle him to all the rank and consideration his country finally bestowed upon him. When it is remembered that the staff officer who played this important but unusual part never put himself forward to claim credit, reward, or promotion, but silently and firmly effaced himself, while doing all he could to shield his friend from criticism, to advance his fortunes, and to ensure his final triumph, it must be admitted that Rawlins had grown to a noble and fearless manhood, in every way worthy of the admiration of all who read this simple story.

The part played by him in bringing forward and advocating the plan by which Johnston's army was defeated and Vicks-

burg with its garrison were captured lifted him to another sphere and to another altitude. Hitherto, he had concerned himself mainly with the routine duties of his office and with the personal interests of his chief, but this raised him to the rank of military adviser and strategist, in which, as this narrative will show, he was destined to the end of the war to exert a powerful influence over the plans and policies by which it was brought to a fortunate conclusion.

Finally it must be admitted that the emergency which was signalized by Rawlins's letter of June 6, 1863, was one which called for courage of a different sort from that of the soldier in the fighting line. To such as are familiar with military hierarchy and its rules, it will appear almost incredible that an adjutant should have taken such a liberty as he did; and when it is recalled that he did this entirely without advice from any one and on his own responsibility, it must be conceded, in the words of Grant's letter of August 13, that "Rawlins especially was no ordinary man." When it is recalled in addition that Grant, the next year, in asking for Rawlins's confirmation as brigadier general, strengthened his former recommendation by the statement that "he comes nearest being indispensable to me of any officer in the service," it becomes certain that the admonitions of a friend had not only given no offence in his case but had rather drawn closer the bonds of interest and respect between the parties to the incident. Indeed, Grant's written declarations in favor of Rawlins receive a peculiar significance from the remonstrance and the circumstances which called it forth. Happily, so far as known, they stand alone in our annals and may well be regarded as reflecting unusual credit upon both of the men connected with them.

When Vicksburg surrendered and filled the country with the fame of General Grant and the Army of the Tennessee, Rawlins had reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was in his thirty-third year, a man of medium size and weight,

about five feet seven inches high, with black hair, dark, almost black, eyes, and swarthy complexion. His features were regular, without being noticeably handsome. He had no color in his cheeks, and made no pretension to elegance of deportment or military bearing. He was just a plain, blunt man, full of purpose and vigor, of austere habits, severe morals, inflexible will, resolution and courage, and of most aggressive temper. He had no thought but for the success of our arms and the preservation of the Union under the Constitution and laws. American to the innermost recesses of his heart, and alive to the drift of public opinion, with a mind alert and responsive to every noble sentiment, he reached conclusions of his own upon all subjects, both military and civil, and never for a moment hesitated to express them with independence and vigor, whether they were asked for or not. His very ignorance of military customs and ceremonies was a source of strength rather than of weakness, as it caused him to go straight to the highest authority without fear and without hesitation. Conscious of his own rectitude and unselfish devotion to duty, he expected every officer, however high, and every man, however low, to give all there was in him to the cause of the Union.

As a rule, his voice was low and well modulated, but withal he was capable of the most vehement flights of eloquence when occasion called for them. Direct in purpose and deliberate in manner, his ordinary speech was firm, straightforward, and convincing, but in the face of opposition or delay he did not hesitate to raise his voice to emphasize what he was saying or, all unconsciously perhaps, to punctuate it with epithets and even oaths that were sure to arouse and stimulate rather than to shock or offend. He was altogether the most earnest and impressive man of his rank the army had in it. With an absolute unconsciousness of self, his thoughts were naturally direct, coherent and logical. Never hesitating for a word, and never uttering one indistinctly or

hurriedly, his sentences were short, crisp, and convincing. Nor do I recall a single instance in which they failed to carry through the recommendation or measure in behalf of which they were uttered.

Profoundly impressed by the responsibilities resting upon his Chief, and indirectly upon himself, he took neither rest nor respite from his work, but stood by night and day to see that no weakness was displayed, no duty was neglected, no effort was misdirected and no opportunity was allowed to pass by unimproved. With such a mind as this, its possessor needed nothing except technical training to become not only a model chief of staff but a model corps or army commander. Situated as he was, however, there was no such destiny in store for him. Fate or circumstances had cast his lot in another sphere, and while there is no evidence extant that he had any other ambition, or ever indulged in vain repinings, it is certain from the foregoing narrative that he was fully conscious of the dangers which lay in the path of the easy-going and sociably inclined chief with whom he was associated. While it cannot be said that Rawlins ever presumed upon the slightest familiarity with Grant, they were the best of friends, though it must be confessed that Grant, in their daily intercourse, showed more bonhomie towards his staff officer than his staff officer showed towards him. In this they were not unlike Lincoln and Stanton. Grant, who was always kind and considerate, loved to chat with those about him, by the campfire or on the march, but Rawlins was more serious and apparently more preoccupied. He of course had the orders and staff details to look after and these necessarily absorbed his time and attention while others were at rest. But the close of the Vicksburg campaign, which was not only the most brilliant but the most complete in all our annals, inaugurated a new era in his career. It had inflicted the first mortal blow upon the Confederacy. It had raised the hopes of the Union men everywhere to the certainty of a

complete triumph in the end, and not only they but the world at large were calling for the details by which the army's rapid marches had been made, and its splendid battles had been won.

It has long since come to be well known that Grant had up to this time made no elaborate reports, and had apparently forgotten that he had sent in one of seven closely-written pages, in regard to the battle of Shiloh. The fact is that he was looked upon by the War Department as a poor correspondent and at best but an indifferent reporter of his own deeds. But now all this was to be changed, and the complete story was to be told. As was his habit, Grant wrote with his own hand an outline of what had taken place from first to last as far as he could recall it, and then turned that over to Rawlins as a basis for the final and complete report, in which every date and figure should be verified and every essential detail should be fully given. Henceforth this was the rule and practice, and the duty of carrying them into effect fell upon Rawlins and his assistant, Major, afterwards Lieutenant Colonel, Bowers. As the former was a methodical lawyer and the latter an experienced newspaper man and ready writer, the work was thoroughly done, and as a consequence Grant's reports from that day forth are justly regarded as models of clearness and completeness.

Department headquarters remained at Vicksburg during the summer, and while Grant had gone to New Orleans on a trip which Rawlins did not approve, the report of the Vicksburg Campaign was finished. As will be more fully set forth hereafter, Rawlins was at the same time in virtual command of the army, attending to all branches of its administration, and making all the necessary orders, in the name of its absent commander.

It is specially worthy of note that Grant's recommendations were now received at Washington with full credit and due respect. The authorities could not do too much for him.

Even Halleck wrote him complimentary letters and treated him with marked consideration, and what was still more to the point, the promotions he had asked for were made without delay. Rawlins shared the good fortune of the army and was gazetted Brigadier General of Volunteers on August 11, 1863. Naturally he felt that this new rank was intended in a measure to relieve him from the drudgery of paper work, which he naturally disliked, and to impose upon him the larger and more important duties appropriate to the peculiar and very unusual personal and official relations which had grown up between him and his Chief.

In his relations with his brothers of the staff, and with the general and other officers having business at headquarters, Rawlins was singularly cordial and approachable. While he liked to see all official papers framed and submitted as required by the army regulations, he had no patience with mere red tape as such. Far from being a martinet or caring for formalities and ceremonies, he made every officer and enlisted man feel that it was a pleasure as well as a great privilege to meet him. Every leading officer of the army knew and appreciated him as a modest, unselfish, and able man, who could not be swerved from his duty, nor induced to look leniently upon the vices and shortcomings of military life. Kindly and considerate towards all, civilians as well as soldiers, no man could know him or hear him converse without marking him in his memory as a man of the highest character and patriotism. While he was cheerful and friendly towards all, he was never light or trivial in speech or behavior. As though conscious of his lack of the lighter accomplishments, he never sought the society of ladies, but was painfully shy in the presence of such as called upon him on business or met him by chance. Altogether and everywhere, though clad with the rank and power of office, he never forgot that he was one of the plain people. While he never became a communicant or a regular church member,

he had a profound respect for religion and all who regulated their lives by its precepts. Throughout life he revered the ways of the godly, and looked with contempt upon the idler and the drunkard. He drank neither beer, wine, nor liquor, played no cards, and spent no time in idle ways or light and profligate behavior. In the times of the Commonwealth he would have been a Puritan of the straitest sect, if not a Covenanter and an Ironsides. And when his sturdy English name is considered along with the austere ways of his life, who can say that he was not descended from the very loins of the New Model Army, which was the crowning glory of the immortal Cromwell?

It is not certain that Rawlins ever read the story of that most heroic organization of our race, but if the officers and men who upheld the Union cause with him had all been as simple, steady, orderly, and inflexible in character, behavior, and courage as he was, there can be but little doubt that we should have had the greatest army the world had ever seen up to that time.

IX

AFFAIRS AT VICKSBURG

Grant Goes to New Orleans—Rawlins in Virtual Command—Made Brigadier General—Battle of Chickamauga—Grant Ordered to Chattanooga—Commands Military Division of the Mississippi.

IMMEDIATELY after the capture and occupation of Vicksburg, army headquarters were established at the house of a well-to-do planter in the lower part of the city, and in due time both Grant and his staff made the acquaintance of the ladies of the family. Among them was the governess, a charming and accomplished young woman from Connecticut, named Miss Hurlbut. Rawlins was at that time in the prime of life and apparently in perfect health, but he was singularly shy and restrained in the presence of ladies, and always avoided their society when he could do so without rudeness. Others, however, less backward at once discovered the beauty and attractiveness of the fair Yankee and made her the object of attentions which, although intended to be flattering, soon became embarrassing. This led to the presentation of Rawlins to the ladies as a measure of protection during the absence of Grant, and was soon followed by the development of an interest which no one, and Rawlins least of all, expected. He was far from being a beau but he was full of chivalry, which needed only a proper occasion to make itself known. This he found in the protection he was called upon to give to innocence and beauty. He had been a widower nearly two years, and although a man of sedate manners, his reserve was soon relaxed, and in the course of a few weeks,

he asked for and obtained the hand of Miss Hurlbut, who was at that time a most attractive picture of health and beauty. They were married shortly after the great victory of Missionary Ridge, on December 23, 1863, at Danbury, Connecticut, and became a devoted and contented couple; but, quite unconscious of the danger that menaced them, they were destined to close their lives in turn, after a few short years of sorrow and suffering, as victims of that most dreadful of diseases, pulmonary consumption.

As has been previously stated, Rawlins's first wife died of that disease at the outbreak of the Civil War, and it is now certain that she communicated it to her husband. It first showed itself in him at Chattanooga in the winter of 1863-64, but the victim, with delusive hope, regarded it not only then, but for several years afterwards, as merely a cold, or at worst a slight bronchial affliction, which would soon pass away. Its progress was slow, but certain and irresistible; and finally, after seven years of alternate hope and despair, it proved fatal. The fair young wife took the disease in due course, and although every aid known at that time to the science of medicine was tried, she succumbed to it a few years after her husband's death. These three cases afford most pathetic but indubitable evidence both of the communicability and the fatality of the dread disease. The microbe or bacillus theory had not yet been announced, and the modern tests of the disease were still unknown. The doctors repeatedly assured Rawlins that he was free from consumption, but the fear of it was with him from his first persistent cold at Chattanooga to the end of his life, and this, together with his anxiety and suffering, had a modifying influence upon his temperament and career.

But to return to the consideration of current events. It will be remembered that the surrender of Vicksburg was concluded by Grant's decision to parole Pemberton and his army and allow the officers and men to proceed to their homes,

there to remain till properly exchanged. Rawlins, as before stated, felt that this was mistaken liberality, and that it would lead to complications, if not to the immediate reënrollment of the surrendered army in the fighting force of the Confederacy. He suggested that it would be better to send the prisoners to the North for detention and safe-keeping, but unfortunately Grant upon this important occasion adhered to his own views, and after disarming and enrolling his prisoners and putting them on parole not to take further part in the war till duly exchanged, allowed them, after stacking arms and colors, to march back again into the Confederacy, under the command of their own officers, with their various organizations intact.

It is only necessary here to call attention anew to the fact that a month had not passed before the Confederate authorities repudiated the validity of the capitulation as not complying with the terms of the formal agreement between the two governments, and ordered the paroled troops to take up arms and resume hostilities against the United States.

Shortly after the surrender Sherman was ordered towards Jackson and beyond with a strong force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery for the purpose of clearing the State of Mississippi of the enemy. Ord, with another corps, was sent to take part in the operations in Louisiana, and almost immediately after these dispositions were made, Grant himself, accompanied by that portion of the staff which neither Dana nor Rawlins valued very highly, went to New Orleans for the purpose of conferring with Banks. The result of these measures, which originated mostly with Grant and were approved in Washington, was to scatter and practically neutralize Grant's splendid army, not far from eighty thousand strong, and to place its nucleus practically on the defensive.

Of course these dispositions could not have been made or carried into effect but for Halleck's consent. Although the author of a standard work on the art of war, he seemed to

be utterly unable to understand the policy of concentration, or how to use the overwhelming forces at his disposal so as to follow the enemy to his real points of defence and make his overthrow certain. Rosecrans was about crossing the Tennessee River for the purpose of maneuvering Bragg out of Chattanooga. To thwart this purpose and to prevent the Confederacy from being again cut in two by an advance of the national forces to Atlanta, the Confederate Government detached Longstreet's splendid corps of veterans from Lee's army in Virginia, and ordered it to report to Bragg in Northern Georgia. Instead of acting on the timely discovery of this important movement, which had been made by Meade's provost marshal and confirmed by spies operating in East Tennessee and Virginia, under orders issued from Dodge's headquarters at Corinth, neither Rosecrans nor the Washington authorities made any adequate preparations to anticipate or counteract it. As elsewhere stated, it was feasible to send at least two army corps, or 50,000 men, from Grant's army on the Mississippi, and a like number from Meade's army, at any time after the fall of Vicksburg, to reënforce Rosecrans; but this was not done till more than ten weeks had been wasted in secondary operations, or, what was still worse, in idleness at sickly encampments, or in futile and fragmentary operations in the field.

My duties as Inspector General of Grant's army required me to visit the posts and detachments scattered throughout the widely extended Department during the lull of operations, and as the northernmost post was at Paducah, and there was much work to be done at that place as well as at Cairo, Columbus, Jackson, Memphis, and Helena, I was necessarily absent for several weeks. During the summer months and especially while Grant was absent, Rawlins remained at Vicksburg in charge of headquarters, in virtual command of the army. Strangely enough, although both Sherman and McPherson as next in rank were entitled in turn to succeed,

they concurred in waiving their right under the Army Regulations, in favor of Rawlins. It was a compliment which he fully appreciated and yet he was far from satisfied with the arrangement. He not only strongly disapproved Grant's trip to New Orleans but chafed under the arrangements, which he could plainly see were neutralizing such an important part of the national army.

During my absence I wrote him freely and received several characteristic letters in reply. From one, dated September 15, 1863, I make the following extract:

. . . I am sorry that General Asboth's Columbus improvements cannot be justified on sound military principles, for it will make him feel badly, but an officer in the discharge of a duty must perform it strictly no matter whom it may place in an unpleasant situation. Of course he will not go outside of his proper path to injure one's feelings.

I anticipate a large amount of valuable information from the result of your present inspection, not heretofore had at Department Headquarters; information of utility as well as interest. General Grant returned from Memphis to this place on Saturday the 29th ultimo, and left here on the 31st for New Orleans accompanied by General Lorenzo Thomas and staff, General T. Kilby Smith, Colonels Riggins and Duff, Captains Jaynes and Ross, and has not yet returned though I am looking for him hourly. I hear a rumor that on Friday of the first week in this month, on returning in company with General Banks from a grand review they were riding quite rapidly when General Grant's horse fell and injured him very badly. I have no other knowledge than that which rumor has put afloat. No one of his *highly intelligent* staff has deemed the matter of sufficient importance to write me one word nor even as much as send a verbal message. The General I understand is at Carrollton and I suppose his staff are in New Orleans enjoying hugely the time the General's indisposition from injuries gives them.

In the meantime, however, matters here move on as smoothly as could be desired. Sherman and McPherson are both content that I should carry on the current business of the Department the same as if the General were here. All General Hurlbut's

requisitions for troops with which to reënforce Steele have been filled and he informed that if necessary more could be spared. I have also written to Colonel Kelton the satisfactory status of things here. The expedition of General Crocker to Harrisburg, Louisiana, was a complete success. The enemy evacuated the place leaving four field pieces in our possession. I hope Steele may get up a fight and entirely rout the rebels at Little Rock. I have high regards for Steele but would like to see Hurlbut with the expedition himself.

In the omitted part of this letter Rawlins disclosed for the first time the great interest which Miss Hurlbut had excited in him, and on my return to headquarters he confessed that he hoped to make her his wife. As she was in every way worthy of him, he had the best wishes of his family and friends, and especially of both General and Mrs. Grant. It was a pleasure to all to see this strong and rugged man softened and humanized by the smiles of a beautiful and interesting woman. It was a still greater pleasure to see him finally made happy a few months later, by the union of her lot with his for life.

During this interesting period, and just before Grant left for New Orleans, an incident took place which well illustrates the relations existing between him and his adjutant. Under the trade regulations then in force throughout the Department, citizens were still forbidden to buy or ship cotton to the North, but in violation of standing orders a connection of Grant's by marriage, who had come ostensibly to visit him, bought and undertook to ship North a lot of cotton from a landing nearby. The circumstance was at once reported to Rawlins, and as a matter of routine, without even consulting his chief, he issued an order expelling the offender from the department. This shortly became known to the General, who at once most modestly asked Rawlins to recall or suspend the order. Thinking that the request foreshadowed a weakening on the part of the General

in behalf of his kinsman, which would not be extended to an ordinary citizen, Rawlins broke forth in a flood of violent language, concluding with the declaration that if he were a general commanding an army of a hundred thousand men and a relation of his came down into it and violated one of his important standing orders, he would march him out under guard and hang him to the highest tree within five miles of camp. Grant was naturally amazed at this outburst, but with admirable self-control made no reply whatever, whereupon Rawlins retired to his office, pale with rage. The scene was an embarrassing one violating in every way the rules of official propriety. It was the first time I had ever seen Rawlins lose his temper with the General, and feeling sure he had acted under a hasty and ungovernable impulse, I followed him out, and after remonstrating with him on the impropriety of his violent outburst, pointed out the necessity for the withdrawal of his words and an immediate apology therefor. Without a moment's hesitation he acknowledged his fault, and returning at once to the General's room, said with a full and sonorous voice:

"General, I owe you an humble apology for my exhibition of temper and for the rude and profane language I have just used in your presence. I sincerely beg your pardon, and hope you will grant it. I thought I had mastered both my tongue and my temper, for when I made the acquaintance of the ladies here, I resolved to quit cursing and flattered myself that I had succeeded."

But by force of habit he unconsciously closed even this manly declaration with the unconscious utterance of a few emphatic words, which brought a smile of forgiveness to Grant's face, with the remark:

"Of course you were not cursing, Rawlins, but like Wilson's friend merely expressing your 'intense vehemence on the subject matter.' Don't think of it again, but now that the storm is over, you can destroy that order, and tell the

gentleman to whom it refers that his health requires him to take the first steamer back to Cairo."

The reconciliation was instantaneous and complete, and Grant never referred to the incident again except playfully, to illustrate how Rawlins, who had early in the war become somewhat famous for the habit of expressing his "intense vehemence on the subject matter," but ultimately gave it up after marrying the lady in whose honor he had made the worthy resolution.

The summer, which was both hot and dry, wore away without further friction though not without unhappiness. Rawlins employed himself for the first few weeks after the occupation of Vicksburg in editing the General's rough report of operations, and in looking after the routine business of the army and the Department. Affairs were conducted at headquarters with great simplicity and modesty. No display nor dissipation of any sort was allowed, and but little social intercourse was held with the people. Even the uniforms of the officers were dull, and the camp equipage and office furniture were plain and primitive to a degree that the neediest of the Confederates would have regarded as mean, if not niggardly. Rawlins, with his simple and inexpensive habits, was apparently unconscious of all this, and when Bowers remonstrated with him against using wooden blocks for candlesticks and asked for better ones, he replied with a grave shake of the head:

"Oh, no, Bowers! Those wooden candlesticks are good enough. They fill a very important purpose. They are the connecting link between silver candlesticks and no candlesticks at all!"

During the hot weather of July, Rawlins was perplexed by a lot of petty annoyances. The work of preparing the official reports and of watching over the ladies at headquarters, was incongruous if not exacting, and had it not been for the alternate consolation and uncertainties of love

making they would have made him very unhappy. Grant was away, the army was more or less idle, and altogether official matters were not going to suit him. But when Grant returned and found the reports ready for signature, he concluded to give Rawlins an outing by sending him to Washington as bearer of despatches. This was most honorable and acceptable duty and as it was intended as a special compliment to Rawlins it pleased him greatly. He arrived in Washington July 30, and the next day had an interview with the President and cabinet lasting two hours. On his return to the army he of course made a full report to General Grant, but told the rest of us but little about it. Fortunately, however, Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, made an interesting entry in his diary, and as it not only shows the favorable impression Rawlins made but confirms other statements of this narrative, I quote from the *Atlantic Monthly* as follows:

Friday, July 31, 1863.

I met at the President's, and was introduced by him to, Colonel Rawlins, of General Grant's staff. He arrived yesterday with the official report of the taking of Vicksburg and capture of Pemberton's army. [I] was much pleased with him, his frank, intelligent and interesting description of men and account of army operations. His interview with the President and Cabinet was of nearly two hours duration, and all, I think, were entertained by him. His honest, unpretending, and unassuming manners pleased me, the absence of pretension, and I may say the unpolished and unrefined deportment of this earnest and sincere man, patriot and soldier pleased me more than that of almost any officer whom I have met. He was never at West Point, and has had but few educational advantages, yet he is a soldier, and has a mind which has served his general and his country well. He is a sincere and earnest friend of Grant, who has evidently sent him here for a purpose.

It was the intention of the President last fall that General McClelland, an old neighbor and friend of his, should have been associated with Admiral Porter in active operations before Vicks-

burg. It was the expressed and earnest wish of Porter to have a citizen general, and he made it a special point to be relieved from associations with a West Pointer; all West Pointers, he said, were egotistical and assuming, and never willing to consider and treat naval officers as equals.

The President thought the opportunity a good one to bring forward his friend McClernand in whom he has confidence, and who is a volunteer officer of ability, and possesses moreover a good deal of political influence in Illinois. Stanton and Halleck entered into his views, for Grant was not a special favorite with either.

Rawlins now comes from Vicksburg with statements in regard to McClernand which show him an impracticable and unfit man. He has not been subordinate and intelligent, but has been an embarrassment, and, instead of directing or assisting, has been really an obstruction to any movements and operations. In Rawlins's statements there is undoubtedly prejudice, but with such appearance of candor, and earnest and intelligent conviction, that there can be hardly a doubt McClernand is in fault; and Rawlins has been sent here by Grant in order to enlist the President rather than bring despatches. In this I think he has succeeded, though the President feels kindly toward McClernand, Grant evidently hates him, and Rawlins is imbued with the feelings of his chief.

Meanwhile the course of the war in the neighboring Department of the Cumberland was preparing work of a more serious character for all the troops which could be drawn from far and near. The battle of Chickamauga took place on September 19-20, and followed as it was by the withdrawal of the Union army into the fortified lines about Chattanooga, and the investment of that place south of the river, it became necessary for the Government to bestir itself and to utilize all its resources to make good its hold and to restore its supremacy in that quarter. As before stated, the union of the three departments of the Mississippi Valley into one Military Division, under one supreme head, was now recognized as an important measure which must be carried into effect without further delay. An order to that effect was issued, Grant was by common consent assigned to the

chief command, and as soon as he was informed and the necessary arrangements could be completed, he proceeded with his staff to the new field of duty and glory which the fortunes of war had prepared for him.

Rawlins had in the meantime received his commission as Brigadier General, and had been announced as chief of staff. He was relieved at once by Bowers from the routine work of the adjutant general's department, and was thus enabled to devote himself exclusively to the more important duties of his new position. He had grown steadily with his commander in knowledge and experience, and was regarded by those who knew him best as fully entitled to the increased rank which had been bestowed upon him. If he had been necessary to the General in the formative period of their military life, he was still more necessary now that they were about to enter upon a broader stage and to undertake a task of far greater magnitude than any which had yet engaged their attention.

X

EVENTS IN TENNESSEE

Meeting Between Grant and Stanton—Plan of Operations—
Battle of Missionary Ridge—Knoxville, Cumberland Gap, and
Lexington—Headquarters at Nashville—Completes Official
Reports—Reflections on Campaign—Rawlins Married.

THE disastrous battle of Chickamauga took place about twelve weeks after the surrender of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg. It was long contended that inasmuch as Rosecrans had occupied and made good his hold on Chattanooga he had gained a substantial victory; but as he retreated from the field of battle it must in fairness be admitted that he suffered an actual defeat, although, as is frequently the case, the victorious army was almost as much exhausted as the one it had beaten. It had put forth its very last effort, and if Thomas, who had succeeded to the command of the Union army and resisted every attack, had not voluntarily concluded, after darkness had closed in, on receipt of special authority from Rosecrans, to retire, the struggle would probably have gone down to history as at most a drawn battle. But night found neither army in condition to strike another blow. Longstreet's arrival from Virginia with his splendid corps, in time to take part in the second day's battle, made the contending hosts nearly equal in strength. Had it not been for Longstreet's weighty reënforcement of his antagonist, Rosecrans could doubtless have held his position intact, and might have gained a substantial advantage. On the other hand, had the Government sent Grant's disposable force promptly from Vicksburg to reënforce Rosecrans, that gen-

eral would have had a tremendous preponderance of strength and this would have given him every reasonable assurance of a complete victory.

But, unfortunately, the authorities at Washington were late in discovering the detachment of Longstreet from Lee's army, and never seemed to realize that while superior genius might give us the victory, nothing short of a great superiority of strength on the actual field of battle could give absolute assurance of it. No general ever had a better knowledge of the strategical principles involved than had Halleck, the General-in-Chief, and yet no one ever failed more egregiously than did he to profit by their application. With the introduction of improved firearms, the open formation for battle and the rapid construction of rifle trenches and breastworks, the dangers of the direct attack had already become greatly increased. It is now recognized among military men that rapid marching and an overpowering superiority in numbers, particularly in mounted troops, which are specially fitted to operate effectively against the enemy's flanks and rear, are more than ever necessary to insure success in warfare; but simple as it is, this lesson never became properly understood in Washington.

News of the disaster of Chickamauga reached Grant late in September, and immediately afterwards he sent me to Cairo by steamboat with despatches for Halleck. I arrived there on Saturday, October 2, sent off my despatches at once, received the replies the same night, and returned to headquarters as rapidly as a swift steamer could carry me. On the 10th Grant gave orders to break up at Vicksburg, and on the 16th arrived at Cairo with his staff. The next day he continued his journey by rail, met Stanton, the Secretary of War, at Indianapolis, and accompanied him without delay to Louisville.

Neither Grant nor any member of his staff except Rawlins had ever seen the great Secretary, and naturally enough, they

were all anxious to meet him. When the train stopped at Indianapolis he was at the station and came at once into the General's special car. Overlooking or not seeing Rawlins, he walked directly up to Dr. Kittoe, the chief surgeon, who was wearing a flowing beard and an army hat; he held out his hand and said:

"How are you, General Grant? I knew you at sight from your pictures."

Of course the error was discovered instantly, but the incident was not without embarrassment to the Secretary, and trivial as it was, seems to have produced an unpleasant impression, if not a positive prejudice, in his mind. He evidently expected to meet a more impressive man than the quiet and modest General, and acted throughout the ride to Louisville as though he was disappointed. They, however, dined and spent the evening together and Stanton doubtless bore himself with perfect frankness in giving the General his instructions in reference to the new command and the new campaign, but it was no secret to any of us that neither of these great persons was greatly taken with the other. They coöperated henceforth loyally and effectively in the cause, till the struggle was closed, and so long as Stanton remained Secretary of War their relations were friendly, but they never became intimate or particularly sympathetic with each other.

It is not to be supposed that the trivial mistake at the beginning of their acquaintance had any appreciable effect upon the feelings of these great but dissimilar characters. Grant was shy, diffident and reserved with strangers, and knowing that ill reports had been sent to Washington about him, he may have been more or less under restraint, in the Secretary's presence. Stanton, who was a man of extraordinary severity of manner, was profoundly conscious of his own importance, and may have desired to impress Grant with his personal as well as with his official power. Whatever

may have been the inward feelings with which they regarded each other, it was evident from Grant's conduct not only the next day but always afterwards that he felt no great interest either in the man or in the Secretary.

Dana, who met the party on the way south from Louisville, returned with us by the same train to Stevenson and Bridgeport, and gave us full particulars of the great battle and of the behavior of the leading generals. As is well known, he had not brought from the field of Chickamauga a favorable opinion of Rosecrans, and Grant, who was at best not over-partial to that general, during the conversation with the Secretary signified his wish that the unfortunate general should be relieved from command and that Thomas should be assigned to the vacancy. It has long been believed by some that this change was partly due to political intrigue, but so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no contemporaneous evidence to sustain this belief. It was shown by the Official Records years afterwards that during the interview at Louisville the Secretary of War wisely placed the choice of subordinate commanders entirely at the discretion of Grant, and Grant, who up to that time had never been governed in the performance of his duty by considerations of a political nature, did not hesitate to decide in favor of the change. Rawlins and I were informed of all the facts so far as they were then known, and fully concurred in the wisdom of the decision. I am sure that neither of us then knew or cared what Rosecrans's politics were nor was influenced in the slightest degree by any other consideration than the good of the public service.

Pausing on the way to the front to confer with Rosecrans, who met the party at Stevenson, and with Hooker and Howard, who had been stopped at Bridgeport, Grant and his staff went forward by horseback over the rough and roundabout road through Jasper, over Walden's Ridge to Chattanooga. As Dana and I were anxious to get on we

took a shorter cut from the same point over the Ridge and along the north bank of the river within range of the Confederate pickets, and under the cover of darkness rode into the beleaguered town just before midnight. Grant and the rest of the staff reached the town wet and weary after dark the next night. But the road was so rough and slippery that Grant's horse had fallen upon him, severely bruising the leg which had been so badly injured at New Orleans. The wagons with the baggage and camp equipage could not keep up and were consequently left far behind. As there were no hotels open at Chattanooga, Grant necessarily became the guest of Thomas, while his staff officers were bestowed wherever room could be found for them.

It will be recalled that Grant and Thomas had last met during the Shiloh-Corinth Campaign, in which Thomas had virtually superseded Grant and that this or some other circumstance had prevented the establishment of cordial relations between those distinguished officers. The tables were now turned. Grant was in supreme command. He was the hero of the most successful campaign which had been made on either side during the war, and twelve weeks later, without the suspicion of personal influence or intrigue, had been placed in authority over both Rosecrans and Thomas. He had without the slightest hesitation turned down the former and exalted the latter, and yet Thomas, whom he had preferred, did not receive him cordially.

I had been busy during the entire day calling upon the leading officers, inspecting the army, and studying the situation at Chattanooga, so as to be prepared to make an intelligent report to General Grant on his arrival. Grant, wet and weary, reached town between eight and nine o'clock at night, and of course went directly to Thomas's headquarters. I got in from my work a little later and found the two generals seated on the opposite sides of a blazing wood fire, a little puddle of water under Grant's chair and his clothes steaming

from the heat. They were both silent and grave. Rawlins, whom I had shaken hands with as I was going in, was white with anger at the cool reception the general and staff had received. They had made a long and tiresome ride and were soaking wet, but as yet nothing had been done to relieve their discomfort. They had found shelter but apparently nothing more. Taking in the situation at a glance, I pushed my way into the room and after the usual salutations and a few questions, I spoke substantially as follows:

"General Thomas, General Grant has been on the road two days. His wagons are behind; he is wet and suffering from a bruised leg; besides, he is tired and hungry. Can't you get him some dry clothes from one of your staff and order some supper to be provided for him?"

This broke the restraint and recalled Thomas, who was ordinarily one of the most thoughtful and considerate of men, to the duties of hospitality, as well as to the requirements of official courtesy. He replied promptly:

"Of course, I can."

And calling Willard, his senior aid-de-camp, he gave the necessary orders, which, it is needless to add, were cheerfully obeyed. Grant was soon clad in dry clothes and called to a plain but bountiful supper, during which he listened to my report, which was by no means encouraging. As soon as his meal was finished he discussed the situation with Thomas as quietly as if he had received the heartiest welcome; but it is a fact worth recording that neither he nor Rawlins ever quite forgot the frigidity of their reception. Rawlins referred to it more than once during the subsequent operations about Chattanooga. He regarded it as entirely inexcusable, if not intentional, and cited the captious conduct of Thomas's adjutant general, an old regular officer, perfectly posted in all official courtesies, as positive proof that an unjustifiable state of irritation and resentment prevailed at Thomas's headquarters towards Grant and his staff. I was particularly

struck by the evidences of it from time to time and have referred to it frequently since for the purpose of finding a satisfactory explanation of its origin, and of pointing out its baneful influence over the subsequent relations of those distinguished men. It is admitted by all who knew them at that period that they were not sympathetic with each other. Perhaps they never became so. They were alike in their taciturnity and reserve. Neither was ever effusive or demonstrative towards even his intimates, and yet both were warm-hearted and considerate to their closer friends. That they were not so towards each other was doubtless due to circumstances over which neither had entire control, but which concerned them both, and exerted a great influence over events in which they were deeply interested.

Between Grant, Sherman, and McPherson a warm friendship, characterized by perfect cordiality, prevailed from the first days of their association. Grant could not do too much for either of them. He preferred them over all others for honors and command. He considered them as more prompt and probably more trustworthy than Thomas, and yet in many respects Thomas was the superior of either. He was a man of greater deliberation and solidity of judgment, as well as a better and more experienced practical soldier, organizer, and administrator, than either of them. Indeed, in these respects it may well be questioned if he had his superior on either side of the Great Conflict. I have elsewhere undertaken to point out how personal pride, the consciousness of a blameless life, of unfailing success, and of duty always well performed, on the one side, in unconscious contrast with careless habits, hard luck, and ill report, even in the face of unusual victories, on the other side, may have had a tendency to arouse a spirit of rivalry and distrust between these great men. After all they were only human, and it was but natural that they should not understand each other as well as they understood

those with whom they were more frequently and more favorably brought in contact.

Rawlins recognized the full significance of these facts and exerted all his influence to bring about greater intimacy and a more cordial feeling; but while his convictions urged him in that direction, the daily intercourse between the Military Division and Department headquarters was never placed upon an entirely satisfactory basis. There was always friction, which Rawlins finally resented with such energy as to put an end to its open exhibition thereafter. His relations with Thomas were always most punctilious, but never intimate. Dana and I were the means most depended upon to cultivate friendly relations and to bridge over difficulties. Our success was only partial. We succeeded in preventing an open breach, but failed to bring about a cordial understanding.

The plan of operations, the concentration of forces and the battle of Missionary Ridge have been so frequently and so fully described that further reference to them may well be omitted from the life of a subordinate. Rawlins was of course at the very focus of information and events. Every letter and order sent, as well as every communication received, was necessarily known to him, if it did not actually pass through his hands. Grant consulted him more fully than ever, and the chief of staff did not hesitate to express his views whenever he thought it necessary. He did his best from the start to hurry up reinforcements, to open shorter lines of communication, and to bring forward an adequate amount of supplies. Grant and Rawlins had during previous campaigns met all the leading officers except W. F. Smith, the chief engineer, who had recently come to the Army of the Cumberland from the Army of the Potomac. He had been at Chattanooga long enough to become familiar with the topographical features of the surrounding country, and to evolve a plan for opening a direct line of supplies between the beleaguered town and the railroad terminus at Bridge-

port, 30 miles away. That accomplished, he was duly transferred to Grant's staff as chief engineer, and turned his attention at once to the development of a plan of attack against Bragg's position. In this he found himself daily in contact with Rawlins, and soon learned to confide fully in him, and to depend confidently upon his coöperation. A warm friendship, based upon mutual respect, grew up between them, and when the plan of operation was ready for execution, every feature of it had the approval not only of Grant but of Rawlins.¹

The features of the country and the condition of the army, at the time Grant took command, as well as the preliminary movements ordered by him are well described by Rawlins in a letter dated Chattanooga, Tenn., November 6, 1863.

. . . Much of the country between here and Nashville is the hardest in appearance and the worst for military operations I have ever seen. The fact is, when we reached here the fate of this army was suspended by a single thread and that the line of its supplies, which was a road leading from Bridgeport through the Sequatchie Valley and over the mountains to Chattanooga, a distance of sixty miles, the valley road almost without bottom, and the mountain road the roughest and steepest of ascent and descent ever traversed by army wagons and mules. One riding over the road if he did not see with his own eyes that they did get over it, would not believe it possible for them to do so.

Since General Grant's arrival here the distance for wagon transportation has been reduced to eight miles, by the moving of forces across to the South side of the Tennessee River and fortifying all the mountain passes leading to it from below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport and through which the enemy had been enabled to pass to the river and cut off its use for transportation purposes to us and even prevent our soldiers passing along its bank on the North side. This movement of ours was to the enemy's perfect surprise, and the next night after it was effected, he attempted by a night attack to regain the advantages we had wrested from him, but after a severe battle in which we lost in killed and wounded full four hundred, he was repulsed, leaving

¹ Wilson's "Life and Services of Major General William F. Smith."

on the battle-field one hundred and fifty of his dead, many of his bad and dangerously wounded and seventy-five well prisoners, and full one thousand good Enfield rifles.

The necessity of this movement had been considered here for weeks prior to General Grant's arrival, but until General Rosecrans was relieved and General Thomas succeeded him in command, no steps had been taken to carry it into execution that I am aware of. General Thomas immediately on being placed in command had issued orders for this purpose which were concurred in by General Grant and the necessity of their prompt execution urged. The advantages of this new line of communication and supplies to us, is no less than enabling us to hold Chattanooga, for I have no hesitancy in saying that it would have been during the winter almost if not quite out of the question to have supplied the army here by the old line. The mules were so poor and worn out that they could not in my judgment have made to exceed two more trips. Still man determined to do a thing can accomplish almost impossibilities and frequently does make practicable that which seems utterly impracticable.

The army here under General Thomas is in fine spirits and whatever may be its feelings of love and regret for General Rosecrans, it evinces no regret at his removal, and is united in according to General Thomas the glory of rescuing it from disastrous rout and ruin and saving the honor of our arms at Chickamauga. Had some other generals, brave, double-starred and high in command as he, remained upon the field and rallied their broken divisions, instead of leaving it for Chattanooga at an unseasonably early hour, the Federal and not the rebel army would have cared for the wounded and buried the dead of Chickamauga.

General Gordon Granger shares largely with General Thomas in the glory of that terrible conflict. Between a quarter and half past one o'clock P. M. after the second day's battles of Chickamauga, three divisions or near that, of Crittenden's and McCook's corps were routed by the enemy and our lines broken, and by four o'clock P. M., of the same day, Generals Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden had got safely back to Chattanooga, a distance of full twelve miles from the field of battle.

We are expecting General Sherman's forces here by Monday or Tuesday of next week. On their arrival you may expect to hear news of importance from this section or field of operations. We are now secure or at least in apparent security against getting

out of supplies, and if we can so dispose of our troops as to secure General Burnside's in East Tennessee against an attack in overwhelming numbers from the enemy, shall feel we have accomplished a great deal. Every energy is being put forward to this end and I feel certain we will succeed.

General Grant is a quiet, brave and energetic commander, with his eye ever on the foe and watching his movements, with a view to taking advantage of any misstep or weak point he may discover. He is not of those who constantly write letters and issue proclamations and keep their eyes half turned and their ears half listening to see and hear what the people back home are writing or saying of them, and in such predicament lose the successes they otherwise might obtain, and sink out of sight in oblivious waves when they might have been enthroned in fame's temple had the one purpose of defeating the foe only possessed them.

Whether it be called luck or military ability to which is attributed General Grant's successes, I have but little care, so that the same successes that have thus far attended him desert him not in this, his new field of operations. . . .

After Hooker's preliminary movements against Lookout Mountain, and Sherman's across the Tennessee against the end of Missionary Ridge, Grant, Thomas, Granger, Smith, Rawlins, Dana, and many staff officers took post on Orchard Knob to witness the operations of the day. It was expected that Sherman would carry Tunnel Hill and the right of Bragg's army, supported by Howard's corps to his immediate right, by Hooker's movement against Bragg's extreme left at Rossville, and finally by Thomas with the Army of the Cumberland at the centre. But Sherman found the enemy strongly posted, and instead of driving back and doubling up or taking in reverse Bragg's right wing, he suffered a severe repulse, which seemed to paralyze his efforts and to discourage his subordinates. The day was wearing away with but little promise of victory. A feeling of anxiety and doubt began to show itself. Grant's face became overclouded. Thomas was taciturn and silent. Gordon Granger alone was

noisy in directing the work of a field battery nearby. Smith, Rawlins, and Wilson, perceiving that a deadlock had been reached, put their heads together in conference as to what should be done. The orders issued the night before contemplated an advance from the centre when it should become apparent that Sherman had carried or turned the enemy's right, and Hooker had turned his left, but by noon, or shortly after, it was painfully evident that the double contingency had not arisen, and that something else must be done. The deadlock was distressingly evident, but neither could suggest anything more promising than a demonstration from the centre against Bragg's advanced entrenchments at the foot of the Ridge; and accordingly it was decided that Rawlins should urge this movement upon Grant. Concurring fully in this conclusion, he stepped up to Grant, and in a low voice made the suggestion; whereupon Grant walked over to Thomas several steps away and in a conversational tone said:

"Don't you think it is about time to order your troops to advance against the enemy's first line of rifle pits?"

To this Thomas made no reply whatever so far as could be heard, but stood silent with uplifted glasses, scanning the enemy's position on the ridge, in plain view, just beyond the range of our artillery, across the intervening fields and open country. He was evidently in doubt. So far as the eye could determine there was nothing to indicate the slightest success in Sherman's front, and so the deadlock continued. Our little group became more and more serious as time passed slowly on. Minutes seemed like hours. Granger kept up the noisy fire of his battery and this added to the annoyance and the embarrassment of the situation. Our group grew still more impatient, and finally at or about three o'clock, Rawlins again pressed Grant to issue a positive order, and this he did with a firmness and decision which brought the desired

result.² Grant, who had by this time also become thoroughly aroused, turned to Thomas, who was only a few feet away and had doubtless heard all that had passed between the General and his Chief of Staff, and with a blazing face and an expression of unusual determination, said:

"General Thomas, order Granger to turn that battery over to its proper commander and take command of his own corps." After a pause, he added in the same tone of authority: "And now order your troops to advance and take the enemy's first line of rifle pits."

There was no longer room for doubt or hesitation. As was his duty, Grant had taken the entire responsibility and given a positive order which could not be disobeyed. So long as the discretion was left with Thomas, he stood silent. Even now he made no reply, but turning at once to Granger, he ordered him to his corps, and then coolly despatched his aide-de-camp with orders for a general advance. Sheridan, Johnson, Wood and Baird, whose divisions were waiting impatiently for orders, moved out with the promptitude and precision of a parade. Without the slightest hesitation, they rushed against the enemy with irresistible force. In full sight of all the generals they swept over the long line of rifle trench at the foot of the hill, and without halt or pause, pushed on towards the summit. This was more than any one expected. It was a voluntary impulse of the fighting line, doubtless due largely to the slight resistance it had encountered at the enemy's outlying defences. It was inexplicable at the time, but it is now known that Bragg made the fatal mistake of dividing his force between the entrench-

² S. Cadwallader of the *New York Herald*, in his manuscript "Four Years with Grant," says:

It is due to General Rawlins, Chief of Staff, to state that upon this occasion, as upon that of all Grant's great campaigns, he is unquestionably entitled to one-half the praise for the strategy. Tactical successes were due to others, but no general or broad plan of campaign, or pitched battle, was ever adopted by General Grant without the unqualified assent and approval of Rawlins. The latter was his only military confidant and often originated many of the most successful operations.

ments at the top and those at the bottom of the Ridge, and in directing the troops at the bottom to deliver their fire, when the Union advance should get within 200 yards, and then to retire to the works above.⁸ This order was carried out literally, but the officers standing on Orchard Knob, including Grant and Thomas, all thought that the upward rush of our troops was a mistake which would end in disaster, and there were muttered predictions to that effect in plenty, but as it turned out all fears were groundless. Once under way up the steep hillside, officers and men vied with one another till the summit was reached and the victory won. Grant, seeing that his men had broken the enemy's line and disappeared over the crest, mounted and went forward with his staff to the top and across the ridge, till at nightfall he came up with Sheridan's advance beyond the Chickamauga. His example was followed by Thomas, who took a road to the right, and had Sherman throw his troops rapidly forward along the ridge or, better still, behind it, Bragg's army should have been taken in flank or rear and captured or destroyed that night.

The victory was an overwhelming one, but, as has been seen, while it was gained by movements which had been previously ordered, the vital blow was struck by Thomas and not by Sherman, as was intended, and what is still more singular, the immediate impulse to deliver this blow had its origin with Grant's staff, and was not struck till Grant himself assumed the entire responsibility and gave a positive order to put Thomas's troops in motion. It is but simple justice to add that while another might have given that impulse later, Rawlins actually gave it at the time and in the manner which I have described.

In just fifty-five minutes from the time the national advance began from the centre both the rifle pits at the foot of the hill and the crest of Missionary Ridge had been carried,

⁸ "Military Memoirs of a Confederate," by E. P. Alexander, p. 476 *et seq.*

the enemy's centre had been broken and swept away and his whole army had been compelled to retreat, leaving many guns and prisoners in the hands of the victors. Bragg, who was unaccountably slow in realizing the extent of the disaster, had scarcely time to make his own escape. It is now certain that if Sherman had been as vigilant and aggressive as was expected of him, this would have been impossible, or if Grant had had an efficient force of cavalry on his left flank, or could have foreseen the certainty and extent of Thomas's success, and the timeliness of Hooker's turning movement by the roundabout way of Rossville, the Confederate General and the greater part of his army must surely have been captured. As it was, the defeat was overwhelming and almost fatal to the Confederate cause.

Grant's fame now became world-wide. All honor and credit were ascribed to him. No one else was considered. He was the one general of the Union army who always triumphed over the enemy, who was charged with no failures, and had nothing but victories to his credit.

By the time he had made the necessary dispositions to drive the enemy further from his front and from East Tennessee, winter was upon him and general operations came to a standstill. After calling for the reports of subordinates, and taking measures for the completion of his own records, Grant decided, about January 1, to visit Knoxville in East Tennessee for the purpose of acquainting himself with the military situation in that quarter. Becoming convinced by the information gathered on the trip that the enemy would not seriously endeavor to hold that region, after tarrying a few days he continued his journey by horseback with his staff through Cumberland Gap to Frankfort and Lexington, and thence by rail to Nashville, where he established his headquarters for the rest of the winter.

Meanwhile Rawlins, who had taken what was at first believed to be nothing worse than a severe cold due to exposure

and hardship, availed himself of the lull which followed our victory to take leave of absence for the benefit of his health and for the additional purpose of getting married. On his return to duty, about the middle of January, he began the work of editing and completing Grant's official report of the great campaign. As was his custom the General, relying almost entirely upon his memory, wrote out with his own hand a simple but comprehensive narrative of events, which he then turned over to Rawlins as the frame-work or guide for the full and accurate report which was sent afterwards to the War Department. In such work as this, Rawlins, aided by Bowers, as usual, was singularly capable. He spared no pains to test, reconcile and elaborate every statement and inference. With fidelity to the truth, without prejudice or conscious bias in favor of any one, he strove to get at the facts, and to relate them always just as they occurred. His training as a lawyer and his habit of gathering and stating evidence, so as to bring out the truth and do equal and exact justice to all, gave to his work unusual accuracy and value. Grant relied absolutely upon it; and it is but just to add that never in any instance is he known to have overruled Rawlins, or changed his account of a controverted point. It is for this reason that Grant's official reports, which from Belmont to Appomattox, either as first submitted or afterwards, passed through Rawlins's hands and received the benefit of his investigations, have withstood criticism so successfully. Indeed, it may be safely said that no official reports, whether referring to the American Civil War or to any other war, were ever framed with a more scrupulous regard to the truth, whether resting upon personal statement or embodied in the subordinate reports, than were those of Grant. If any of them contain misleading statements or false inferences, it should be assumed that it was because they were not verified by Rawlins, or because the facts on which they were based were not fully or accurately known at the time.

This is particularly the case in reference to the operations ending with the battle of Missionary Ridge. I pointed out to Rawlins when he was preparing the final report, that Sherman and not Thomas should have won that battle, by doubling up and crushing Bragg's right wing or by falling on his rear. While both Grant and Rawlins claimed that Sherman had met with unexpected resistance, and thought that I was hypercritical, they stoutly maintained that his operations had compelled the enemy on the day of the battle to so weaken his left and center by withdrawing troops from them and sending them to his right for the purpose of resisting Sherman's advance, that it made it correspondingly easy for Thomas to break through the center. As before stated, Grant and Sherman died in that belief, and it may be now asserted with equal confidence, that the same was true of Rawlins. It should be added that this view of the matter is supported by the official reports of such of the Union generals as touched upon that point. All shared in that delusion, and it was not till long after the close of the war that it became certainly known that Stevenson's Confederate division was transferred the day before, and that no troops whatever were moved from any part of Bragg's line on the day of the battle to resist the advance of Sherman's column against the Confederate right. Without these facts, the weight of testimony was all in favor of the Sherman contention and of the conclusion adopted by Grant and Rawlins, as well as by Badeau afterwards, in the "Personal History of Ulysses S. Grant."

It was apparent to every officer on Orchard Knob, at the time, that Sherman had not carried the enemy's position at Tunnell Hill, but had been repulsed, while Thomas, who was ordered to take the enemy's rifle trench at the foot of Missionary Ridge, rather as a demonstration in Sherman's favor than as a positive attack, had, much to the surprise of everybody, not only carried the rifle trench but had swept up the

ridge and over its crest, breaking through the enemy's line and driving him in confusion down the slopes and across the Chickamauga beyond. In spite of all this, Sherman, who really failed, received a larger share of praise than Thomas, who succeeded beyond all expectation, and this fact inevitably tended to intensify, rather than to end, the feeling of estrangement between Thomas and Grant.

There is not the slightest doubt that both Grant and Rawlins believed that they had seen the enemy moving along the crest of Missionary Ridge on the day of battle, to his right towards Sherman, and were entirely honest in their convictions that Sherman, who had promised so much and performed so little, was entitled to greater praise than Thomas, who had promised nothing but performed much. Such is frequently the case in military as well as in civil life, and the lesson to be drawn from it is that a cheerful and confident demeanor is an asset of real value to the soldier as well as to the man of affairs.

To the military reader it will of course occur that Sherman's threatening position on the enemy's right flank, notwithstanding the fact that all his attacks had been repulsed, may have exerted a powerful influence towards weakening Bragg's defence when he saw his centre seriously assailed. Knowing, as he must have known, that the united forces of Sherman and Howard on his right, aided by Hooker on his left, if vigorously handled, must prevail in the end, and would in that case imperil his retreat, it was perhaps natural under the circumstances that he should remain somewhat in doubt and fail to put up as stout a defence against Thomas as he should have done. At all events, his resistance was comparatively feeble, and although he inflicted heavy loss on his gallant assailants and delayed his retreat to the last minute, he succeeded in withdrawing from his entrenchments with insignificant loss except in artillery.

In considering the results of this battle, it should not be forgotten that the weight of numbers and resources, notwith-

standing the extraordinary natural strength of Bragg's position, was hopelessly against him, and therefore his retreat, even before the battle, would have been both prudent and justifiable.

The detachment of Longstreet for a campaign against Burnside in East Tennessee in the face of the reinforcements coming from both East and West to strengthen the national forces, was according to all military rules a fatal mistake on the part of the Confederate leader, though it may be doubted that he could have held his advanced position for any great time even with Longstreet's help.

The great national victory won in front of Chattanooga was from every point of view the legitimate outcome of the broad and comprehensive policy which the Government on the heels of a great calamity, had been forced to adopt. The overwhelming concentration of men and materials which followed was a striking tribute not only to the soundness of the policy which Grant had always advocated, but to the success which had always attended his operations. He was the rising man of the Union army. Without pretension or parade, he was making successful campaigns and winning great victories, while both the Administration and the country were wondering how he did it. There was but little in his despatches or his reports throwing light upon the subject. There was no mention of "grand tactics" or of "strategy." They said nothing whatever about "organizing victory," and as for "logistics," it may well be doubted that either Grant or Rawlins ever heard the word or had the slightest conception of its meaning. And yet there was no great mystery in their methods. They were plain, straightforward, earnest, and patriotic men, working together with all their faculties as though they were but one. There was no friction between them, no jealousy, no suspicion, and no misunderstanding. The combination was complete. Grant was the experienced, unpretending, educated soldier, while

Rawlins the civilian, was his complement and *ad latus*, rather than "the power behind the throne."

It added greatly to Grant's strength that he had the habit of absorbing the thoughts and suggestions of others, and incorporating them with his own without showing the slightest false pride or jealousy. There was nothing small or mean in his makeup. Conscious of his own needs and shortcomings and of the inability of any man to think of everything or to do everything, he welcomed assistance from every quarter, and never lost an opportunity to reward or secure promotion for those who had contributed to his success. No general was ever more approachable than he, and neither the records nor the recollections of the times will reveal the slightest evidence that he ever harbored a feeling of resentment towards Rawlins for plain speaking or plain writing.

As for Rawlins, no one can read his letter of June 6, 1863,⁴ or his references to the same subject at various other later dates without realizing that he felt himself constantly in the presence of a great danger, and while it is possible that he may have magnified that danger and underestimated the strength of his chief, it is certain that he did not think so and was absolutely faithful and fearless in performing what he conceived to be his duty in respect to it. For this, and for the lofty virtues he always displayed, he enjoyed the respect and confidence of every officer of rank and character who had the good fortune to know him. So long as he remained at his post, no one doubted the success of Grant, or of the army he commanded.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 128, 129.

XI

CHANGES IN RANK AND DUTIES

Grant Made Lieutenant General—Rawlins Chief of Staff—Correspondence of Grant's Headquarters with Army of the Potomac—Rawlins Strongly Approves.

SHORTLY after the Chattanooga and East Tennessee campaigns, and the establishment of headquarters at Nashville, I was relieved from Grant's staff and ordered to Washington for temporary duty, in the War Department as Chief of the Cavalry Bureau. Before leaving, I had participated in all the discussions which took place between Grant, Rawlins, and W. F. Smith in regard to the future conduct of the war in the South and Southwest. I was familiar with every plan that had been considered, and naturally hoped to be permitted to take part in such active operations as might be finally agreed upon. I therefore regarded this detail for duty in the War Department at first as likely to deprive me of further field service, but was reassured by the information that it was understood between General Grant and the Secretary of War that my detail would last not longer than six weeks or two months, and that I should return to the field in time for the spring campaign.

On my arrival at Washington I found that public attention had been so concentrated on Grant and his wonderful successes that his assignment to the chief command of our armies in the field had already become inevitable. The only question open was what rank he should have, and when the assignment should be made. At that time the highest grade known in the army was that of Major General, and although

the President was by law authorized to assign officers of that rank to the command of armies or army-corps, without reference to seniority, this proviso was not thought to be sufficient, either as a means of authority or as a reward for such successes as those gained by Grant. It was therefore suggested that the grade of Lieutenant General should be revived, and that it should be bestowed upon Grant along with the command of all our armies, but the measure did not at once receive the approval of the Government. At the instance of an official press agent, then feeling the public pulse for the first time, the newspapers discussed the subject both favorably and unfavorably. Congress was slow to commit itself, but the bill to carry the measure into effect was introduced by Mr. Washburne and received his untiring advocacy from the start. The more it was discussed the more popular it became. Dana, fresh from Chattanooga and from an intimate association with Grant and his staff, gave it his approval, and when I arrived in Washington early in February, 1864, I found it to be the absorbing theme of every discussion. Although but recently appointed a brigadier general, it was known that I had participated in Grant's greatest campaigns, and had been honored by his confidence. It was therefore thought that my knowledge of his character and methods might be valuable and I was freely consulted both by senators and members of the House of Representatives, as to the advisability of creating the new rank and bestowing it upon Grant. In these consultations, as well as in frequent conferences, both Dana and I took ground in favor of the proposed legislation.

I wrote fully both to Rawlins and W. F. Smith, suggesting among other things that the winter had been spent by the Washington authorities in waiting for something to turn up; that Halleck, who was generally regarded as wise and well informed, was, in fact, selfish and timid; that there was but little hope of a vigorous policy while the General-in-

Chief, the Secretary of War, and the President were all pulling in different directions, or while one was pulling forward and the others refusing to pull at all. Notwithstanding Grant's great victory in the West, military operations had everywhere come to a standstill, and each of the great leaders of the Government was apparently trying to shift the responsibility to the other. So long as that condition continued the chances for ultimate victory rested merely upon "main strength and awkwardness," which was the phrase of the day.

A more comprehensive policy was necessary. It was useless for any one to suggest plans for the reorganization of the army, or for carrying on campaigns till military affairs could be placed under a competent head. Accordingly, I wrote Rawlins in part as follows:

. . . To be plain—General Grant must be Lieutenant General and General-in-Chief of all our armies. He is the only really successful man the war has brought to the front. Everybody here acknowledges it, and is willing to trust him and the bill creating the grade should be put through as soon as possible. There can be no doubt of this, and if the General has any scruples, he must simply lay them aside. He owes Halleck nothing, either personally or officially, but the country everything. . . .

When called to the head of the army he can put forward whom he may choose, direct all the armies in unison, and go hereafter as heretofore wherever the danger is greatest. With his honest heart, his clear head and unselfish intentions, there can be no doubt of the ultimate result. He will not be required to remain at Washington. Halleck can be kept there. . . .

In this letter I referred also to the demands which were now coming from the politicians and the public press for Grant's nomination to the Presidency. As these were obviously premature, and for the greater part from men who were out of patience with the Administration, or who distrusted its willingness to allow any subordinate a free hand, I took ground not only against his nomination at that time but against his

writing political letters or taking any part in the politics of the country. I felt, besides, that it was unfair that Mr. Lincoln should be confronted by our only successful general in his campaign for reelection, and that it might be well for Grant to let it be known in some authoritative way that he would not allow his name to be used for any such purpose. Fortunately both Rawlins and Smith concurred in the main with these opinions, and after reading my letters to Grant, Rawlins wrote me from Nashville with unusual fullness, on March 3, 1864, as follows:

. . . While sympathizing with you in the desire for harmony and the greatest attainable unanimity of action possible on the part of the people in the coming Presidential election, I cannot see a better course for us than that we have hitherto pursued, viz., attend strictly to our duties as soldiers, leaving the management and conduct of the canvass for the election of Chief Magistrate and civil officers to the people at home. This will not debar those in the service who desire to do so, from expressing their choice through the ballot box, when from States in which provision has been made for such expression, by law. Unanimity of action on the part of all connected with the military arm of Government, in the one and sole purpose of destroying the armies of the Rebellion and in non-interference with civil matters, will in my judgment tend more to secure the desired harmony and unity of action in the coming election than all other influences combined. It will give to the masses an earnest of our sincerity, confidence in the ability of the Government to establish and maintain its supremacy throughout the revolted States, and leave powerless the argument of "danger from the military to our Democratic institutions," and by those opposed to coercion, to excite their prejudices.

I cannot conceive how the use of General Grant's name in connection with the Presidency can result in harm to him or our cause, for if there is a man in the United States who is unambitious of such honor, it is certainly he, yet the matter is not in such a shape as to justify him in writing a letter declining to be a candidate for the Presidency. The nomination for the office has not been tendered him by the people; nor has it by either of the

great political parties or any portion thereof. . . . To write a letter of declination now, would place him much in the position of the old maid who had never had an offer declaring she "would never marry;" besides it would be by many construed into a modest way of getting his name before the country in connection with the office, having, as he always has, avoided public notice or newspaper talk relating to him.

His letter to the Democratic Committee of the State of Ohio, he says was written in the strictest confidence and he wishes it still to be so considered. Any use of it by his friends would, if known—and that it would be known scarcely admits of a doubt—remove from it the curtain of privacy and might give occasion for discussing it in the public press which of all things you know he would most avoid; hence I do not send it.¹

The Honorable E. B. Washburne I am sure is not in favor of Grant for the Presidency. He is for Mr. Lincoln, and if he has made use of the language imputed to him, it has been to further the passage of his Lieutenant-Generalcy bill; nothing more I am certain. This is my own opinion. That Washburne should seemingly arrogate to himself the exclusive championship of the General, is not at all strange when we reflect upon the fact that two years ago he was the only man in Congress who had a voice of condemnation for the General's maligners. His defence of Grant aided to keep him in his position and enabled him to achieve the successes that have placed him first in the World's History as a military man, and secured for him the gratitude of his countrymen. Grant cannot neglect writing to him, but of course should be guarded in what he writes him as well as in what he writes others. One in the General's position can scarcely write a private letter that in any manner touches upon passing events, because of the eagerness of every one to give to the public that which they so easily conceive to belong to it, coming as it does from one to whom all look to dispel the dark clouds of war that have drenched our land with blood, and reveal to their longing eyes the bright sky of peace beyond.

I am glad to know you are getting along so well with your new duties. Of one thing we here were certain—that you would bring to the discharge of them an honesty and an energy of purpose that would awe and keep off those who would by undue and corrupt influences, seek advantages against the Government.

¹ The copy of this letter I have never seen.

When we consider the immensity of the cavalry arm of the service and its immediate necessities, then and then only, can we, anything like properly, estimate the importance of your Bureau and the many difficulties to be overcome by you in the successful management of it. All here, Wilson, wish you the greatest success. Department commanders were directed to send names for the inspectors you telegraphed for; all have not yet responded. The suggestions in your letter to W. S. Smith, Chief of Cavalry, are being attended to. As soon as the necessary reports are in from which a correct estimate of the General's cavalry force can be made, and the numbers not mounted or armed ascertained, to the extent of such unmounted and unarmed cavalry, the General proposes to dismount the mounted infantry, armed with cavalry arms, and turn their horses over to the cavalry. In this manner he hopes with what you can do for him to at least secure mounts and arms for all his cavalry.

Sherman's expedition via Meridian towards Central Alabama is the subject of most interest at present. The last information deemed reliable, from him since the rebel papers speak of his being at Quitman, on the railroad South of Meridian, is to the effect that he had reached Demopolis, East of Meridian, which if true removes all apprehensions as to his success and safety. The repairing of the damage he will do the railroads, will be to the enemy the work of months, saying nothing of their losses in negroes, horses, mules and supplies. The expedition under General W. S. Smith, Chief of Cavalry, which started from Memphis with a view to forming a junction at or near Meridian with Sherman, has returned to the neighborhood of Memphis. This we learn by despatch from General Butterfield. No report has yet been received from General Smith. I therefore refrain from comments. He has been ordered South again. Longstreet is evidently abandoning East Tennessee with the greater part of his forces and this is caused in no little degree by the movements of Sherman. He will perhaps, with a few troops, try to hold Holston Valley, from some safe point to cover the salt works in Virginia. Thomas's recent move against Dalton had the effect of making the enemy recall several thousand troops he had started against Sherman.

The Lieutenant-Generalcy bill has I suppose become a law ere this. That General Grant will be appointed to that grade, if any one, I suppose there is no doubt. With his honest patriotism,

good common sense, great military ability and experience, and the unexampled success that has thus far attended him we may hope high for the future of our country. To merit by acts, not words, and receive the Lieutenant Generalcy of the armies of the United States, is to be more than President. Let the General but continue to be himself as now and heretofore, giving no public heed although not unmindful of them, to the censures or praises of the press, and there will have lived few men who have secured so bright a fame. Military not civic honors best bedeck the soldier's brow.

The General is very anxious about the confirmation of some of the Generals appointed in his command, among them your own. He has written a letter to General Halleck on the subject and put your name among the first four.

Captain Badeau is here; we welcome him to our military family, appreciate him for his high and gentlemanly bearing and sympathize with him in his misfortune. He is recovering, however, and will I hope soon be able to lay aside his crutches. We expect you to be back with us by the opening of the spring campaign. Your horses are in fine condition. No one uses them except the Engineer Department and that not often I believe. Your boy reports regularly to me pursuant to your directions. He dislikes much to have the horses used and I don't blame him. If you wish it I will let no one have them. Hope of W. F. Smith's promotion seems to be waning. You perhaps know more about this.

General Grant's official report of the battle of Chattanooga has gone forward. It is full and complete, written in his usual happy, narrative style, void of pomposity or parade. . . .

It is known that the President had serious apprehensions in reference to Grant's political affiliations and ambitions from the date of his surprising success at Vicksburg, and shortly afterwards, to satisfy himself, sent for their common friend, J. Russell Jones of Galena, then United States Marshal at Chicago. Jones, who had visited headquarters at Vicksburg, and became convinced that Grant had no political aspirations, was enabled to allay the President's fears for the present, but only to see them aroused again by the extraordinary success

of Chattanooga.² To an active politician like Lincoln, it was scarcely conceivable that any man, whether soldier or civilian, with such a chance as was now within Grant's reach, should not seize upon it to go up higher. Other politicians shared Lincoln's apprehension; and knowing the intimate relations between Grant and Rawlins, such of them as had the opportunity of seeing the letter from which I have just quoted, did not hesitate to say, they regarded it as conclusive. The clear and explicit declarations which it contained had a tendency to allay apprehension if not to smooth the way for Grant's accession to supreme military power, subject of course to the President as constitutional commander-in-chief.

The Senate passed the bill reviving the grade of Lieutenant General with only six dissenting votes, while the House of Representatives passed it by 96 to 41. It is well known, however, that the President used no influence whatever for or against it, but as soon as its fate became assured and he had given it his approval, he sent for Grant, and the latter, accompanied by Rawlins and one or two other staff officers, started at once for Washington. He arrived there on March 8, 1864, and having received his new commission, three days thereafter began his return trip to complete arrangements for assuming the duties to which the President had assigned him.

Before starting on this trip to the East, Grant wrote, March 4, 1864, to Sherman, then near Memphis, notifying him of his departure for Washington, informing him that he should accept no orders which would require him to make that city his headquarters, and extending his thanks to Sherman and McPherson as "the men to whom above all others" he felt indebted for whatever success he had gained. It is to be observed, however, that the context of this letter shows delicately, but plainly enough, that the thanks it conveyed to his favorite lieutenants were for the energy, skill, and cheerfulness with which they had always executed his orders,

² Richardson's "Personal History of Ulysses S. Grant," p. 380 *et seq.*

rather than for any special advice or valuable suggestions they had contributed to the formation of his plans. Sherman's reply was dated March 10. It heartily praises Grant's "unselfishness, honesty, and simple faith in his success." But with surprising frankness, it indicates the existence of a fear from the first in Sherman's mind that Grant's ignorance of strategy, science, and history, might at any time prove fatal, though this fear is qualified by the confession that an unusual amount of common sense seems to have so far supplied most of Grant's deficiencies.

It is apparent, however, that Sherman still had serious doubts of Grant's strength and stability of character, as well as of his capacity properly to solve the great questions with which he would have to deal in the East. This is indicated by the following extract from his letter:

. . . Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. . . . Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley, let us make it dead sure, and I tell you, the Atlantic Slope and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. . . .

Although the purport of this advice could not be mistaken, Sherman was evidently not satisfied with the way in which he first gave it. Apparently forgetting that the occupation of New Orleans, the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the overwhelming defeat of Bragg in front of Chattanooga had practically ended the war in the Mississippi Valley, he changed the form, if not the substance, of his exhortation, as follows:

. . . For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington. I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here is the seat of the coming empire, and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.*

* For this correspondence in full, see Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. 1, pp. 398-400.

It is known that most of Grant's trusted subordinates shared Sherman's apprehensions. Indeed such apprehensions were somewhat widespread at the time, but how far they were based upon distrust of Grant's ability to protect himself against jealousy and intrigue, rather than upon a misapprehension of the obligations imposed upon him by his new rank, to meet Lee and the veteran army of Northern Virginia on the field of battle must forever remain a question of doubt. But there can be no doubt that those who favored the courageous course, which Grant actually adopted, did so as much because of their confidence in Rawlins's influence and inflexible character, as in Grant's superior courage, constancy, and generalship.

It will be remembered that Grant had recently recommended W. F. Smith or Sherman for the command of the Army of the Potomac, but this was before the bestowal of the new office of Lieutenant General, and the President's orders placed upon him the actual duty of deciding what should be done in all such cases. The change in his own fortunes and duties was a radical one. His new responsibilities were coextensive with the military operations of the country, and could not be lightly limited to a sectional command. Fortunately neither Grant nor Rawlins was moved by Sherman's earnest appeal to "come out West." They seemed to recognize from the first that the country's greatest danger and consequently its greatest military task lay in the Eastern theatre of war. There was the Confederate Capital, and there was "the foremost Army of the Confederacy under the Confederacy's foremost leader." Lee had beaten McClellan, Hooker, and Burnside. He had baffled Meade, and although he had retreated from Gettysburg, he still barred the way to Richmond, with a confident and almost invincible array of veteran soldiers. Manifestly so long as that army remained unbroken, the country must remain divided against itself. Rawlins saw all this as plainly as any man could

see it, and realizing that Congress must have created, and the President must have bestowed the rank of Lieutenant General upon Grant the better to clothe him with power for a trial of prowess and leadership with Lee and his gallant followers, steadily opposed the advice of all who begged him to "come out West" and rightly favored the establishment of headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac. So far as can now be ascertained, Grant's only objection to going East was based upon the possible requirement that he should remain in Washington as Halleck had, where he would have been subject to the criticism and intrigue of the politicians. The danger of this course was doubtless in Sherman's mind from the first and may have been the main influence which impelled him to urge Grant so strenuously to return to the West and complete the subjugation of the Mississippi Valley. It is said that when he knew Grant was not to remain in Washington, but was going to make his headquarters in the field and cast his lot in with the Army of the Potomac, he gave this determination his unqualified approval. But it must be observed that this was not till Grant himself had decided the question irrevocably and had made it known that Sherman would succeed to the chief command in the Western theatre of operations.

Where Grant, the Lieutenant General and chief commander of the loyal armies in the field, should place himself for the performance of the new duties devolving upon him, was one of the great questions of the day. Opinions differed widely as to its solution. Many besides Sherman thought that the new General-in-Chief should give his personal supervision to the completion of the campaign in the West. Others thought it would be better for him to remain in Washington to correlate and direct the movement of our widely scattered forces. Even the President himself may have held this view, but Rawlins, whose judgment in regard to such questions acted with the certainty of instinct, was never for a moment in

doubt. He held with Washburne, Dana, myself, and other close friends of Grant, that the new commission not only placed him in an independent position, where he was free to act on his own judgment, but carried with it a supreme and imperative duty resting solely upon himself. Manifestly this duty could neither be divided nor delegated to another. Fortunately the two stood together in choosing the right course and when it was crowned with success and the victorious soldier had become a candidate for the Presidency, it was well and forcibly said, and Rawlins approved the saying, that Grant could no more have declined the trial with Lee . . .

without injuring his fame and weakening his power to command, than the country could have afforded to allow its life-blood and treasure to be fruitlessly wasted at the hands of incompetent and irresolute generals. He realized too truly the significance of his new rank and the task imposed upon him by his countrymen to permit himself to be turned from this duty either by the difficulties and dangers attending it or by the solicitations of devoted but misjudging friends.⁴

⁴Dana and Wilson's "Life of Grant," pp. 168-9.

XII

THE NEW FIELD

Enlarged Staff—Rawlins Advocates New Policies—Letters to His Wife—Culpepper C. H.—Influence on Plan of Operations.

ON March 23, 1864, Lieutenant General Grant reached Washington with Rawlins and six members of his Western volunteer staff. There was not one regular officer among them, but the duties of Grant's new position, with all the additional work it imposed upon him, made an increase of his staff absolutely necessary, and, naturally enough, he selected regular officers. Colonel Comstock, a learned, dignified, and experienced officer of the regular engineers, who had served with him as chief engineer of the Army of the Tennessee, and afterwards as inspector general of the Military Division, was naturally assigned to the new staff as senior aid-de-camp. Horace Porter, captain of ordnance, and Orville E. Babcock, captain of engineers, were also selected as aids-de-camp. Neither had served on Grant's staff, but largely on my introduction and recommendation, they were both chosen and through the interposition of Dana, who had met them in the field, both were finally allowed to accept the promotion and assignment which had been offered them. These young officers were honor graduates of West Point, of excellent character, and first-class ability each in his own line; but they were to a certain extent new men, unacquainted with Grant or his methods, and without special sympathy for officers from civil life. They had but little acquaintance with Rawlins, or with Grant, for that matter, and were naturally slow to acknowledge the real merit of the former, or

to comprehend the reasons for his extraordinary influence over their common chief. They doubtless did whatever work fell to their lot to the very best of their ability, but even in the fiercest campaign the busiest officer finds time for rest and for social intercourse with his fellow officers from the general down.

Grant, it should be remembered, was entirely free from all affectation of superiority, and habitually treated his staff on the regular army theory that "gentlemen are all of the same grade." He regarded them as his companions and social equals, and while he rarely ever consulted them in reference to policies or plans, he never repressed their efforts to help or repelled their informal expression of opinion. He was both kindly and impressionable, and, like other great men, more or less unconsciously absorbed the views and yielded to the influences of such of those about him as he liked and respected.

As has been seen in the course of this narrative, Rawlins, who in a military sense had grown up with the successful general, and knew him better than any one else, did not hesitate even in the new and greater field to give his views and advice whenever he thought the occasion called for them; but it is not to be denied that with the advent of new officers and new conditions, he grew more reserved. It was both natural and proper that he should be less aggressive and outspoken in counsel, and more considerate of the military proprieties in his new position. On the other hand, it is probable that Grant, in view of his own uniform success, had begun to feel more confidence in himself and less necessity for leaning on others. At all events, to those who knew the inside of their past relations it soon became apparent that the Lieutenant General and his Chief of Staff were measurably drifting apart. There was no rupture, and no public withdrawal of confidence or respect, but Rawlins soon came to understand that there were influences at work which he could not always

locate or counteract. During the Overland campaign from the Rapidan to Appomattox, he told me repeatedly that he felt his influence with Grant was not what it used to be, and that neither the policy nor the plans developed themselves with the same absence of friction, or reached the same high level of excellence, that characterized them in the West when the staff was smaller. He recognized, of course, that the problems which confronted them were greater, and that the Confederacy was putting forth its last and best efforts under the command of its ablest leader; but in addition it is certain that as the campaign progressed, he became conscious of complications and difficulties of a more or less intangible character, due partly to the new conditions and partly to the increased complexity of the machinery for military command and administration. The staff was necessarily larger, while the arrangements for supervising the operations of the entire army were in a measure tentative, if not experimental. As it turned out they were also quite defective at times.

When Grant was assigned to duty as Lieutenant General, two courses were open to him in respect to the method of exercising command and arranging his staff for carrying his orders into effect. He might have assumed direct command of the Army of the Potomac and assigned Meade to the command of one of its corps, in which case it would have been necessary for him to issue orders directly to each corps commander; or he might have left department, army and army-corps organizations as he found them, and issued his orders to their immediate commanders, leaving those officers free to regulate and control the details of carrying such orders into effect. Something might have been said in favor of each plan. While the former would have been simpler and more direct, it would have required a larger and much more efficient staff, with much greater experience and knowledge of details and a much closer attention to the various branches of army administration as well as to the strategy of the

marches and combinations and to the tactical arrangements of the fighting line in the various contingencies of actual battle. In modern armies the supervision of these duties falls within the province of the general staff. They require not only the highest theoretical knowledge of the art of war, but the greatest aptitude and practical experience in the details of commanding, marching, and fighting troops.

In the consideration of this subject, it is not to be forgotten that the Army of the Potomac was at the time supposed to be the best army we had in the field. It was composed largely of veterans, commanded by regular generals of great experience, with every qualification to meet the actual exigencies of campaign and battle. To tell them how to form their lines or columns, or to bring them effectively into battle might well have been considered as unnecessary, if not presumptuous. Grant himself was never considered a great organizer and still less a great tactician. He was not overfond of details, and never thought of hampering such officers as Sherman, Thomas, McPherson, or Ord with minute instructions. Still less did he think it necessary with Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Warren, Wright, Humphreys, W. F. Smith, or Sheridan. At all events he decided that it was not, and throughout the campaign, till near its close, contented himself with indicating in general terms what he desired to have accomplished, leaving his subordinates to work out the details in such manner as they thought best.

This course not only received Rawlins's approval, but seemed to him, under the circumstances, the best that could be devised. He was conscious, no doubt, of his own lack of technical knowledge and practical experience in the commanding of troops, and while he knew that there were several good officers within easy reach, such as Upton for instance, who were in every way qualified to work out all sorts of military details and to superintend their execution, no such help was called for. As Chief of Staff he could

doubtless have obtained permission to detail any other officer he thought necessary, but made no such detail, and the war was fought through to the end without the assistance of anything corresponding to a General Staff. Looking back on the course of operations during the Overland Campaign, it is hard to understand how they were conducted at all without such an organization. Both Grant and Rawlins were to blame for this. Neither seems to have understood the necessity for it, but that the chief responsibility for it should be placed upon Grant, the professional soldier, rather than upon the volunteer Chief of Staff, must be the verdict of the military critic. That Grant was aware of a great defect in the organization of his army is shown by the celebrated simile of the "balky team" by which he typified the difficulty of making the corps commanders work together in harmony, and justified himself for winning "by force of numbers" and "mere attrition," if by no other means. Withal, it is believed by many that if Grant had organized his forces more simply and compactly, and had had a competent general staff for the management of details, he could have ended the war within six months instead of taking nearly a year for it as he did.

It is worthy of note in this connection that while Lee's army was more simply organized, and he had direct command over all the Confederate corps in Virginia, without the interposition of army or department commanders, his staff arrangements were more defective than even Grant's. Lee, the professional soldier, relied entirely upon himself and his corps commanders. He wrote many of his most important orders with his own hand, and, like Grant, refrained from burthening his subordinates with detailed instructions. This did much to mar the result of his operations, especially at Gaines's Mill, White Oak Swamp, Malvern Hill, and perhaps elsewhere. His staff was small and, even to a greater extent than Grant's, was made up of civilians with but little technical

knowledge or experience, and therefore capable of performing but little of the complicated technical work usually assigned to the general staff.

But to return to Rawlins. It has been seen that his title was to a certain extent a misnomer. While he was Grant's oldest and most trusted staff officer and had more influence with him than had any one else, it is evident that the plan under which the national forces in Virginia were then organized had more to do with limiting the nature and extent of the staff, of which he was the chief, than had any lack of knowledge on his part as to the kind of officers it needed, or as to the kind of work they would be called upon to perform. As the army was actually organized, the duties of the staff as well as of its chief were necessarily minimized. Rawlins had therefore more to do with questions of military policy than with details of military operations. He believed in the Overland route to Richmond, and that Lee's army was Grant's true objective. He believed in maneuvering against Lee's flanks and marching rapidly. In the Vicksburg campaign he had seen the futility of assaulting well-defended rifle trenches, however hastily constructed, and of making direct attacks against strong positions. He believed in gathering all the forces that were available, and, above all, he believed in the good sense and the solid qualities of Grant, and in the superiority of his army in numbers and resources. He had no doubt that Grant would win, but after the first few days he became bitterly opposed to the slipshod manner in which many important operations were conducted, and especially to the persistency with which the army was hurled head-on against the enemy's entrenchments on the way to Spottsylvania Court House and beyond. He did not hesitate to declare later that such attacks were a fatal blunder, due mostly to the influence of Colonel Comstock of his staff, a regular engineer, whose advice and constant refrain was, "Smash 'em up! Smash 'em up!" In repeating this re-

frain, which he did more than once, Rawlins's face grew pale, and his form became almost convulsed with anger. With the fearlessness that characterized the imprudent utterances of W. F. Smith and of that peerless soldier Emory Upton, he did not hesitate to designate this as "the murderous policy of military incompetents," and there is good reason for believing that his outspoken remonstrances, emphasized as they were by the failure and fearful loss of life which uniformly accompanied the head-on attacks in parallel order against entrenched lines had more to do with their abandonment than anything else, except perhaps the pathetic protest of the enlisted men, who at Cold Harbor, before advancing to the charge, wrote their names on slips of paper and pinned them to their coats in order that their dead bodies might be recognized after the battle was over.¹

Another policy of great wisdom which Rawlins constantly advocated during the campaign in Virginia was in favor of bringing troops from places where they were not needed, or were rendering service of only secondary importance, to the front, where the army was engaged in daily battle and suffering heavy loss. He was doubtless unconscious of the great military principle laid down by the masters in support of this policy, but his own common sense must have told him that it was correct. He had perhaps never heard it stated that the greatest duty of the State in carrying on war is to "keep the road to the front crowded with recruits and reënforcements," to fill the gaps made by sickness and battle, but with a prescience which would have done credit to a great theoretical commander, he not only did his best to carry out this maxim but constantly favored the draft to fill the ranks of the old regiments, instead of organizing new ones, as the quickest and best possible way to make the Union army overwhelming in strength and invincible in battle.

Fortunately Rawlins's attitude in respect to these, as well

¹ "Campaigning with Grant," by General Horace Porter, p. 174.

as other important matters, does not rest upon conjecture, but was made known from day to day in a series of letters to his wife beginning in January, 1864, and continuing almost to the end of the campaign against Lee. The first of these letters is dated January 14, 1864, and the last April 4, 1865. They are without break or intermission, except when his wife was in camp, or he was absent from the field on account of sickness. There is another series, written while absent from her in search of health after the war was over. I shall quote freely from each series as occasion seems to call for it, but so much of either as refers to other public matters will be given in full in the appendix.

It has not been previously emphasized, but it should now be noted, that it was by this time becoming generally known that Rawlins was seriously ill. Soon after establishing headquarters at Chattanooga he began to cough violently and continuously. The weather had become inclement. The rainy season had begun, and his quarters were more or less uncomfortable. Hence we thought at first that his cough was due to a severe cold which would soon pass away; but in spite of every attention, it proved persistent, better one day and worse the next. Finally it aroused the deep anxiety of the patient himself and especially of his home friend, Chief Surgeon Kittoe, who applied all known remedies, but without permanent success. During the whole of his stay at Chattanooga, Nashville, as well as afterwards with the Army of the Potomac, and in the West, to the end of his life his pathetic and baffling fight against the disease was hardly ever absent from his letters. Many another man would have given up the struggle in its earlier stage, but to this noble soul that way out was never seriously considered. For a season his confirmation by the Senate as brigadier general seemed doubtful, and in reply to a question from his wife as to what he should do in case he was not confirmed he expressed both incredulity and indifference; and there can be

no doubt that he would have returned to private life with resignation, if not with cheerfulness, had he lost the place to which he had been advanced in the army. While he had frequently expressed the idea that he regarded his services, like those of every other sound man, as obligatory without reference to either rank or pay, and was proud of his success and of the honor in which he was held by his chief as well as by the leading generals who had served with him, he was not without ambition as to what might yet be in store for him. He therefore at no time slackened his work nor relaxed his vigilance over what was going on around him.

During and after the Chattanooga campaign a number of minor operations were carried out: Dodge drove the enemy from Athens towards Florence, in Northern Alabama; Morgan L. Smith, of Logan's command, attacked and defeated a strong force near Lebanon, Kentucky; a third affair took place at Sevierville; a fourth in East Tennessee, and finally Sherman made and relinquished his abortive march eastward from Vicksburg, nominally because Forrest defeated and drove back his coöperating cavalry column under Sooy Smith, but really because he met with greater resistance than he expected. To keep the run of all this, and occasionally to visit an outlying command or to accompany the General to Chattanooga, kept Rawlins fully employed throughout the winter. But fortunately his activity was broken at the Christmas holidays by a leave of absence for the purpose of getting married to the lady whose acquaintance he had made under interesting, if not romantic, circumstances at Vicksburg. The wedding took place at Danbury, Connecticut, on December 24, 1864; but the short honeymoon ended by his return to headquarters at Nashville early in January. Counting on remaining there a few weeks, he sent for his wife and children (by his first wife) whom he installed in a comfortable little house, where he had hardly three weeks of unalloyed happiness, and where the comforts of home checked his disease and

encouraged him to hope for an early and complete recovery. The exact length of this period, perhaps the brightest of his life, is fixed by the fact that no letters from him to his wife were found dated between February 16 and March 5, 1864.

It will be recalled that shortly after the victory of Missionary Ridge and the enemy's withdrawal from Northern Georgia and East Tennessee, Congress revived the rank of Lieutenant General, with the evident intention that it should be bestowed upon Grant. Under the old laws the President had full authority to assign any Major General to chief command without reference to relative rank, and had frequently exercised that authority according to his own judgment without let or serious hindrance from any quarter. But it had at last become evident that the new and higher rank would strengthen the hands of the actual commander, whoever he might be. There was some talk, however, at the time that the act of Congress created and was intended to create a military dictatorship, but it cannot be too often repeated that this talk exerted no hurtful influence on either Lincoln or Grant. Both accepted it loyally and modestly, and as soon as it became law Lincoln summoned Grant to receive the higher commission.

Accordingly Grant and Rawlins set out for Washington, but had to wait over at Louisville. That evening, after dining at the Galt House, they went to the theatre, of which Grant was fond. But the play, or his physical condition, or perhaps the important juncture of affairs filled Rawlins's mind with serious reflections, and after returning to his room he wrote to his wife in terms which at least throw a strong light upon his own character. He was evidently depressed by the great responsibility about to be placed on his chief's shoulders, and felt that the latter was yielding more readily and more fully to the applause he received at the theatre than was becoming in one whom he had grown to think both unusually modest and unassuming. He referred, with ap-

proval, to a letter on the new promotion, which I had written him from Washington. He was profoundly impressed with the magnitude and weight of the duties which would soon come to the Lieutenant General and himself, and also with his own lack of technical military education for the high position of Chief of Staff. In view of all this, he signified his willingness to withdraw and leave "the place to an educated and finished soldier." But he did not disguise the feeling that having been with Grant throughout his brilliant career, having shared all his perils and "been his stay and support in his darkest hours," without at any time playing the part of an injudicious friend, he had the right to claim the place without subjecting himself to the charge of vanity. It is evident that Grant not only considered the situation fully but reassured him now of his unabated confidence and did what he could to put an end to Rawlins's undue apprehensions and to silence his self-depreciation.

The journey to Washington began the next morning, March 8, and of course at the first opportunity Rawlins wrote his wife full particulars of such incidents as attracted his attention. On the whole he was gratified by the modest manner in which Grant received the enthusiastic greetings "which the people, ladies, gentlemen and children" everywhere on the route extended to him. He approved the reticence with which Grant received the congratulations of Halleck and the Secretary of War, and the great modesty with which he accepted his new commission and made haste to return to Nashville for the purpose of turning over to Sherman the next week the Military Division of the Mississippi. He appeared to be particularly pleased that Grant would not even delay a few hours for the purpose of attending a dinner which Mrs. Lincoln, and, doubtless, the President wished to give in his honor at the White House.

The return to Nashville was without incident or delay, and the business connected with the change of station and

command was soon despatched. Rawlins sent his wife and children to his parents at Galena, and within ten days had everything ready for the new order of things and was on the way with the Lieutenant General and personal staff back to Washington. It is pleasant to add that Rawlins records with unalloyed satisfaction that the General and Mrs. Grant, who left the party at Harrisburg, were more attentive to him during this trip than ever before, though he naïvely confessed he was at a loss to account for it, unless it was because his recent separation from his wife entitled him to special sympathy.

XIII

IN VIRGINIA

Headquarters at Culpepper—Overland Campaign—Battles in the Wilderness.

GRANT remained but two days in conference with the President and other authorities at Washington. On March 24 he took post at Culpepper Court House, accompanied by Rawlins and Comstock. He established headquarters in a house large enough for himself, the Chief of Staff, and an office, and at once issued his orders taking command of the Army.

It was rough March weather, with alternate snow and rain, which kept Rawlins, at least, in quarters for several days. Spring, however, was near at hand; but without waiting for sunshine, the work of reorganization, as far as reorganization was necessary, was begun. Two army corps were distributed into the others, thus reducing the organization from five weak corps to three strong ones. Rawlins was apprehensive that this might produce dissatisfaction; but his correspondence with his wife shows that his fears were soon dismissed as unfounded. The most radical changes were in the Cavalry Corps to the command of which Sheridan, from the Army of the Cumberland, fell heir; while Torbert, from the infantry, took the First Division, and Wilson, from Grant's Staff and more recently from the Cavalry Bureau, took the Third Division. The Corps had been overworked and badly needed remounts, therefore it was permitted to reduce the extended front its pickets were covering. While Rawlins was privy to all this, and fully concurred in the orders which brought it about, his routine work was greatly reduced from

the first, and this in turn gave him more time to familiarize himself with the country and the great problems which henceforth were to tax his chief to the utmost of his powers.

While it has been stated that Grant had at one time recommended William F. Smith to command the Army of the Potomac, and at another thought of Sherman for that important place, it soon became known that Smith would go to Butler as second in command, and that Meade would continue in the command of the Army of the Potomac, under Grant's immediate supervision. Just how far Rawlins was consulted in this, or in the plans of campaign, cannot be precisely stated, but his correspondence shows that he accompanied Grant to Fortress Monroe, April 1, and necessarily became aware of all measures under consideration. Although Butler was adroit enough to enroll himself in Rawlins's mind, with Sherman and Meade, as a friend whom Grant could thoroughly trust, it is quite certain that both he and Grant thought it wise to supplement that wily politician by sending William F. Smith to him and providing that he should have a large command when the spring campaign began.

Whether Smith ever discussed the plan of operations in person with either Grant or Rawlins does not appear; but it is certain that soon after Grant's return from Fortress Monroe, Smith sent me a letter fully setting forth his views on the forthcoming campaign, and this in turn I sent to Rawlins. It is now known that Rawlins, in laying it before Grant, took strong ground against it, which, it is to be observed, required a good deal of independence of judgment, not only because the plan suggested involved considerations of the highest strategic and administrative importance but because it had the general support of a strong group of older strategists, who had stood behind McClellan in favor of the disastrous Peninsula Campaign. The plan suggested involved

all the difficulties of the old one, of which it was a modification; for it required the transfer of a great part of the Army of the Potomac by water and the concentration of an independent and coöperating army on Albermarle Sound, to move from there against the interior of North Carolina and the railway lines connecting Richmond with the interior of the Confederacy.

Rawlins evidently thought that, because I had been made the channel through which this plan was transmitted, it had my approval also; but such was not the case. Recognizing from the first that it was General Grant's exclusive right to make the plans, and that in doing this he should have the help of the best minds in the army, I felt it to be plainly my duty to hand Smith's letter to Rawlins for such disposition and consideration as it ought to receive. The letter itself, although Rawlins sent a copy to his wife, has not been found.¹ Its general character is, however, sufficiently well known. The most important point for present consideration is that it incurred Rawlins's strenuous opposition from the first, mainly because its natural effect would have been to move the army on eccentric lines by sea and further scatter instead of concentrating the national forces. This argument doubtless caused it to be turned down by Grant after the full and careful consideration to which the high rank and great experience of its author entitled it. But Smith's letter derives additional importance from the fact that Rawlins certainly and Grant probably considered it as an evidence of an improper desire on the part of its writer to exert a controlling influence over the plan of campaign in the East as he had over that recently carried out in the West. If this surmise is correct, it necessarily strengthened Grant's decision to attach Smith to Butler's army, which was to move by river from Fortress Monroe towards Petersburg and Richmond,

¹ See Wilson's "Life of Major General William F. Smith," p. 81 *et seq.*

and could easily be transferred further south, instead of assigning him to the command of the Army of the Potomac, for which the General had previously recommended him.

Rawlins's letter also shows beyond question that he not only had a correct view of the fundamental principle which should control Grant's plans, but did not fail to use all the arguments he could bring to bear in favor of its observance. Had he been better educated in military history and the art of war, he would not have thought it necessary to ascribe selfish or other improper motives to so distinguished a soldier as W. F. Smith merely because that commander advocated a plan which he thought the Government strong enough at that time to carry safely into effect.

Rawlins, it must not be forgotten, was not only an unusually strong and able man himself, but, as is frequently the case with men of his race and class, he was naturally not above the vice of suspicion. No one can read his letters without seeing that while he was devoted heart and soul to the national cause and to his chief, and was perfectly willing to efface himself as far as necessary in their behalf, he was no more than properly jealous of his personal and official prerogatives. He evidently felt it to be his duty and privilege to express his views or those of others which he made his own, upon both the plans and the motives of those who submitted them. He believed that Grant should know his men "inside as well as outside," and hence he did not hesitate to speak against either men or plans which he did not approve; and when he had condemned either he became quite impatient, and perhaps at times unjust, towards such as continued to stand out against him.

It is to be regretted that Rawlins did not keep a formal diary, and that his letters written as they were from the very centre of the army as it was constantly pressing to the front, were necessarily liable to capture by Confederate raiders or partizans in the rear, and were therefore given up to per-

sonal rather than official details. This circumstance will sufficiently account for their lack of vital military interest; yet no one can read them without catching glimpses here and there of how plans were made and great questions were disposed of at headquarters, and how great operations were carried out by subordinate commanders. They show beyond all question that Rawlins, notwithstanding his impaired health and the presence of a number of regular officers on the staff, was the ever vigilant and faithful coadjutor of his chief in the East as he was in the West. They also show conclusively that he threw his entire influence at all times for the success of his chief.

First: he advocated what finally came to be known as the Overland Campaign, or in other words he favored Grant's marching out to find Lee, who was known to be near at hand, and directly in front; instead of transferring the Army of the Potomac several hundred miles by water to the James River, or still further south, to Albermarle Sound, as recommended by Smith and other able strategists.

Second: he favored concentrating the largest possible force on the chosen line of operations in Virginia, by withdrawing troops from other lines and departments where they were not needed, and, above all, by filling up the old regiments through a rigid enforcement of the draft, rather than by calling into the field new volunteer organizations under inexperienced officers. His declaration that he believed more in "the infallibility of numbers than in the infallibility of generals, no matter how great their reputation," is the comprehensive expression of a fundamental principle which should pass into the settled maxims of war.

Third: he strenuously opposed the promotion and employment of political generals over regular officers educated at West Point.

That the Chief of Staff, himself only a citizen soldier, should have formulated and expressed these views at the

time and under the circumstances that he did, shows him to have been not only a strong and virile thinker but an extraordinarily clear and sound one. No professional soldier could have expressed them better, and no soldier, professional or volunteer, could have advocated them with greater force or greater independence.

All arrangements having been completed, Grant's great campaign began at 1 A. M., May 4, 1864, with the Third Cavalry Division, under my command, in advance. Grant's headquarters were established that evening near the Old Wilderness Tavern. The army was distributed upon two roads and both columns were well covered by cavalry, but the movements of the infantry from the first were cautious and slow. Had they pushed forward with all the celerity of which they were capable, instead of moving cautiously and slowly, as they did, the first day after crossing the Rapidan they could have passed almost, if not entirely, through the Wilderness and forced the enemy to fight in the open country beyond. From Lee's headquarters at or near Orange Court House, with his front on the Rapidan, which separated him from the Union Army, and his right on Mine Run, he had no means of knowing the direction Grant's columns would take till their movement was well developed. It is of course possible that he might have taken exactly the same roads he did take to strike Grant in flank, and this would have increased the perils of our situation, but competent critics of Lee's methods have generally held that his true policy was to throw himself as directly and quickly as possible across Grant's line of march and thus, with his entire force, impede his foe's progress towards Richmond. That is perhaps what he strove to do in the Wilderness, and although it brought him against the right flank of Grant's columns, instead of in their front, it was perfectly easy for the latter to face to the right and fight on equal terms. It is evident that a flank or rear attack against Grant's probable, or even his real, line of battle formed

no part of Lee's actual plan. This is abundantly shown by the "Official Records" and by the light cast upon the course of events by the Reminiscences and Memoirs of various Confederate generals.

It is not my purpose to dwell upon the details of this campaign further than may be necessary to explain the part taken in it by the Chief of Staff. It is here worthy of note, however, that Rawlins, Bowers, Sheridan, Dana, and I were the only officers of high rank in that vast host who had ever been with Grant in battle, and that it was no part of his plan to fight in the dense and almost impenetrable woods of the Wilderness, if he could help it. He was surrounded, as it were, by strangers who were more or less incredulous as to his real capacity as a general, and believed that he had succeeded hitherto by good fortune rather than by good management. As shown by Rawlins's letter of May 2,² these critics did not conceal their apprehension that Lee would prove to be too much for Grant. This feeling was widespread and undisguised. It was evidently shared by many of the rank and file as well as by several generals commanding corps and divisions, and doubtless did much towards making the movements of the Union army more cautious and more deliberate than they should have been. As it was, they were inexcusably slow. It was clearly Grant's true policy as well as his plan to force his army as rapidly as possible through the Wilderness to the open country beyond, and all his orders were made to that end; but it is certain that the cavalry was the only part of the fighting force that reached each day the point to which it was directed. The Third Cavalry Division had the advance next to the enemy for five days, and was the only division that ever got into Spottsylvania Court House. It did this early on the morning of May 9; and after driving out Wickham's Confederate cavalry, capturing about fifty prisoners from two divisions of Longstreet's corps, and recapturing a

² Appendix, pp. 426, 427.

number of our own men, it held the place for several hours, and did not withdraw till after it had received orders not to go there at all.

On the night of May 3, after the orders were issued, the day's work done, and the troops in motion towards the Rapidan, Richardson tells us that Grant, Rawlins, and their anxious friend, Washburne, sat up till two o'clock the next morning "talking about politics, history, and literature." No further record of that conversation is known to exist. It does not appear that Rawlins had time to write to his wife again for several days, but if he wrote, his letters were either captured or have passed out of the possession of his family. It is of course possible that Washburne kept a private account of what took place, and if so it may yet be published. Meanwhile it can be well understood that the conversation must have been one of unusual interest, as it doubtless had first to do with the plans and movements then under way and with the calculations and hopes of those present, before it passed to questions of history and literature, or even to those of current politics.

So far as headquarters were concerned, there was little to be done after the general orders were actually sent out. Under the method of procedure adopted by the Lieutenant General, Meade and his subordinates worked out the details and kept Grant well informed of all that came to them from the front. It will be remembered that Lee was not taken by surprise. He was too able a commander to neglect any precaution along his front, and especially at the crossings of the Rapidan, for obtaining early and exact information of Grant's operations. He was quite as well prepared as Grant was for any movement that might be made, and when the Union columns began their march to pass beyond his right flank, he lost no time in making his dispositions to counteract it. His columns advanced with certainty and confidence, engaging shortly in a two days' death grapple, in which neither

commander could see his opponent, nor do much more than face the dangers confronting him.

The fighting on both sides was desperate in the extreme. First one line would gain ground, and then the other, but no decided advantage crowned the efforts of either till late in the evening of the second day, when the Confederates under Gordon turned the right flank of the Sixth Corps under Sedgwick and rolled it back in confusion. Gordon tells in his "Reminiscences" how early on the morning of the sixth he found himself on the extreme right of Grant's line and after satisfying himself by a personal reconnoissance that his presence was unknown, and that no sufficient disposition had been made to stay his onset, asked first his division and then his corps-commander for permission to sally forth, and that this, notwithstanding his urgency and his repeated assurances that he could win, was denied till nearly nightfall, when Lee himself, riding his lines and conferring with his subordinate commanders, listened to his suggestions and gave him permission to carry them into effect.

Gordon's narrative, whether correct or not in all its details, is one of the most graphic and exciting bits of military writing to be found in our history. It is the story of a born soldier who had learned by actual experience one of the great lessons of modern warfare, namely, that an unexpected and well-sustained attack in flank or rear can scarcely fail, if directed against an enemy who has not had ample warning and time to prepare for it.

At all events, Gordon's attack upon the right of the Sixth Corps, after the fighting, front to front, was over for the day, fell upon the Federal line in the nature of a surprise. It was the most important event of the campaign so far, and, like Jackson's flank attack the year before against Howard, was signally successful till darkness put an end to it. It resulted in the capture of Generals Seymour and Shaler, with a considerable part of Seymour's division, but that was

not all. It threw the right half of the corps into great confusion and filled with the gravest apprehension the minds of both Grant and Meade, who were encamped together and in constant conference. Fortunately, Sedgwick had all the steadiness that might be expected of a descendant of Major-General Sedgwick of Cromwell's New Model Army. With imperturbable deliberation he gave the necessary orders for an additional change of front, to resist the enemy; but the latter failed to realize the extent of his own success, or perhaps thought further progress was impossible through the darkness, which was made still more impenetrable by the gloom of the surrounding forest. What looked at first like an irremediable disaster to the Union right soon gave place to a cessation of the fight, which was in due time followed by a conviction on the part of Sedgwick and his veterans that the worst had passed.

Shortly after dark I received an order from Sheridan to move, as soon as it was light enough to see, with my division to the Germanna Ford road, for the purpose of ascertaining if the enemy had reached it, or had advanced to the right and rear of the Sixth Corps. The intervening hours were full of anxiety to Sheridan, Forsyth and myself. We were near Chancellorsville on the Fredericksburg and Orange turnpike, from three to five miles from general headquarters. We had early received the news of Sedgwick's disaster, accompanied by orders to cover the movement of the trains towards Fredericksburg, which we construed as foreshadowing a retrograde march of the army, possibly to the north side of the river. To make matters worse, we thought we could hear the rattle and roar of distant musketry till late at night, but fortunately this turned out to be the noise of the moving trains. Yet withal the night was a gloomy one, long to be remembered.

At early dawn my division turned into the Germanna Ford road and was covering with its skirmishers the entire

zone of danger; but happily we soon discovered that the enemy had not fully realized the value of his opportunity and had taken no measures whatever to improve it. Knowing how important it was that both Grant and Meade should be immediately advised as to the exact state of affairs in this quarter, I sent a staff officer to report to the latter, and rode myself rapidly to the former. Naturally I was full of anxiety as to the effect upon Grant of the exciting incidents of the two days previous and especially of the night before, and hence went as fast as my horse could carry me. I reached headquarters on a little wooded knoll in the Wilderness at, or shortly after, seven o'clock, and dismounting at the proper distance, I had started up the hillside when Grant caught sight of me, and before receiving my report, called out cheerily: "It's all right, Wilson; the army is moving towards Richmond!"

This was the first time I had seen the Lieutenant General since he crossed the Rappahannock. Of course his hearty reception and confident bearing relieved my mind instantly of all apprehension. An exchange of greetings with Rawlins, Bowers, and the other staff officers followed at once. We congratulated one another on the triumphant manner in which our Chief had met the crisis of his fate. Up to that time the Army of the Potomac had not "fought its battles to a finish"; but it was now certain that it "would fight it out on that line if it took all summer," although this stirring assurance was not made public till Grant sent his memorable letter of May 11 to General Halleck by the hand of Mr. Washburne.

Many misleading accounts have been given to the world in regard to Grant's bearing when the news of Seymour's disaster and capture reached him. He has been reported as having remained unmoved and unshaken throughout the excitement which followed.⁸ As the incident was not closed till some time after dark, it is not to be denied that it consti-

⁸ "Campaigning with Grant," by General Horace Porter, p. 70 *et seq.*

tuted a crisis of the most portentous character, calling not only for unusual fortitude but for unusual self-control on the part of the commanding general. As courier after courier dashed up to his headquarters with reports more or less exaggerated, but all most alarming, and as the serious nature and progress of the disaster became better known, it would have been an extraordinary exhibition of stolid insensibility if Grant had actually gone to sleep in the midst of the excitement. Defeat might possibly grow out of this unexpected disaster, and defeat meant more to him than to any other man in that army. Hitherto he had met the enemy but to overwhelm him, and this was, above all, the reason for his being awake and at the head of the army in that field. To suffer a reverse of fortune at the hands of Lee meant in the end a failure that might be fatal to his country's cause, and must be fatal to himself. All this and more may have passed through his mind, and externally composed, as all unite in saying he was, he would have been less than human had it not moved him to the very depths of his soul.

And there is no doubt that such was the case. Rawlins and Bowers united in saying to me aside before I left that the situation the night before for a time seemed appalling, that Grant met it outwardly with calmness and self-possession, but after he had asked such questions and given such orders as the emergency seemed to call for, he withdrew to his tent and, throwing himself face downward on his cot, instead of going to sleep, gave vent to his feelings in a way which left no room to doubt that he was deeply moved. They concurred in assuring me that, while he revealed to others neither uncertainty nor hesitation as to what was to be done, and was equally free from the appearance of indifference and bravado, he made no effort to conceal from them the gravity of the danger by which the army was threatened. They had been with him in every battle from the beginning of his career, and had never before seen him show the slightest apprehension

or sense of danger; but on that memorable night in the Wilderness it was much more than personal danger which confronted him. No one knew better than he that he was face to face with destiny, and there was no doubt in their minds that he realized it fully and understood perfectly that retreat from that field meant a great calamity to his country as well as to himself. That he did not show the stolidity that has been attributed to him in that emergency but fully realized its importance is greatly to his credit. It rests upon the concurrent testimony of those two faithful officers that he not only perfectly understood the situation but was the first to declare that the enemy, not having fully improved his advantage, had lost a great opportunity. It was also Grant who was first to see with the clear vision of a great leader that the true way out of the perils which surrounded him was to leave the care of his right flank to the imperturbable Sedgwick, and push his army, as soon as it could see its way, through the Wilderness on its forward march "towards Richmond."

In adopting this heroic course Grant had the earnest support of both Rawlins and Bowers, as well as of those who had yet to learn by actual observation that it was his custom to fight his battles through to the end. I, for one, am free to confess that when he gave me the cheerful assurance that the army was already in motion "towards Richmond," he lifted a great weight from my mind. We who had known him best felt that the crisis was safely passed, and that we were now on the sure road to ultimate victory. I never saw Rawlins in a more resolute nor more encouraging temper, nor Grant in a state of greater confidence. Feeling entirely reassured, I returned to my division, and as soon as possible made known to Sheridan and Forsyth all I had learned. My report, as might have been expected, also lifted a load from their minds and strengthened their faith in Grant and the

ultimate success of the campaign in which we were now fully embarked.

Rawlins's first letter to his wife after the army crossed the Rapidan shows that Grant claimed the advantage in the first two days' fighting. It also shows that, when the enemy withdrew, Grant did not know in what direction he had gone. The letter runs as follows:

Battle-field, Old Wilderness Tavern, Va., May 7, 1864.

. . . We crossed the Rapidan on the 4th instant with the entire army of the Potomac, without opposition, were met by the enemy at this place on the forenoon of the 5th and after a very sanguinary battle which closed only with the night of the 6th, found ourselves this morning masters of the field, the enemy having withdrawn. Whether within his fortifications at Mine Run, five miles distant from here, or towards Richmond, is not yet clearly ascertained. Our loss in killed, wounded and missing will reach full ten thousand, among them five general officers. On the main road by which the Confederates retired they have left a considerable force to protect their rear. With the pickets of this force our skirmishers are now engaged. The General and staff are all well. I am feeling much better than when I left Culpepper. On my way here I saw Miss Rawlins. She is my cousin and a daughter of Elloi Rawlins. . . .

The next letter runs as follows:

Near Spottsylvania C. H., Va., May 9, 1864. . . . Since writing you on the 7th we have progressed about eleven miles nearer Richmond. The enemy beat us to Spottsylvania and now hold the place. By this move they have interposed their whole force, perhaps, between us and Richmond. The feeling of our army is that of great confidence, and with the superiority of numbers on our side, I think we can beat them notwithstanding their advantage of position. In God we trust for continued success. To-day the brave and heroic Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps, was shot through the head and died instantly. He was a gallant and able officer but thank God his place is well filled by the accomplished General H. G. Wright, who is an able officer and as popular as his predecessor, the lamented Sedgwick.

By a Richmond paper of the 7th we learn that the enemy up

to that time had lost in killed and mortally wounded, three general officers; General Longstreet was also severely wounded in the shoulder. . . I am in very good health. . . .

Two days later Rawlins wrote as follows:

Near Spottsylvania, Va., May 11, 1864. . . . We have had six days continuous fighting and heavy losses in killed and wounded, reaching perhaps eighteen thousand, and among them Major General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, Brigadier Generals Wadsworth, Hare, Stevenson and Rice. Wounded Brigadier Generals Robinson and Bartlett. Missing Brigadier Generals Seymour and Shaler.

The enemy's loss is perhaps as great as ours, in rank and file, and in general officers; in captures of prisoners, we perhaps have the count considerably in our favor, having already captured near four thousand. In an assault last evening one brigade of ours pierced the enemy's lines, and captured an entire rebel brigade. We have suffered no such loss. In all our losses, we have not yet lost a single regimental organization, much less a brigade. I mention this to show you how complete have been our lines and perfect the discipline of our men, only one brigade having at any time shown evidence of stampeding; this one is the old brigade of General Milroy of Winchester notoriety.

Our progress towards Richmond is slow, but we are on the way, and do not propose, unless some disaster overtakes us, ever taking a step backwards. We have still an abundance of supplies and ammunition . . .

How my heart bleeds to think of the weeping of loved ones, on the receipt of the news from this terrible strife, but those who have been killed, have died in a noble cause, and fallen with their faces towards Richmond, having lost no step taken in that direction. . . .

Again, two days later, he wrote:

Battle-field, Spottsylvania, May 13, 1864. . . . Yesterday's battle ended with dark, and during the night the enemy fell back from the position he held stubbornly during the day. Whether they will make a stand for another battle this side of Richmond, is not known, but my opinion is they will fight us again in their present position; a few hours, however, will determine. Our

losses have been very heavy, but the advantages in the conflict have been with us most decidedly. It still continues to rain, and the effects of the damp, chilly weather I feel very perceptibly—still I am quite well. . . .

If Rawlins wrote any letters between the fourteenth and the twenty-third of May, they have not come into my possession, nor are they in the hands of his family. It was a period of suspense and uncertainty, during which there was a constant strain, but no great crisis. Sheridan had been detached with the entire cavalry corps to operate against the Confederate cavalry under Stuart, and to break up Lee's lines of railway communication with Richmond. Grant was pressing steadily and irresistibly towards Richmond, while his grim determination to win at any cost, which was most popular with the people, was again bringing his name forward for the Presidency. It may be safely assumed that Rawlins was not insensible of this, but it must be recalled that the contingency in which he could favor it, that of complete success over the enemy, had not yet arrived; hence, the inference is safe that he was at that time taking no interest in it, but confining himself rigidly to the duties of his position. It was now evident that Lee could not, as in former days, "command" the Army of the Potomac, as well as his own, and that it had at last passed under a general who did not take orders from his opponent. It may well be doubted if there was ever an army which was held so relentlessly to its work, or which was more bravely confronted by its opponent. The fighting was almost without intermission, and the loss on both sides unprecedented. The necessity for reënforcements, so ably set forth in Rawlins's farsighted letters, was now apparent to all; and after giving a summary of the operations the previous day, on May 25 he wrote:

. . . The entire army was ordered to move out this morning and feel the enemy, and ascertain if he is making a stand here, or falling back still nearer to Richmond. It is now eight o'clock

A. M. and no firing has been heard. So I infer he has gone south of the South Anna and Pamunkey Rivers. The railroad from Hanover Junction to Gordonsville is in our possession and its systematic and complete destruction has been ordered.

Reënforcements are still coming forward with commendable promptness. I have every confidence, if the Government will keep up this army to its present numbers, all will go well and that before many months, perhaps weeks, Lee's army will be defeated, and the last hopes of the Confederacy extinguished in the bloody storm that called it into existence.

I am in very good health, and stand the campaign finely. In fact it has continued to benefit me. . . .

On May 26 he wrote from Quaile's Ford, on the North Anna, as follows:

. . . Yesterday no changes were made of any moment in the relative positions of the two armies, the reconnoissances on our part having shown us the enemy in strong force immediately in our front and strongly entrenched. You may think the continual mention of the enemy's entrenchments very strange, when you have been constantly hearing of his having been by some movement of ours compelled to abandon first one of his defences and then another. Now the true statement of this is, that when we crossed the Rapidan the enemy had strong works at Mine Run, some three miles to the right of the road we marched on. He came out of his works and gave us battle at Old Wilderness, after the second day of which he fell back with his main force into his works, and we took up our march by his right flank for Spottsylvania. Discovering our movement, the enemy marched rapidly for the same place, and having the shorter line, arrived there a few hours before us, and commenced at once to entrench his new position. By the time we got up our whole force and had put our trains in a place of safety, he had so far completed his new works as to give him great protection in the battles which were subsequently fought there. So again, when we by a movement similar to that in the Wilderness had started for this point, the enemy broke camp simultaneously with us, and having the Telegraph road to move on, one of the finest in the country, and the direct one to this point, he succeeded in getting here about twelve hours in advance of us and throwing up rifle

pits in defence. A few hours always suffice for an army acting purely on the defensive to fortify itself, and the fortifications make up greatly for inferiority of numbers.

I cannot speak of contemplated movements as I would like to do, lest my letters . . . might be captured by the enemy while passing through the country to Washington by courier, or rather to our base on the river. I am in excellent health and spirits, and have full confidence in our final success. The feeling of this army as to its ability to whip that of Lee is good and gives assurance that it can, unless some mistake should be made in movement, which I do not fear. . . .

In spite of the heavy fighting behind field entrenchments, Rawlins wrote confidently as follows:

Hanover Town, Va., May 28, 1864. . . . The army of the Potomac is massing here, about fifteen miles from Richmond. So you see the real results of the battles we have fought notwithstanding what may be said by those who do not believe Richmond can be taken. Unless some terrible blunder is committed in the movements of our army, by which the enemy obtains an advantage over us, Richmond must fall. That any such blunder will be committed I do not for a moment believe. General Grant and General Meade are both able and experienced soldiers, either of them the equal and in everything heretofore Lee's superior on the field. Of course our numbers are greater than those of the enemy, but by his fortifications he has made up for inferiority of numbers. You know what I have heretofore written you of General Meade. My opinion which has always been decidedly favorable to him, is much heightened by the soldierly qualities and great ability he has displayed throughout this campaign. He reminds me much of Sherman, and handles his men equally well in battle. If in anything Sherman is superior it is in writing. Of this, I cannot however be sure, for I have seen nothing of General Meade's abilities in this direction. Generals Hancock, Wright, Warren and Burnside are all able and competent soldiers and their subordinate officers and men are equal to any in the world. With such an army of leaders, and such men as fill the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, no nation need fear its triumph, when engaged in the holy cause of liberty and its own existence.

I should never have been fully able to speak impartially of this

army of heroes had it not been for the opportunity I now have of serving with and becoming acquainted with them. These soldiers fight as well and bravely as do their comrades in the armies of the West. They are all Americans and why should they not?

Reënforcements are still arriving. A portion of the force from General Butler will be here to-morrow . . .

Our base will hereafter be at the White House, the place made famous as the base of the Army of the Potomac under McClellan in his celebrated Peninsula campaign. How I pray in my heart that God will avert from us the fate that met his attempt to overthrow the rebel army and capital. I have the utmost confidence in success and no fear of failure. I would like to speak particularly of further movements. I know your good sense would appreciate such knowledge, but the danger of the capture of our mails, and prying officials forbid this. . . .

From this time on Rawlins wrote to his wife daily as follows:

Hanover Town, Va., May 29, 1864. . . . To-day has been delightful. Nothing exciting has taken place. Our reconnoitering forces pushed out in the direction of Richmond and found the enemy in force about seven miles distant from here. The remainder of the army is ordered forward to the support of the forces sent out at noon. The new position of the enemy is on a creek called the Totopotomoy, at the crossing of the Shady Grove and Mechanicsville roads. Whether he intends holding this position against us at the risk of a general engagement is not certainly known. My opinion is that, most likely he will defend his new position as long as he can make it tenable, but the prevalent opinion is that he will give it up and retire behind the Chickahominy. Be this, however, as it may, we shall pursue steadily the original plan of General Grant's to the reduction of Richmond if it is to fall. In this campaign thus far there has been no deviation from it. That which we most desire and what would soonest give us the city, is a battle on something like equal ground, in which I am sure we would defeat and rout the enemy. Sheridan's cavalry corps had hard fighting yesterday evening about three miles in advance of here. It drove the enemy about a mile. Our loss was three hundred and fifty, of whom fifty-four

were killed. In the list of casualties were fifty officers, of whom seven were killed. . . .

Near Hawes Shop, Va., May 30, 1864. . . . Another delightful day. We are now about three miles nearer Richmond than we were yesterday, but the position of the army is but little changed. Our reconnoissances have, however, developed the enemy in force—perhaps his whole army—in our immediate front with every indication that he will await battle this side the Chickahominy. A few days will solve the question of Richmond, and whether a long siege or a sharp decisive battle is to terminate it. My health is still improving. . . .

Near Hawes Shop, Va., May 31, 1864. . . . Another delightful day. The position of this army is the same as last described, save that it has advanced a short distance.

The enemy attacked General Warren's advance forces, on our left, about six o'clock last evening, and after a sharp conflict of perhaps forty minutes, were repulsed with considerable loss. We buried over one hundred of their dead, and captured from one hundred to two hundred prisoners. They removed their wounded from the field. Our loss in killed, wounded and missing was about four hundred.

General Hancock carried a line of the enemy's works in his front this morning and captured about thirty prisoners, the loss on either side not heavy.

General Wilson was sent this morning to destroy railroad bridges. He is a good destructionist, and I have confidence in his rendering the railroads as useless as any one in the service could. The success of the cavalry expedition under Sheridan in which General Wilson had command of a division, secured his confirmation by the Senate. Of this I am truly glad for Wilson is a brave and energetic officer and I am of the opinion will be popular with his command. His superior officers all think a great deal of him. You remember the letter I wrote him from Nashville. He expressed to me great satisfaction and perfect accordance with its statements.

General William F. Smith has arrived at White House with heavy reinforcements for this army. Another large force is also on the way from Port Royal, and is now near here.

General Breckenridge's and General Buckner's divisions from Western Virginia have reinforced the enemy in our front, but

I feel sure they cannot get forward for the grand struggle as large a force as we shall be able to gather.

I enclose you a rose bud from the yard of a beautiful residence just in rear of one of our batteries occupied by the 4th U. S. Artillery, and in front of a battery of the enemy, and from which residence, strange to say, the women folks—a mother, four grown-up daughters and several small children—refuse to go, but sought shelter in the cellar during the cannonading yesterday. The house was struck by canon shot and shell at least twenty times, and is marked much by bullets from the enemy's sharpshooters. These women and children were requested by officers to leave, but they would not, and thought it very hard that the Yankees would put a battery where they did, thereby drawing the fire of the enemy upon them. I mention this to show you that war has not softened in any way its features since you looked it in the face at Vicksburg. . . .

Near Via House, Va., June 1, 1864. . . . To-day has been beautiful, and closed, or is closing, in a heavy battle. So far as heard from the result is favorable to us. General Smith's troops have arrived and are in position. The only change of the forces from yesterday is that General Wright's Corps (the Sixth) has moved from our right to our left. The cavalry under Sheridan attacked the enemy last evening near Cold Harbor and drove him into and through that place, which holding at one A. M. to-day he was in turn attacked by the enemy, but repulsed the attack and captured about one hundred and fifty prisoners. Neither our loss nor that of the enemy has yet been reported. . . .

Colonel Bowers is in very poor health and goes to Washington to-morrow. I was the only invalid when we started on the campaign, but am, I have no doubt, to-day in as robust health as any member of the staff, and promise fairly to beat all of them in the end. I am really almost well. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 2, 1864. . . . The forenoon was very hot and dusty; this afternoon and to-night it is raining quite heavily.

The enemy yesterday afternoon about five o'clock attacked our lines in front of Warren's, Burnside's and Hancock's corps and were repulsed, the heaviest attack being on General Warren's front. Here they were repulsed three times. At 4.30 P. M.

Generals Wright and Smith attacked the enemy in their immediate front, and carried one line of works, which we now hold, excepting a portion of that carried by General Smith, which, being commanded by another line, was abandoned by us. They captured full eight hundred prisoners. Our entire loss during all this fighting was 2,078 wounded and about 500 killed. The loss of the enemy can only be guessed at, save their loss in prisoners already stated.

Our cavalry under General Wilson succeeded in destroying the railroad bridges across the South Anna yesterday, so altogether yesterday was a day of success for us. To-day but little has been done, save that we have made some changes in our lines. During the withdrawal of one of General Warren's divisions the enemy, thinking to take advantage of it, attacked it, but it returned immediately to its old position and forced the enemy back.

Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864. . . . Along our lines to-day there has been comparative quiet. The fighting day before yesterday inclined each of the opposing armies to desist until they could breathe. This very moment heavy firing has commenced in front of General Hancock. It is the enemy, I suppose, trying to drive our working parties from work. It is too late for a serious attack. These days of quiet are long ones, I assure you, but this musketry is growing louder and heavier, and it may be more than I suppose. It still rages with the greatest fury. The artillery has opened, but it sounds not half so terrible and deadly as does the quick and rapid discharge of musketry. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 6, 1864. . . . To-day has been very warm, a foretaste I suppose of what we are to have during the summer. How I would like to look on this campaign as soon to close successfully. That it will soon be at an end, I scarcely think probable. A people, although in error, will not easily give up that in which they have sacrificed the flower of their youth and impoverished themselves in a bloody war of three years to maintain.

I enclose you a new two-cent coin, the first one received at these headquarters and the first one seen by the Lieutenant General. Please retain it as a keepsake. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 7, 1864. . . . This morning was very cold, a great change in the temperature. Everything has been quiet along our lines, except in front of one of Burnside's

divisions, where there was a skirmish which resulted in nothing of importance to either side. The *Richmond Examiner* of to-day states that their forces under the command of General W. E. Jones were defeated twelve miles beyond Stanton; that General Jones was killed on the field, and that his successor retired to Waynesboro in the mountains between Charlottesville and Stanton. This is a triumph which will inure greatly to our interest in this campaign. Hunter is doing what we expected Sigel to do some time since. Hunter and a heavy force, under General Crook, will meet now without doubt at Staunton, if they have not already done so. Their combined forces will be sufficiently strong to enable them to strike a staggering blow against the Confederacy; besides, heavy reinforcements have been ordered to Hunter.

I took dinner to-day with General Wilson, about four miles from here, in the house of Edmund Ruffin, who fired the first gun at Fort Sumter. His fine plantation is abandoned, and I understand that he is dead. I enclose a lily picked in the yard. . . .

After the dinner mentioned above I returned with Rawlins to army headquarters, and during our ride we had an interesting conversation in regard to the policy under which the army had acted so frequently during the campaign, and especially during the last four or five days. I refer of course to its repeated assaults of the enemy's entrenched positions, which assaults generally failed, and always resulted in a number of killed and wounded entirely out of proportion to the advantages gained. Rawlins declared his bitter opposition to such assaults, and to the influences which brought them about, and reiterated that as they were advised by Comstock, a professional soldier, whose specialty on the staff was supposed to be entrenchments and their capture, it was almost impossible to neutralize his influence. He was usually sound enough on most military questions, but his judgment in reference to the conditions under which battle should be delivered, was regarded by Rawlins as faulty in the extreme.

The next day I removed, with my first brigade, to the left

of the army and Rawlins repeated his visit; but this time he was accompanied by Dana and Warren. The conversation again turned upon the policy of attacking the enemy behind breastworks and rifle trenches, and again this policy received unsparing condemnation. During the conversation Rawlins and Dana concurred in criticising and disapproving the influence which had come to be paramount at headquarters; and in expressing their regret that I was no longer with them on the staff, but was commanding a division instead, they did not hesitate to declare that their own influence was on the wane and that the new staff was neither so harmonious nor so efficient as the old one used to be.

The next day I received a letter from W. F. Smith, commenting severely upon the "murderous assaults" of Cold Harbor, the demoralizing effect they had had upon the rank and file, and the reflection which they cast upon the generalship of those who had ordered them, or were responsible for their management. I sent this letter at once to Dana at Grant's headquarters, and it is known that he approved its statements; but what use he made of it has never been reported. It is probable, however, that he also showed it to Rawlins, from whom he had no concealments. Be this as it may, a period of gloom and discouragement followed, and the army's feelings were reflected throughout the country. Officers of all ranks participated in it, and the unfortunate controversy between Grant, Smith and Butler ultimately grew out of it; but as I have discussed this controversy with sufficient fullness in "The Life and Services of General Smith,"⁴ I return to the letters of Rawlins, which give many interesting details of current events.

On June 8 he wrote from Cold Harbor as follows:

. . . All quiet to-day except for occasional firing of artillery and sharp-shooters.

⁴ Published by the John M. Rogers Press, Wilmington, Del., 1904.

The sudden change of the weather from extreme heat to cold night before last was the cause of my taking cold and of a slight return of my cough. . . .

The papers are filled with eulogies of General Grant and General Sherman, but little is said about General Meade, who is one of the ablest and most accomplished officers. Grant's fame is established as one of the most successful military men on our side, brought to the notice of history by the Rebellion. Sherman by the success of his campaign thus far against Atlanta has risen and is still rising in the public estimation. You know my opinion of him. General Meade, however, is overlooked by all in the eagerness to see Grant, and let me assure you no one regrets this more than General Grant himself, and when this campaign is ended, whatever may be the result, in his official report he will do justice to the able and patriotic Meade. There has been nothing thus far between Generals Grant and Meade (nor do I have a single apprehension there will be) in their official and personal relations conflicting in the slightest manner with the most cordial coöperation in all movements of the army or marring for one moment their friendship. In no single instance has General Meade shown the slightest indication of indecision. To the contrary he is prompt and decided in everything and at all times. I have never seen the officer who knew more of his army and was more watchful to guard it against surprise by the enemy. He fills my highest expectations of him, some of which, if I remember right, I expressed in a letter from Culpepper C. H. He is of all men in the army of the Potomac the one most fitted to command it. This opinion is not mine only, but is one frequently expressed by General Grant. His modesty and merit will be discovered and made to illuminate the pages of history by searchers after truth and the admirers of worth in the final writing of this rebellion. In your conversations about officers connected with this Army, please give considerable prominence to Meade, for none is more deserving than he. This I particularly desire. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 9, 1864. . . . Greater quiet has prevailed along the lines of the hostile armies to-day than at any time since our arrival here. An armistice was had on the 7th for the burial of the dead of each army. The number of ours buried was 432. The enemy buried his own, and I have no means of

knowing the number. These were killed in the battle of the 3rd. General Grant proposed certain arrangements to General Lee on the 4th for the burial of the dead, but they were not agreed to, hence the delay.

General Sheridan left here three days ago with a large cavalry force for Charlottesville or thereabouts. He will, we have great hopes, be able to effect a junction with General Hunter, who after whipping the enemy badly at Mt. Crawford, twelve miles beyond Staunton, on Sunday last, entered Staunton on the Monday following. I mentioned this battle in a previous letter. Hunter and Sheridan will have a force of great strength, able to take care of itself in an open country, and which will, I have no doubt, inflict great injury upon the enemy. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 10, 1864. . . . To-day has been more quiet than any day since we crossed the Rapidan. Richmond papers confirm previous reports of the defeat of their forces by General Hunter, and also state that General Crook, in command of a large force of Yankees, was on Monday last at Wilboro, about sixteen miles from Lexington, Va., where the rebels have a military academy, the destruction of which they very much fear. This all looks favorable to us. Sheridan has reached Charlottesville before this and, we have great hopes, has effected a junction with Hunter and Crook, unless they have moved on to Lynchburg, the destruction of which place would be a terrible blow to the rebels. This is, however, almost too much to hope for considering our forces, yet it is not improbable by any means. . . .

Cold Harbor, Va., June 11, 1864. . . . Along our main lines we have had almost perfect quiet since my last writing. Our cavalry on the right this morning drove in the enemy's pickets, and were in turn driven back by the enemy. The loss of the cavalry was fourteen killed and wounded. The enemy's main cavalry force has evidently gone after Sheridan, who started five days ago for Charlottesville.

Our entire loss since the beginning of this campaign, May 4th, 1864, to and including June 9th, as officially reported, is killed 7,289, wounded 37,410, missing 9,862, total 54,561. This statement, however, does not include the losses in the cavalry corps since June 1st. Its loss will be about 600. I send you the exact number of casualties that you may not be in ignorance when you

see statements of the same made in the newspapers. The number is great, but the losses of the enemy are also great. We have already captured and sent forward fully 11,000 prisoners, but in killed and wounded their loss must have been considerably less than ours, especially at this place. Our attacks have been against a strongly fortified position. In all other places I should say their loss has been as great as ours.

If any letter was written on the 12th, it has not been found.

Charles City C. H., June 13, 1864. . . . To-day has been fine and pleasant. We broke our camp at Cold Harbor yesterday at 3 o'clock P. M., encamped near Despatch Station last night and reached here at 4:30 P. M. to-day. The whole army is now virtually across to the west side of the famous Chickahominy. To-morrow morning we shall commence laying a pontoon bridge across the James River, and also ferrying over troops. Our movement this far has been a splendid success, and the weather most opportune for all our movements. I have no doubt the enemy is also moving to the south side of the James and will meet us, most probably at Petersburg, should we move in that direction. He may possibly make an attack on us in our crossing the river, but I apprehend no such thing. From the commencement of this campaign General Grant has not deviated at all from his written plan, but has steadily pursued the line he then marked out. I shall give it to you in one of my letters hereafter.

A despatch from General Hunter confirms all we heard of the victory he had gained over Jones. He captured 1,500 prisoners, 3,000 stands of arms, three pieces of artillery and large quantities of stores. . . .

I am in excellent health and spirits. . . .

Charles City C. H., June 14, 1864. . . . Another beautiful day has just closed, with a lovely western horizon, giving promise of fair weather to-morrow. Two more such days as this, with no interference on the part of the enemy, will enable us to cross the entire army of the Potomac to the south side of the James River. It seems that thus far we have been especially favored of Heaven. Our last flank movement has been regarded by military men as extra hazardous. General W. F. Smith's corps has already reached Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock's corps is

nearly all ferried over to a point nearly opposite here. A pontoon bridge will be laid across the river at Fort Powhattan by to-morrow morning. Our troops are all up, with trains near by. Everything is progressing finely.

I accompanied the General to Butler's headquarters to-day. We went by boat. The James River is one of the most majestic of the great rivers of America, and is daily adding to the interest it already possesses in American history. . . .

City Point, Va., June 15, 1864. . . . Beautiful weather. . . . Hancock's corps is across the river and the advance of it near Petersburg. The pontoon bridge was finished this morning, and by to-morrow morning Burnside's corps, which is now crossing on it, will be also well up towards Petersburg. General W. F. Smith, with a force of 15,000 infantry besides cavalry and artillery, has been fighting since about 4:30 A. M. at Petersburg. He has carried one line of works, capturing some artillery; was to have assaulted the enemy's line at dark to-night, and there has been heavy firing, which indicates that he did so. We have received no report from him as yet, but are momentarily expecting one. The enemy since about 3:50 P. M. have been reënforcing Petersburg by the railroad from Richmond, and we very much fear he will be too strong for Smith. Unless the latter should succeed to-night in conjunction with Hancock in taking Petersburg, we will likely have to commence regular approaches for its reduction.

The news from General Hunter through rebel papers is very encouraging. He captured Lexington, Va., on Saturday, the 11th, and was within 28 miles of Lynchburg and marching in that direction. Great apprehensions are felt by the Confederates for the safety of that place. Should he reach it, a great advantage will be gained by our arms. Nothing could tell more terribly against Richmond unless it were the defeat of Lee's army. Lynchburg is the point where not only two lines of railroad may be cut, but also the James River canal.

Word from Sherman is very cheering, and all looks well, but from Northern Mississippi we have news of another terrible disaster. General Sturgiss was sent out some days ago with a force of 8,000 men, of whom 3,000 were infantry, from Memphis to drive Forrest, who was assembling his command for a raid against Sherman's communications, out of Northern Mississippi.

He met Forrest near Baldwin on the Ohio & Mobile Railroad, and was defeated with the loss of 4,000 men and all his artillery, and was pursued to Colliersville, Tenn.

I cannot understand this, but it seems that we are destined to meet with reverses in that direction and must try the harder to win success in other places. Morgan's raid into Kentucky has been promptly met, and the raiders after the loss of three-fourths of his command is fleeing for safety with the remainder of it. . . .

City Point, Va., June 16, 1864. . . . All the troops except one division of the army are across to the south side of the James River, and four corps are in front of Petersburg. The attack of General W. F. Smith on Petersburg last night was very successful, resulting in the capture of the entire left of its main defences, 260 prisoners and 16 pieces of artillery. These defences were very formidable and, had the enemy succeeded in throwing a sufficient number of troops into the place, we would not have been able to carry these works except by siege. They command the city of Petersburg, which lies in a flat below them. The enemy still holds the right of the line around the place, and is busily constructing an interior one. An attack was ordered again this evening, but from it no report has as yet been received.

The colored troops, about 3,000, in the attack last night carried the strongest part of the entrenchments, losing in the assault about 500 killed and wounded. They did nobly, and are entitled to be regarded as among the best of soldiers. You know I have ever had some misgivings of their efficiency, but seeing what they have accomplished, I doubt no longer.

The enemy this afternoon abandoned his works in front of Bermuda Hundred, and General Butler sent out a strong force and now occupies them. He also pushed a force forward to the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad and destroyed considerable of the track. This seems a strange move on their part and would indicate an intention to evacuate Petersburg. They certainly can't hold it with Butler between it and Richmond. Two divisions of Wright's corps are now passing up the Appomattox to the support of Butler.

A rebel paper of yesterday states that Lieutenant General Polk was killed near Marietta on the 14th instant. He was struck by a shot from Sherman's artillery. Generals Johnston and Hardee were with him at the time. The same paper says that Hampton

had attacked and defeated Sheridan at Trevillian Station, capturing 500 prisoners. . . .

City Point, June 17, 1864. . . . My health is still improving, and you may be assured no one seems less likely to be a subject of consumption than I. The doctors have all assured me that my lungs are not affected, and if you saw me now you would concur in their opinion.

The attack on the enemy at Petersburg made last night and this morning resulted in the further capture of works, six additional guns and four hundred and fifty prisoners. Our loss in killed, wounded and missing was about two thousand two hundred. Petersburg is still firmly held by the enemy. While I write, however, heavy cannonading is going on in that direction. I was out there both yesterday and to-day.

General Butler has returned to his old lines and the enemy to his old position in Butler's front. Butler has been ordered to drive the enemy back, which he will try to do to-night. His failure to hold and fortify the position they evacuated yesterday morning was a great mistake and may cost us a great deal. The General and all are well. . . .

I have just heard from Petersburg. Burnside attacked the enemy at eight o'clock p. m. and has carried, according to report of prisoners taken, the last line of entrenchments between us and Petersburg. The fighting is still progressing. I have great hopes of being able to report the capture of the Cockade City to-morrow night. . . .

City Point, Va., June 18, 1864. . . . We failed to get into Petersburg to-day, but gained considerable ground in that direction on some portions of our lines, which we are entrenching and will hold. We are within one mile of the main part of the city. Our losses since we arrived before Petersburg have been very heavy. I will be able to state the number in my next letter. I send you a Vicksburg paper, not knowing but in the notices of marriages you might see some name you would recognize.

You ask to know the size of my head and the number of the slipper I wear. My head is seven and a quarter full—my slippers No. 8.

To-day, like many preceding it, has been most beautiful. Our headquarters are most delightfully situated on the banks of the James River, overlooking the immense fleet of river and sea-

going vessels lying at City Point and Bermuda Hundred. You would be delighted and charmed with the view. . . .

City Point, June 19, 1864. . . . A despatch from Sheridan, dated 16th instant at Guinea's Bridge, Virginia, states that he had a severe engagement with the enemy at Trevillians' Station on the Virginia Central Railroad on the 12th, and completely defeated them, capturing 500 prisoners and inflicting on them a heavy loss. He destroyed the road from Trevillian's to Louisa C. H. Among the rebel officers: Colonel McCallister killed, General Rosser and two colonels wounded. The enemy having sent a heavy force on to the road between him and General Hunter, he commenced his journey back. General Hunter is on the railroad about twenty miles west of Lynchburg, destroying it at a great rate, according to the Richmond papers. . . .

City Point, June 20, 1864. . . . To-day has been clear and fine, with all quiet along our lines. No news from any quarter, except from the White House, which place was attacked by the enemy at daylight this morning, and at 10 A. M. the fighting was still going on. Our forces there number about 3,000 men under General Abercrombie. The place is well fortified, and we have every reason to believe will be able to hold out until the arrival of Sheridan, who was near there yesterday.

I am now out of debt and feel independent. If you could exchange your greenbacks for gold, it might possibly be the best investment you could make. Do as you like about it. Don't say to any one I have advised you thus, but the rapid rise in gold and the great surplus of currency makes me doubt if greenbacks will ever be at par, no matter what may be the result of the war. The trouble in our currency is, in my judgment, the surplus, in excess of the necessities of commerce, and not in the fact that we don't take Richmond. Whatever may be the result of this campaign, the success of which I do not for a moment doubt, our Government is strong and wealthy, and will cancel or put into the course of cancellation all its indebtedness. If you have gold you can always convert it into currency, and I think you had better make the exchange. . . .

City Point, Va., June 21, 1864. . . . Everything quiet on our lines. The attack on White House yesterday was repulsed. Sheridan reached there at 5 P. M. and will join us here at once.

The Petersburg papers on the 20th say that General Hunter attacked Lynchburg on Saturday, the 18th, and was repulsed, and that they expected a general battle the next day, which showed that the attack and repulse amounted to no more than a reconnoissance on the part of Hunter.

President Lincoln is here. He arrived about two o'clock P. M. to-day, and in company with the General and staff rode out to the front. We got back to this point about eight o'clock. He goes to-morrow to the pontoon bridge across the James at Deep Bottom. He is greatly pleased with the condition of affairs here, and it was most truly interesting when he was cheered by the negro troops, those who fought so gallantly here on the 16th. Their honest, hearty hurrahs for the man whom they regard as their liberator went up to Heaven I am sure. . . .

City Point, Va., June 22, 1864. . . . In moving the corps of Generals Hancock and Wright to the left to circumvallate if possible Petersburg to the river on our left, the enemy attacked Hancock in great force and compelled him to fall back some distance from the intended line, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. We subsequently retook the line, but whether we recaptured the guns or not is not reported. At seven o'clock P. M. the advance was to commence again, but we have not heard from it yet. It will most likely result in a heavy fight.

Richmond papers again report the attack of Hunter upon Lynchburg, which attack they say was repulsed with a loss to Hunter of 200 prisoners and three guns, and that they were in pursuit.

President Lincoln left here for Washington this afternoon.

Wilson and Kautz with 7,000 cavalry started this morning for the Danville & Richmond Railroad. They crossed the Petersburg & Weldon road at 10 A. M., destroying the track and depot where they crossed. I have great confidence in their success, although cavalry thus far has succeeded but poorly in the destruction of the enemy's communications. The enemy's cavalry are mostly to the north of the river, and hence my belief in the success of this raid.

General Ransom of the old Tennessee Army, who was wounded in the Red River expedition, is here. Also Colonel Hillyer and two French officers. Thus you see we have distinguished visitors. . . .

City Point, Va., June 23, 1864. . . . You say I need give myself no uneasiness about your wearing imported goods. Now, my dear, if you understand me as being uneasy about your doing so, you misunderstand my letter. I simply desire you to give your approval to that movement on the part of the ladies of America and am delighted to know that you do approve it. Everything that looks to rendering our country independent of other countries I desire to favor. Its greatness and glory is the one idea of my heart, after my love and duty to you and our little ones. And all through her greatness and glory I would have her benevolence and generosity shine. . . .

The refusal of Congress to strike out the commutation clause in the conscript law is regarded by many here as very unfortunate. . . .

City Point, June 24, 1864. . . . Have just returned from the front. In extending our lines last night we lost very heavily—about 3,000 killed, wounded and missing, at a rough estimate, and four pieces of artillery. We reached the Weldon Railroad and destroyed about one mile of it, and then fell back. We now hold a strong line threatening the road, and cavalry has been at work destroying it to-day.

This morning the enemy attacked General Smith's line, and were repulsed, leaving in our hands 166 prisoners. To-night an attack was ordered by General Smith on a hill between ours and the enemy's main line, but the result has not yet been reported. Our entire losses in our operations from the 9th to and including the 19th instant were ten thousand four hundred and fifteen (10,415).

I have made an arrangement with Colonel Hillyer to convert the money on deposit with N. Corwith & Co., that is to say, five hundred dollars, into gold, and have drawn on them for it. . . .

City Point, Va., June 25, 1864. . . . Very dry. Everybody wishing for rain.

General Smith did not make the attack he intended last night. To-day all has been quiet. Yesterday afternoon Sheridan had heavy fighting in the protection of his trains, and in getting them to the James River. He succeeded in saving everything and inflicted severe loss on the enemy. His own loss was heavy, say about 400 killed and wounded. . . .

City Point, Va., June 26, 1864. . . . Excessively hot to-day. So hot indeed as to practically put an end to operations.

Everything on our lines has been quiet except occasional firing of artillery. The extreme heat renders operations exceedingly difficult, but it will enable the army to get that rest which long and continued marching and fighting since May 4th makes necessary. A few days will suffice for this purpose. . . .

I have been urging General Grant to write to the Speaker of the House of Representatives insisting upon the three-hundred-dollar clause being struck out of the conscription act. Whether he will do so or not, I cannot say. It is getting so late that such a letter might not reach the House before action on the bill is had. With the great advantages we now hold on the James River and in Georgia, if we fail to put down the Rebellion, the nations of the world and our own children will arraign us throughout long ages to come for our treason to humanity and liberty. We must succeed. We dare not fail. . . .

City Point, June 28, 1864. . . . All quiet along our lines yesterday and to-day, save the firing of siege guns at intervals into Petersburg and at bridges across the Appomattox.

Richmond papers of yesterday show that General Wilson's cavalry raid is doing great damage upon their railroads. He reached Burkeville Junction on Friday, destroyed the depots, etc., tore up and burnt the ties, bending the rails over the fires. He went on down the Danville road towards Danville, destroying as he went. All communications with Richmond by rail are now out, and I imagine it will take several days, if not weeks, to repair damages so as to get cars through from beyond the breaks in the roads.⁵ . . .

They claim to have whipped a detachment of Wilson's cavalry on the Petersburg road about seven miles from Burkeville Junction, but I doubt its truth, as they gave no particulars. General Hunter has reached Gauley, Virginia, after having, as he reports officially, inflicted great injury to the rebels in the destruction of railroads and supplies, and whipped them in every engagement. He says his troops are in good heart and health and ready to move in any direction on getting a fresh supply of ammunition. It was want of ammunition that caused his return.

⁵ It took nine weeks to repair this road so that trains could be run over it. See Richardson's "Personal History of U. S. Grant," p. 417.

We have had no rain yet at this point, but yesterday it rained all around us and cooled the atmosphere very considerably. It is now delightfully pleasant. . . .

City Point, Va., June 29, 1864. . . . All quiet along our lines, save artillery firing at intervals. It will be several days, perhaps weeks, before we have another general engagement. We are not idle, however, and should we discover any weakening in the enemy's lines, advantage will be taken of it if possible.

An officer with forty men came through to-day from Wilson. He is on the Weldon Railroad and confronted by a greatly superior force of the enemy. Sheridan's other two divisions of cavalry have gone to his assistance, supported by Wright's army corps of infantry, which, while they effect the relief of Wilson, will, we trust, effectually finish the work of destruction on the railroads.

News from Washington to-day says the House has passed the conscription bill without the commutation clause. I hope it will also pass the Senate. It is more like an earnest desire for the end of the war than any act of the House since the fall of Sumter.

The General was at the front to-day, and I learn from one of his staff he deviated from the only path he should ever travel by taking a glass of liquor. It is the first time I have failed to accompany him to Petersburg, and it was with misgivings I did so. Nothing but indisposition induced me to remain behind. I shall hereafter, under no circumstances, fail to accompany him. . . .

City Point, Va., June 30, 1864. . . . To-day has been as dry as any preceding it. In fact it is so dry and dusty that the very river looks like a bed of dust. . . .

News from Wilson is laden with grief. His command was attacked yesterday afternoon this side of Notoway River and from all the information we have obtained was defeated with heavy loss in men, his train and five pieces of artillery. General Kautz cut his way out, bringing off his own command and a part of Wilson's, while Wilson retreated towards Jarrott's Station on the Weldon road. The cavalry and infantry sent out yesterday to his aid did not reach there in time.

It is hoped that this force will be able to relieve him yet and make up in damage to the enemy all they have inflicted on Wil-

son. Our reports are vague and unsatisfactory. I have hopes the facts will look better for us when they come to hand.

I have received my commission, which I send you by Express. . . .

City Point, Va., July 1, 1864. . . . Still hot and dry. . . . News from Wilson received this evening confirms the reports of his defeat and loss of train and artillery, all of which he destroyed himself to keep it from falling into the hands of the enemy. His loss in men will not exceed 1,000, I should say, from present information. He destroyed effectually twenty-six miles of the Petersburg & Lynchburg Railroad and thirty miles of the Richmond & Danville Railroad. On the latter road he also destroyed every tie and rail. The Richmond papers say it will take four weeks to repair the damage done. At this time Richmond is entirely isolated from all railroad communications with the South, and we hope to continue the isolation until it falls of its own weight. This, however, will take months. . . .

City Point, July 2, 1864. . . . No rain yet. All has been quiet to-day, save artillery firing, which is continued at intervals along a portion of our lines.

Colonel Rowley left for Galena this morning. His health is poor and he talks of resigning, in fact has tendered his resignation, but Bowers and I have persuaded him out of the notion, and urged him to take orders for Chicago, from whence he could go home and stay for a month at least, and at the expiration of the time he could forward his resignation should he still be of that mind. Otherwise he could return to the field.

Colonel Dent went North yesterday in very low health, and Colonel Babcock is lying sick in camp. I am in very excellent health. My cough, although it still hangs on, is very slight indeed. . . . I am better in general health than I have ever been since our acquaintance. . . .

City Point, Va., July 3, 1864. . . . Another day, dusty, dry and hot, has closed, with no sign of change. Quiet prevails all along the lines of the army. The great giants who have wrestled from the time of their grappling with each other on the 5th of May south of the Rapidan until their feet pressed the soil of Petersburg south of the James, now breathe in each other's face while resting and making ready for another struggle, each look-

ing for the spot to strike at in which he can inflict the greatest injury.

Judging from the newspapers, it would seem that the resignation of Mr. Chase is creating quite a sensation or, rather, has increased the gloom that has hung over our nation since the breaking out of the Rebellion. I have held Mr. Chase in high esteem as Secretary of the Treasury, but feel that he has shown a want of true patriotism in selecting this time of all others to add to our national embarrassment, and am inclined to the opinion that his withdrawal from the Treasury Department will, after it becomes fully understood, result in good to our cause. Representing as he does the radicalism of the country, he is little less dangerous than Vallandigham.

Our national currency looks badly, but what of it? Had not the rebellion maintained the war against us from almost the beginning with a depreciated and, for the last eighteen months, an entirely worthless currency? And can we not do what they have with all the advantages and means to boot in our favor? No, a depreciated currency cannot stop the war for national existence. We are too near the goal of triumph now to recede. Give us the conscription bill with the commutation clause stricken out and we will within twelve months stand forth among the nations as a united people, free and powerful for good. Years only can erase the feelings of ill will engendered, but time will heal them in the end. This is the faith of my existence. . . .

City Point, Va., July 4, 1864. . . . Another of our country's anniversaries of independence and the first of the fall of Vicksburg has just closed. Oh, how unlike those before the rebellion, and how my heart aches for the restoration of peace! . . .

Everything quiet along our lines. It is reported that Ewell's force sent from Lee's army to repel Hunter's raid is moving down the Shenandoah Valley, and I fear much excitement will exist throughout the country for the safety of Washington before this reaches you. We suppose Hunter will be able to concentrate his forces at Harper's Ferry in time to prevent the invasion of Maryland. Ewell's command cannot much exceed 15,000, though it may reach 18,000. Should he get into Maryland, however, there will be nothing left undone that can be done to prevent his ever getting back. With our great facilities for the transportation of troops it will take but two days to move

from here an army corps if necessary. Besides, we are expecting here the arrival of the 19th Army Corps from Banks's Department within a short time. Vessels to transport them were sent several days since; of this, however, you will please not speak to any one where there would be the least likelihood of its becoming public.

City Point, Va., July 6, 1864. . . . I had hoped during the present lull in affairs here to get a few days to myself for the purpose of visiting you in your new home, but all prospects of it vanished yesterday evening, when it became necessary for Colonel Bowers to go and see his mother, who is dangerously ill, and also for the purpose of repairing his own health, which is poor indeed. At present of the General's staff there are absent Colonels Dent, Duff, Rowley and Bowers, and Colonel Babcock is quite poorly and will, I fear, have to go also. I am too well to think of getting off on a plea of sickness; besides, my presence is perhaps more indispensable than that of any staff officer, for in the absence of the assistant adjutant general I know and can perform his duties, which no one else can do so well; and then, too, I look after and care for the personal habits of those who must not be permitted to fall.

All quiet to-day. Richmond papers say that they have whipped Sherman in Atlanta and that he is in full retreat. This we do not believe. From seven to nine thousand men left here to-day for Washington to aid in defeating Early. . . .

No letter of July 7 has been found.

City Point, Va., July 8, 1864. . . . News from General Sherman is very favorable. He has driven the enemy to the south side of the Chattahoochee. Nothing new along our lines save the firing of artillery by both the enemy and ourselves. But little damage is being done to us, and whether we do any more to them is questionable. . . .

City Point, Va., July 9, 1864. . . . The remainder of the 6th Corps goes to Washington in the morning, and should have gone three days ago but for a despatch from General Halleck stating that they would not be needed. They are now in great trepidation, but I have no doubt we shall get forces forward soon enough to defend the place and at the same time inflict such damage

upon the enemy as to make him think he has paid dearly for his whistle. . . .

City Point, Va., July 10, 1864. . . . All quiet along our lines.

Stirring and exciting news from Washington reached us last night and this morning.

The remaining two divisions of Wright's corps left to-day for Washington—one division had gone forward several days ago. The 19th Corps, on its way from New Orleans to this place, or, rather, its advance, has reached Port Monroe and has gone forward to Washington. All will be well and the rebel movement into Maryland will result, if properly looked to, in great advantage to us. . . .

City Point, July 11, 1864. . . . Another hot day, followed by rain after night.

No news here at all. Everything is as quiet as summer. We have a rumor, however, that Hill's corps moved from its position in our front yesterday, Longstreet's corps taking its place, but where it has gone, if gone it has, we do not even conjecture yet. We do not believe it has gone to Maryland for the distance is so great it could not hope to reach Early in time to afford him any material aid. One or two days will determine its whereabouts. If it has gone on any expedition from here we will try and take advantage of its absence to inflict a blow upon the enemy.

The news from Sherman is very encouraging. He has forced Johnston to the south side of the Chattahoochee, and has crossed portions of his own army, and secured the crossings of the river at two different fords.

From Washington we have had no news to-day. Last night General Grant received a despatch from the President stating that he thought it best for the General to come there. This was a despatch in answer to one the General had sent saying he would go to Washington if it was thought best. I differed with any and all such propositions and told the General that his place was here—that he had started out to defeat Lee and capture Richmond—that his appearance in Washington would be heralded all over the country as an abandonment of his campaign, a faltering at least in his purpose; that he had under orders to Washington full thirty thousand men, with able and efficient officers, besides the troops of Hunter and those already at Washington and Baltimore, and if they could not defeat, rout and capture Early, whose force

never could exceed twenty-five thousand, I did not think his presence would help the thing enough to justify his going from here. Falling in with my view, he telegraphed the President in accordance therewith . . .

Colonel Ritter goes to Harrisburg in the morning, for a few days. Colonel Badeau is quite sick and will perhaps have to go North. . . .

City Point, July 13, 1864. . . . News from Washington continues exciting but we have no fears for the safety of the place. All the troops necessary for its defence and to follow up and give successful battle have been sent from here. General H. G. Wright, an able and splendid soldier, has the supreme command of the moving forces there, and from the facts as they appear to me, I can see no reason why we should not defeat and destroy Early's whole command and turn into positive success for us this movement of the enemy. What will be done a few days will determine. When this letter will reach you is doubtful. The railroad from Washington north is broken, but I never fail in keeping my word to you in the matter of correspondence.

It would appear that the whole of Lee's army is threatening Washington. It is positively asserted that Longstreet's corps is on the way there, but we have the best of evidence that it remains here, and that it is here I have no doubt. We have deserters from it daily and also make captures of prisoners from it. This latter evidence never has failed us. . . .

City Point, July 14, 1864. . . . News from Washington is that the enemy has taken up his return line of march. Whether we will be able to inflict damage upon him is not yet known. Colonel Comstock goes to Washington to-night to try and hasten the return to this place of the troops sent from here, the moment it is ascertained that they are no longer needed there, or that the enemy is beyond their reach. . . .

City Point, July 15, 1864. . . . All quiet along our lines here. News from Washington shows the enemy has left Maryland with large amounts of plunder gathered from the Marylanders. Hunter is moving from Harper's Ferry to intercept their retreat.

Sherman has got the enemy south of the Chattahoochee and will himself move to the south side as early as the 17th. He has his supplies all up for a vigorous push on Atlanta. . . .

On July 16, 1864, Rawlins wrote a long letter, speaking of his "Democratic notions of life and its proprieties." He added:

. . . That I have not gone home is a matter over which thus far I have had no control, but I have been shaping everything with a view to seeing you before a great many weeks go by. I have urged and encouraged every one of the staff who had the least desire to go home, to do so, and all except Colonel Babcock have been off. When they return I shall have the aid of all of them, and their interest too, in getting away for a few days myself. Don't you think I'm something of a diplomat? . . .

City Point, July 17, 1864. . . . The General has ordered to this place the 6th and 19th Corps, sent some days ago to Washington, with a view to an attack on the enemy before Early can get back. Whether the Government will let them leave Washington is somewhat doubtful. There is evidently much anxiety still there for the safety of the city, and I fear an uneasiness as to the effect the recent raid may have upon the fall election. The blame will, I have no doubt, be laid at the General's door. For my own part I see nothing serious that can come of it. Certainly the General acted as promptly as he could in the premises and but for the despatches saying they thought they had troops enough to defend the city, sent by one authorized to speak for them, and who ought to be regarded as capable of judging, one whole army corps would have been there three days earlier than it was. Say nothing of this. We shall see what we shall see.

It turns out that General Wilson was not confirmed by the Senate, although we had, in answer to inquiries long ago, been made to understand that he was. He has, however, been appointed again to rank from his former date. This is treating very badly an enthusiastic, able young officer, but time will make all things even, it is said, and I trust it is true. . . .

City Point, July 18, 1864. . . . Another delightful day has closed with nothing worthy of mention, except that General Grant has in view the responsibility that may be laid upon him for the enemy's recent raid into Maryland, asked to have a Military Division constructed out of the territory now comprising the Departments of Washington, Middle and Western Virginia, with Major General Franklin to command it. If this is done the Gen-

eral can be answerable for the safety of the Maryland border; otherwise he should not be so held.

The two corps ordered to be returned here are en route for this place.

The regiments whose term of service expires between this and the twenty-fifth of August next, have been ordered to Washington. They will tend considerably to steady the nerves of the people of Maryland and not materially weaken us here; for the fact is those regiments whose time is nearly out, do not evince the alacrity of regiments who have a long time yet to serve. There is good reason—or at least it is not unnatural—that this should be so.

General Ord and staff arrived here this evening. Honorable Mr. Kellogg of Michigan is here. He talks to suit me, and his visit, I have no doubt, will be fraught with good to the service. I like to entertain such men . . .

Enclosed I send you photograph with autograph of Major General Winfield S. Hancock, one of the best and most gallant of soldiers. Put it along side of the lamented Sedgwick in your album of heroes. . . .

City Point, Va., July 19, 1864. . . . We have had one steady and continuous rain all day. The dust is effectually laid and it will take several days to resurrect it into the clouds, which seemed so long to delight in enveloping us. Never were people more glad to have rain than we.

The 19th Corps is beginning to arrive. The news from Sherman is very favorable. He has crossed the Chattahoochee with his entire army and is moving directly on Atlanta and Decatur. He has already struck and broken the railroad east of Atlanta. Since crossing the river he has encountered only the enemy's cavalry. It may be possible they intend giving up Atlanta without a battle. The tone of the Atlanta papers favors this supposition. If they do, my own conviction is that the major part of Johnston's army will be brought here. Should they do this, there is no doubt of our ability to hold our present position, even against both Lee and Johnston. The danger will be of a movement against Washington. But why speculate upon the uncertainty of future military movements? All we have to do is what we can do in the living present, not forgetting, however, to prepare for future dangers, as time may develop them.

General Grant to-day relieved Major General William F. Smith from command and duty in this army, because of his spirit of criticism of all military movements and men, and his failure to get along with any one he is placed under, and his disposition to scatter the seeds of discontent throughout the army. . . .

City Point, July 20, 1864. . . . No news to-day from Sherman. General A. J. Smith, after a fight with Forrest at and in the neighborhood of Tupelo, Miss., on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, defeated him, with a loss to the enemy of full twenty-five hundred. Our loss was small in men and no loss in anything else . . .

The President has finally called for five hundred thousand more men. This is better late than never. Had Congress given him the power to conscript, with the commuting clause left out, at the beginning of the last session, instead of at its close, and he had exercised it, the end of the war, so much hoped for, would have been reached in the campaign begun last May, but such was not the action of the Government and hence the unfinished work yet to be done. . . .

City Point, July 21, 1864. . . . A most delightful day has closed with still the same momentous quiet along our lines here, that has prevailed for the last month.

News from the South is that Johnston has been relieved and General Hood, who is said to be a fighting General, has been put in command of his army, from which we infer that the enemy will give Sherman battle at Atlanta, and that if we can only whip them, is the very best thing they can do for us. The enemy beaten in battle at Atlanta, would give us the whole country, whereas if they simply fall back from that place, keeping their army intact, it will be a constant menace to our position which at best is difficult to hold.

We shall so operate here as to prevent the enemy from sending troops to Hood to defeat Sherman as Beauregard did from Corinth in 1862 to defeat McClellan, and as Lee did last September to defeat Rosecrans.

Of the operations of our Eastern and Western armies this spring and summer, this much at least can be said—they have so moved and fought as to prevent the enemy reënforcing in either front, to our destruction, as they have in every instance heretofore.

News from General Wright is encouraging. He and Crook

had crossed the Shenandoah yesterday, near Berryville and were driving the enemy, with a prospect of capturing their trains. The day before they had driven Crook back from his attempt to cross the river before the arrival of Wright. . . .

City Point, July 22, 1864. . . . I mail to you an article which I desire preserved, from the *New York Herald*, vindicating General Hunter against attacks, which have been made upon him in the Western Press, and which article is near the truth. The only question being whether General Hunter should not have gone by the way of Charlottesville to Lynchburg instead of by Lexington. His orders were to go to Staunton, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, if possible, destroying thoroughly the railroads from those points to Richmond. In this way the Valley of Virginia would always have been open to him.

I send you also a copy of a letter from General Scott, touching what he understands some one has reported he should have said about General Grant. He is mistaken, however, in his supposition, for the General had never heard of his speaking unfavorably of him. I am pleased at his writing the letter.

. . . My cough is still annoying me, but I have a fresh gallon of very old Bourbon and a bottle of cod liver oil, but how I wish the necessity for its use no longer existed. . . .

City Point, Va., July 23, 1864. . . . No occurrences of interest to the historian. No, I cannot say so much, for every day some of the brave defenders of our country are taken away to a better land, and in their death help to swell the roll of honor . . .

News from Sherman to-day brings sad intelligence that Major General J. B. McPherson was killed yesterday by a bullet through his lungs, fired from the enemy's works while he was making a reconnoissance of them. McPherson, my friend, with whom I have shared the same blanket, messed at the same board, endured the fatigue of the march, the exposures of the storm and faced dangers of battle. Brave, patriotic and gifted, his country will weep his loss as irreparable, and every friend of freedom will find for him a tear. My mind would be to say more of him but I have not the command of language to do justice to his worth and fame. . . .

City Point, Va., July 24, 1864. . . . I send you in this mail a *Galena Advertiser* in which you will read an article advocating

your husband's being appointed Secretary of War, which will surprise and amuse you as much as it does him. . . .

City Point, July 28, 1864. . . . On my return yesterday from Washington I touched at Cherry Stone Point and there received your despatch, for which accept my thanks. . . .

I find the General in my absence digressed from his true path. The God of Heaven only knows how long I am to serve my country as the guardian of the habits of him whom it has honored. It shall not be always thus. Owing to this faltering of his, I shall not be able to leave here till the rebel movement in Maryland is settled and also the fate of Atlanta. . . .

City Point, July 28, 1864 [later]. . . . Matters are now such that it is impossible for me to leave here at present. Active operations have commenced, which with the fact of the General's forgetting himself, in that one danger of which I wrote you this morning, renders my being here of an importance that you can appreciate as fully as any person living, although it deprives you of an immediate visit from me, a visit which my health demands . . .

Since writing the foregoing I have had a long talk with the General and Colonel Bowers, and they conclude I had better go as early as the first of next month, and I have thought, all things considered, I can perhaps as well be spared by that time as at any time thereafter. So you may begin to look for me about next Wednesday if I have no delays. . . .

From the foregoing correspondence it will be seen that from the time Grant assumed command of our armies as Lieutenant General till he crossed the James River and besieged Petersburg, Rawlins had been his inseparable counsellor and his ever-vigilant guardian. He had from the first thrown the weight of his influence in favor of the Overland Campaign, and what is still more important, in favor of maneuvering the enemy out of his entrenched positions, instead of trying to drive him out by direct attack. He had constantly urged that the army should be reënforced by all the troops that could be spared from elsewhere and that Congress should authorize a conscription from which no man could escape by

purchase. He points out that had this measure been enacted at the beginning of the current session of Congress instead of at its close, the army would have been strengthened in the right way and the war would have been ended much sooner. Withal, it is evident that in a strictly military sense his influence had begun to wane, and that in the daily operations of the army others of inferior judgment had acquired greater influence than himself. In the more important fields of personal conduct and military policy he still remained without a rival. When the President invited Grant to Washington, it was Rawlins whose fears and arguments prevented his going, till it was certain that the trip was absolutely necessary.

It is also evident that while Rawlins had at first a high regard for the abilities of W. F. Smith, and concurred in his condemnation of the assault at Cold Harbor, he ultimately came to censure his criticism of those in authority over him for their responsibility and part in it, and fully approved his relief from duty with the Army of the James as the shortest way to the restoration of harmony and discipline. In common with Grant, Rawlins appears to have been disappointed in regard to Butler's merits as a soldier as well as to his importance as a politician and statesman.

On the other hand, Smith was an open, imprudent, and even an acrimonious critic of both men and measures that he did not approve, and while he was careful to limit his censure to those whose function it was to regulate details, the latter were doubtless ingenious enough to make it appear that his shafts were aimed at the chief commander as well as at the plans upon which the army was then operating. The letters quoted above show that Rawlins not only came to this opinion but to the belief that Smith, whom he knew to be an honest and able man as well as a good friend of Grant, had been actuated rather by disappointment and selfish ambition than by a spirit of helpfulness in advocating the plan

of operations by the way of Albemarle Sound, which Franklin was first to bring forward, but which his friend elaborated and supported, as Rawlins thought, with obstinate persistency. When it is recalled that both Grant and Rawlins at first concurred in considering Smith's success at Petersburg as having been all that could have been expected, and that Rawlins, at least, joined in the condemnation of the futile and costly attacks directed against the enemy's entrenched positions at Cold Harbor and Spottsylvania, it will be seen that powerful influences must have been brought to bear to weaken his control and to bring about Smith's overthrow.

It is not known what Butler's own attitude was in respect either to these operations or to what finally came to be designated by the critics as the "Policy of Attrition," but it is fully established that he used the criticism contained in Smith's letters, as well as what Smith said in person to Butler's officers at Fort Monroe, to secure his own reinstatement and Smith's dismissal from command in the field. This is one of the most interesting but obscure episodes of the time, and whatever may have been the open or secret influences underlying it, it may well be regarded as an instance of retributive justice that, notwithstanding Butler's immediate triumph and Smith's downfall, Grant shortly found himself compelled to relieve Butler for incompetency and to place his army under the command of the steady-going Ord, of the regular army. Moreover, it is certain that, whatever may have been the part taken by Rawlins in these transactions, he fully approved of Butler's relief by a professional soldier as a sound and judicious measure which called for no public defence.

To those who knew Grant and his Chief of Staff in the West and were aware of their peculiarities and personal relations, and to such as read with care the letters which I have quoted, it will be apparent that the friendship or hostility of Rawlins was an important factor in the fate of many of the leading generals, and that he gave his approval, on the one

hand, or his disapproval, on the other, from none but the highest and most unselfish motives. While it is to be regretted that he did not more fully describe the conduct and characteristics of those with whom he had to do, and did not more fully set forth the genesis and course of the various plans and movements which came under his observation, there is much in his correspondence which the student of history will thank him for. His revelation of self is complete. It shows him to have been a fearless friend, an unselfish patriot, and an official adviser, of ability and independence. Lacking technical military knowledge, to which he made no pretension, but possessing moral qualities and character of the highest order, he nevertheless rendered the greatest service to his chief, who had had military training and experience in abundance, but was lacking in other important qualities which Rawlins supplied. It was a rare and fortunate combination; and while it was far from including all the attributes of a perfect general, it may well be contended that without the contributions of both, Grant could scarcely have hoped to achieve the splendid success which finally crowned his military career.

It is to be noted, on the other hand, that notwithstanding the vein of hopefulness which pervades these unstudied letters of Rawlins to his wife, the work and exposure of the campaign were proving too much for his strength, and that in spite of his indomitable will and his pathetic desire for health, the disease from which he was suffering was making slow but steady progress to its inevitable end.

XIV

NEARING THE WAR'S END

Petersburg Mine Explosion—Rawlins on Sick Leave—Letters of Lieutenant Colonel Bowers—Grant Visits Washington—Tactical Mistake of Dividing the Cavalry—Failure to Complete Circumvallation of Petersburg—Rawlins Rejoins Army—Sheridan's Campaign Against Early—Rawlins's Letters to His Wife—Wilson Ordered West—Hood's Invasion of Middle Tennessee—Rawlins Opposes Sherman's March to the Sea Till Hood Could Be Disposed of—Sent West to Forward Reënforcements—His Views Vindicated.

It will be observed that the confidence, which Rawlins expressed on July 29, in a successful assault of the enemy's lines at Petersburg, like that of the month previous in regard to the extension of the national lines to and across the Weldon Railroad, was misplaced. The latter should have succeeded because of Grant's superiority of numbers, if not by good management, but the former was based upon the belief that the explosion of an extensive mine in Burnside's front would make an opening in the enemy's entrenchments through which a vital thrust might be made. The mine was exploded, an enormous breach was made, but unfortunately it was bot-tomed by a crater of great depth, with sides too steep to be surmounted by a rush. The enemy was stunned and scattered by the explosion, and quite a quarter of an hour passed before his shaken battalions could be rallied and put into position to resist the assault which should have followed at once, had proper dispositions been made to that end.

Grant, in accordance with his general rule, had left the details to Meade, who unfortunately left them in turn to

Burnside, the immediate commander. It was clearly their duty to make the necessary arrangements for following the explosion with an assault which should pass around, not through, the breach, drive the enemy back, and take possession of the works on either side. But it appears that neither general had had much confidence in the mine; hence, neither made any adequate preparation to insure the success of the assault following the explosion. Instead of telling off two divisions of the best troops under the guidance of experienced officers, and preparing others to support and cooperate with them, Ledlie's division of white troops was assigned to the task of assaulting the breach made by the crater. Ledlie, although a civil engineer and contractor, was an officer of but little aptitude and no special training for such serious work, and while he was supported by two divisions of colored troops, one of them commanded by an ex-dancing master at West Point, the movement after the explosion was not only slow but badly managed throughout. The advancing men piled into the crater without method or adequate leadership, became hopelessly confused, and were killed by hundreds, mainly through the use of hand grenades, which were thrown down the slopes of the crater in great numbers. The operations instead of being conducted successfully by trained officers and competent commanders, ended, as might have been expected, in a bloody and discouraging disaster, which should have emphasized the failure to capture Petersburg, not only then but when the Union Army first closed in upon its defences. In both cases it is now evident that the troops available for the undertaking were ample and within reasonable supporting distance, and that the failure was primarily due to defective organization of the army as a whole, and to the absence of all proper staff arrangements. There were too many links in the chain, too many separate heads through which orders must be sent, too much independence, too little coöperation between commanders, and a

total absence of that promptitude, coherence, and efficiency of operations which are impossible without a competent general staff.

Grant was primarily responsible for all this. He had complete authority over such matters, but having committed himself from the start to the maintenance of the separate organizations in that theatre of operations, as well as to the policy of leaving the different generals free to carry their orders into effect in such manner as might seem best to them, he had thereby relieved his chief of staff from most of the responsibility that should otherwise have rested on him.

Nobody knew better than Rawlins that well-laid plans were failing far too often. Nobody knew better than he that the team was not only "balky" but badly driven, and finally nobody had been more severe than he in the condemnation of direct assaults upon fortified positions; but he allowed himself, apparently with good reason, to hope that the explosion of the mine would afford an exceptional opportunity, which might lead to a great success. The failure which followed was a sore disappointment to him as well as to his chief. His impaired health made him peculiarly susceptible to the influence of the hot weather, which was now becoming intense. Realizing that this, when superadded to the great disappointment which had overtaken the army, would necessarily put an end to active operations for a few weeks, Rawlins concluded to take a sick leave, with the understanding that he would return on short notice should any emergency arise. He left the army on July 25, with despatches for the President and Secretary of War. After seeing them both, he went on to New York and Danbury the next day. It is not known what passed between him and the Washington authorities, but it may be safely assumed that he posted them fully, not only as to the history of recent operations but as to the requirements of the army, forgetting neither the necessity

for the draft nor for such other reënforcements as could safely be drawn from other departments.

During the absence of Rawlins, his faithful assistant, Bowers, kept him informed by daily letters, written the last thing at night, in reference to all matters of importance which took place at headquarters after August 1. These letters contain many interesting comments upon current events, and especially upon the operations that were undertaken for the purpose of preventing Lee from detaching further reënforcements to Early in the Valley of Virginia.

On August 2 Bowers reported the losses of the various corps of the army in the operations following the mine explosion as 4,400 men, of whom 1,960 were prisoners; and that the failure of our troops to break through the gap made by the explosion had produced a feeling of gloom and despondency which threatened to paralyze future operations. The next day he reported that he was having unusual trouble on account of whiskey permits. Nearly all the sutlers were asking for such permits, and the embarrassment was increased by the demand of the Chief Quartermaster in behalf of his own sutler, who wanted permission to introduce a large number of cases of liquor and bitters. Permission was refused and Colonel Bowers adds:

. . . The Quartermaster General thought my course unreasonable and my objections mawkish, youthful sentiment. He said if you were here no objection would be interposed. I told him that he was much mistaken unless you had radically changed your views, that I had derived my education on the subject from you, that he could appeal to Grant and I would do his bidding, but that so help me God, I never would voluntarily stock this army with liquor. Grant was not accessible and so the matter ended for the time. . . .

Early in the month of August, Grant went to Washington for the purpose of looking after its defence against

Early's army operating in that direction. Referring to this trip, Bowers wrote Rawlins, August 10:

. . . I have tried to induce the General to remove Halleck. While he confesses to having been deceived in him and having now his eyes open as to Halleck's position and conduct, he will not bring himself at present to take the step we urge. He has, however, settled Halleck down into a mere staff officer for Stanton. Halleck has no control over troops except as Grant delegates it. He can give no orders and exercise no discretion. Grant now runs the whole machine independently of the Washington directory. I am glad to say he is fully himself, works vigorously and will soon devise another plan for discomfiting the enemies of the country. . . .

Referring to a movement similar to that contemplated when Hancock and Sheridan were sent to Deep Bottom, he wrote, August 12:

The troops are already in motion and everything is being conducted with great vigor and secrecy . . . If the movement succeeds it will give us Richmond. The prospects are fair. Indeed my expectations are up to the highest pitch. After debating the subject seriously I this morning telegraphed you to come up by the first train. I was not only agonizing to have you here but I feared you would think me unfaithful if I neglected to recall you on the eve of important action. I know the General would be rejoiced to have you present but his solicitude for your restoration to health would prevent his sending for you as long as he could. I think when I see you you will approve my action in telegraphing you to return.¹

On August 20 he wrote:

. . . The impression is becoming almost universal that for political considerations the President will suspend the draft. If he does, good-bye United States.

The General is fully himself, although in impaired health. . . .

¹ Not found. Correspondence with Bowers's brother brought out the fact that his letters had not been kept.

The next day he wrote:

. . . I never before saw Grant so intensely anxious to do something. He appears determined to try every possible expedient. His plans are good but the great difficulty is that our troops cannot be relied upon. The failure to take advantage of opportunities pains and chafes him beyond anything I have ever before known him to manifest.

Each and every member of the staff daily requests me to present you his kindest remembrances. . . .

On the 25th he wrote:

. . . Anxious as we all are to have you return we trust you will remain until your health has permanently improved, unless the necessities of the service here make your presence indispensable. In the latter case we shall promptly telegraph you to come. I will show portions of your letter to the General in the morning and to-morrow will give you his views on the subject. I regret to say that Grant has been quite unwell for the past ten days. He feels languid and feeble and is hardly able to keep about, yet he tends to business promptly and his daily walk and conduct are unexceptionable. . . .

This is the last of Bowers's letters, as he was about this time called home on account of his widowed mother's severe illness. But the daily reports from headquarters were continued by Captain Leet, who thenceforth kept Rawlins officially informed of what was taking place not only there but throughout the entire theatre of war.

The situation from the time the Army of the Potomac crossed the James and sat down before Petersburg was a discouraging one. Grant had early in the campaign committed the serious mistake of dividing his cavalry, thus making it easy for the Confederate leader to use his entire mounted force supported by a moving column of infantry, from a central position on shorter or interior lines against our detachments, as well as for the reestablishment and maintenance of his communications with the Confederacy. Raw-

lins's letters, as well as the Records, show that Sheridan, instead of going on to Hunter, which he might have done, or rejoining the army immediately after the fight at Trevillian's Station, pursued a circuitous route to the White House and then lost eleven days in getting from the White House to the left of Grant's infantry front, when the distance of about fifty miles, including the passage of the James, might have been covered easily in two, or at most three, marches. My discomfiture at the close of the movement against the Danville and Southside Railroads was the direct result of this division of force and of Sheridan's unnecessarily long absence north of the James. Both should have been entirely successful had we been directed to operate together, first north and then south of Richmond.

Immediately after I began the operations confided to me, the army made another failure, which was a great disappointment not only to Rawlins but to every general in it. I refer now to the effort to complete the circumvallation of Petersburg on the south side of the Appomattox, which was an essential part of Grant's general plan. While it was not absolutely necessary to my safe return, both Grant and Meade confidently said that it would be accomplished on the twenty-second and twenty-third of June and that in any event the door would be kept open for me. It will be remembered that all of Grant's efforts to rest the left of his army on the Appomattox were frustrated till April 2, 1865, or for a total period of nine months. The energy and skill with which Lee during that period held and extended his line of defence from the Appomattox below Petersburg to Five Forks, nearly forty miles straight out into the country, and thus covered both the city and its railroad connections, while he kept up his connection with the Confederacy, are among the marvels of modern warfare. They are worthy of the most careful study and consideration by military men. Grant did his best from time to time to break through or turn this line of

defence, but after making due allowance for the mistakes and mismanagement which are always liable in military operations, it must be admitted that the efficiency of the army had been so lowered that it seemed unequal to the task before it. Grant had a considerable preponderance of force over Lee throughout the campaign, but withal he did not have sufficient to hold his own works, cover his base, maintain his line of communication, and detach at the same time a force strong enough to turn Lee's right flank completely and drive it from the field, till after the other Confederate forces operating elsewhere in Virginia had been overthrown. Had Rawlins's policy in favor of the prompt and rigid enforcement of the draft and of fetching reinforcements from other departments been earlier and more vigorously carried into effect, it is now conceded that the end might have been reached just so much sooner.

During the excessively hot weather of August and September the army in front of Petersburg remained on the defensive, or its operations were desultory and inconclusive. Consequently many of the officers took leave of absence. Rawlins, who was among the first to go, was again encouraged and anxious to return to duty, but with that thoughtful kindness which never failed him, Grant insisted upon Rawlins remaining away till rest and care should completely restore him. His brother-officers, with most of whom he was a strong favorite, in spite of the favorable reports he sent back, had begun to feel anxious on account of his prolonged absence, though as yet it is far from certain that any of them realized that he was in the clutches of a fatal disease. On September 25, Babcock strongly advised Rawlins by letter to give up the idea of further service in the field and to establish headquarters at Washington. He reinforced this advice by saying that all his friends concurred in the opinion that this would be the best course for him. While Grant's name was not mentioned, it may be regarded as certain that

the letter would not have been written without his permission.

But in spite of this solicitude for his health and welfare, Rawlins remained firm, and after nearly three months spent with his family, mostly in the bracing air of the Connecticut highlands, returned to his post of duty at City Point, somewhat improved in strength and looks, but still far from as fit as he ought to have been for military work. While absent he had consulted a specialist in New York, who pronounced his lungs sound, but said he was suffering from chronic bronchitis, which would yield to proper treatment. Dana, who held him in the highest esteem, saw him while passing through Washington, and wrote me that he was sorry to notice in him "the signs of increasing disease." He added ominously: "I fear there is no escape for him." Both Porter and Bowers held similar views and wrote in the same strain, but I am persuaded that none of them yet realized that the indomitable Chief of Staff was hopelessly ill. After his return he took encouragement from every flash of sunlight and every passing breeze, and thenceforth remained steadfastly at his post to the end. But whether from impaired strength and the wish of his Chief to spare him from the drudgery of his position, or from other causes, it is certain that he took less and less part thereafter in the detailed work of the staff.

When he arrived at headquarters the heat of summer had given way to cool and comfortable nights. But it was still a period of great anxiety. While his faithful assistants had kept him fully informed of what was going on during his absence, and the newspapers with what had taken place throughout the entire theatre of military operations, there was still much pertaining to present and future plans which he could learn only at Grant's headquarters. It was painfully apparent to him, as well as to the country at large, that the failure of all efforts to turn, or dislodge, the Confederates from their strongly fortified positions covering Petersburg and Richmond had not only greatly discouraged the Admin-

istration, the army, and its leaders, but had correspondingly encouraged the Confederates, and begotten a feeling on the part of Lee that the time had now come for a counter-movement against Washington and the country to the northward.

The tacit truce and the feeling of uncertainty were rudely broken by the detachment of Early with a mixed but considerable force of infantry, cavalry and artillery to move first into the Valley of Virginia and thence across the Potomac against the National Capital. The Confederate advance was soon discovered, and the country was at once alive with apprehension. Gold, which was already high in terms of greenbacks and National bank currency, rose rapidly. The disastrous failure of the campaign against Lynchburg had shaken the confidence of the Administration in Hunter's capacity as a leader. Halleck, the Chief of Staff, was in Grant's absence its main dependence, but the public had no confidence in him. While there were plenty of troops within reach, there was no one at hand to command or lead them efficiently, consequently Early's advance met with but little serious opposition until it encountered and defeated the unfortunate Lew Wallace at the crossing of the Monocacy.

As the danger became more and more apparent, the Sixth Corps and one division of cavalry were detached from the Army of the Potomac and hurried by transport to Washington. Sheridan was shortly afterwards assigned to the command and at once called for another division of cavalry. All the troops within reach, or that could be spared from other departments, were ordered to the point of danger. Meanwhile Early, who was as cautious as well as a resolute commander, after reaching the outer fortifications of Washington, where he first got wind of the real storm gathering against him, began his retreat, without tarrying to strike home for victory. After a few days he was safe behind the Blue Ridge.

But Sheridan was now in the field, though it is to be observed that that vigorous officer took hold but cautiously at first. The stakes were great, but as this was his first independent command, he naturally felt the importance of making no mistake. Gathering his forces as rapidly as possible, but manœuvring them cautiously, two months and more passed away without a serious engagement. The country began to doubt the propriety of giving so young a man as Sheridan so important a command. Gold, which was the country's military barometer, rose to a point never reached before. The mine explosion and the assault at Petersburg were everywhere regarded as a disastrous and expensive failure, all aggressive operations had come to an ominous standstill, and the feeling of gloom and despondency which had settled on the country were accentuated by Sheridan's caution, till Grant finally went in person to the Valley and told him to "go in!"

The battle of Winchester, resulting, as it did, in a complete victory over Early, which was followed by the battle of Cedar Creek and the ultimate destruction of Early's army, restored public confidence and, what was still better, enabled Grant later to gather up and concentrate in front of Petersburg an overwhelming force with which to move against Lee and his dwindling army.

Rawlins, being absent for much of the time, had but little to do with the preliminary dispositions that led to these important results. He returned to headquarters at City Point on October 3, and the next day wrote to his wife in Connecticut as follows:

. . . I arrived here last evening at 7 P. M.
. . . The General goes to Washington to-day to see if he cannot hurry up the reinforcements for this army. The situation here is more than flattering. All we want is a few thousand more men to enable us to strike a blow that will tell and tell to the death of the Rebellion. I find here every convenience for my comfort,

a room with a grate in it, neatly fixed up for my occupation. The fact is I could have no more convenience in the city of Washington than I have here.

My cold is a little improved but I fear a little the dampness of the weather. A few days will test my ability to remain here. . . .

City Point, October 7, 1864. . . . General Wilson has been recommended for a brevet major general and ordered to Sherman to command his cavalry. It was or is necessary that he have such rank to enable him to command, for most of the brigadiers out with Sherman are his superiors in rank. . . .

City Point, October 8, 1864. . . . Yesterday in company with Colonel Parker and my friend, Mr. Felt of Galena, I went to General Butler's front, arriving there just at the conclusion of the fight, but before the excitement and confusion consequent after an attack, had subsided. . . .

General Grant has not yet returned. We look for him to-day and unless the weather was too heavy last night for his boat to run on the bay, he will most certainly be here.

Troops are arriving very slowly. How long it will be before we are ready to make a determined move against Richmond I am unable to say. A heavy and organized force will perhaps reach here during the ensuing week. If it arrives we shall not remain long idle, and stirring news may be expected from this quarter. I am getting along quite comfortably. The weather is dry and fine but my cough has not left me although my appetite and digestion are good. . . .

City Point, October 10, 1864. . . . Hood has adopted a bold plan of campaign. He has abandoned every point south and struck out with his whole army northward. On the 9th he was crossing the Coosa River twelve miles south of Rome, which is far north of Atlanta. He was moving westward evidently with the view of getting onto the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, in the State of Mississippi, now in operation to Corinth, or to move towards the Ohio River via Nashville. I cannot myself see other than great disaster to him, if Sherman pursues him as is his character to pursue. Of course this movement was unexpected and makes even Grant scratch his head. But with the rebels it is desperation, and even despairing as they are, nothing but an underestimate of Sherman's forces could have induced them to undertake

it. Sherman is strong enough to hold Atlanta and move a sufficient force to defeat Hood, for as he nears the Tennessee River he gathers up many men on the line of the railroad and also comes closer to his supplies.

Here all is quiet and will be until reinforcements arrive which we are daily expecting. In the last ten days a little upwards of seven thousand reinforcements have joined us. So you see less than a thousand a day come forward. But we will have here before Monday some of the old organized and reliable heroes of the war. . . .

City Point, October 12, 1864. . . . General Dodge of the Western Army is here. It does one's heart good to meet one from the army that has made such a bright record for its country's honor and its own fame. I can shake the hands of these veterans and herpes with something of the thrill of joy and pride that pervades my being when I take hold of the hand of my own dear wife after months of absence . . .

General Quimby, formerly of the old army, is also here. He is, however, not in the service at present, having long since resigned. Major General Doyle of the English service is here. He is the least English and most American of any Englishman I have ever met. He sympathizes with us in our struggle to maintain our governmental authority, and furthermore he believes we will succeed. . . .

City Point, October 13, 1864. . . . No news of any importance from any quarter . . . On the 10th General Grant upon my putting the unreliableness and insubordination of Rosecrans clearly before his mind, and showing him that should Hood get well up in Tennessee, he would have great difficulty in getting troops from Rosecrans to help resist Hood, he telegraphed to Washington and asked to have Rosecrans removed and some one sent out there who would take at once the offensive and defeat or at least drive Price clean out of the State, and on the 11th he sent up the name of General Crook as the one to relieve Rosecrans. Whether this order will be made I cannot say, but I deem it most important to the public service that it should be made.

What course Sherman will pursue now that Hood has thrown himself north of him, so as to threaten his communications, is not fully determined, but if he carries out the plan he proposed to General Grant, and which was approved by General Grant,

conditioned that Thomas had force enough to hold the line of the Tennessee, why you may look for Sherman within a few weeks to come out at some one of the great Atlantic or Gulf cities. This of course you will keep to yourself . . .

I learn from a letter of Rowley to Colonel Parker, that Lemon has enlisted, so has Obediah Taylor. This is the spirit that animates the Western country and makes Western troops invincible—the spirit which sends young men of first standing and respectability to the field to fill up the thinned ranks of our veteran regiments. Jarradd writes me from California that he is coming on here in February and will enter the service as a private. So you see our children will not be ashamed to hear the mention of their family name in connection with this bloody strife. . . .

City Point, October 15, 1864. . . . We are expecting Secretary Stanton here to-morrow to confer with the General upon the field of operations for all the armies. No news has been had for several days from Sherman. I suppose, however, that he is following up Hood, who at last accounts was at Dalton on the railroad north of Atlanta about one hundred miles, and south of Chattanooga thirty-eight. It may be that Sherman has cut loose and gone down through Georgia, but I think not. Too fine an opportunity presents itself for the entire destruction of Hood's army for Sherman not to avail himself of it. . . .

City Point, October 16, 1864. . . . We have here to-day Secretary Stanton, the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General and the Surgeon General, also the Secretary of the Treasury and many of the public men of the country. I suppose they will leave to-morrow.

Mr. Antrobus, the artist whom you met at Chicago and who painted the General's portrait, is also with us. He is glad that he did not then get a sitting of me for the reason that I now look so much fleshier than then. I was weighed to-day and find that I am ten pounds heavier than my usual weight which is 155 pounds. I now weigh 165, and am daily getting heavier. My cough is also better. . . .

City Point, October 18, 1864. . . . Never since I used to work on the farm have I had such an appetite as now. My digestion is good and I have no doubt of my recovery. News from Sherman

about the same as yesterday. Everything here very quiet and will remain so for some days.

Mr. Antrobus is painting a portrait of me for Russell Jones. I have already gone through one sitting.² . . .

City Point, October 19, 1864. . . . Despatches from Harpers Ferry say that from five o'clock this morning and up to late this afternoon heavy and continuous cannonading was heard near Strasburg, which we suppose was a battle going on between Sheridan and Longstreet who succeeded Early. We feel great confidence if such is the case that Sheridan will defeat him. A few hours will fix the fact whatever it may be . . .

Hood has lost more men than Sherman in this recent move and his men must feel more despondent than ever, now that all the promises made them by Hood and Jefferson Davis have proven so fruitless to them. I wish we had this army of Lee's in as bad condition as the army of Hood necessarily must be.

Everything here is very quiet. Men arrive very slowly. We have received the sad intelligence to-day of the death of Major General Birney of this army. He was a noble, true man. The country will lament his loss, and the army feel it as almost irreparable. . . .

City Point, October 20, 1864. . . . To-day has been very fine and brings us news of Sheridan's glorious victory of yesterday, snatched as it were from the jaws of disastrous defeat. Early attacked our forces early yesterday morning, near Strasburg, Va., and succeeded in turning our position and driving our whole line in confusion a distance of four miles, capturing from us twenty pieces of artillery, when Sheridan arrived on the field (he having been to Washington) took command of our retreating forces and by his masterly generalship brought order out of the confusion, repelled a fierce attack of Early and attacking him in turn routed and defeated him, capturing forty-three pieces of artillery, many prisoners and a large number of wagons and ambulances. The losses on both sides were heavy, but our victory was complete.

Everything here is quiet, no news from Sherman to-day, nor have we any from Missouri. I have been urging the removal of General Rosecrans ever since my return, and General Grant

² This portrait, from which the half-tone frontispiece was taken, is now in the State Library at Springfield, Illinois.

has asked to have it done, but the thing hangs fire for want of some one to take his place. Rosecrans seems to desire that Price should remain in Missouri. I judge so from his inactivity, for since Price entered the State there has been no hour but Rosecrans had sufficient men to defeat and drive him from it. . . .

City Point, October 21, 1864. . . . More detailed report from Sheridan of his victory on the 19th instant increases the number of pieces captured to over fifty, and also informs us of driving the enemy's rear guard from Fisher's Hill.

News from Sherman is to the effect that Hood is rapidly retreating to the South and he is following. Missouri news is very unsatisfactory, as to all save one thing, and that is the unfitness and incompetency of Rosecrans for his present command. Whether any order will soon be made to relieve him I cannot tell. General Grant has certainly done his duty in the premises and cannot be held responsible for any failures in that quarter, even if it should be the blockading of the Mississippi River again. This latter, however, cannot well happen for General G. H. Thomas is looking to its safety with the troops he has in Tennessee. . . .

City Point, October 23, 1864. . . . Another beautiful day has closed. No news of interest save in regard to General Sherman's intended campaign, the details of which I fear to write lest my letter might fail to reach its destination. All quiet here. Sheridan followed the enemy to Mt. Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. . . .

City Point, October 25, 1864. . . . To-day has been clear and cold. No news of note, except that the Mexican Minister Romero from President Juarez, is on a visit here. He is accompanied by a major general and a colonel of the Mexican service, and was received in the manner prescribed for the reception of foreign ministers. How it will be with the Minister Maximilian sends, I cannot say.

News from Sherman is satisfactory. All progressing well with him. . . .

City Point, October 26, 1864. . . . We have had no news from Missouri nor from Sheridan. A despatch from Sherman shows all well, with abundant supplies in the country for his army. Indications are that Hood has not yet abandoned his intention of

invading Tennessee. Proposed movements of Sherman will, however, without doubt, compel Hood to look to affairs south. Otherwise the heaviest blow yet dealt will fall in that direction.

Here all is quiet save the preparations that have been going on for a movement to-morrow morning against the Southside Railroad, which I have but little doubt will bring on a great battle, one perhaps decisive of the fate of Petersburg. Should the railroad, however, be found too strongly fortified, we shall not risk an attack. The General and staff go to the front to-morrow morning. I shall of course go with the party. In God who has thus far protected us from danger, I place my trust. . . .

City Point, October 28, 1864. . . . We got back last night but I was so tired, I put off writing till this morning. We were along the line of our march, to the very front of our advance and up to half-past three P. M. of yesterday had found no place favorable to us, for an attack. Being so far separated from our base of supplies, and not having what we conceived to be a sufficient force to warrant cutting loose from it altogether, we determined to return to our entrenchments. The General and staff started for City Point. Up to the time named, there were no indications of a battle, except some artillery firing to which we were perhaps as much exposed as any others. Although the shot and shell came exceedingly near, no one was hurt. About an hour after we left, however, the enemy made an attack on Hancock and a very heavy battle followed in which neither party gained anything of permanent advantage. The losses on both sides were heavy. We, however, repulsed the enemy and held possession of the field at dark, but during the night commenced to retire.

News from Missouri is cheering. General Price has been severely defeated and General Marmaduke and another general captured. Price lost ten pieces of artillery and over a thousand prisoners. . . .

. . . Full reports of the battle fought yesterday afternoon show the result to be a splendid victory for us. Hancock retained his position, repulsed the enemy and held possession of the battle field until midnight when he commenced his withdrawal in pursuance of orders issued to him before the battle. The loss in killed and wounded on either side is not yet stated but we captured 910 prisoners and lost but 60. Among the rebels killed was Brigadier General Dearing. On the north side of the river, how-

ever, we did not fare so well. General Butler, although acting under positive orders not to attack the enemy in fortified position, did so attack and lost for us full one thousand men, killed, wounded and prisoners, without any corresponding damage, if damage at all to the enemy. I am free to say I fear the continuance of General Butler in command will some day work disaster of a serious character to our arms. But General Grant has had to deal with such men from the beginning and has succeeded. I therefore have hopes he may succeed with this one.

General Halleck is expected here to-morrow on official business the nature of which has not yet been communicated to the General.

I have been urging General Grant to bring here at once fifteen thousand of the veteran troops of the West, to help end this campaign against Richmond. I have said to the General that if half the pains and energy had been shown in getting troops here that have been taken in sending them unnecessarily to Missouri, to drive off Price, we could have broken the enemy's lines yesterday and held in our hands to-day the long coveted prize of Richmond. He listens favorably and I have hopes he will adopt my views. I am still quite well. . . .

City Point, October 30, 1864. . . . No news here of any kind. That from Sherman is that Hood is heading towards Middle Tennessee via Decatur, but trusts that Thomas, with the force he has sent him, will be able to prevent Hood's advance north of the Tennessee River.

All orders to General Rosecrans for troops of Sherman's command to be returned to Tennessee, where they are likely to be greatly needed, having failed to get them, I have received orders and instructions from General Grant to proceed at once to St. Louis, with full authority in the premises to enforce obedience to these orders. I leave here this morning. The trip I do not much like, and were it not for the confidence the General has in my ability to discharge the duties imposed, over any other member of his staff, I would get myself excused. But the importance to the public service, of the faithful execution of my orders, will tend to the interest of my going, and will lighten in a great degree the wearisomeness of it.

I shall perhaps be absent two weeks, and unless I find a letter from you at Washington as I go west, will not hear from you

until my return. Major General Halleck is here and I go with him on a special boat to Washington. . . .

St. Louis, Mo., November 3, 1864. . . . Until to-day, I have not had a moment for writing since I left Washington, which place I left on the 31st ultimo. Without missing a connection I arrived here this morning at one o'clock in as good health and spirits as when I started, save a slight cold which does not trouble me much. I have not yet seen General Rosecrans. He is absent from the city but a despatch from him states he will return this evening. Until he does, or at least, until I see him, I shall be unable to state when I shall leave for City Point.

I have met two or three of my old friends of the Army of the Tennessee, among them General Grierson of cavalry celebrity. They were delighted to see me. My mission will I trust greatly aid the success of General Grierson's trip here, he having come for the express purpose of trying to get General Rosecrans to return to Memphis the cavalry of West Tennessee, which are a part of the troops, I am also here with orders to send back. . . .

St. Louis, Nov. 4, 1864. . . . I met General Rosecrans this morning and transacted with him the business on which I was sent. I was delighted to find that in pursuance of orders previously telegraphed to him, he was moving the troops for which I came here, to the river for embarkment. It saved me a long and perhaps perilous journey to the interior of the State, which is infested with bands of guerillas. General Rosecrans received me with great cordiality and assures me that the orders I brought to him from General Grant shall be promptly complied with. I also saw this afternoon General A. J. Smith, who confirms all that General Rosecrans said to me of his (Rosecrans) disposition to obey the orders of General Grant. My orders were to remain here until the troops for which I came were embarked and off but as matters were promising so well when I came here, and as I am assured they will continue so, I deem it unnecessary to remain longer, and I have so telegraphed the General. Unless he thinks differently I shall leave here for City Point on Sunday evening. . . .

St. Louis, Nov. 5, 1864. . . . I have been very busy this evening getting off orders to troops and despatches to General Grant, and was in hopes I would be able to leave here to-morrow, but I

have learned some things that may detain me two or three days longer. I still hope to get away but I fear I shall not.

I was out to see Mrs. Grant, at her father's. She is in excellent health and inquired most affectionately after you and your welfare. She is very anxious to have you visit her at Philadelphia and go with her to City Point on a visit to the General and myself. We will discuss this when we meet which I hope will be in New York Thursday or Friday. . . .

It should be noted that the detachment of my division from the Army in front of Petersburg to join Sheridan in the Valley, and my subsequent detail to command the cavalry of Sherman's Military Division in the Southwest, separated me entirely from Rawlins, with or near whom I had been serving for over two years. As before related, I first met him in Northern Mississippi and during the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns was his constant companion and intimate friend. As Engineer and Inspector on the same staff, till promoted and ordered to Washington, I knew both his daily life and his inmost thoughts. After taking the field in Virginia, with the cavalry, I saw him often and enjoyed his confidence without break or intermission; but from the time I left the Army of the Potomac on August 5, 1864, I did not meet him again till after the war had ended. Although he was never a ready correspondent, it was our custom to write to each other on subjects of common interest from that time till the date of his death. During my service in Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia, and especially after Sherman had begun his "March to the Sea" and Hood had begun his invasion of Middle Tennessee, I kept him fully informed of all important matters in regard to which I felt that he and the Lieutenant General should have accurate and disinterested information. But my correspondence with the headquarters of the army was not confined to Rawlins. Porter, Babcock, and Bowers, at first, and Badeau afterwards, participated in it, and the information which I sent was, when deemed neces-

sary, communicated also to Grant. In this way he had an independent source of information, especially in reference to the disposition and the preparation of the troops, the condition of the country and the roads, and the character and efficiency of the leadings officers, their relative deserts, as well as their claims for recognition and promotion.

As occasion offered I pointed out to Rawlins that Sherman had taken the flower and pick of the army on the "March to the Sea," and had left Thomas with the dismounted cavalry and the poorer infantry, which was widely scattered, to make head against Hood and his veterans, whom Sherman had left behind, still aggressive and unbeaten. I also pointed out the danger of defeat, and the urgent necessity for the concentration of all the forces available in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, and especially for the remount of the cavalry.

Whatever may have been the confidence of others in immediate success, Rawlins indulged in no illusions. He appeared to see from the first that Thomas might be overthrown before he could gather his widely scattered forces together and weld them into an efficient army, and it was doubtless for this reason that Grant sent his Chief of Staff to Missouri with full authority to hurry the idle troops from that department to Nashville for the purpose of reënforcing the army in front of that place. In spite of all Rawlins could do, however, in spite of all the promises made by Rosecrans, and in spite of the anxiety of A. J. Smith, the hardy and aggressive commander of the Sixteenth Army Corps, that corps was nearly a month, or four times longer than necessary, in moving from St. Louis to the scene of action. Rawlins never performed a more useful service than when he hastened the concentration of the forces with which Thomas finally won his splendid victory at Nashville. Rawlins, like the rest, was impatient at the delay in overwhelming Hood, but having far more faith, as we have seen, "in the infallibility of numbers than

in the infallibility of generals," he took no rest till he had sent to Thomas every available man within reach.

The careful reader will not fail to note the many important suggestions contained in the extracts from Rawlins's correspondence; yet their bearing upon controverted historical points is not always clear. It has long been known that he was not in favor of Sherman's starting on his "March to the Sea," while Hood was marching northward, and this is now placed beyond controversy by what Rawlins wrote while the matter was under discussion. He thought that Sherman, having with him the bulk of the good troops of his Military Division, should follow Hood and bring him to battle, rather than permit him to march unmolested against the widely scattered forces left to defend the territory previously taken from the enemy. He rightly thought that Hood's march first to the west and then to the north offered a fine opportunity for Sherman to throw himself upon his rear, cut off his retreat, and destroy his army. That this would have been the policy of a Napoleon there can be but little question. It is also evident that when the intentions of Hood to move through Middle Tennessee against Nashville became apparent, Rawlins at once became the strenuous advocate of strengthening Thomas and making him invincible by sending to his assistance all the good troops that could be spared from other departments. This was clearly in accordance with the simplest maxims of war, and Grant could not have paid Rawlins a greater compliment than to send him on this mission. That it was necessary is abundantly shown by the fact that in spite of its urgency and the orders given to Rosecrans on November 3 and prior thereto, the Sixteenth Corps did not reach Nashville in time to participate in the battle of Franklin, which was fought November 30, while Grierson's cavalry, although the wounded Upton had been sent to Memphis to hurry it to its destination, did not join the corps in Northern Alabama till after Hood's army

had been defeated and driven south of the Tennessee River.

When it is remembered that the national troops attached to the Military Division of the Mississippi amounted to something like 300,000 men "present and absent," and that counting those with Sherman and those gathered up by Thomas to make head against Hood, with his unbeaten army between them, there was scarcely 120,000 effective men with the colors in the entire Military Division, it will be seen that Rawlins, who knew the dangers of the situation perfectly, had abundant grounds for apprehension. It is now evident that the country was justly alarmed, and that Hood's well-directed campaign failed solely because he had neither men nor resources sufficient to make it a success. Strategically his plans were not only brilliant but in accordance with correct principles. They failed because his battalions, brigades, and divisions lacked weight, while a scarcity of supplies caused him to lose thirty days on the banks of the Tennessee before beginning his Northern march. It was during this period that Schofield succeeded with the heterogeneous forces under his command in delaying the earlier stages of the Confederate advance, and at last, through the reinforcements sent by Rawlins and the work done in concentrating and remounting the cavalry, that Thomas finally found himself at the head of an organized army strong enough to defeat Hood in the great battle at Nashville, on December 15-16, and to destroy his exhausted and decimated army as it retreated, broken and despondent, during midwinter towards Central Alabama.

When these facts are considered, it may well be admitted that Rawlins, who was the first to propose the transfer of fifteen thousand veteran troops from the West to assist in closing the campaign against Lee, was, as usual, giving sound advice. It should also be remembered that the Sixteenth Corps belonged to the Army of the Tennessee, and after participating in Banks's ill-starred campaign on the Red River, where there was no real call for its service, was sent to

Missouri. It is this circumstance that gives point and force to Rawlins's declaration on October 28 that "if half the pains and energy had been shown in getting troops" to the Army of the Potomac "that have been taken in sending them unnecessarily to Missouri . . . we could have broken the enemy's lines yesterday and held in our hands to-day the long-coveted prize of Richmond."

That Rawlins's counsel was conclusive in this case is shown by the fact that as soon as Thomas had driven the Confederate army out of Tennessee, Grant ordered the transfer of troops from the West to the East in great numbers. And it was this wise measure, made feasible and safe solely by the great victory at Nashville, that enabled him to bring the war to a close by concurrent movements the next spring. It is to be noted, however, that Grant was to the last impatient of Thomas's deliberation, and wanted him to continue active operations through the winter, while he permitted Sheridan to remain idle at the same time in the Valley of Virginia, with no enemy whatever confronting him.

This is not the place to argue the case in behalf of Thomas. It was his fate to be doubted and misunderstood from the first, and when his relations with Grant, as they are elsewhere pointed out, are considered, it will not be thought strange that he was left practically unemployed while younger and perhaps more deferential men were permitted to finish the great work of overthrowing the Confederacy and reestablishing the Union. That Rawlins in some degree shared the prejudice of his chief cannot be denied, nor can it be denied that he was partial to men of more aggressive temper and less formal habits than the stately and deliberate Thomas. There is no room to doubt that he admired the erratic Sherman and the impetuous Sheridan more than he did the more formal Meade, the more brilliant Warren, or the more imperturbable Thomas.

XV

VIEWS ON SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN

Rawlins Returns from the West—Extract from Grant's Memoirs Considered—Rawlins's Letters to His Wife—Sherman's Army Ordered to City Point—Movement Discussed—Rawlins Opposed to Political Generals.

AFTER finishing the business that took him to the West, Rawlins went East and rested a few days with his family at Danbury, with apparent benefit to his health, but with real disadvantage to his influence at headquarters. While he was far from being a loquacious man, he never sought to disguise from his brother officers his opinions on questions of either personal or public policy. His views in regard to Sherman's proposed campaign, which in its earlier stages was far from being settled in favor of the Atlantic coast, but for a while confessedly looked towards the Gulf of Mexico, were well known to the rest of the staff. They may have been approved for a time by some of the officers, but his absence from headquarters and the necessity he was under of passing through Washington both going to and returning from the West, gave an opportunity, after it was known that Sherman as well as Thomas had succeeded, to circulate the report that Rawlins had been bitterly opposed to the "March to the Sea." It is personally known, however, that Rawlins was cognizant of the first suggestion leading to that march, and gave it his unqualified approval, but there was nothing in the condition of affairs when it was first made, that contemplated the necessity of meeting such a counter-campaign as Hood afterwards conducted. It will be apparent that the defeat of that

general and the destruction of his army settled many military problems, and greatly simplified those that yet remained to be settled.

Before leaving this subject, it may be well to call attention to the following quotation from Grant's "Memoirs," published years afterwards:

. . . I was in favor of Sherman's plan (for the March to the Sea) from the time it was first submitted to me. My Chief of Staff (Rawlins), however, was very bitterly opposed to it, and as I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington to stop it.¹

I have purposely delayed the discussion of this statement till all Rawlins's letters concerning this period were within reach. They show conclusively both the ground of his opposition and the extent to which it was carried. They make it evident that his anxiety related solely to the timeliness of the proposed movement and the advisability of delaying it till the defeat of Hood could be counted upon with absolute certainty. When all the circumstances connected with the double campaign of Sherman and Hood in opposite directions, and the consequent anxieties which the Government and the country passed through during the months of October, November, and December of that year, are reviewed, it must be admitted that Rawlins's apprehensions were well founded, and that his views were supported by the soundest principles of the military art. It should also be remembered that the statements of the "Memoirs" were not formulated till twenty years after the end of the war, and that they are not supported by any corroborative evidence whatever. If Grant personally wrote the lines of the "Memoirs" bearing on this subject, it is altogether probable that he did so on the report of others, who must have had it themselves upon hearsay. The only other supposition consistent with the established facts of the case

¹ Grant's Memoirs, Volume II, p. 376.

is that Grant's memory, like that of his informant, dulled, as might well have been the case, by the lapse of time, may have confounded the well-known opposition of the Chief of Staff to the time for commencing the "March to the Sea," till the necessary measures had been taken to resist Hood's advance, with the statement that "he was very bitterly opposed" to the march itself.²

It is also due to Rawlins to say that I have found no evidence whatever, beyond the simple statement of the "Memoirs," to support the declaration that he "appealed to the authorities at Washington to stop it." No letter to that effect has ever been published, and hence, if any appeal was ever made to the authorities, it must have been as he was passing through Washington, October 31, 1864, on his way to the West, or as he was returning therefrom to headquarters. There is no evidence that he saw any of the authorities on either of these occasions, but if he did see them, it was doubtless at their instance, in which case it would have been clearly his duty when questioned to give his views frankly and honestly both as to the facts and as to the military policy which should have been based upon them. There was nothing to be concealed in all this. The entire country knew the general situation and was greatly alarmed by Sherman's abandonment of the pursuit of Hood, by the aggressive attitude of the latter, and by the divided and scattered condition of the forces left at the disposal of Thomas for the defence of Middle Tennessee. It was one of the great crises of the war, and now that it is long since over, and we know how well-founded his apprehensions were, we may well pardon the Chief of Staff for whatever grain of truth there may have been in the statement of the "Memoirs." That nothing more serious than this was ever brought against him shows conclusively that he was a man of good judgment and sterling worth.

² This view of the case is fully sustained by Schofield's "Forty-six Years in the Army," p. 322 *et seq.*

Rawlins arrived at City Point November 15, and the next day wrote to his wife as follows:

. . . I arrived here last evening having left New York on Sunday evening.

. . . The General is satisfied with my execution of his orders in Missouri. How delightful was my little stay in Danbury. . . .

City Point, Nov. 16, 1864. . . . Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith is here—so is Dr. Kittoe. General Grant goes to-morrow to Burlington, N. J., to see Mrs. Grant. Colonel Badeau accompanies him. Colonels Porter and Duff are both absent on duty, one at Indianapolis and the other at Louisville. . . .

City Point, November 17, 1864. . . . General Grant accompanied by Colonels Comstock and Badeau and Captain Robinett, started to-day for Washington and Burlington. I hope he will keep all straight during his absence, which will last till about the 22nd instant. General Sherman was to leave Atlanta yesterday on his Southern campaign. I have every hope he may succeed to his fullest expectations, but have many fears that he may fail. That he will damage the enemy terribly I have no question, but whether he will cause such commotion in the Confederacy as to loosen their hold on Richmond, is not so certain. And regarding Richmond's fall as of the first importance to our arms, I can but feel solicitous at every movement of troops that looks not directly in that direction.

The country need feel no uneasiness as to the movements of Beauregard^{*} for Thomas has a much larger army than Beauregard, and should if the latter persists in pushing North, defeat him. . . .

City Point, Nov. 18, 1864. . . . It began raining at dark and I fear it will continue some time. Last night the enemy captured some pickets of General Butler's command in front of Bermuda Hundred; the number has not yet been reported, but they will probably not exceed one hundred. No news whatever from other quarters, nor have I heard from the General since he left.

At this moment heavy musketry firing is heard in front of Bermuda Hundred. It is very dark and it is not at all unlikely that the enemy under cover of it have attempted to break through

^{*} Beauregard was at that time senior Confederate General in the central South, but Hood was in personal command of the main army.

our lines. Such an attempt has been looked for and I suppose General Butler's troops are in readiness to repel it. . . .

City Point, Nov. 19, 1864. . . . To-day has been excessively stormy. It has rained with little intermission since it set in last night. General Butler, Senator Wilson, ex-Governor Gardner and other gentlemen of distinction were here to-day. The firing in front of Bermuda Hundred last night was our pickets attempting to recover the line the enemy drove them from last night, but they did not succeed.

No news from the enemy's lines in this vicinity. We have had no newspapers from Richmond since one dated the 16th. It is with much anxiety we now look for them, for in them we hope to see something of Sherman's whereabouts. He was to have started from Atlanta on Wednesday morning last and this is the fourth day of his march. Moving as he does many miles must now intervene between him and his starting point. May providence prosper and preserve him is my earnest prayer, and may the road, though marked with ruin as it will be, along which he passes, prove in the end the pathway to Peace.

General Wilson is at Nashville organizing the cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi. I was in hopes he would accompany General Sherman, for in so doing he would have secured his confirmation as a brigadier general, and perhaps as brevet major general too. As it is he may have difficulty. I hope, however, he will receive his confirmation for he is a brave and deserving officer. . . .

City Point, Nov. 20, 1864. . . . The rain continues with no indications of ceasing soon. Richmond papers of yesterday show that Sherman has commenced his campaign from Atlanta southward and that he has reached Jonesboro. They also show that an attack from the armies here is daily expected. From other sources we have certain information of the return to Richmond of Kershaw's division, which was with Early in the Valley. This would indicate the intention on the part of the enemy to withdraw from further offensive operations in the Shenandoah Valley.

The General being absent leaves us here without news from the West, other than that which reaches us through the newspapers all of which you see before we do. All quiet along our lines, and will perhaps remain so for some time to come.

I see by the papers gold has gone down. I shall write to Colonel Hilyer to purchase \$200 more and send it to you by express.

Headquarters, in the absence of the General, is quite a lonesome place. The only excitement we have is the news we get from Richmond papers and scouts, and digesting and sending it to the General and to Washington. . . .

City Point, Nov. 21, 1864. . . . The rain still continues. Richmond papers of this date state that Sherman was on the 19th, within thirty miles of Macon, that great consternation existed on the first news of his approach, but they were now becoming quiet and preparing to meet him. The papers editorially urge the people in the line of Sherman's advance to destroy everything in the way of supplies. Marching with the rapidity that Sherman marches they will in this, be able to do but little to delay him. Should he hesitate, or delay, they might greatly jeopard his advance by the destruction of everything in his front. This much, however, in that event he could and would do, namely, turn either to the right or left and get supplies or compel a general destruction of everything in the country.

There is no news here of any interest. All is quiet and the rain is pattering as it has pattered for several days and nights on the tent flies.

No news reaches us from the west. The fact is the weather is so unfavorable for army operations that I do not anticipate anything of importance from any quarter for some days, save what we gather from the Richmond papers in regard to Sherman's movements.

I have just received a despatch from General Grant dated to-day at New York City. This somewhat surprises me for when he left here it was his intention to be back to-morrow. Now I do not know when he will return. It makes, however, little difference, so far as there is anything to do here, because of the prevailing storm, but I would like to have him here for it is not with these armies as it was with the armies of the West. There any orders that went from his headquarters over my signature were the same as if the General were present.

Everything is going smoothly and quietly. . . .

City Point, Nov. 22, 1864. . . . We must be patient, and content our minds to the performance of the duties demanded by the times in which we live. The privations consequent upon our

being so much separated, and at times of sickness too, when we could be of so much comfort to each other were we together, we will bear and submit to without complaint, knowing that in doing so we are but fulfilling the requirements made upon hundreds of thousands of our countrymen and countrywomen, and feeling too in so doing we are but filling the measure of service we owe our country.

Richmond papers of this date have but little news. They state that Sherman was yesterday eighteen miles from Macon. No news from the West. All quiet here. A despatch just received from the General dated at Washington says he will be back to this place Thursday.

I am I suppose what might be called a man in perfect health. In all the stormy weather we have had I have not felt or had the slightest cold, and my appetite and digestion are perfect. . . .

City Point, November 23, 1864. . . . To-day has been clear and cold—a most delightful change from the cloudy and rainy days that have preceded it.

The only additional news from Sherman through Richmond papers is that he was near Macon on the 21st instant and a battle at that place was imminent, and also that he had cut the railroad between Atlanta and Macon, twenty-five miles from the latter place. This looks very favorable to his success. The Richmond papers of to-day have not yet come in. Deserters report that a South Carolina brigade and two North Carolina regiments have been sent from Petersburg probably to Georgia to meet Sherman. With this exception there is no news here. From the West we have no report.

I see by the *New York Herald* that a member of General Grant's staff at the complimentary serenade to the Governor elect of New York, appeared and very neatly and delicately advertised the General's great modesty, by stating and requesting that no notice of the General's presence in the city be taken by the papers, till the next Tuesday thereafter. Now I have high respect and regard for modesty but this thing of making too much of it I deprecate exceedingly. I know the General is a modest man but if he allows it to be proclaimed too loudly in immediate advance of his presenting himself, the credit he has for it will fast depreciate. What object he could have in desiring the papers not to mention his presence in New York, I cannot conceive. It cer-

tainly was not that he would prevent people from calling upon him, for the fact that he was at the Astor House being known at all would spread sufficiently among those of that city, who since his congratulation of the President upon the double victory achieved in the peacefulness of the recent election, would consider it an honor to call on him, to occupy his entire attention in receiving them during his short stay. If it was that the rebel leaders might suppose him at City Point, it was entirely unnecessary, for they had already the news of his absence and drew the deduction therefrom that the expected attack on their lines would not soon be made. The General from his long labors was entitled to respite and rest, and if he desired to visit New York, he should have gone there and not permitted his military secretary, Colonel Badeau, to ostentatiously announce his desire that his presence should not be noticed. This whole thing is not General Grant, but solely Colonel Badeau.

Colonel Bowers started for Washington this morning. He will be absent for perhaps a week.

I look for General Grant to-morrow, which is Thanksgiving Day. We have received several Turkeys for our dinner, and the good people of New York and vicinity have sent here about eighty thousand pounds of turkey for distribution, and they are now being divided among our men. This remembrance of them by their friends at home is truly encouraging. Some of them may not get any but the greater majority will. . . .

City Point, November 24, 1864. . . . To-day has been most delightfully beautiful and everyone seemed to enjoy Thanksgiving most heartily. I am sorry to say, however, that one boat containing a portion of the turkeys for the soldiers' dinner got aground and was detained till late to-day, but those who were by this cause deprived of their turkey for dinner will have it to-morrow, and except the little annoyance, the disappointment and the causes, it will be just as well. Turkey in camp is a luxury all can appreciate . . .

The following is as nearly as I can repeat it a proclamation from General Beauregard and shows the trepidation he is in:

"Corinth, Miss., Nov. 18, 1864. . . . To the people of Georgia: Arise to the defence of your native soil. Rally around your patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers; destroy all bridges and block up all roads in Sherman's front, flanks and rear, and he will starve

in your midst. Be confident, and trust in an over-ruling providence, who will crown your efforts with success. I hasten to join you in the defence of your homes and firesides. P. G. T. Beauregard, *General Commanding*."

I have written the above as I remember it from reading it once. It may not be exactly correct but is substantially so. This looks as though he would move Hood's army after Sherman, but as information from Thomas places three corps of Hood's army North of the Tennessee, it would seem to be beyond hope of successful pursuit of Sherman.

Richmond papers of to-day have not yet come to hand. General Grant, and Colonels Porter, Comstock and Badeau and Captain Robinett of his staff, returned this morning all in excellent health except the General who sat up too late last night. Mrs. Grant went with the General to New York. They breakfasted with Colonel Hillyer. . . .

City Point, Nov. 25, 1864. . . . To-day is clear and fine, all quiet here. News from Thomas is meagre. Hood appears to be advancing towards Nashville, with three army corps, but he moves slowly. Thomas is sufficiently strong for defensive purposes and will soon have his forces so concentrated as to take the offensive should Hood not attack him.

Nothing new from Sherman save confirmation of the report that the capital of Georgia is in his possession, and that he has cut the railroads between Augusta and Macon.

The General and all the members of the staff except Colonels Bowers and Duff are at headquarters. The General has written Mrs. Grant to come down here week after next and asked me your address for Mrs. Grant, as she intended or had spoken of inviting you to come with her.

Now I would like very much to have you come, were it not that I disapprove of having officers' wives in camp. It does not look like war to me, to see it heralded throughout the country by the press that the wife of the General and also the wife of his Chief of Staff are at City Point, and would be what I would avoid unless some good end could be subserved by it, besides the item of expense and the disposition of the children during your absence, is something to be considered. However, I leave the matter to your decision, after having stated my views, and whatever it is will meet with my concurrence and approval. . . .

City Point, Nov. 26, 1864. . . . Richmond papers of yesterday seem studiously to avoid any reference to Sherman, except a despatch which mentions the fact that his cavalry had been repulsed in its attempt to cross the Oconee River. Their failure to give details of Sherman's movements is construed here to be significant of his success.

News from Thomas is to the effect that Hood is advancing on Columbia, Tennessee, where our forces are being concentrated. General A. J. Smith with his command from St. Louis passed through Nashville on the way to Columbia.⁴ There seems to be little doubt now that Hood will give Thomas battle, and if Thomas can get his forces concentrated in time we are confident of victory.

All quiet here, General Hancock to-day took leave of his old comrades and soldiers of the Second Corps. He goes to Washington to organize a veteran corps to be composed of soldiers who have served out their time and have reënlisted. General Humphreys succeeds him in the command of the Second Corps. He is a brave and fit successor to the heroic Hancock.

Generals Grant, Meade, Warren, Crawford, Ingalls and others went up this morning to General Butler's front and are still there witnessing experiments being made with Greek fire. . . .

City Point, November 27, 1864. . . . Around our lines the greatest quiet prevails. Since I wrote last night we have had no news from Sherman or Thomas, and that from Sheridan is to the effect that all is as quiet with him as with us here. Colonel Bowers has returned, and now all of the staff except Colonel Duff are at headquarters.

The steamer *Grey Hound* with General Butler and Admiral Porter on board caught fire to-day and was burned below Fort Powhattan. No lives were lost. Butler and the Admiral continued their trip to Fort Monroe in a tug boat. . . .

Steamer *M. Martin* off Norfolk, Va., November 29, 1864. . . . General Grant having business with Admiral Porter left City Point this morning accompanied by myself and other staff officers, for Fort Monroe, off which place the Admiral lay in his fine flag ship the *Malvern*. We reached there about three o'clock p. m., met the Admiral and General Butler on his ship, transacted

⁴ This statement was not correct.

the official business, and then as we could just as well get back to City Point by breakfast, by starting for that place at twelve o'clock to-night, the General decided to come down here and attend the theatre, to which place he with all his staff save myself have gone. To have gone there would have afforded me no pleasure. Besides in times like these I do not approve of those to whom the country looks for leadership and guidance through the terrible storm still swelling with unspent fury, going to such places, and shall not myself by going give countenance to it although I might go without any injury to the cause of my country. Still the brave men in front can't have this privilege, if they desired it, and I will not take the benefit of it though the privilege is mine. The look of a thing is sometimes a great deal.

News this morning from Richmond is to the effect that the enemy has sent off either Kershaw's or Field's division to meet Sherman, and indications in front of General Sheridan are that the enemy has withdrawn Gordon's division from Early. Whether he has gone to Richmond or to resist Sherman has not yet been ascertained, probably however the latter is his destination. General Grant has ordered movement of troops to take advantage of this on the part of the enemy. Breckenridge's troops in West Virginia and East Tennessee, from all the information we can gather from Richmond, will be sent, and are now perhaps on the way to reënforce the force opposing Sherman.

Hood in Tennessee is slowly advancing on Thomas but both Sherman and Thomas are supposed to have men enough for the purpose each had in view. Great battles will no doubt soon be fought. May God grant us victory.

The Confederate war steamer *Florida* captured in a Brazilian port sank near Fort Monroe the other day in fifty feet of water. Nothing can be seen of her but her masts. What will be the result of this I do not know. I am decidedly in favor of doing exact justice to the sovereignty of Brazil. This, however, is left to our Secretary of State who has thus far prevented our becoming entangled with foreign powers, and I have full confidence, he will get us through this difficulty and I trust honestly, too.

Richmond papers state that thirteen thousand of our prisoners at Salisbury, N. C., attempted to make their escape on the 24th instant but that artillery was brought to bear upon them and some forty were killed and a large number wounded, when they submitted. I have hopes that many of them got away; poor fellows,

my heart bleeds for them when I think of their sufferings. A just God will not always permit this state of things. . . .

City Point, Va., Nov. 30, 1864. . . . We reached this point from Norfolk this morning at sunrise. No news from the West to-day and information from Sherman very meagre. All quiet here.

General John Pope was here to-day and will perhaps have added to his Department of the Northwest the Departments of Kansas and Missouri. General Grant has recommended this. Generals Hardee and Beauregard are at Augusta, Georgia, and General Bragg with Western troops has left Wilmington for Augusta. So the Confederates have Generals enough if they can find troops enough to give Sherman trouble, but that they have troops enough, we do not believe, and without troops these generals are no match for Sherman. . . .

City Point, December 1, 1864. . . . I fear my answer to your despatch of this date in regard to your reply to Mrs. Grant about coming to City Point, was not such as you had hoped for, but I could not decide that you should answer affirmatively for the reason that I could not approve of your coming, unless you should yourself decide to come after reading my letter on this subject, written to you last week. You know that when headquarters are established in a city whether in Washington or some Southern one, I will send for you, but not while they are in the field in front of an enemy, and when everything at headquarters should be indicative of readiness for immediate movements should they be required. Besides the orders are against officers wives being with them in camp and I am opposed to their being disregarded at headquarters, while enforcement of them is exacted of officers in the field. If you came you probably would not be able to stay more than one or two days and the fatigue of the journey to you in your weakened condition would not be recovered from in that time.

You will not think less of me for entertaining the view I express in this letter and the one written last week. They are based upon firm principles which I trust will find in you a hearty support. This is written with no view of influencing your decision, for that you have already made, but only to show you why the answer your sweet despatch invited, was not sent you instead of the one which was sent. Until I receive a letter from you I shall

write my letters in fear that you will not get them for some time, as may be the case if you start for this place with Mrs. Grant.

News from the West is that Hood has attacked Thomas's army at Franklin, Tenn., a place about twenty-seven miles South of Nashville, at four o'clock yesterday and was repulsed with a loss of from five to six thousand men including one thousand prisoners, and among them one brigadier general. Our loss was from five to six hundred. This will prove a heavy blow to Hood and will, it seems to me, compel him to withdraw to the South bank of the Tennessee. Thomas's army by to-morrow, according to his despatches, will be ready to take the offensive. No news whatever has been received from Sheridan. All quiet along our lines here.

I stated in a letter to you some time ago, speaking of General Grant in New York, that Colonel Badeau probably requested that the press should not speak of the General's presence in the city. It was not Colonel Badeau who did this but Mr. Beckwith our cipher operator.

I see gold is going up again. I wrote some time ago to Colonel Hillyer asking him to purchase for me and send to you two hundred dollars in gold, but fear he did not do so.

In my trip to Fort Monroe I caught cold, which causes me to cough somewhat, but does not affect my general health. I went with Colonel Parker to-day to get weighed. My weight is now 173 pounds, or seven and a half pounds more than when I was last weighed.

The Richmond *Examiner* of to-day, just received, gives it up that Sherman will get through to the coast, and is now across the Oconee River. This looks most favorable for our military situation. . . .

City Point, December 2, 1864. . . . The news from General Thomas to-day is not so favorable as it looked yesterday, for notwithstanding our repulse of the enemy at Franklin on the afternoon of the 30th ultimo, at 3 A. M. of the 1st instant, we fell back to within the fortifications at Nashville and Hood's advanced infantry was near there. General Grant has ordered General Thomas to attack Hood at once and before he has time to fortify. So you may expect news of a battle from that quarter at any time, yes, before you read this . . .

General Gregg commanding the cavalry of the Army of the

Potomac attacked Stoney Ford Station on the Weldon Railroad and succeeded in capturing it with two pieces of artillery, one hundred and seventy prisoners, among them Major Fitzhugh of General Hampton's staff and a brother-in-law of Colonel Dent. He destroyed by burning the depot containing five hundred bales of hay, three thousand sacks of corn, large quantities of bacon and ammunition; also one train loaded with supplies. This was a very brilliant affair and reflects much credit upon the cavalry and its commander.

General Dodge will be assigned to command the Department of the Missouri. General McClelland has resigned his commission in the army.

General Grant expects Mrs. Grant here within the next four or five days and says she has invited you to come with her. I merely mention this to show how much she has put her heart upon having your company. You of course have decided this and as you have not telegraphed me I take it for granted that you have decided not to come. . . .

City Point, December 4, 1864. . . . News from the West is that Thomas will in two or three days from this be in condition to give Hood battle.

News from Sherman through Richmond papers is that he is still progressing towards the coast without serious opposition. Colonel Markland with Sherman's mail and Lieutenant Dunn with despatches for him, start for the blockading fleet off Savannah this morning, to remain there till General Sherman gets through. All quiet here. . . .

City Point, December 4, 1864. . . . No news of army movements from any quarter away from here. The First Division of the Sixth Corps, which has been in the Valley with Sheridan, arrived here to-day. The Third Division will commence arriving to-morrow and the Second and last division will be here in a few days, unless movements of the enemy in the Valley should require it to stay in that section.

I see in *Harper's Weekly* of the 10th instant a wood cut of myself, with a short (but as to my being wounded in battle incorrect) notice of my career. If you have not already seen it, you can, by procuring that copy of the paper, have the pleasure of doing so. I have no doubt it will amuse if not interest you. . . .

City Point, December 6, 1864. . . . I was kept in my room all day yesterday by a severe cold. Otherwise I was quite well and this morning I am out but not entirely well of my cold. The day is beautiful and I shall take a ride on horseback which I hope will much improve me.

News from Sherman through Richmond papers is still favorable to him. From Nashville matters do not look as it seems to me they should. The enemy day before yesterday captured two transport steamers going down the river, but Captain Fitch in command of our gun boats recaptured them and drove back the rebel battery from the river bank. Everything quiet here. . . .

City Point, December 7, 1864. . . . I am delighted to know all is satisfactory to you. I felt it would be. Mrs. Grant telegraphed yesterday she will start for City Point on the 8th. Colonel Dent has gone with the steamer *Washington* to meet her. News from Nashville is unchanged save that General Thomas intends to attack the enemy to-day.

Nothing from Sherman. Warren with a force from the Army of the Potomac started this morning to break up the Weldon railroad so as to deprive the enemy of any benefit of it for some weeks. His command is large and sufficient for the purpose. I am getting better of my cold. It is raining here quite hard this morning.

Colonel Babcock goes to Sherman this morning with orders of the right ring I assure you. Richmond ere long will tremble at the Union soldiers' march, if the orders which Babcock has for General Sherman are carried out. Mail time is up. . . .

City Point, December 9, 1864. . . . This morning is clear and cold. No news from Warren, Sherman or Thomas.

The expedition for the capture of Wilmington, under General Butler and Admiral Porter got off last evening. They should reach there day after to-morrow. Colonel Comstock accompanied General Butler. . . .

City Point, December 10, 1864. . . . It commenced to snow, sleet and rain here last night, and this morning everything was white as age. To-day has been really disagreeable.

Colonel Clark of the old Army of the Tennessee is here; he will leave for Washington to-morrow. Hon. E. B. Washburne and General Logan arrived this afternoon. They are both in

excellent health and spirits. News from Thomas is that all there is quiet and a freezing storm prevailing. Nothing of any kind whatever from Sherman. General Warren has not yet been heard from. He should be back to-morrow. The expedition against Wilmington is off. In a day or two we shall hear from it, and I trust the news will be such as to cheer the country throughout its borders. . . .

City Point, December 11, 1864. . . . To-night is very, very cold but clear as a bell. One consolation I have is that I have blankets enough to keep me warm and shall suffer no inconvenience from the change of weather. Would to heaven I could say the same for all of our brave men.

General Warren has been heard from. He is on his way back and will be in to-morrow. His raid has been most successful having destroyed the Weldon railroad from Jarrotts Station to Hicksburg including several bridges of considerable importance. No news to-day from Thomas. Richmond papers place Sherman East of the Ogeechee River and moving towards Savannah. The expedition against Wilmington has been delayed at Fort Monroe by the recent storm. Mrs. Grant arrived yesterday morning. She had your letter, also your despatch, and is considerably disappointed that you did not come. She says she thinks you must be a very considerate and obedient wife to ask your husband if you should come to see him, that she intended having your visit here as a surprise to me and the next time she sees you she intends to give you some instructions as to how to manage me. . . .

City Point, December 12, 1864. . . . To-day has been clear and cold. This evening, however, the wind has laid and we hope the expedition against Wilmington got off from Fort Monroe to-day. News from Sherman through Richmond papers of this date, is that yesterday afternoon he was within twenty miles of Savannah and they think it more than probable that the battle for the possession of that city is progressing to-day. If they meet Sherman outside of the city in battle he will most certainly beat them. We are anxiously expecting direct news from Sherman daily. From Thomas we have not a word to-day. General Warren is coming in from his raid to Hicksburg. It is a great success. The last division of the Sixth Corps has arrived. All quiet in our front to-day. . . .

City Point, December 13, 1864. . . . We have no news from General Thomas to-day. The last was on Saturday. He then could not attack Hood because of the sleet that covered in one icy glare the whole country about Nashville. Still Hood had been able to move against Murfreesboro and at the same time to cross some three thousand men into Kentucky. General Grant has ordered and repeated over and over again his orders to General Thomas to attack Hood, but it seems, first from one cause and then another, he will not or at least has not attacked. General Logan who was here has been ordered to Nashville and when he gets there, if Thomas has not attacked Hood, will relieve Thomas and whip Hood if it can be done. We can depend on these old soldiers of the Tennessee.

News from Sherman is quite satisfactory. Richmond papers say he is within five miles of Savannah, and drawn up in line of battle, and that they have a large force confronting him. . . .

City Point, December 14, 1864. . . . To-day has been warm and cloudy. The General with Mrs. Grant and lady friends, accompanied by Colonels Bowers, Dent and Morgan, and General Barnard, left here to-night for Washington, and unless he receives other information than he had when he started from here, the General with Colonel Bowers and General Barnard will go on to Nashville. Notwithstanding the positive orders sent General Thomas to fight Hood, he had up to the 13th made no move whatever in that direction.

We have just received a despatch from Sherman's army, dated the 9th. He was then within ten miles of Savannah. The despatch came through from General Howard, commanding the right wing of Sherman's army, to Admiral Dahlgren, and on the 12th instant was forwarded by the latter to Washington. Admiral Dahlgren was going at once to open up communications between Sherman and the fleet off Savannah.

Through rebel papers we learn that Sherman has already invested the place. General Foster holds a point near the railroad between Savannah and Charleston, with batteries in twelve hundred yards of the road and prevents cars from passing between these places. All quiet here and nothing yet from the Wilmington expedition. . . .

City Point, December 15, 1864. . . . No additional news from Sherman and none whatever from Thomas. All quiet here.

Through Richmond papers we learn that a part of Burbridge's forces reached Bristol on the 13th and captured the place and destroyed three trains of cars. Bristol is a point on the railroad near the boundary line between Tennessee and Virginia. This is a decided success to us, as it must relieve East Tennessee from further pressure from Breckenridge. Richmond papers also show that the forces that we sent out from New Berne a few days ago failed to reach the Weldon railroad. Whether it accomplished the purpose for which it was sent—mainly the capture of some guns and a force the enemy had at work fortifying a place called Rainbow—the papers do not state.

I have received no word as yet as to whether or not the General has reached Washington. . . .

City Point, December 16, 1864. . . . To-day has been quite warm, too warm in fact for good health, still I am getting along finely.

Despatches this morning from Nashville inform us that at 9 o'clock A. M. yesterday General Thomas attacked Hood and drove his left and centre out of their entrenchments and back from three to five miles, capturing fifteen hundred prisoners and seventeen pieces of artillery. This, if no reverse has since followed it, is glory indeed for our arms.

Through Richmond papers we learn that the force which captured Bristol is pushing towards Salem, Virginia, having already captured Abingdon and reached a point only two miles distant from Marion. They fear the salt works at Saltville would fall into our hands. This force is in the rear of Breckenridge and will I have no doubt compel him to withdraw from East Tennessee. The same papers also state that Sherman has carried Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River by assault, capturing the garrison and entire armament thus opening up full and complete communication with our fleet, which can run up to that point with the heaviest class of ships. All this is very cheering news I assure you. . . .

City Point, Va., December 17, 1864. . . . Accompanying this is a badge or medal of honor of the 17th Army Corps, General McPherson's old corps. It was presented to me by the officers of that corps as evidence of their friendly regards. I desire it preserved for Jimmie. In the meantime I think it is beautiful

enough for you to wear. It might answer as a brooch for your splendid new cloak. . . .

City Point, December 17, 1864. . . . To-day has been like several preceding it, too warm for winter and good health.

Colonel Porter went home several days ago on account of sickness and Colonel Badeau starts in the morning for the same reason. He is very sick with fever. General Grant will be back Monday next.

The news from General Thomas is glorious, a victory complete as any yet obtained in open field, with little loss of life to us.

A despatch dated 14th from General Foster states that he met General Sherman that day, that he was then investing Savannah, the right of his army resting on the Ogeechee River and the left on the Savannah, three and a half miles from the city—that he was sending a division to the East bank of the Savannah River, to prevent Hardee's escaping with the garrison in that direction, and also to connect with Foster's forces: that Sherman intended summoning the city to surrender on the 16th instant and in the event of refusal would open on it with artillery at once. His army is in fine spirits.

Here all is quiet. In the morning a salute of one hundred guns will be fired in honor of our victory at Nashville. . . .

City Point, December 18, 1864. . . . The salute of one hundred guns in honor of Thomas's victory was fired this morning.

City Point, December 20, 1864. . . . Yesterday was a damp day with no news from any quarter. General Grant got back from Burlington where he had gone with Mrs. Grant from Washington.

Colonel Babcock arrived from Sherman this morning, bringing very satisfactory report. All there is well and Savannah must soon fall. It is in much the same situation Vicksburg was after we invested it.

News from General Thomas is still favorable. We have hopes he may get a force in Hood's rear to destroy his means of recrossing the Tennessee River. One has already been started for that purpose and if it succeeds Hood will be entirely ruined. . . .

City Point, December 21, 1864. . . . To-day has been one of storm and wind without, and it admonishes one that within doors is the best place to find comfort to-night.

The news from General Thomas is cheering and his prospects of preventing Hood from recrossing the Tennessee River are hopeful.

Nothing new from Sherman. The fleet of the expedition against Wilmington had appeared off that place yesterday and a brigade of troops were sent from Richmond to reënforce Wilmington. It is to be hoped they will be too late. This information we have from Richmond papers and deserters. . . .

City Point, December 22, 1864. . . . To-day is clear and cold. All quiet here, no news from Thomas or Sherman. Richmond papers state that Butler and Porter's expedition against Wilmington has done nothing as yet, that two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry were approaching, one on the Virginia Central and the other on the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad. This latter is no doubt true as Sheridan had ordered the movement some time ago. . . .

City Point, December 24, 1864. . . . We have no news from General Thomas nor from Sherman, save that a telegraph operator from Richmond yesterday says that Beauregard telegraphed on the night of the 20th to Davis that Savannah had surrendered to Sherman unconditionally on the morning of the 20th, and that papers of this date say that there is a report that Hardee had evacuated Savannah and Sherman had taken possession.

The Wilmington expedition has done nothing yet. All quiet here. . . .

City Point, December 25, 1864. . . . This has been a most beautiful Christmas and news from Sherman in Savannah made it merry indeed. He telegraphs through General Foster his occupation of the place on the 21st; evacuation of it on the afternoon of the 20th. His captures consist of 800 prisoners of war, 150 heavy guns, much ammunition, three steamers, 32,000 bales of cotton. The enemy burned their navy yard and blew up their three ironclads.

The news from General Thomas is quite cheering and he is still pursuing Hood with hopes of inflicting greater damage upon him. No news whatever from the Wilmington expedition. General Butler is with it. You remember what I wrote about him

some time since. I fear I was right. Whenever he does anything to change my judgment I shall commit that change to paper. . . .

City Point, December 26, 1864. . . . To-day has been quite misty and very foggy. Everything here is quiet. News from Thomas is still good. General Wilson's cavalry appears to be doing excellent service for which I am truly glad, not only on the country's account but on his own. The General has written out his orders for Sherman. They are not in accordance with my first views, but they are all right, and when the result of them is seen, the country will fully approve their wisdom . . .

The Wilmington expedition has failed—failed too, I am sorry to say from what I can learn, from the tardiness of the navy, which delayed two clear days of good weather, during which time the enemy had only one thousand men in all the defences of the place, including Fort Fisher. At the expiration of these two days a storm set in which drove our fleet to sea and gave the enemy time to get into the place some eight or ten thousand men and thereby destroyed every vestige of a chance for our success.

The powder boat of which I wrote several days ago was exploded near Fort Fisher and so little damage did it do that the enemy thought it only one of our gunboats that had been run aground and blown up by us to keep it out of their hands. The terrible danger they escaped they little dreamed of. Our entire casualties in the land forces do not exceed sixteen. . . .

City Point, December 30, 1864. . . . We have here to-day Frank P. Blair, Sr., and Montgomery Blair. Their mission is one with which I have not been made acquainted. It does not, however, relate to military affairs. . . .

City Point, Va., December 31, 1864. . . . To-day has been very stormy and to-night a heavy gale is blowing but within my cozy, comfortable quarters I could wish you with me, laugh at the storm, so far as it might affect me personally, and even though you are absent, I am delightfully enjoying myself, in the anticipation of your soon being with me. Those of our brave men without shelter, wherever they may be, I do most sincerely pity, and wish within my heart of hearts, this war were ended and they in the bosom of their beloved families.

We have no news from any quarter. To-morrow the rebel army of General Lee has a New Year's dinner gotten up by their

friends in the same manner as was our Thanksgiving dinner, and as they claim not to have fired on our lines to annoy us when we were enjoying our Thanksgiving dinner, General Grant has issued such orders to our troops as to prevent any firing to-morrow unless it be in answer to shots from the enemy. We are never to be outdone, either in fighting or magnanimity. . . .

City Point, Va., January 1, 1865. . . . To-day has been very fine. No news from any quarter. The mine intended to open out the canal was exploded but the result was not as favorable as was anticipated. It will require several weeks more work to complete it. . . .

It will be observed that in his letter of December 7, Rawlins speaks of the orders sent to Sherman from City Point the day previous by the hands of Colonel Babcock, as having "the right ring." They were conveyed by an autograph letter from General Grant, containing this phrase:

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea coast, fortify and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with despatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but I want you in person. Unless you see objections to this plan, which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

On its face, this was the natural and proper order to secure the concentration of the overwhelming force against Lee, which had been the object of Rawlins's, as well as of Grant's, constant solicitude. It was approved by Halleck, the Secretary of War, and the President, but when water transportation came to be considered, it was found that ships enough could not be got to transfer 60,000 infantry from Savannah to City Point in less than sixty days, or say, before the middle of February. Such a movement, preceded as it must have been by a separation of the cavalry, artillery and trains from the army, would necessarily result in a certain amount of disin-

tegration and a consequent impairment of its efficiency. These considerations were not lost sight of for an instant, but besides this, and the lost time it would entail, there was another which soon found a lodgment in Grant's mind. I refer now to the suggestion that, if possible, it would be better for the Army of the Potomac to overthrow Lee, alone and unaided, rather than by the help of Sherman's army, which had never suffered a defeat, and by "marching through Georgia," although unopposed, had added so greatly to its fame. It was thought that if it were permitted to be in at the death it would claim, and the country would accord it, a share of praise beyond its due, and this might promote a feeling of sectionalism, rather than one favorable to national unity and harmony.

It must be recalled that Sherman's entire army was in the highest condition of mobility, could doubtless with all its impedimenta make the overland march in a considerably shorter time than it would take to land its infantry alone at City Point, that in making the march it would necessarily destroy the entire railway system upon which Lee depended for his connection with the Southern Atlantic States, and would besides, constantly interpose itself between the Confederate forces it was leaving behind and those under the immediate command of Lee in Virginia.

It has been frequently shown that, strategically considered, Sherman made a serious mistake in going to Fort McAllister near the mouth of the Ogeechee, and then to Savannah, instead of marching directly through Augusta and the Carolinas, by the shortest and most practicable route to Southern Virginia. It will be observed that it was through his loss of time and distance, by going to Savannah, that Johnston was enabled to gather up the scattered remnants of the Confederate forces, and interpose himself between Sherman and Grant. Had Sherman gone by water to City Point, as had been at first proposed, Johnston would doubtless have been enabled to form a junction with Lee early in February, or before the

troops which came by rail from the West under Schofield could have intercepted him in North Carolina.

Fortunately Thomas's victory at Nashville, December 15 and 16, shook Grant's confidence in the soundness of his first view as to the proper movement of Sherman's army,⁵ and gave the foregoing considerations their proper weight in deciding that he should have both the duty and the privilege of marching northward overland and giving South Carolina a real taste of the war she had done so much to provoke.

It has been charged that Rawlins opposed this view of the case, and adhered to the orders sent Sherman on the sixth of December; but his correspondence shows beyond question that he at first opposed those orders, and fully approved the change as soon as it was made. The military arguments which justify the change, were as easily understood by him as by any professional soldier in the army, while such of them as were based upon political considerations, if not actually brought forward by him, were more in consonance with his known views than with those of any other man on the staff. Watchful as he was of his Chief's real fame, he would naturally have been the first to see the desirability of beating Lee without the actual presence of Sherman and his army. And when not only the possibility of this was shown, but the probability of still greater injury to the Confederacy from the overland march was pointed out, it might well be assumed as certain, in the absence of positive testimony to the contrary, that Rawlins was in full accord with the change of orders that left Sherman free to carry out his own preferences. Had it been otherwise, Rawlins was not the man to have stated as he did in his letter of December 26:

. . . The General has written out his orders for Sherman. They are not in accordance with my first views, but they are all right, and when the result of them is seen the country will fully approve their wisdom.

⁵ O. R. Serial No. 92, pp. 740, 797, 798.

Evidently he had as much right to change his views as had Grant, Halleck, and Stanton, and in doing so gave additional evidence of his real ability as well as of his independent judgment. This was indeed one of his strongest characteristics. It will be remembered that he had approved the action of Grant in retiring W. F. Smith and restoring Butler to the command of the Army of the James. But his correspondence shows that he soon came to doubt the wisdom of trusting Butler with such grave responsibilities. This is made manifest by a pointed remark in his Christmas letter, referring to the Wilmington expedition:

. . . General Butler is with it. You remember what I wrote about him some time since. I fear I was right. Whenever he does anything to change my judgment I shall commit that change to paper.

While Rawlins's correspondence shows that he was firmly attached to such men as Logan, Dodge, Gresham, Ransom, Crocker, and Legget, who had entered the service from civil life and had become great soldiers from long experience in actual campaign and battle, it also shows that he had no abiding faith in mere political generals, like Butler and Banks, who failed to prove themselves equal to the great opportunities which had come to them rather by their prominence in civil affairs than by their just deserts as military men.

Rawlins's attitude in respect to this important matter receives increased importance from the action of the appointing power in respect to certain promotions in the regular army after the Spanish War. In the days of the great rebellion, highly educated officers who had served creditably both as regulars and volunteers from the first, either in confidential staff positions or in actual command of troops, were not infrequently passed over in silence, or actually rejected by the Senate, because they had neglected to advertise themselves in the newspapers, had not otherwise sufficiently demonstrated

their fitness for high rank, or had not thought it necessary to invoke the aid of political friends to secure their confirmation. Intrigue was as common then as now, but fortunately the Senate's approval was hard to secure, and grew harder towards the end of the war for men who had not honestly won their advancement to the higher grades by creditable deeds. It is due to Rawlins to say that, although from civil life, no officer was a greater stickler than he for the promotion of only such men as had shown themselves by actual service to be worthy of it. He kept himself well informed as to the character and services of the leading officers in all the armies, and when I notified him by letter that there was a feeling prevalent in the Western Army that Generals Thomas, Schofield, Wood, Cox, and Stanley had not been properly recognized, he at once earnestly advocated their advancement and exerted all his influence not only with his Chief but through Washburne in Congress to secure favorable recommendations to the War Department and favorable action from the Senate. He was the ardent friend of every good man in the service, and the implacable opponent of every man who sought promotion by meretricious methods, and this came to be generally recognized throughout the Eastern as well as the Western army. His merit has received no better attestation than that derived from the character of the men who gained his friendship during the troublous days of the war, and held it to the end.

XVI

WINTER OF 1864-65

Preparations for Final Campaign—Sheridan Rejoins Army of the Potomac—Conference with Rawlins—Sheridan's Memoirs—General Forsyth's Letter—General M. V. Sheridan's Letter—Campaign Begins—Rawlins's Letters to His Wife—Proposed Withdrawal of Cavalry—Doubts and Discouragements—Rawlins's Letters—Successes of Sheridan and Humphreys—Grant's Correspondence with Lee—Part Taken by Rawlins—Lee's Surrender.

For the first three months of 1865 there are but few letters from Rawlins in existence. The winter was a severe one, characterized by heavy rains, swollen streams, and almost impassable roads, and although Grant was justly anxious that the Union armies should not go into permanent encampments but keep constantly in motion, he could neither move the Army of the Potomac himself, nor prevail upon his subordinates in that region to carry on effective operations till spring. In fact, the weather as mentioned in Rawlins's letters, made this impracticable, and hence both the Union and Confederate armies in Virginia continued to confront each other sullenly and defiantly, but without serious intentions, while their commanders made themselves as comfortable as possible in winter quarters.

Rawlins, like his Chief, finally brought his wife to City Point, where she remained till after the final campaign began. During that period, he of course wrote her no letters, and being but a poor general correspondent and keeping no diary, I am forced in the remainder of my narrative to confine myself to the Official Records and to the memoirs of the times, for

the particulars of his career. As a staff-officer, without initial or independent authority, his part was then and always a subordinate one. Sherman found no occasion to mention him in his account of the visit to City Point in March, but enough has been said by both Grant and Sherman in their "Memoirs" to indicate that Rawlins was neither a silent nor an insignificant factor in the determination of policies and plans. The fact is that he took an important part in both, and, as usual, displayed sound judgment and marked independence of character.

It is well known that after authorizing Sherman to make his overland march northward from Savannah, issuing his orders for the transfer of Schofield, with an army corps of 21,000 veterans, by rail from Middle Tennessee to the coast of North Carolina, and directing Thomas to resume active operations in various directions from his Department, Grant made his dispositions to gather all the forces within reach for a movement against Lee. To this end he directed Sheridan to send back to the Army of the Potomac the Sixth Corps and such other infantry as could be spared, but instead of recalling the cavalry, which had grown steadily for the past year in aggressive temper and efficiency and now believed itself to be invincible, while the infantry of the Army of the Potomac, with its nine months of killing but inconclusive work had gained but little in steadiness and nothing in confidence, he ordered the great cavalryman to move up the valley with his horsemen, clean up the remnant of Early's force about Staunton, break up the railroads and canal, cross the James River, destroy the Southside Railroad, and, after thus isolating the Confederate Capital and cutting off its supplies, to continue his march through Southern Virginia and North Carolina to a junction with Sherman's victorious army, wherever it might be found. This seems to have been a favorite though fallacious idea with Grant, for he had included it as an alternative in the instructions sent Wilson the year before.

Sheridan had no difficulty whatever in overrunning all that part of Virginia north of Richmond, but the Confederates, perceiving his purposes, beat him to the bridges above Richmond, and effectively destroyed them. His own bridge train was inadequate for the passage of so wide a river as the James, and as he believed in concentration rather than in a further dispersion of forces, he doubled on his track and after a wide and destructive march, through Central Virginia to the eastward reestablished connection with the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, March 25.

After a full description of the operations which brought him to this place, Sheridan says in his "Memoirs":

. . . Very early next morning, in conformity with a request from General Grant, I left by boat for City Point, Merritt meanwhile conducting the column across the James River, to the point of rendezvous. The trip to City Point did not take long, and on my arrival at Headquarters the first person I met was General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's chief of staff. Rawlins was a man of strong likes and dislikes, and positive always both in speech and action, exhibiting marked feelings when greeting any one, and on this occasion met me with much warmth. His demonstrations of welcome over, we held a few minutes' conversation about the coming campaign, he taking strong ground against a part of the plan of operations adopted, namely, that which contemplated my joining General Sherman's army. His language was unequivocal and vehement, and when he was through talking, he conducted me to General Grant's quarters but he himself did not enter.

As that was the most critical juncture of the war, everything which throws light on the plan of campaign and its evolution is most important. And inasmuch as there is considerable divergence in the various narratives as to the parts played then and afterwards by the great actors in the drama, what Sherman says, although it was written long after the events but while still in the full possession of all his powers, should be considered in connection with what Grant himself

says. It seems to be certain that the Lieutenant General was somewhat reluctant to give up the idea of detaching Sheridan to join Sherman in the Carolinas, as he mentioned it in his final letters to Sherman and incorporated it in his final orders and instructions. His subsequent declaration that it was a "blind" has the appearance of an after thought as it throws no light whatever upon who was to be deceived by the "blind." Both Sherman and Sheridan were certainly entitled to his fullest confidence. It is also certain that Sheridan thought the General's purpose was a serious one which he did not like any better after rejoining the Army and talking it over than he did when it was mentioned in his first orders and repeated in Grant's formal programme. Referring to this subject again, Sheridan makes the following explicit statement :

. . . When I had gone over the entire letter I showed plainly that I was dissatisfied with it, for, coupled with what the General had outlined orally, which I supposed was the "other instructions," I believed it foreshadowed my junction with General Sherman. Rawlins thought so too, as his vigorous language had left no room to doubt, so I immediately began to offer my objections to the programme. These were that it would be bad policy to send me down to the Carolinas with a part of the Army of the Potomac to come back to crush Lee after the destruction of General Johnston's army; such a course would give rise to the charge that his own forces around Petersburg were not equal to the task, and would seriously affect public opinion in the North; that, in fact, my cavalry belonged to the Army of the Potomac, which army was able unaided to destroy Lee, and I could not but oppose any dispersion of its strength.

All this was said in a somewhat emphatic manner, and when I had finished he quietly told me that the portion of my instructions from which I so strongly dissented was intended as a "blind" to cover any check the army in its general move to the left might meet with and prevent that element in the North, which held that the war could be ended only through negotiations, from charging defeat. The fact that my cavalry was not to ultimately join Sherman was a great relief to me, and after expressing the utmost confidence in the plans unfolded for closing

the war by directing every effort to the annihilation of Lee's army, I left him to go to General Ingalls's quarters. On my way I again met Rawlins, who, when I told him that General Grant had intimated his intention to modify the written plan of operations so far as regarded the cavalry, manifested the greatest satisfaction, and I judged from this that the new view of the matter had not previously been communicated to the chief of staff, though he must have been acquainted of course with the programme made out on the 24th of March.¹

But the substantial accuracy of Sheridan's statement does not rest solely on his own recollection. It is confirmed by Major General James W. Forsyth, who was chief of staff to Sheridan from the time he joined the Army of the Potomac to the end of the war, in a letter dated at Columbus, Ohio, May 28, 1904, which runs as follows:

. . . I shall begin this communication with a conversation that I had with General Sheridan when he received his instructions in the early part of February, 1865, in regard to the movements of his command.

Upon receipt of General Grant's communication giving him his orders, he opened it, read it, and then handed it to me to read. He was directed to move up the valley with his cavalry, clean up the remnant of Early's force located near Staunton, then move over into Southern Virginia, destroy all railroads, and, if possible, the James River and Kanawha canal. Having accomplished this, to cross the James River, break up the Southside Railroad, then to move south and join Sherman in the Carolinas. After reading these instructions I said: "General, are you going to join Sherman?" He said: "No." I said: "How are you going to get out of it? This order is positive and explicit." He said: "I am not going to join Sherman." I said: "Why?" He said, in substance: "I'll tell you why; this campaign will end the war. I have been anxious for fear Lee would commence moving west before we could get to Grant's army. The Army of the Potomac will never move from its present position unless we join them and pull them out. The cavalry corps and the Army of the Potomac have got to whip Lee. If I obeyed these instructions and crossed the James and joined Sherman, the Army of

¹ "Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan," Vol. II, pp. 124-127.

the Potomac would rest where they are and Sherman, with our assistance, would close the war. If this should happen it would be disastrous to the country, for there would be no balance of power between the East and the West. This cavalry corps and the Army of the Potomac, of which it is a part, have got to wipe Lee out before Sherman and his army reach Virginia."

We moved out from Winchester, finished up Early, destroyed the railroads in Northern Virginia, swung over on to the James River and destroyed the James River and Kanawha canal. Prior to our departure from Charlottesville, where we rested two days, a force of cavalry was sent south to a bridge across the James River near a place called Dugansville. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division and Longstreet's corps had been detached by Lee and sent west on the Southside Railroad to watch us. When our cavalry made a dash for the bridge at Dugansville, the rebels burned it up before our forces reached there. The result of this was that there was no bridge across the James River from Richmond to Dugansville. When the officer in command of this reconnoissance reported to General Sheridan at Charlottesville, he turned to me and said: "How are we going to cross the James River? Have you found any bridges on your map over the James River between Richmond and Dugansville?" "No, there are none," I said. Then he said: "How many pontoon boats did you bring?" I said: "We have eleven canvas pontoon boats." He then said: "Do you think we can bridge the James with eleven pontoon boats?" I answered: "No." He said: "Well, as we can't cross the James, we will now join Grant." A few days after that we reached a place on the James River and Kanawha canal called Columbia. In the destruction of the canal we had captured sixty canal boats loaded with ordnance and medical supplies on their way west to Lynchburg. This disturbed the General very much, as it indicated that Lee was preparing to move west into the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia.

From Columbia we sent two scouts north of the river and around Richmond, and two scouts down the river in a canoe, each of whom carried a copy of the same despatch notifying General Grant of our success, of the impossibility of crossing the James and, therefore, that General Sheridan further proposed to move around north of Richmond to White House Landing on the Pamunkey River, and thence south to the Army of the

Potomac. He requested General Grant to have the supplies for our command at White House Landing ready for us upon our arrival there.

We joined General Grant about the 25th of March, the cavalry corps was ordered out on the left of the line of the Army of the Potomac, and orders were issued to move out on the 27th and swing around the left and try to cut up the railroads in that part of the country. This project was not carried out.

We fought the Battle of Dinwiddie C. H. on the 31st and the battle of Five Forks on the 1st of April. All the while we were moving and getting into position we had nothing but soaking rains. Our wagon trains were all stalled on the road. Prior to the battle of Dinwiddie C. H. General Sheridan went over to General Grant's headquarters every day for the purpose of seeing General Rawlins and helping him to brace up and sustain General Grant. The relationship between Sheridan and Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, was exceedingly close, and there was no man in that army so determined and positive that we should continue to push on and crush Lee's army as General Rawlins. Sheridan agreed with him. I believe if it had not been for these two men that Grant would have dropped back into his original works at Petersburg. In fact, an order was drafted and printed, according to my best recollections, looking to that end. The location of the army wagons, the supply trains and the cattle herds *were* changed. The pressure brought on General Grant by General Meade and other officers of the Army of the Potomac and the desperate and continuous rains were the reason assigned for withdrawing. The men who prevented that withdrawal were General Sheridan and General Rawlins. When Sheridan arrived at City Point he clasped the hand of Rawlins and earnestly discussed the condition of affairs. A cor was made and they stood by each other all the hrough

This statement of M. V. Sheridan is the following

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of the Army of the Potomac. I have always understood that the retrograde movement was suggested by General Meade, and that it was assented to by General Grant there is no question. The letter of General Grant (Page 142, Sheridan's Memoirs) corroborates this.

I care as much for the memory of General Grant as any man that lives to-day, but I regret to say that in writing his "Memoirs" he dismissed from his mind, with a few words, an incident which had a most important bearing upon the close of the war.

The history of the whole matter as given in detail by General Sheridan can be the only truthful and accepted one. When Grant wrote he was a dying man. . . .

The renewal of the forward movement of the forces under Grant's immediate command began on March 29, 1865, and on the evening of that day Rawlins wrote from the first camp of Army Headquarters to his wife whom he had left in his cabin at City Point, as follows:

Crossing of Vaughn Road, Gravelly Run, March 29, 1865. . . . To-day has been very favorable for our movements; everything thus far meets our expectations. About 4:30 P. M. the enemy with two divisions attacked Griffin's division of Warren's corps, but were handsomely repulsed, leaving in our hands one hundred prisoners and losing many in killed and wounded. Our loss was between two and three hundred. Warren followed the enemy until he retired inside his main lines. Sheridan has reached Dinwiddie Court House, and everything is ready for an advance early in the morning. The General feels like making a heavy push for everything we have hoped for so long, and I am not slow in seconding all such feelings. It does seem to me we must succeed.

I trust, darling, you are giving yourself as little anxiety as possible about me. I have coughed but very little and I ate one of the best dinners since dark I have eaten in a great while. My tent looks very tidy, for, you see, it is new; besides I have Jenny's little chair, brought by mistake of course, which reminds me all the time of you and her. Tell her I shall bring it back. Say to Mrs. Grant the General is in fine spirits and I believe she will ere long be happy in seeing the captor of Richmond in him. . . .

The next day the camp was moved further to the front, and aggressive operations continued, but it rained heavily that night and the next morning. The streams became flooded, and the country roads were converted into quagmires and quicksand. It looked for much of the day as though the forward movement would have to be abandoned. Sheridan had met with fierce resistance in his effort to advance from Dinwiddie Court House. Warren had been greatly delayed by swollen creeks and muddy roads in his night march to the support of the cavalry, and consequently a feeling of discouragement and gloom began to spread throughout the army. It is certain that operations were temporarily suspended at the front, because of the rain, and that this was with Grant's concurrence is shown by his letter of March 30 to General Sheridan, in which he directs him, after leaving a force to protect the left, to "send the remainder back to Humphreys's station where they can get hay and grain."²

At that juncture Rawlins wrote as follows:

Dabney's Mill, March 31, 1865. . . . Owing to the rain last night and this morning, making the roads movable quicksand, the proposed movement of General Sheridan had to be postponed indefinitely. So one of my bright visions of hope has for the present passed away. To-day we have had considerable fighting, and the losses in Warren's corps in prisoners are, I fear, pretty heavy, as usual, with him. He sent out one division to seize a road, and instead of sending his other divisions to support it, suffered it to be beaten and driven back on his second division, which in turn was driven back on his third, which checked the enemy's further advance. Had he sent up his second and third to the fight when it began, we should have had a splendid victory and would have saved Sheridan's cavalry from imminent peril. But thanks to God and Sheridan, the cavalry has been saved without his aid. Warren is now moving with his whole corps to get in the rear of Pickett's division, which has been fighting Sheridan. I do hope he will succeed in getting where he is ordered. If so, all will yet be well if not glorious. . . .

² "Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan," Vol. II, p. 142.

Neither of these letters shows any hesitation or doubt on Rawlins's part, but the last quoted seems to make it clear, without giving details, that the rain was the principal if not the only cause of the delay which had apparently been decided upon. This view of the matter is fully confirmed by Sheridan's Memoirs, and Forsyth's letter. There is no intimation from any source that Rawlins had lost heart in the slightest degree or that his course at any time during the campaign was other than what it had always been, in favor of a persistent aggressive campaign to the bitter end. And yet, many years afterwards, Grant in his "Memoirs" makes the following statement:

. . . Although my chief of staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing as I did from experience of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were given accordingly."³

In view of what Rawlins wrote to his wife, as well as of what has been quoted from Sheridan's "Memoirs" and from Forsyth's letter, the conclusion is inevitable that the memory of Grant—fully twenty years afterwards, and suffering from an incurable malady—was at fault in the allegation that Rawlins urged the return of the army to its former position "about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg." The only reasonable explanation of this statement is that Grant's letter directing the withdrawal of the cavalry from Dinwiddie Court House, as well as the retrograde movement, which it was sup-

³ "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. II, p. 436.

posed to foreshadow, was suggested by General Meade, because of the heavy rains or the stout resistance of the enemy, or by some other important person, and not by the Chief of Staff, who had always, up to that time, stood as the exponent of an unrelenting and aggressive policy. Undoubtedly the bad weather and the almost impassable state of the roads and fields, were the immediate cause of the suspension of all aggressive operations on March 31, as well as of the authorized withdrawal of the cavalry. But as the actual conditions were evidently quite as unfavorable to the Confederate as to the Union forces, the recall of the order for the retirement of the cavalry was not only timely but greatly to the credit of those who advised it. That Sheridan is entitled to the first place in this is made clear by Grant's own statement, and that Rawlins is entitled to the second, is made equally clear by the statements of both Sheridan and Forsyth.

In connection with the change of plan by which Sheridan was relieved from the necessity of again cutting loose from the Army of the Potomac, and making his way to a junction with Sherman in North Carolina, but little is said in any of the histories or memoirs of that period. Still less is said in regard to the origin of the order directing Sheridan on March 31 to leave a portion of his cavalry to protect the left and withdraw the rest to Humphreys's station on the railroad. Sheridan's ride to Grant's headquarters at Dabney's Mill, on the receipt of that order is mentioned in Newhall's "With General Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign," but it casts no light upon the occasion. Indeed, no mention is made of the incident except in the "Memoirs" of Grant and in those of Sheridan. Grant's letter to Sheridan has been frequently alluded to as authorizing a retrograde movement, but Humphreys and other writers of accurate memory refer to what actually followed as at most a suspension of hostilities for the day, or a part of the day, due entirely to the heavy rains. It is to be noted, however, that the rains having ceased on the

Neither of these letters shows any hesitation or doubt on Rawlins's part, but the last quoted seems to make it clear, without giving details, that the rain was the principal if not the only cause of the delay which had apparently been decided upon. This view of the matter is fully confirmed by Sheridan's Memoirs, and Forsyth's letter. There is no intimation from any source that Rawlins had lost heart in the slightest degree or that his course at any time during the campaign was other than what it had always been, in favor of a persistent aggressive campaign to the bitter end. And yet, many years afterwards, Grant in his "Memoirs" makes the following statement :

. . . Although my chief of staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked ; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing as I did from experience of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were given accordingly."³

In view of what Rawlins wrote to his wife, as well as of what has been quoted from Sheridan's "Memoirs" and from Forsyth's letter, the conclusion is inevitable that the memory of Grant—fully twenty years afterwards, and suffering from an incurable malady—was at fault in the allegation that Rawlins urged the return of the army to its former position "about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg." The only reasonable explanation of this statement is that Grant's letter directing the withdrawal of the cavalry from Dinwiddie Court House, as well as the retrograde movement, which it was sup-

³ "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. II, p. 436.

posed to foreshadow, was suggested by General Meade, because of the heavy rains or the stout resistance of the enemy, or by some other important person, and not by the Chief of Staff, who had always, up to that time, stood as the exponent of an unrelenting and aggressive policy. Undoubtedly the bad weather and the almost impassable state of the roads and fields, were the immediate cause of the suspension of all aggressive operations on March 31, as well as of the authorized withdrawal of the cavalry. But as the actual conditions were evidently quite as unfavorable to the Confederate as to the Union forces, the recall of the order for the retirement of the cavalry was not only timely but greatly to the credit of those who advised it. That Sheridan is entitled to the first place in this is made clear by Grant's own statement, and that Rawlins is entitled to the second, is made equally clear by the statements of both Sheridan and Forsyth.

In connection with the change of plan by which Sheridan was relieved from the necessity of again cutting loose from the Army of the Potomac, and making his way to a junction with Sherman in North Carolina, but little is said in any of the histories or memoirs of that period. Still less is said in regard to the origin of the order directing Sheridan on March 31 to leave a portion of his cavalry to protect the left and withdraw the rest to Humphreys's station on the railroad. Sheridan's ride to Grant's headquarters at Dabney's Mill, on the receipt of that order is mentioned in Newhall's "With General Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign," but it casts no light upon the occasion. Indeed, no mention is made of the incident except in the "Memoirs" of Grant and in those of Sheridan. Grant's letter to Sheridan has been frequently alluded to as authorizing a retrograde movement, but Humphreys and other writers of accurate memory refer to what actually followed as at most a suspension of hostilities for the day, or a part of the day, due entirely to the heavy rains. It is to be noted, however, that the rains having ceased on the

morning of March 31 the roads dried out rapidly and were sufficiently improved to permit the partial renewal of operations that afternoon. There seems to be no doubt that Sheridan and his confidential staff officers for several hours thought that Grant's letter directing the withdrawal of the cavalry, foreshadowed an abandonment of the campaign then fully under way. It appears to be equally certain that Sheridan and Rawlins, in mutual confidence and support, stood together in the determination to prevent such an inglorious result.

Whatever may have been the precise facts of the case, it is to be observed that it presents the second occasion, during the entire period of the war, on which Grant ever allowed himself to question the conduct or the judgment of Rawlins, or to cast the slightest reflection upon the aggressive policy of which he had come to be generally acknowledged as the advocate. At most the incident as recorded indicates a temporary difference of opinion between the Lieutenant General and his chief of staff, from which no evil consequences resulted. Fortunately the difference, whatever its extent, led to the issuance of no formal orders for a "retrograde movement," of any corps except the cavalry, and if such movement was ever seriously thought of for the infantry, by Meade, or by any one else, whether on account of the rain, or of the fierceness of the Confederate resistance in the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court House, it is a creditable circumstance that the thought never crystallized into definite orders, either written or oral. There is no evidence that any such orders were ever given or that there was ever anything more than a temporary cessation of the pressure which Sheridan and Rawlins, from the first, never doubted would end the war.

It should not be forgotten that while the Lieutenant General might have had at any time the opinions and advice of his subordinates for the asking, the responsibility of advance or retreat rested in that as in every other case, solely upon him, and it was infinitely to his credit that he decided after but a

few hours' hesitation in favor of an unrelenting advance. It is evident from all accounts that the condition of the weather and the roads was, for at least two days of the campaign, most discouraging; but clear skies and sunshine soon brought a revival of hope which culminated in a determination to continue the movement as begun until victory should crown it with complete success. Fortunately, heavy rains and muddy roads are about as fatal to movements in retreat as in advance. If they paralyze one belligerent they are likely to have the same effect upon the other. Hence it is always well in stormy weather to wait a while for developments.

Whatever may have been the doubts and discouragements of the initial movements of the campaign, it is certain that the brighter weather of April 1 found Grant's headquarters, as well as the left of the army, glowing with hope and confidence. By the battle of Five Forks Sheridan literally pulled the Army of the Potomac out of its hesitation and delay, and started it in earnest upon its last and most victorious campaign. Nothing could now stop it, and nothing but a failure to press forward with the utmost speed could mar the completeness of its success. When the troops were in motion and the enemy on the retreat, Rawlins was not the man to interpose with suggestions. His letters to his wife, written in the evening after the results of the day's operations were known, were necessarily brief and to the point. So far as I know, they are the only ones hot from the very center of information, and while they are full of confidence, they bear unmistakable testimony to the fact that Sheridan held the post of honor and of interest in the drama that was then so rapidly unrolling itself before the world. As his turning movement acquired momentum, it brought the left wing and center of the army into closer relation, and made it unnecessary for Grant to break camp till April 2, for the purpose of following the marching columns. Consequently he held on for the day

at Dabney's Mill, from which place Rawlins wrote, April 1, 1865, as follows:

. . . The hero of the Shenandoah stands afront of all on the Appomattox. His personal gallantry and great genius have secured to us a splendid success to-day, 4,000 prisoners, 8 pieces of artillery and many wagons, with the morale of victory to us. General Grant is making every exertion to prevent anything occurring to dim its brightness. Miles's fine division with all the reserves of the Second Corps move at twelve to-night to join Sheridan, to enable him to resist any attempt the enemy may make to retrieve their losses and to follow up his successes, as circumstances may determine in the morning. All the other corps will attack between this and morning. Sheridan relieved Warren of his command and succeeded him with Griffin. This should have been done yesterday. . . .

Southside Railroad, April 2, 1865. . . . To-day has been one of battle and glorious victory. Thank God, the Lieutenant General has commanded in it himself and not permitted the spirit or, I might say, the genius of his orders, to be dampened by his *subordinate commander*.

We have captured as strongly entrenched positions as I have seen—many thousand prisoners and pieces of artillery. We hope to get Sheridan with the Fifth Corps and two divisions of the Second Corps to the north side of the Appomattox between this and morning, which will enable us to shut up the enemy's forces in Petersburg or compel them to evacuate that place. . . .

Sutherland Station, April 4, 1865. . . . I did not write to you last night, for the reason that I had no opportunity of sending back. I now do so hoping for such an opportunity to-day.

The evacuation of Richmond and the apparently great demoralization of Lee's army have decided the General to follow it up to its final destruction, if possible to do so; hence it is not probable that I shall reach City Point for some time. So, please, after visiting Petersburg and Richmond, make your preparations to return to Danbury. You need not start, however, till you hear from me again. Colonel Bowers will let Harry go with you, I am sure. Speak to him about it. If we are brought to a halt by the enemy, or for the want of supplies, I may get to see you before you start home, which I desire so much to do. My

health is much better than when lying still at City Point. The excitement of victory and of army life agrees with me. The letter of yesterday, which I expected from you, I did not receive. Don't fail to write me often.

The decision of the General not to let Lee rest is a wise one and augurs the early termination of the war. I had feared he might not so decide, but all is well now and promising early brightness of the national sky. . . .

With the campaign at last in full swing, the enemy's right wing doubled up and driven back, and his entrenchments covering Petersburg in possession of the victors, there was nothing left for Lee except to retreat. Richmond was no longer tenable. Davis and his cabinet had fled, and ruin was staring the Confederacy in the face. Sheridan and Humphreys's rapid advance resulted in a sure lodgment of the Southside Railway, fully nine months after it was first broken by Wilson's cavalry. All the roads south of the Appomattox were at last firmly in the grasp of the national army, and there was no way left open for the retreat of the enemy except by a circuitous route leading in the direction of Amelia Court House. It was now a race for life between Lee and his pursuers, with the short line in favor of the pursuers.

Rawlins was the constant companion of his Chief, sharing his labor and joining in his counsel, but, so far as is known, writing only orders and despatches. The hurry and rush of the campaign, which culminated in the disintegration of Lee's army and its final surrender at Appomattox Court House, overwhelmed the staff with work. There was but little time for rest and sleep, and none for personal correspondence. Even the diaries and itineraries were left to be filled up after the campaign was ended. Only the reporters were making contemporaneous records. The great actors now occupied the stage in front of all others. Grant and Lee held the center, with Meade, Sheridan, and Humphreys on one side, and Longstreet and Gordon on the other. The staff officers had

their part, but it was the part of subordinates. Rawlins, worn and pale with disease and impaired strength, met all demands upon him. At the supreme moment he was by the side of his Chief, and when Lee's letter came asking for an interview he was the first to see it after Grant had opened and read it.

It will be remembered that Grant first wrote to Lee, April 7, 1865, saying in substance that the results of the last week's operations should not only convince him that further resistance must be hopeless but were such as to justify a demand for the surrender of that portion of the Confederate forces known as the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee replied the same day, asking what terms would be offered. This letter did not reach General Grant till the eighth, but was followed immediately by a reply that as "peace" was "his great desire," there was but one condition which he would insist upon, namely that the men and officers surrendered should be disqualified from taking up arms again till properly exchanged. This communication reached Lee late in the afternoon, and the use of the word "peace" was at once seized upon by that astute and wary commander with the hope of broadening the meeting into one for a treaty of peace between the contending belligerents. In his reply he put forward the declaration that he had not intended to propose the surrender of his army and did not think the emergency called for such a result. He added:

. . . But as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposal would lead to that end. I cannot therefore meet you with a view to surrendering the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposals may effect the Confederate States' forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace, I shall be glad to meet you at ten o'clock A. M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the pickets of the two armies.

The phraseology of this note was adroitly framed. It was evidently designed to entrap a frank and generous commander who was anxious to bring his labors to a successful close, and

yet not quite sure that he had the enemy in such position as would render his capture certain. It reached Grant at midnight, and, according to Cadwallader, the *Herald* correspondent who occupied the parlor of the farmhouse where headquarters had been located for the night, it was sent upstairs to the bedroom occupied by Grant and Rawlins. As customary, it was delivered to Rawlins, who tore it open and proceeded to read it in a voice so loud that both the correspondent and the junior staff officers below-stairs heard it as fully as Grant did. Rawlins caught its drift instantaneously, and pointed out Lee's disingenuousness and inconsistency in the declaration that he did not intend to propose the surrender of his army, but was ready to meet for the purpose of considering the restoration of peace. At this Rawlins flamed up, and, according to Cadwallader, addressing Grant directly, said :

Lee now tries to take advantage of a single word used by you as a reason for granting such easy terms. He wants to entrap us into making a treaty of peace. You said nothing about that. You asked him to surrender. He replied by asking what terms you would give if he surrendered. You answered by stating the terms. Now he wants to arrange for peace—something to embrace the whole Confederacy if possible. No, sir,—no, sir! This is a positive insult—an attempt in an underhand way to change the whole terms of the correspondence.

Thereupon Grant replied :

It amounts to the same thing—Lee is only trying to be let down easily. I can meet him, as requested, in the morning, and settle the whole business in an hour.

But Rawlins was inexorable and declared with all his strength :

It would be presumptuous to try to teach General Lee the force of words, or the use of the English language ; that he had purposely proposed to arrange terms of peace to gain time and secure better terms ; that the note was cunningly worded to that end, and

deserved no reply whatever. He doesn't think the emergency has arisen! That's cool,—but another falsehood. That emergency has been staring him in the face for forty-eight hours. If he hasn't seen it yet, we will soon bring it to his comprehension. He has to surrender! It shall be surrender—and nothing else!

To this outburst Grant replied modestly and quietly:

Some allowance must be made for the trying position in which General Lee is placed. He is compelled to defer somewhat to the wishes of his Government and his military associates. But it all means precisely the same thing. If I meet Lee, he will surrender before I leave.

Then Rawlins took another stand.

You have no right to meet Lee, or anybody else, to arrange terms of peace. That is the prerogative of the President and the Senate. Your business is to capture or destroy Lee's army.

It will be observed that this was a strictly legal view of the situation, due doubtless to Rawlins's training as a lawyer. In bringing it forward he gave it additional force by reminding Grant that when he telegraphed for instructions in reference to meeting the Confederate Peace Commissioners at City Point a few weeks before, Stanton in his reply went to the verge of giving him a reprimand. This was the most notable despatch of the day, and if it had been sent to meet the emergency which confronted Grant in his correspondence with Lee, could not have been more explicit or more applicable. Rawlins dwelt with emphasis upon its terms which are as follows:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's army or on solely minor and purely military matters. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.

Rawlins concluded the argument by pointing out that this despatch was sent when Grant had no thought of treating for peace, but had merely asked for instructions as to the treatment he should give to the Commissioners. It is well known that Grant, at the time, regarded the wording and scope of Stanton's reply as an open rebuke; but in view of its provisions, which were still more pertinent to the case under consideration, and finding that Rawlins was irreconcilably opposed to the meeting as modified by the provisions of Lee's last note, Grant yielded, and Rawlins carried his point, as he always did when his mind was resolutely set. But as Grant felt that it was his duty to give a respectful answer to all official communications, and that Lee was, under the circumstances which surrounded him, especially entitled to courteous treatment, he replied fully to his note. The discussion with Rawlins had cleared the case of all uncertainty, and laid the foundation for a reply entirely within Grant's discretion, but which was so clear and explicit that it could not be misunderstood. As this reply is a historical document, which owed its form and provisions to a most unusual discussion between a victorious general and his chief of staff, and was besides an essential link in events of far-reaching importance to the country, its provisions should not be forgotten. It was written at Clifton House, Virginia, in the latter part of the night of April 9, 1865, and, omitting the address, runs as follows:

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed by you for 10 A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace, with yourself, and the whole North entertain the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of prop-

erty not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I am,

Very respectfully, Your Obedient Servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

It is worthy of note that as soon as this communication was despatched, Grant sent copies of the entire correspondence to the Secretary of War; and, as if to show that he had not lost sight of the instructions he had received on a previous occasion, he concluded with the significant remark that "there has been no relaxation in the pursuit during its pendency."

It was a busy and exciting time at headquarters. The fate of an army was at stake, while the victorious general was, on one hand, marring his fame, or, on the other, gathering new and imperishable laurels. Neither Rawlins nor any other staff officer got much rest or sleep that night. The Lieutenant General and his staff took breakfast with Meade, and as soon as it was light enough to find their way, they were on the road to join Sheridan, who had already planted himself squarely across Lee's only road to escape. The ride was a long and circuitous one, much of the way through fields and farms, over hills and ravines, and across muddy streams and bogs of quicksand. At eleven o'clock, or about that time, they halted for a rest; and while waiting they were overtaken by Major Pease, of Meade's staff, bringing Lee's reply to Grant's letter declining to meet for the purpose of arranging terms of peace.

The staff officer gave the sealed envelope to Rawlins, who tore one end open slowly, withdrew the enclosure, read it deliberately, and then, without a word of comment, handed it to Grant. The latter read it through with the same deliberation, and as he passed it back to Rawlins, directing him in a conversational tone to read it aloud. The staff officers and military suite were looking on with mingled anxiety and hope. They were expecting the surrender, but the impassive conduct of Grant and Rawlins left them momentarily in doubt. Grant

betrayed no emotion whatever, but Rawlins compressed his lips, clenched his teeth and grew deathly pale. When Grant directed him to read aloud, he proceeded in a deep and solemn but somewhat tremulous voice as follows:

9th April, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

R. E. LEE,
General.

It will be observed that Grant's last letter had not only settled the purpose of the meeting beyond further question but had placed it as completely on the basis of a simple surrender, as it would have been had Lee not written his letter of the eighth at all, in which he sought so adroitly to induce Grant to enter upon the larger subject of peace. Grant's triumph was complete, while Rawlins had the satisfaction of seeing the course he had recommended fully vindicated.

Silence fell upon those who had just heard the momentous news, but this was broken in a few moments by a staff officer who sprang upon a log, waved his hat, and proposed three cheers. A feeble response was all that followed. While it was apparent that the end had come, that the war was over, and that all would soon be reunited with friends, family, and home, not one of the party felt that it was an occasion for loud or jubilant exultation.

Grant broke the spell by penning the reply in which he acknowledged the receipt of Lee's note, explained that he had passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg to the Richmond and Farmville road, and that he would push forward to meet Lee at the place he wished the interview to take place. This brief but all-sufficient note was written by Grant while seated

upon a log. When it was finished he passed it over to the Chief of Staff, asking with a smile:

"How will that do, Rawlins?"

The latter replied:

"I think *that* will do," laying strong emphasis on the word "that."

As soon as the necessary record had been made, and the note had been sent to its destination by one of his own staff, Grant with his headquarters and escort "pushed forward to the front for the purpose of meeting" Lee and bringing the business between them to an end.

The surrender took place at Appomattox Court House, on the same day, April 9, 1865, but the details have been given so often and so minutely that they need not be repeated here. Rawlins was of course present at the negotiations, made the record, and revised the official reports of the events now on file in the War Department. It is a circumstance of great interest that of the many officers present he was the only one who had served through the war with Grant. The first staff had long since been scattered. Some were dead, some disabled, and some had been left behind, or assigned to service in other fields. Rawlins alone had remained with his Chief from the first gun at Belmont to the last at Appomattox. Strangely enough, it was four years almost to a day since the young Democratic lawyer had made the modest ex-Captain his friend for life by his ringing words at the Galena meeting: "We will stand by the flag of our country and appeal to the God of battles!"⁴

On the night after the surrender the General and his staff encamped at Prospect Station and were joined by their faithful friend and supporter, E. B. Washburne, who, it will be

⁴ This account of the correspondence with Lee and the closing days of the campaign is condensed from the manuscript of S. Cadwallader entitled "Four Years with Grant."

It will be remembered that Cadwallader was constantly with Grant's headquarters till after Lee's surrender, and based his narrative on his own note books, and his correspondence with the *New York Herald*.

remembered, was the principal speaker at the meeting which brought the Buchanan Democrat, the Douglas Democrat, and the "Black Republican" together in the cause of the Union. They had stood by one another loyally and steadily from the first, and they shared one another's confidence and congratulations to the end. While the "infallibility of numbers rather than the infallibility of generals" had prevailed, yet each had acted well his part in his own sphere. No selfish ambition had marred the career of any one of them. The pure love of country, inspired all, and it may well be doubted if, in the great conflict between the States, history affords a more striking example of patriotic and successful effort on the part of three citizens of a single country town than that of Grant, Rawlins, and Washburne.

XVII

THE AFTERMATH

Grant's Headquarters at Washington—Rawlins Chief of Staff of the Army—Completes Grant's Final Report—French Withdraw from Mexico—Reconstruction of Confederate States—Rawlins Accompanies Grant and the President to Chicago—Elected First President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee—Résumé of that Army's History.

IMMEDIATELY after the close of the war in Virginia, Grant returned to Washington; but fortunately on the very day the President was assassinated went on to Burlington where his children were at school. During his absence Rawlins gathered up the headquarters of the army and made arrangements to re-establish them at the Capital, where they would be in daily touch with the War Department.

Before the end came, in recognition of his services, Congress, largely under the influence of Washburne, who was at that time one of the Republican leaders in the House of Representatives, had created the permanent office of Chief of Staff with the rank of brigadier general; and without question, or the consideration of any possible rival, Rawlins was appointed thereto on March 3, 1865. In the final distribution of honors he received the commission of major general by brevet, to date from April 9 of the same year, "for gallant and meritorious service during the campaign terminating with the surrender of the insurgent army under Lee." Through some oversight his name was left off of the first list of nominations, whereupon Grant wrote a special letter in his behalf, dated May 8, 1866, from which the closing paragraph is taken. It runs as follows:

. . . General Rawlins has served with me through the entire war from the Battle of Belmont to the surrender of Lee. No staff officer ever before had it in his power to render as much service, and no one ever performed his duties more faithfully or efficiently. He is eminently entitled to the brevet rank of major general, and I earnestly but respectfully request that his name be yet sent in for consideration.

Nothing can be added to this statement. It bears conclusive testimony to the high regard in which Grant held his chief of staff and the great value he attached to his services from the beginning to the end of the war.

It will be remembered that the terms granted by Sherman for the capitulation of Johnston's army and "the reestablishment of peace" were rejected by the Government, and that Grant, who had returned at once to Washington after the assassination of the President, was sent to North Carolina for the purpose of supervising the final arrangements for the surrender of the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi.

Meanwhile, Grant having arrived at Washington, Rawlins was making his dispositions for the continuance and completion of the report at that place. Aided by Bowers, Parker, and Leet, he gave his first attention to the collection of the reports and the preparation of materials for Grant's final report of operations. As was customary Grant prepared the outlines of the report himself but the details of every statement were wrought out, tested, and arranged in their proper places by Rawlins and his assistants; so that the report as finally sent to the War Department and published was the best one ever submitted to the Government and one of the most accurate and complete known in the annals of war. It has successfully withstood the test of time, and while the wisdom of some of its statements in reference to the principles upon which the army was administered has been questioned, the whole document may well be studied by military men as a model of arrangement, style, and completeness of statement.

As soon as peace was assured the work of mustering out the army began ; but before this was finished, measures were taken to rid Mexico of the French and Spanish interposition, which had resulted in the establishment of an ephemeral empire under Maximilian. Sheridan was sent to Texas with a force of cavalry, infantry and artillery, to make good our demands in behalf of the sister republic. I, with my cavalry corps, was also under orders for a week to proceed from Georgia to the Mexican frontier.

Rawlins, who was, after all, more of a civilian and statesman than a soldier, was a strenuous advocate of the Monroe Doctrine, sympathized deeply with the Mexicans, and gave his Chief the most ardent support at that important juncture.

It should also be remembered that as soon as it became certain that the French would evacuate Mexico and leave Maximilian to his fate, public attention was strongly directed to a settlement with Great Britain for the unfriendly part taken by her in behalf of the Southern Confederacy. The depredations upon American commerce by the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers fitted out in British ports, had aroused the deepest feeling of resentment throughout the army, as well as in commercial circles. The rank and file, as well as the higher officers, manifested the liveliest disposition in favor of an enforced indemnification for our losses. Many of them wanted no money settlement, but openly advocated a campaign for the occupation of Canada and the expulsion of the British flag from North America. It is now known that Grant was for a while strongly in favor of this policy, and in view of the fact that we then had the most powerful navy in the world, and could have turned an army of 500,000 veteran soldiers in the direction of our northern frontier, there can be but little doubt as to what would have been the result. Even so late as Grant's own administration it seems likely that this would have been the policy, but for the political quarrel between President Grant and Senator Sum-

ner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who had become its most powerful advocate.¹

In this great question Rawlins shared the feelings of the army and, through Grant, did all in his power to give them effect. What would have been the result, had the more important questions connected with the reconstruction of the seceding States not been complicated by the assassination of Lincoln and the memorable quarrel between Andrew Johnson and the Republican party, must always remain a matter of conjecture.

It will be remembered that at first both Grant and Rawlins were disposed to approve the methods and uphold the hands of President Johnson in reference to Reconstruction, mainly because they supposed he was carrying out the benignant policy of his great predecessor. Both accompanied him on the memorable tour which he made through the Northern States, ostensibly for the purpose of delivering an address at the dedication of the monument to the memory of Senator Douglas, at Chicago, in September, 1865, but really for the purpose of winning the people of the Northern States to the views which he held in regard to the political rehabilitation of the Southern States, and the readjustment of their relations to the Union. In respect to this important matter a radical difference of opinion began to show itself between Congress and the President, shortly after his inauguration, and ended finally in his impeachment, trial, and acquittal. Although generally regarded as an astute politician, Johnson was slow to recognize the fact that the Northern people were against his policy. He was surrounded by office seekers and political parasites, who concealed the truth from him and told him only such things as they thought would gratify his vanity.

Secretary Seward, Secretary Welles, Admiral Farragut, and many other officials and ladies accompanied the President in

¹ See "Treaty of Washington" in "Lee at Appomattox," by Charles F. Adams.

the trip to the West. Speeches were made at the principal cities; but after the first few days it became manifest that the President was delivering substantially the same speech everywhere. It was a vague, incoherent appeal to the country in behalf of the readmission into the Union of the States which had taken part in the Rebellion, without terms or conditions, and had this policy been advocated with the gravity, decorum, and kindliness that Lincoln would have given to its discussion, it might have prevailed. But the trip soon degenerated into an undignified, if not a disgraceful, junket, which the newspapers designated derisively as "Swinging Around the Circle." Grant and Farragut doubtless consented to accompany the party because they considered the wishes of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, quite as obligatory upon them as his orders would have been. Rawlins went because Grant did, but having been a Douglas Democrat, and a great admirer of that distinguished statesman, he doubtless felt besides that it would afford Grant an excellent opportunity to show himself to the people, while attending the dedication of the Douglas monument. The war having come to a favorable ending, the time was now at hand when Grant could do this without incurring the criticism of even his bitterest enemy. As it turned out, however, Grant also soon became disgusted with the undignified exhibition the President was making of himself, and took leave of the party at Buffalo, going with Rawlins by lake steamer to Detroit. They rejoined Johnson at Chicago and accompanied the party to St. Louis, where they finally left it, ostensibly for the purpose of visiting Grant's father near Cincinnati, but really because, as Grant expressed it, he did not "care to accompany a man who was deliberately digging his own grave."

Rawlins, who was a politician before he became a soldier, soon saw enough to convince him that Johnson could not be renominated, and that Grant's chances for the succession would be injured by a further identification with Johnson or

his policy. But notwithstanding its melancholy features, it must be admitted that the trip was a novel and interesting experience to the General and his Chief of Staff. To the latter it was a relaxation from the routine of army administration, for which in times of peace he had but little taste. Suffering, as he was, from impaired health and failing strength, he had grown exceedingly tired of the life in Washington. He realized, in fact, that his military services were at an end. They had been imposed upon him by the "Appeal to the God of Battles," which he had accepted and advocated in the Galena speech, as the only proper response that could be made to the overt acts of the secessionists. The work which it brought to him as a soldier was now done, while that which devolved upon him as a civilian and statesman was about to be extended to a wider field.

But before considering the concluding period of this patriotic and useful life, it may prove interesting to allude briefly to an association of officers in which Rawlins took the greatest interest, and which was doubtless suggested by the "Order of the Cincinnati," organized immediately after the close of the Revolutionary War.

In this connection it should be observed that the end of the Civil War and the disbandment of the volunteer army were followed almost immediately by the formation of a number of military societies, intended to keep alive the memories and foster the fraternal feelings which had grown up between the officers and men of the national army. The first and most important of these was started in the Senate Chamber at the Capital of North Carolina on April 14, 1865, during a pause in Sherman's march Northward through the heart of the Confederacy. The meeting was necessarily a preliminary one, but it was followed by another at the same place on April 25, at which time the organization was completed, and a constitution was adopted which entitled to membership every officer who had served with honor in the Army of the Tennessee.

The name selected for the association was the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. Instead, however, of electing one of its living commanders as its first president, it passed over the names of Grant, Sherman, Howard, and Logan alike and unanimously conferred that honor upon

Brigadier General John A. Rawlins, U. S. A., Chief of Staff to the Lieutenant General, in consideration of his eminent services to our country in connection with the Army of the Tennessee and also for his ability for the position.

Inasmuch as he was not within four hundred miles of that army at the time, but had been absent from it over a year, this was not only an unexpected but a marked compliment which shows better than any other event that ever took place the esteem in which Rawlins was held by the leading generals. It also shows that the Society recognized and intended to certify him to the country as an officer of the highest character and most unusual services. No ordinary man either of the regular army or of the volunteers could have counted upon such a distinction. The proceedings show that the choice was not made by accident nor without full and careful consideration. Rawlins had not been consulted, and therefore had no reason to be prepared for or to expect that this honor would be conferred upon him.

The first regular meeting of the Society was called by letter, July 10, addressed to the officers of the Army of the Tennessee and was held at Cincinnati on November 14, 1865. Rawlins was of course present at that meeting, and delivered a careful and elaborate address which was listened to with marked attention by his comrades. It contains without doubt the best synopsis that has ever been made of the history of the Army of the Tennessee interspersed with anecdotes and frequent allusions to its most distinguished officers. Although it is necessarily much condensed, it is of such value to the historian that it is given in full in the Appendix. It may be well

to observe again, however, that Rawlins, with Grant and Sherman, persisted in the error that Bragg, at the battle of Missionary Ridge, moved his troops from the left and center of his line to the right, for the purpose of resisting Sherman's attack on the last day. Rawlins always took great pride in this society, and remained its president until his death. Its first Vice-Presidents were Logan, Blair, Oglesby, Giles A. Smith, Belknap, and Fairchild.

XVIII

INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES, 1866-67

Rawlins's Galena Speech—Life on the Plains—Letters to His Wife—Suspension of Stanton as Secretary of War—Appointment of General Grant Ad Interim—Controversy Between the President and General Grant—Rawlins Supports Grant.

EXCEPT for his short visit to Chicago in the autumn of 1865, Rawlins had been constantly with his family since the cessation of hostilities, but his tour of the country with President Johnson and party again separated him from, and gave occasion for several letters to his wife, two of which are here quoted as follows:

Hudson River, August 30, 1866. . . . We have been so constantly engaged that I have not had time to write sooner. I am well and improving all the time, but don't much relish the loss of my morning naps. However, I hope soon to get used to it.

The ovations to the President have been very fine all the way from Washington here. The one in New York perhaps has never been excelled in this country. General Grant and Admiral Farragut came in for a large share of the cheering, I assure you. And I am now more than ever glad that the General concluded to accompany the President, for it will do Grant good, whatever may be his aspirations in the future, and fix him in the confidence of Mr. Johnson, enabling him to fix up the army as it should be, and exert such influence as will be of benefit to the country. The Philadelphians gave the President a splendid reception, notwithstanding the action of their officers. Mr. Cadwallader¹ has been very busy, and is likely to continue so. The General and all the party are well and happy.

I see by the papers that Admiral Radford is mentioned as

¹ Correspondent of the *New York Herald*, attached to Grant's headquarters throughout the war.

having been with General Meade in the procession, when in fact Grant, Farragut, Meade and myself rode in the same carriage. . . .

Niagara Falls, September 1, 1866. . . . I have been so constantly on the move since leaving Washington that I have been unable to write as I intended, but shall try hereafter to get off a line to you every day till we start back. We reached here at 4 P. M. to-day and met a hearty reception from the people. The fact is the enthusiasm everywhere along the route has been unbounded, but there is more cheering for Grant and Farragut than for the President. The President's friends along cheer him, but all parties cheer Grant and Farragut. I feel from what I see that the chances are favorable to the conservatives and Democrats in this State this fall. They claim that they will carry the State by forty or fifty thousand majority. Seward is delighted and is certainly a man unequaled in tact and shrewdness to manage an assemblage of men opposed to him in politics. I am not surprised that he was the leader of his own party when he was in membership with it. I can tell mother many things when I get back that will greatly please her and some, too, that will not.

They are having a grand ball here to-night. I shall take no part in it, but go early to bed and try to get some sleep. I have had very little since I left home. Still I feel refreshed with the trip already, and after to-night shall be in a condition to stand it better than I have. My cough is nothing like what it was in severity, which, under the circumstances, loss of sleep, etc., is a little surprising.

After dinner to-day Surgeon General Barnes got a carriage and, being well acquainted with the falls and vicinity, took me to see them. I can give you no description of them that would give you any idea of what they are, other than that you already have. You will have to come and see them yourself to properly appreciate their beauty, magnitude and grandeur. Simply to look at them and think, thus they have poured in their ceaseless roar from the beginning of time, and will continue to the end, sinks all thought of self in the sublime.

Mr. Cadwallader is well—the General is well—I am growing better all the time, and everybody with us is well.

The President makes innumerable speeches every day, and the people cheer him lustily. Grant was at first quite fidgety over

the matter, but has finally grown quite tranquil and seems to enjoy himself very much. Admiral Farragut takes everything admirably and is having a happy time. Mrs. Farragut is delighted, and the only fears she seems to have are that the people will shake the Admiral's hands off. She is a most lovely lady and decidedly in love with you. She inquired very tenderly after you and Jenny, and said she should never forget your sincere affection for the sweet little girl. I told her we had a new baby, and she seemed perfectly enthusiastic over it and said that it would be another link in your love for the others. Of all that I have heard since I left home, this talk of hers pleased me most. This you believe, don't you, my darling wife? . . .

From the tone of this correspondence, although devoted mainly to public matters, it is apparent that Rawlins was a man of the warmest affections, who held his family and its interests above all considerations except those of public duty. As was his custom, he continued his letters to his wife during the whole of his trip, but as they relate mostly to personal and family matters, no further quotation from them seems to be required. It is evident that although he was encouraged by his physicians, and at times by his own feelings, to believe that he was mending, his health was really on the decline. It is also evident that the occupations of peace called less frequently for the exercise of his personal influence with Grant than did those of war. The load of his official responsibility had become lighter, and he felt correspondingly more at liberty to look after his own health and interests, and especially to study the drift of public opinion. As before stated, his earlier feelings inclined him to the support of Andrew Johnson and his policy, but the better he came to know the man and the politicians who supported him, the more certain did he become that they could not sufficiently command the support of the dominant party in the North to carry their views into effect. He was too good a lawyer to pronounce them illegal. The questions under consideration were of the highest importance. They were questions of policy upon which the Constitution

was silent, and hence their solution called for the exercise of the highest patience, moderation, and wisdom on the part of the President as well as on the part of the Congress.

And as it soon became evident that instead of exhibiting these virtues towards each other the Chief Magistrate and the law-making body were drifting hopelessly apart, thousands of sensible men naturally began to fear that the most valuable results of the Union's victory might be put in jeopardy, if not lost entirely, and therefore began openly to favor Grant's election to the Presidency as the best possible means of restoring peace and quietude to the country. Rawlins favored the movement, but did not for a moment try to deceive himself into the belief that Grant was specially fitted for the solution of such questions as were then claiming public attention; but relying upon his sound judgment and his unselfish patriotism, and considering the fact that the victorious commander, in view of Lincoln's death and of the violent temper and consequent unpopularity of Stanton, was fairly entitled to the succession, without the slightest hesitation he declared for his nomination and election to succeed Johnson. While some thought him unfit for the office, and many of his best friends, such as Sherman, did not hesitate to declare that he would be foolish to give up the headship of the army for life in order to embark upon the uncertain career of a politician even if he should be elected President, Rawlins did not share their views. He felt that Grant, like every other citizen, must answer such supreme calls as his country might make upon him; that he would be entitled to the best help his countrymen could give him; and that if he failed for any reason fully to satisfy the highest demands made upon him, he would still be entitled to the grateful recollection of his fellow-citizens, not only for his military services but for standing as the exponent and guardian of the Union cause at a period during which its greatest interests were at stake, and its wisest statesmen were in doubt. Besides, Rawlins felt that under his Chief's leader-

ship the war having ended in a complete suppression of armed hostility to the National Government, he was at perfect liberty to express the convictions which were growing in strength month by month, with the political unrest which gave rise to them. Rawlins early declared his feelings to his more intimate friends and as they regarded him not only as Grant's mouth-piece in civil as well as in military affairs, but withal as better able than was Grant himself to set his views fully before the public, they asked him to prepare and deliver an address upon the questions of the day, at such time and place as might best suit his convenience. His health was still failing, and Grant had already decided that he should make the overland tour of the continent along the line of the Union Pacific railroad, then under construction, in company with General Dodge, who had resigned from the Army and become Chief Engineer of the contracting company.

Yielding to the request of his friends, Rawlins prepared his speech with unusual care, and through them made all necessary arrangements for its delivery at Galena, on June 21, 1867. The manuscript was of course submitted to Grant, and received his approval. This fact became known at the time and gave to the address an importance and a circulation which it could not otherwise have obtained. It was justly considered as setting forth Grant's opinions and policy on the questions then uppermost in the minds of all. For this reason it was published shortly afterwards by the Union Republican Congressional Committee at Washington as a campaign document of the first importance.

As soon as Rawlins had completed the address and made arrangements for a protracted absence, he bade farewell to his family, and started for Chicago, where he stopped over for the purpose of conferring with his friend, Judge Drummond, who had already become greatly distinguished as the learned and fearless judge of the United States Circuit Court for Illinois, and also with J. Russell Jones, afterwards Grant's

Minister at Brussels. They were both from Galena, and were besides the leading citizens of Northwestern Illinois. They were ardent Republicans, but cool, observant, and able men, who could hardly be mistaken as to the drift of public opinion. Nobody knew Grant's character or lack of qualifications for civil office better than did they. They were also his closest and most faithful friends; but nothing in their relations with the victorious soldier could be construed as indicating a willingness on their part to prefer his further promotion to the public welfare. After careful consideration, they fully approved Rawlins's proposed speech, and this gave him additional confidence in its timeliness and propriety as well as in the soundness of his views.

But in the midst of the satisfaction he had derived from seeing and conferring with his friends, Rawlins suffered a cruel and overwhelming blow to his affections. On June 13, 1867, he received a telegram announcing the sudden and unexpected death of his young son Willie. Naturally his first impulse was to give up his trip across the plains, and return to his sorrowing wife; but realizing that his duty to her as well as to others, required him to conserve his strength, he went on to Galena, where he received every mark of consideration and sympathy from his family and friends, and especially from his former brother staff-officer, General Rowley, with whom he spent his first night. From there he wrote that as soon as he had delivered his speech, which would not be delayed, he should continue his journey across the plains in hopes that their dry air would restore his health.

It is pitiful to contemplate how this able man, stricken in the prime of his usefulness by an incurable disease, was alternately buoyed up by the hope of recovery, and depressed by the certainty of increasing weakness. Distracted by a sense of duty to his wife and family, and by the necessity of doing all in his power for himself, he set forth bravely to make a supreme effort in search of health and strength, amid new scenes

and new occupations, far from those he loved best on earth.

Under these distressing conditions, with a sinking heart and an enfeebled constitution, but sustained by an unfaltering sense of duty to his Chief and to his countrymen, he delivered his speech to one of the largest meetings of his fellow-citizens that had ever listened to him. The task was one which greatly taxed his strength; but he went successfully through with it, holding his audience in rapt attention to the end. It was a worthy tribute to their intelligence, and the honor that the citizen soldier, of whom they were so proud, conferred upon them, was returned to him tenfold by the unstinted approval which they gave to his eloquent periods.

As this address gave an admirable *résumé* of our political history, of the results of the war, and of the multitude of questions to which it had given rise and which were then pressing for solution, it is reprinted in the Appendix.

After a few days' rest at Galena, during which he was soothed and encouraged by the ministrations of his relations and friends, Rawlins finally set out for the far West. From Dixon, Illinois, where he was forced to wait a few hours for a train, he wrote to his wife again; and after expressing his deep and abiding gratitude for the friendly and sympathetic letters which he had received from his brother officers of the staff, and for the present of a thousand dollars, which the people of Galena had given him, he continued as follows:

. . . The people of Galena have been very kind to me. On my leaving there this morning they handed me a letter, which on opening I found to contain one thousand dollars in a draft on New York. This amount I have at present a mind to invest in a few acres of land near Chicago, in yours and the children's name, with a view to its growing in value in a few years. I shall decide between here and Omaha. If I decide to make the investment I shall send it to Russell Jones from Omaha with the request that he make the investment for me; if not will send the draft to you.

. . . I made my speech in Galena. It met with the great appro-

bation of my friends, and has been printed in the Chicago papers with favorable and, I might say, most flattering editorial notices. I shall send you some of the papers as soon as I get hold of them. Of course there are some typographical errors that are a little annoying; still it is generally correct. I sent you this morning a Galena paper containing it in full. The *Tribune* says: "It is the platform of the army; it is the platform of the Republican party; it is emphatically the platform of the country, and it is unquestionably the platform of General Grant."

On July 4, he sent his wife an interesting account of his march across the plains from Julesburg, at that time the end of the railroad, to the site of a new town, which he and his associates named Cheyenne. He was accompanied on this march by Major Dunn, his aid-de-camp and by Colonel Carling, of the Quartermaster's Department. Owing to the presence of wild Indians, the party was escorted through the country by a detachment of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel J. K. Mizner, and it was an entirely new experience for most of them. Rawlins was especially interested in the glimpse of frontier life which the march, the hunting, and the encampments furnished him. It filled him with renewed hope that his health was greatly improved, that his cough had diminished, and that his appetite had increased. He thoroughly enjoyed camp fare, and on the fourth day out ate what he described as "the best meal he had had in four years." It consisted simply of antelope steak, rather poor biscuits, canned peas, peaches, cheese, and coffee. He was pleased with the scenery, the exhilarating atmosphere, and the free and easy life. He praised Carling, who had served on my staff as Chief Quartermaster of the Western cavalry, as "a most splendid gentleman and officer." He added buoyantly: "I feel greatly in hopes that I shall recover my health permanently," and one cannot suppress the thought that if the invalid or the medical profession had known at that time as much as is now known in reference to the proper treatment of such

cases, it is more than probable that his hopes might have been fully realized.

On July 8, after alluding to the celebration held on the Fourth, to the arrival of General Augur at the site of the new town on Crow Creek, and to the expected arrival of General Stevenson with a detachment for the relief of his escort and the garrison of the new frontier post, Fort D. A. Russell, he wrote as follows:

. . . Here will be the junction of the Denver branch of the road; here will be established one of the permanent military posts, the depot for years to come of all the posts this side of the Rocky Mountains. Crow Creek, a rapid stream of fine water, flows by here, and the great snowy mountains lift themselves up in full view, and every evening since our encampment here have breathed their icy breath upon us.

General Dodge is here hard at work and looks badly. He is suffering from old wounds received in the service. I fear if he does not let up a little in his work he will be compelled to do so from physical inability to work longer.

While in this region Rawlins took a deep interest in the frontier life about him. He accompanied Dodge and the army officers in their explorations of the surrounding country and the location of the new army posts, taking part in all the preliminary work for extending the railroad towards Salt Lake. While the party was in no danger, the constant presence of Indians, with occasional rumors of outrages on their part, added to the interest and excitement of the life it was leading. This doubtless stimulated Rawlins's appetite and inspired him to ask for the New York papers and what they said of his Galena speech, which had been widely noticed and favorably commented on.

Rawlins was still at Cheyenne, July 20, 1867, where he was deeply interested in the case of a Swedish boy named Andrew Bomkersen, who belonged to a Government train from Salt Lake, was killed there on the 11th, and was the first person

buried at that place. Having given his advice and assistance to Augur in locating the permanent post, he began to be eager to move on, and anxious about the importance given by the press to his Galena speech. He naturally wanted to know what the New York papers thought of it, though he felt sure his relations with the General would give importance to what he said.

From Fort Saunders, Dakota, he wrote an account of the journey to that place, which he greatly enjoyed, notwithstanding the fact that his party had been followed by Indians. He added with pardonable pride:

. . . I feel greatly flattered by the reception of my speech by the public. I know nothing of what the St. Louis papers say nor of what the New York papers say, except the *Tribune*. Rowley enclosed me some extracts from other papers, which I enclose herewith to you along with some I cut from the Chicago papers and the *Galena Advertiser*. The latter has the whole speech in it, with an editorial written by H. H. Houghton. However flattering the latter has written of me he believes every word of it. . . .

The party then advanced to the North Platte, where it located Fort Steele, but the march was quite trying to Rawlins. Much trouble and some delay were caused by the depth and rapidity of the stream; the cavalry horses and pack animals had to swim it, and this brought the party into a trackless region, farther and farther from the overland trail, as well as from water. Sixteen miles beyond the crossing they discovered a flowing spring, at which the party, and especially Rawlins, drank with great enjoyment. It was a veritable oasis in the desert, and later became the site of a flourishing town, which in due time Dodge named after his friend Rawlins.

From that point the party made its way to the Medicine Bow River, and thence across the Continental Divide to Fort Bridger, Utah. The march was varied by scouting and ex-

ploring, by fording rivers, climbing mountains, and shooting game. Elk, black-tailed deer, and bear were abundant; the mess was kept amply supplied, and Rawlins continued to feel stronger and better. Although he did not get rid of his cough, he still indulged in the hope that the trip would give him permanent relief. On August 19 he wrote:

. . . I see by the papers that General Grant has accepted the position of acting Secretary of War in the place of Mr. Stanton. I suppose of course he has good reason for doing so and that he thinks he can perhaps better serve the interests of reconstruction there than if some one inimical to reconstruction were placed there. For my own part I must confess that I am sorry any condition of things should have so turned out as to necessitate General Grant's accepting the position. It will require a steady hand and clear head to keep out of the gulf that yawns between the President and the people. There is no friendship for the General with the President or any of his Cabinet in my judgment, and the party Butler represents and the bitterness he feels are neither dead nor sleeping. My faith in an overruling Providence is still strong, and Grant's star I believe to be still in the ascendant, but so the stars of my country pale not I shall be content. I have no letter from Washington since I left Galena, and of course know nothing of what is going on.

I received a letter dated July 26 from Russell Jones, in which he says: "I also received yours containing the \$1,000 draft, and after talking with Bass, Bradley and Corwith I conclude to buy ten shares of our street railway stock instead of buying land. If I am not greatly mistaken there is no better place to put it. I hold it in the name of your wife and children, though standing in my name on the Company's books. Unless otherwise directed, I shall invest the dividends in new stock as fast as there is enough to buy another share." I am not so well satisfied with this as I would have been if he had bought land, but I have great confidence in the gentleman named and in his judgment. . . .

From Camp Douglas, Salt Lake City, he wrote:

. . . On Wednesday evening, August 28, we met Brigham Young, his last wife and two daughters at the house of Mr. Head, the Indian agent here. He looks to be a man of about

forty-five years of age, but is sixty-six. Of the peculiar institution of these people one has a more favorable idea from letter writers than from observation. My own views of them are far less favorable than others of General Grant's staff who have been here before. I am in favor of the Conner rather than the Young party. On the 29th I called on Governor Durkee, Chief Justice Titus and Judge Drake of this territory. They are to call on us to-morrow. I like them very much. General and Mrs. Chetlain and Mr. Head are very kind to us. We shall leave here on the 2nd or 3rd of September for the East via South Pass. Shall reach Omaha about the 10th of October. . . .

On his way he sent the following letter:

Bear River Station, September 6, 1867. . . . I am glad the General sent you the funds, but don't be uneasy about my hurrying home on account of the General's new duties, for be assured I owe too much to my family and my own health to hurry to Washington at this time. I could do nothing now. Had I been there I might have prevailed upon the General not to accept the position he has now. I certainly should have tried unless being there had put me in possession of knowledge I do not now have. May God guide him aright is my prayer. . . . I am in very good health, except my cough, and I think I am getting better of that all the time. . . .

During this entire trip across the plains and Continental Divide to the Great Salt Lake, Rawlins had been the guest and inseparable companion of Dodge. As his letters show, they had been warm and devoted friends from the time they first met in West Tennessee, and had never lost an opportunity to say kind things of each other, but neither had come to appreciate the other thoroughly till they spent the summer and fall together, the one seeking health and the other trying to find the best possible location for a railroad to the Pacific Ocean. Hitherto Rawlins had been the industrious, austere, uncompromising staff officer, looking neither to the right nor left, but sternly working for victory over the public enemy. His high character had become known to all, but it needed

this trip to reveal the genial and companionable nature of the man to his friend. During the relaxations by the camp-fire at night, he had let the light in upon his own nature, and the ruling principles of his life. As he told the story of his experiences from Belmont to Appomattox, he unconsciously revealed his unselfish character, his devotion to Grant, his persistence in the performance of duty, his exalted patriotism, and, above all, the high sense of honor by which he was guided through all the emergencies of his career. Dodge bears the most unmistakable testimony to all this, as well as to the fact that although a sick man himself, Rawlins was more worried about the health of his companion than about his own. While all looked out with anxious solicitude for his comfort, he was never for a moment neglectful of theirs. While all hoped that he would receive permanent benefit from the outdoor life of the plains, and it is probable that his disease was arrested and his life was thereby sensibly prolonged, it in the end became evident that the improvement was only temporary and that the unrelaxing hand of death had him firmly in its grasp.

While at Salt Lake City, Brigham Young and the Mormons made every effort to entertain and interest him in their affairs, but he respectfully declined their offers of hospitality and pitched his tent at Fort Douglas, overlooking the city. He treated all with politeness but acted throughout apparently on the theory that his official independence might be compromised by the slightest unnecessary intimacy.

On the return trip from Salt Lake City north to the Snake River Valley the party followed Brigham Young and his bishops, who were on their annual procession through the settlements. While Dodge and Rawlins were received at the settlements with respect, much to their surprise, but little personal interest was shown in their movements. In view of the friendly attentions which had been extended to them at Salt Lake this was difficult to account for and produced an unfavorable impression, which lasted Rawlins until his death.

As the party crossed the Green River Mountains, they discovered many signs of grizzly bears, which excited the sporting propensities of the younger men. A hunt was organized in which, against Dodge's advice, Rawlins and his aid-de-camp took part. They had not gone far before a wounded grizzly turned upon them and, but for the skill of a professional hunter, might have overtaken them. Both were glad to escape, and Rawlins did not hesitate to blame himself for this disobedience of orders.

The march to the eastward was varied by the excitement of bear and buffalo hunting and the fear of the Indians. A few gold camps were encountered, and claims were staked out, one of which, assigned to Rawlins, was sold for a small sum by his family several years afterwards.

After a wide circuit of several weeks through the mountains, north of the line on which it had gone to Salt Lake, the party reached Cheyenne in safety. Rawlins parted from it at the end of the railroad and on October 12, 1867, arrived at Galena, where he received a hearty welcome from his family and friends. He had been gone four months, during which he had been buoyed up by hope, but had derived little substantial benefit from the change.

Before passing from this period of Rawlins's life, it may be well to call attention to the fact that Stanton's dismissal from the position of Secretary of War, and Grant's appointment to that office *ad interim*, was followed by sharp collisions between Congress and the President in regard to the reconstruction of the Southern States, and this greatly complicated the duties which Grant was called upon to perform. Without the help, for the greater part of the time, of his trusted chief of staff, he continued to hold the office till relieved of it in accordance with the Tenure of Office Act. The Senate having refused on January 14, 1868, to concur in the suspension and removal of Stanton, Grant at once abandoned the position he had been filling, although the President alleged that he had promised

to hold it against Stanton's reinstatement. A question of veracity arose between them. Grant denied that he had ever made any such promise, whereupon the President cited his Cabinet as witnesses to prove that he had.

While the discussion was at its height Rawlins returned to Washington, and at once became interested in mastering the facts of the case and giving advice and counsel to his Chief. Through his legal acumen and his keen perception, he soon reached a clear understanding of the complications in which General Grant had become involved. All doubts were speedily dissipated, the damaging charges against the General were disproved to the satisfaction of the country, and he was nominated for the Presidency by a National Convention of soldiers and sailors gathered from all parts of the country at Chicago, May 19, 1868. Rawlins was known to be in favor of the movement, if not absolutely directing it. To his gratification, it culminated two days later in Grant's nomination by the National Republican Convention, substantially on the platform which Rawlins had outlined in his speech at Galena the year before.

During the month of October and a part of November, 1867, Rawlins remained at Galena, and wrote no letters. His health had received but little benefit from his life on the plains. Up one day and down the next, he had serious misgivings, and was driven almost to desperation at times. This is shown by the pathetic fact that while in camp on the plains one bright summer day he opened his shirt and bared his breast to the sun till it was almost blistered, in the hope that it would prove a counterirritant which would benefit his lungs.

It will be remembered that the Presidential election took place in November, 1868, and that Grant was elected by a great majority. While Rawlins was deeply interested in the outcome of the campaign, his health was not strong enough to permit him to take an active part in the canvass, even if the proprieties of his military position had allowed it. He was,

however, constantly consulted by the politicians and gave them his best advice, especially in regard to the West. When the election was over he returned to Washington and took up his residence at Willard's Hotel, but while getting his house ready for his family he slept at his office, to the detriment both of his comfort and his health.

Early in December he wrote that, much as he would like to do so, he could not return home because his official duties forbade it. In common with many others, he soon began to feel some anxiety about the make-up of the Cabinet and the distribution of the great offices of the Administration. On December 10 he wrote:

. . . The subject of offices is scarcely broached. In fact, among those whom I have met the chief speculation is as to what I am to have. All seem to take it for granted that the General is going to do something very handsome, more than he has ever done for me, but what he intends of course none of them know. The position I have is perhaps as good as any the General will have in his power to give, and to have it secured to me is all I want, and even this I should not want if I had the health I lost in the service. My arm pains me considerably and I do not as yet see that it relieves my cough, though it is hardly time.

I met General Butler night before last and had a long talk with him. He tells me he intends to earnestly support Grant's administration, and I believe him, that is, if he is properly treated.

About this time both General and Mrs. Grant gave him an earnest invitation to make his home with them till he was ready to bring his family to Washington, but he persisted in living alone till after the holidays, which he spent with his wife in Connecticut. On his return to Washington he compromised what was evidently an embarrassing question by "sleeping at the office, taking his breakfast at a restaurant, and dining with General Grant." Curiously enough he was assured most positively about that time by the doctors that his lungs were not affected, and again took hope from the assurance; but nevertheless he was henceforth compelled to decline all

social invitations on account of his enfeebled condition. He daily took a horseback ride on General Grant's black pony, "Jeff Davis," and scrupulously followed the regimen prescribed for him, but withal his disease was steadily making progress towards its fatal and inevitable end.

As the inauguration was approaching, he became more and more uneasy as to his own future. General Grant the President Elect, it will be remembered, was peculiarly reticent about his Cabinet and other important appointments, and kept the entire country in a state of suspense almost to the very day he took the oath of office. This doubtless added to Rawlins's anxiety. He had done his full part in making Grant's military career a success and in helping to place him properly before the country as a candidate for the highest office within its gift. He was too proud to ask what was to be done for him, or to even intimate that he would like to have a cabinet position, but his letters to his wife show clearly that he considered himself an important part of what Grant stood for, and did not want to be left out of consideration in the organization of the new Administration.

XIX

CLOSING EVENTS

Rawlins Appointed Secretary of War—Friends Discharge Mortgage on House—War Department Restored to Control of Secretary—Relations with President and Cabinet—Friend of Cuba—Reflections Upon Rawlins's Conduct—Relations with Sherman.

It so happened that J. Russell Jones and I were visiting Grant for a few days shortly before the inauguration, and after the ladies retired, it was his custom to invite us into the library for the purpose of discussing both measures and men. On Friday night, February 19, 1869, he read us the draft of his inaugural address, and asked for our suggestions as to its form, as well as to several of the topics to be considered; but in doing so he warned us that, as he had not yet discussed the Cabinet "with any one, not even with Mrs. Grant," he could not do so with us. He invited us, however, to talk freely about men for other places, and we did so. Before the conversation ended, I naturally asked him what he was going to do for Rawlins. He replied that he intended to assign him to the command of the Department of Arizona, in the confident belief that a prolonged residence in the high and dry atmosphere of that region would result in his complete restoration to health.

The next day, in reply to a direct question as to what Grant was going to do for him, I told Rawlins with Grant's permission what the General had said on that subject the night before, and was not at all surprised at the declaration that it would not be at all satisfactory to him. He said without reserve that he not only wanted but thought himself fairly

entitled to the appointment of Secretary of War. He then gave a full summary of his views, and in conclusion asked me to make them known in my own way, but without unnecessary delay, to the President-elect. That night I complied with his request. The General showed neither surprise nor impatience, but without the slightest question or hesitation, he said: "You can tell Rawlins he shall be Secretary of War," but added, "He will have to wait a few days, possibly two weeks or a month, for I have asked Schofield to hold over a while."

I saw Rawlins early the next morning and gave him Grant's message, which he received with marked gratification, followed by the assurance that the arrangement would be entirely satisfactory to him.

Of course I made this known to Grant, and that terminated my connection with the matter. I naturally supposed that Grant would notify Rawlins officially of his intentions, but as the inauguration approached without his saying anything in confirmation of what he had specially authorized me to tell Rawlins, the latter became again discouraged, and went to Danbury with the declaration that he did not intend to return to Washington. From there he wrote to General Dodge, that he had come to the conclusion that he was not to be Secretary of War, but was to have a command in the West. Thereupon Dodge took the letter to Grant, who seemed surprised, but at once gave Dodge the same assurance he had given me. He explained again that it had been his intention to give Rawlins command in Arizona and New Mexico, in the belief that the high, dry climate of that region would be beneficial to him; but understanding that this arrangement would not suit Rawlins, he should call him to the Cabinet as Secretary of War. Grant made no explanation of why he had not already told Rawlins of his plans. It is of course possible that he may have entertained other views for a while, but be this as it may, he shortly confirmed what he had said to both Dodge and

myself by letter or telegraph; for a few days later Rawlins returned to Washington and made arrangements for his family to join him there.

It will be remembered that Grant's first Cabinet, containing, as it did, several obscure and inexperienced men, was a great disappointment to the public, and still more so to the Republican party. E. B. Washburne, who was appointed Secretary of State for the purpose of increasing his prestige as Minister to France, soon gave way to Hamilton Fish, and in due time Schofield made way for Rawlins. As to Fish, although a distinguished man, who had long been out of active public life, his appointment was a genuine surprise to the country, while that of Rawlins was hailed by those who knew him best as one entirely proper to be made. It gave great satisfaction, especially to the volunteer army, by which he had long since come to be regarded as a man of unusual vigor, honesty, and independence. His principal friends among the higher officers were Dodge, Logan, and Gresham. They were also experienced politicians, who fairly represented the War Democrats as well as the Republicans, and made haste to express their satisfaction to the politicians and the country at large.

Three days before Rawlins's appointment was announced, which was on March 11, Dodge, acting for himself and a few other friends who knew that Rawlins was a poor man, took up and returned to him the mortgage note and other papers connected with the dwelling house which he had purchased sometime before on Georgetown Heights. In performing this generous act, Dodge took occasion to say:

. . . I am enabled to do this through the kindness of a few friends, most of whom only know you by reputation, but who have watched your course through your entire public life. Their respect and high regard for you as a gentleman and a soldier, your strict integrity and ability, your disinterested services to your country and your Chief alone has prompted this gift. I trust you will receive it in the same kindly spirit it is given, and

at some future time more appropriate than this I will furnish you the names of the gentlemen.

Allow me to say, I never performed a duty that gave me more pleasure or satisfaction, and wishing you for them and myself that health and prosperity in the future that your valuable and distinguished services in the past entitle you to, I am truly your friend.

On March 11 Rawlins wrote to his wife as follows:

. . . The excitement incident upon the organization of the Cabinet and the number of persons constantly around me have prevented me writing you earlier. The Cabinet is now organized, and, from what I learn from people here, is quite acceptable. I am congratulated by many for my position in it, and by some I am sure sincerely. Of Brigadier General U. S. Grant's staff as originally organized, I was the youngest member. So of President Grant's Cabinet I am the youngest and as a Cabinet officer shall try to serve my country and him with the same fidelity I tried to serve both as a staff officer.

Enclosed I send you a letter from General Dodge which explains itself. . . .

Of course Rawlins, Secretary of War, was a much more powerful and important person than Rawlins, Chief of Staff; and while he had but few appointments in his own Department to give out, he was greatly run upon by his many military friends now in civil life for recommendations to the President and the other Secretaries.

On March 28 he wrote to his wife, who had not yet joined him, as follows:

. . . I am almost ashamed to write after having received three letters from you without having sent a single one in return for ten days, but I know you will pardon me when I tell you my friends have so pressed me, and the condition of my own department as left by the last of Secretary Schofield's orders so annoyed me, that I could not find a moment to sit down and write you as I would like to have done. Yesterday, however, I got permission and issued an order revoking the one of Schofield's, which virtually put the War Department under Sherman. The

Department stands now as it did under Stanton, Grant and Schofield. The General of the army is subordinate to the Secretary of War.

I was out of ink in my room to-day, went downstairs to get some and started up, when in came Hillyer with a friend—of course he always has one. He remarked: "What are you going to do with your ink?" I replied: "I am going, if I can get an opportunity, to write to my wife, a thing I have not done for ten days." The only effect it had was to cause him and his friend to sit down and talk that ever-wearying twaddle about Grant, and the people being with him, etc., until it was too late to get this off in to-day's mail. I simply mention this to show you how considerate some are who call you friend.

The papers give you full particulars of what Congress and Grant are doing. To those particulars I can only add that God having for the last eight years watched over and guided the destiny of this people in spite of themselves, I have an abiding faith that in His watchfulness and guidance our destiny will be insured, and that it will be as grand as he designs it to be. But for this faith in God I should long since have despaired of my country's welfare and would not feel so hopeful as now. . . .

To this he added, two days later:

. . . The great pressure still continues, but I stand it full as well as I had hoped to. . . . My health, I think, is improving. I certainly am not growing worse.

General Sherman felt badly over the revocation of Schofield's order, fearing it would put him in the light of losing Grant's confidence. He did not seem to think I had any special feelings in the matter, and as to that he was about right. A sense of duty to my country made me insist upon its revocation. I could not consent to have the authorities of a great civil office entrusted to me subordinated to the military authority.

Enclosed is a slip from a newspaper and also a letter from a friend, samples of what come to me on the subject. . . .

In further explanation of the reference to Sherman and Schofield in the letter just quoted, it should be remembered that Schofield's last act as hold-over Secretary of War was to issue an order by direction of the President, the practical

effect of which was to place the administration of the army, as well as most of the business which had been assigned by law to the Secretary of War, under the immediate control of Sherman, the senior general of the army. All the heads of military bureaux were announced as attached to his "General Staff." They were placed under his direct orders, and were required to transact all official business through him or by his authority. Whatever may be said of this as a measure of reform, it was not only adopted without proper consideration but was manifestly in contravention of many laws which had been duly enacted by Congress, and which could not be set aside by an executive order.

Rawlins, as might have been expected, was not slow to perceive the effect of his predecessor's order, nor was he slow to set about securing its immediate nullification. Sherman, general in chief, was to be the principal beneficiary of the order and naturally did all he could through his friend the President to keep it in force, but the case was too plain to admit of serious discussion. The briefest statement of it convinced the President that he could not uphold the revolutionary order, without a palpable usurpation of authority, which would not only discredit his new Secretary but arouse the antagonism of Congress. Rawlins, with his accustomed vigor, but with all due respect, made this entirely clear to Grant and thereby secured the necessary authority to countermand the unlawful order.

The case was a novel one, the outcome of which was watched with intense interest not only by the army but by the statesmen and politicians. It was regarded as a test both of the character and the influence of the new Secretary. His victory was complete, and it at once became recognized that he was a man to be reckoned with in civil as well as in military affairs.

From that time forth, although a confirmed invalid, he took an important part in all public measures which engaged

the attention of the President and his Cabinet. His associates were comparative strangers to him as well as to the President. Not one of them had had the slightest acquaintance with the latter till after he had become the victorious commander of our armies. They knew nothing of his character and idiosyncrasies, and still less of his methods of business or of his mental operations. They knew, of course, that he had been educated at West Point, had served in the Mexican War and in the Indian country, and had resigned from the army. They, in common with the rest of their countrymen, knew also that he had been unsuccessful in civil life. They had heard rumors about his habits, and had shared the doubts of the country at large as to his real greatness; but they were well aware of the fact that he had won an unbroken series of victories which had overthrown the Confederate government and reestablished the Union. Without considering how much of this great result was due to Lincoln, Stanton, the Congress, the army at large, and to the patriotism and sacrifices of the people, they concluded, naturally enough perhaps, that he must be a very great man, richly endowed with wisdom and capacity for civil as well as for military affairs. They heard doubtless with surprise his reflections upon public affairs, which he was accustomed to express with unusual common-sense and directness, and attributed to them an importance to which they were not necessarily entitled.

Lacking familiarity with the Constitution and with the law of the land, unacquainted with the leading men of civil life, inexperienced in politics or statecraft, and being compelled, by the great office to which he had been elevated as well as by the condition of public affairs, to deal with questions of the greatest novelty and importance, Grant, more than any of his predecessors, needed the advice and guidance of the wisest and most independent statesmen of the day. With the generous impulse of a soldier, unchanged by contact with the world, he was naturally inclined to prefer his comrades and

friends of the camp, whom he had learned to esteem and trust, to the politicians and statesmen, however experienced. It perhaps had not occurred to him that, in making up his mind upon questions and policies of his administration, he should seek the counsel of those who had gained their experience in civil life. He unconsciously treated his Cabinet rather as staff-officers than as his constitutional advisers; rather as clerks than as counsellors, and, unfortunately for him and for the country, this view of their relations was too frequently accepted without question by his new associates.

The simple fact is that the members of the Cabinet stood in awe of the victorious and taciturn soldier, and were prone to attribute to his views, a ripeness and wisdom which they did not always possess. Rawlins was the only one of their number who had seen him develop from the simple clerk in the Galena leather store to the victorious chieftain, commanding a million men. He was the only member of the Cabinet who knew that the President after all was only a plain, sensible man, of unselfish patriotism and excellent judgment, surrounded by grave responsibilities, and needing now, more than ever, an accurate knowledge of men and facts, together with sound and disinterested advice upon the complicated questions which were claiming attention.

Rawlins was besides the only member of the Cabinet who actually knew the capacities and limitations of the President, and while he held him in the highest respect, stood not in the slightest awe of him or of his opinions. Accustomed to think for himself on the questions of the day, and to accept no man's conclusions without the assurance of his own reason that they were sound, he was, for the brief period of his service in civil office, the same fearless, independent, and outspoken counsellor that he had been in military life. To those who knew what took place in government circles it was certain that the new Secretary of War wielded the same potent and controlling influence over the President, when he chose to exert it, that

the Chief of Staff had wielded over the Commanding General. It is a circumstance creditable to both that this influence was never exerted except in matters of serious importance, and never failed to receive the attention to which it was entitled.

It is well known that Rawlins early became impressed with the importance of our relations with Cuba, which entered upon its first serious rebellion against Spanish authority in 1868. He was not only intensely American, but believed abstractly in the Monroe Doctrine, and in Senator Douglas's corollary of "Manifest Destiny." He was besides deeply sympathetic with all misgoverned people, and believed that it was our duty, as chief of the American republics, to extend an encouraging if not a protecting hand to such as were unduly oppressed. He did not disguise his sympathy for Cuba, any more than he did for Mexico. He was the open advocate of the Cuban Republic, and although it was not strictly within his province, he advised that the Administration should recognize the Cubans as belligerents, and hold the Spanish government to a rigid responsibility in all matters pertaining to the interests of American citizens. In this policy it is certain that he had at first the concurrence of his Chief and the support of his party as against the more conservative views of Fish, the Secretary of State.

In connection with this important subject, it should be stated that Rawlins had not concealed his views, but had given them fully to the world in his Galena address two years before.¹ In that notable address, which was published and circulated broadcast by the Republican National Committee during Grant's first canvass for the Presidency, he gave his views on every important question then up for consideration. He openly rejoiced in the overthrow of Maximilian's Empire and in the humiliation of Louis Napoleon. He sympathized with the desire and efforts of Ireland to throw off the British yoke, and looked hopefully to the peaceful acquisition of the newly

¹ See Appendix, pp. 470 *et seq.*

confederated British colonies in North America. He called special attention to the disposition manifested by the British Government after the withdrawal of the European invaders from Mexico at "our behest" to pay the Alabama claims, but added, with a frankness not to be misunderstood:

. . . Should she fail to properly adjust them, it may become the duty of the people's representatives to issue their writ in the form of a declaration of war for the seizure of her possessions in America in satisfaction of these claims, and thereby facilitate the departure of the last foreign power from this Continent.

Nor should it be forgotten that these were the views of the President-elect, as well as of Rawlins and the Republican party, at the time they were uttered.

Holding such opinions as these, it was to be expected that as a member of the Cabinet, he should avail himself of the Cuban rebellion, and especially of the *Virginian* affair, to favor Cuban independence as well as to hold Spain to a rigid respect for the rights of American citizens. At all events, that was the position Rawlins took, and there can be no doubt that he was both firm and vehement in maintaining it. Nor can there be any doubt that the more conservative and conciliatory Secretary of State, and possibly other members of the Cabinet, took the opposite view, and were disposed to regard the Secretary of War as going out of his proper sphere to influence and control the policy of the Administration.

It should be observed that the Spanish Government was at that time, as well as before, represented by able counsel, and had, besides, many influential friends to look out for its interests with the Administration and in the public press. Rawlins was an open and aggressive fighter, and, besides, held such close relations with the President as to make his success almost certain in any case that enlisted his sympathy and support. Although a man of modest and blameless life, he was not without enemies. His success had been too great and his

elevation too high not to have brought upon him the envy of some he had left behind. While his arguments were rightfully enough combated by counsel, his motives were wrongfully enough assailed by others, who desired not only to defeat his measures but to injure his character and destroy his influence. They challenged his disinterestedness while living, and circulated reports to his discredit after he was dead, and, therefore, powerless to defend himself. The period of detraction and slander at Washington had already begun and no effort was spared to cripple those who were true to their own sense of duty and propriety.

With those who knew the austere and impassioned Rawlins in active life, his character needs no defence, and no defence will be offered. But for the information of those who come after, it is my duty to say that, having heard the innuendos and reflections made against him just after his death, and having become convinced that they were one and all without the slightest foundation, I have carefully gone through his correspondence, I have conferred with his family and friends, and I have pushed my investigations in every possible direction, without finding the slightest fact upon which to base even a doubt as to his private or official character.

In addition to being a sick and perhaps an irritable man, he was a bold and outspoken one, who never failed to denounce the foibles or the frauds of those in power, when occasion called for it. He thereby made himself a shining mark for envy and misrepresentation, and that envy and misapprehension should have followed him is but a tribute to his virile and aggressive qualities that should help to fix him and his services in the minds of his countrymen. As Dana well said:

. . . Public servants of his quality will always be few, and there are plenty of men whose names will flourish largely in history, without having rendered a tithe of his unostentatious and invaluable contribution to the great work of the nation.²

² Wilson's "The Life of Charles A. Dana," pp. 302-3.

At the time Rawlins became Secretary of War he was under the constant care of a physician, who had prescribed a special diet suited to his case. He was already greatly enfeebled by the disease which had fixed itself upon him, but for the first two months the novelty of his new duties and the excitement which attended the organization of a new Administration, acted as a tonic to his system, under which he showed renewed strength and hopefulness. On May 9 he wrote:

. . . Another week of official care and anxiety for the personal interest of my friends has passed. I had hoped on my return to find only the legitimate and proper duties of the Department to attend to, but found things much the same as when I left. I hope only a short time will be required for matters to arrange themselves properly. Colonel Pride took charge of me in New York as usual until he saw me on the cars to Washington. Should Pride ever leave New York, I sometimes ask myself the question, could I get through New York at all?

On May 14th he wrote:

. . . Matters here are settling down, and soon I trust everything will move smoothly. Congress has mostly dissolved into the people, and applicants are left to press their own claims. I shall have the disagreeable duty to perform of reducing the clerical force of the Department, but am putting it off until the last moment. . . .

Shortly after this he again left Washington, and spent six weeks with his family in the hope that the more bracing climate of the New England hills would prove beneficial. The summer was somewhat dull, yet his position as a member of the Cabinet subjected him to constant pressure and annoyance. The newspapers seized every opportunity to quote him in speeches he had not made. The President and other Cabinet officers were more or less absent. The detention of the Spanish gunboats in American waters had been brought about by the interventions of Peru, and this gave him both pleasure and quiet.

But the end was now drawing near. Irreparable inroads upon Rawlins's constitution had become painfully apparent, and hope at last failed him entirely. It was at that juncture, July 17, that he ordered me to Washington, and at his house in the presence of his wife, asked me to become his literary executor and to see justice done to his memory. He had become greatly emaciated, but had not entirely given up attendance at his office, although he showed much distress while performing his duties. Early in September he became so weak that he gave up going to the Department, but, notwithstanding his distress and failure of strength, he caused all important matters requiring his action to be brought to his residence for personal consideration, and kept this up till within two days of his death, which occurred September 6th, 1869.

One of the last and most complicated questions that demanded his personal attention, and gave him much anxiety and trouble, was the Brooklyn Bridge, the plans for which the law required the Secretary of War's approval as a condition precedent to its construction. The bridge company naturally wanted to minimize the height of the span above the water which would have been injurious to the commerce of the port, while the shipping interests demanded an elevation, which the bridge company declared would involve an impracticable grade from the approaches to the highest point of the span. The case was argued with thoroughness amounting to prolixity. Maps, plans, and memorials covering every point at issue were submitted, and the severest pressure was brought to bear upon the afflicted Secretary by the parties in interest. All the important influences that could be enlisted were exerted to warp or control his judgment, but without effect.

The questions involved were too important to be decided without the most careful consideration, and to this end Rawlins gave several days and nights of minute and laborious

study to the case. He found that the bridge company was willing to admit that a height of 130 feet above flood tide would give the maximum grade that could be worked, while the ship masters stoutly contended that 140 feet, or only ten feet more, would cause the minimum amount of annoyance with which the commerce of the harbor could be successfully carried on. Having got the opposing interests to within a few feet of each other, he thereupon decided to fix the height at 135 feet, with the remark that he would take the responsibility thereby of spoiling the bridge project, on the one hand, or of ruining the commerce of the port, on the other. Although greatly enfeebled at the time, he had the foresight to add to the order of approval a proviso that no part or appurtenance of the bridge should ever be below the limit of 135 feet above high-water mark. The wisdom of this provision was signally vindicated several years afterwards, when the bridge company was prohibited from giving a different construction to the order of approval.

In the short period of six months during which Rawlins held the office of Secretary of War, he was brought into intimate relations with many distinguished men both in civil and military life. His peculiar relations with the President had come to be pretty well understood by the public men of the day, and it is but fair to his associates of the Cabinet to state that they fully recognized his exceptional influence from the start, but apart from the former military relations which placed him closer to the President than any one else, they soon became impressed by the singular force and independence of judgment which he displayed upon all occasions. He had, of course, met during the war many of the military men whom he found on duty at the War Department, but he had been intimate with none of them except Humphreys, the Chief of Engineers, and Meigs, the Quartermaster General. He had known Townsend, the Adjutant General, in the field; but with Marcy, the Inspector General, Barnes, the Surgeon General,

Holt, the Judge Advocate General, and Meyer, the Chief Signal Officer, his acquaintance was but formal. These were all officers of experience and merit with whom he was destined to serve in the closest daily contact till the end of his career. He was, indeed, compelled to lean upon them, in the technical matters of their respective bureaux, and reciprocally to expose to them his character and methods without reserve. It is but fair to those distinguished officers to add that while they were predisposed in his favor by the action he had taken in regard to the order placing them under General Sherman, they speedily came to respect him as a very able, self-reliant Secretary, irrespective of his civil training and military experience. His courtesy, tact, and equability of temper were in notable contrast to the violent and overbearing qualities displayed by Stanton, while his industry and promptitude of decision left nothing to be desired in an administrative officer. It is safe to add that no man ever died in the office of Secretary of War more thoroughly respected or more sincerely regretted by his subordinates of every grade.

In Sherman's order announcing the Secretary's death, a single paragraph is all that referred to the public services of this distinguished man. His letters show that he had been Sherman's faithful friend throughout the Civil War, yet he had not hesitated to disapprove the "March to the Sea" while Hood, with an unbeaten army, was just starting on his great movement against the widely-scattered detachments of the Military Division in the rear. He had approved Sherman's promotion as General of the Army over Thomas and Meade, each of whom were regarded by many as his superior, in place of Grant, and yet he had not hesitated to insist on the reversal of the President's order, turning over to the general of the army the duties assigned by law and custom to the Secretary of War. It is hardly conceivable that Sherman should have regarded this action as in any way personal or intended to reflect upon him, but it is certain that Rawlins

stood out tenaciously for the order, till the President became convinced that his duty required him to withdraw it.

This was a notable episode in the history of military administration, which aroused the attention not only of the army but of Congress. It was opposed by many Representatives and Senators at the time. But the most notable utterances against it were made by Senator Sumner in May, 1872, after he had broken with the President and his supporters. He characterized it "as an act of revolution exalting the military power above the civil." He even went so far as to say "that for the time there was a military dictatorship, with the President at its head not merely in spirit but in actual form."

While it is now evident that, however illegal the order may have been, it had no such sinister purpose, and was followed by no such hurtful results. Rawlins felt deeply about it. He was a civilian and a lawyer who had always been a close student and an ardent supporter of the Constitution, and although bound to the President by ties of personal and official friendship, he regarded it as his duty to secure the repeal of the offensive order even at the expense of his place in the Cabinet. Fortunately, the President yielded as usual to the legal advice of Rawlins, and accordingly, with his authority, the Secretary of War on March 26, 1869, issued a general order, directing that "all official business, which by law or regulation requires the action of the President or of the Secretary of War, will be submitted by the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus, to the Secretary of War." The result of this was to restore the business pertaining to the River and Harbor works, the fortifications, and to all branches of the military administration, to the channels prescribed by law and custom.

That Sherman, who liked power and had every confidence in his ability to administer it honestly and fairly, would have preferred to administer all the business connected with the military branch of the Government, there can be but little

doubt. As his predecessors, from Scott down, had contended that all military business should be transacted through the General-in-Chief, it was not strange that Sherman should hold to the same view, or that he should resent the exercise of authority over him by one who had been subject to his command, as he afterwards did in the case of Belknap, who succeeded Rawlins in the War Department.

While he doubtless had but little feeling of resentment against Rawlins, it is certain that the order which he penned announcing the death of that distinguished man was of the most formal character and quite disappointing to the friends of the Secretary of War. It, of course, directed the closing of the Department, prescribed a military funeral, and fixed the usual period of mourning for officers of the army; but it contained no adequate account of the dead soldier's virtues, or of his services. Its only reference to them is contained in the following five lines:

. . . The career of General Rawlins has been so brilliant and so closely connected with that of the President of the United States that it is familiar to all; it is an honor to the profession to connect his name with that army for whose welfare he labored so hard and with so much enthusiasm.

While many of the leading officers may have thought at the time that this general commendation was sufficient, they also knew that from first to last there was neither halt nor qualification in Rawlins's support of Sherman, no matter how great were Sherman's misfortunes. Neither his failure to fortify at Shiloh, nor the dissipation of his division on that field; neither his bloody repulse at Chickasaw Bayou, nor his opposition to the great turning movement against Vicksburg; neither his failure at the end of Missionary Ridge, nor the collapse of his campaign into Central Alabama brought a word of censure or in the slightest degree shook the confidence of Grant or of his Chief of Staff in the deserts of that brilliant, but not always successful, general.

But that Sherman had a deep interest in the subject is shown by a letter to the writer, dated January 13, 1885, in which after expressing his approval of the proposed "Life of General Rawlins," he says:

. . . I would gladly aid you, but the truth is I know of him little more than the general public. He is a fine example of what an enthusiastic, ardent lawyer may become when war calls out the young and patriotic.

To have begun as a volunteer at Galena, Illinois, to have been intimately associated with General Grant in his most extraordinary career to the end, and then to have been his Secretary of War, will give you an ample scope for your pen. I am sure you have ample materials and only need the encouragement of his friends to do justice to a worthy subject.

After alluding to Grant's financial misfortunes, the preparation and publication of the "Memoirs," on which he was then engaged, and the completion of the picture by the story of Rawlins's connection with him, the letter concludes with the following graphic summary:

. . . Rawlins was violent, passionate, enthusiastic, and personal, but always in the right direction. I know of no one who can do him and his memory justice better than yourself, and I am glad the task has fallen to your hands.

XX

CONCLUSION

Summary of Rawlins's Character and Services—Patriotism and Love of the Union—Devotion to Grant—Cadwallader's Letter—Parker's Oration—Cox's Tribute—Conclusion.

IF the story, as I have told it, is true, and I am sure it is in all essential particulars, it must be admitted that this plain man of the plain people played a most important part in Grant's life as well as in the great events which took place about him. With perfect fearlessness and devotion, he was Grant's friend as well as his adjutant. With unfailing sagacity, he acted the part of mentor and counsellor in all the great emergencies of his Chief's remarkable career, from the first war meeting at Galena to the Presidency of the nation; never hesitating, never faltering, never failing to counsel him aright, yet always effacing himself, with a self-denial and an absence of egotism which are as rare as they are praiseworthy.

Love of country was indubitably his dominant passion—the controlling impulse of his life, but that the love of country could transmute a farmer lad, a charcoal burner, a country lawyer, into a soldier and statesman such as Rawlins had come to be, in the eight short and crowded years from the outbreak of the war to the end of his brief career in 1869, is of infinite credit to him and to our institutions, as well as of infinite encouragement to those whose duty it will be to uphold those institutions in years to come. Doubtless the work of the farm and of the charcoal pits did much to develop the muscles and the character of this typical American youth. Doubtless the pious mother shaped his sense of duty and his

conscience aright; doubtless the shiftless, but strong-willed, resolute father, had his helpful influence,—the one teaching by loving precept what should be done, the other by thoughtless example what should be avoided. Between the two, aided by the neighborhood school, the more pretentious Academy, and the Rock River Seminary, a strong, vigorous, self-reliant soul was shaped, which knew neither guile nor fear. The struggle with nature in the rough and exacting work of a Western community in its formative stage sharpened the faculties, strengthened the judgment, and aroused the ambition of the sturdy youth. The lives of our earlier heroes and statesmen were the staple food of every aspiring soul in those days. The debating society and the political club were the arena in which they fought their battles and gained the plaudits of their fellows. The practice of the courts and the encounters of political debate were the exercises which developed the intellect and prepared the minds of statesmen for the great task that confronted them at that important period. These were the schools of Lincoln, Douglas, and Washburne, no less than of Oglesby, Logan, and Rawlins. These were the school of patriots and heroes, and taught them how to live and how to die for their country in the hour of its dire distress.

No one who was not a witness of and a participant in the events which preceded and gave character to the great conflict between the States, can now properly understand the love which filled the heart of the Northern boy and man for the Union and for the Constitution which our forefathers framed and ordained for our protection. There were some who condemned slavery as "the sum of all villainies." There were some who would have even been willing to sacrifice the Union and give up the Constitution and its guarantees as "a league with hell and a covenant with the devil," to secure the abolition of slavery, but the great mass of the Northern people were inspired, above all, by the love of the Union and the

Constitution, and were willing to fight for them and die for them, if need be, regardless of slavery and its iniquities. Glowing with patriotic pride in their institutions and in the happiness and prosperity they had enjoyed under them, they cared not in the last resort whether the negro should be slave or free, as the price of the Union and the triumph of our arms over the slave holder's Confederacy and their sympathizers. It was this supreme and all absorbing sentiment which filled the ranks of the Union Army and held it to its deadly work till its triumph was overwhelming and complete.

It is but a truism to say that this sentiment never had a braver nor a more self-sacrificing exemplar than John A. Rawlins. He believed in the Union from the bottom of his soul, and worked for it with every fibre of his body. He was the friend of Grant, and had an abiding confidence in his capacity to lead our forces to victory, but he was still more the friend of his country, and loved it above any man, and above every earthly consideration, and would not have deserted it to save his soul, much less to save his life. His letters to Washburne tell the truthful story of his devotion to Grant; but they also show that in his anxiety for Grant's success, he would go so far and no farther, and that he would be the first to withdraw his support, should Grant prove himself to be unworthy of it. His letter of June 6, from the camp back of Vicksburg to Grant himself, makes it plain that he held his official position not at the value of a cent as against his duty to Grant, to the army under his command, and to the country for which they stood.

In all the annals of war there is no nobler example of duty done, without fear or trembling, than in the remonstrance which that letter contained. The bravery of the officer or of the man in battle is the growth of discipline, strengthened by the spirit of mutual dependence and support. It requires that one should go with another and all together, shoulder to shoulder, but the bravery of that remonstrance and appeal to

his Chief was of a higher order than that which was needed to lead a forlorn hope against a fortified position. It displayed the highest moral courage, which is much rarer and greater than physical courage.

No one can either read the utterances or consider the conduct of Rawlins without perceiving that he loved Grant, tenderly and patiently, and had an abiding confidence in his common sense, his ability, and his courage. That he was willing to defend him against unjust criticism, on the one hand, and to "stay him from falling," on the other, is shown beyond question by his conduct from the time he joined the staff at Cairo till he yielded up his charge in death, at Washington.

But his fame does not rest solely on the silent records which I have quoted. His courage, his firmness, his judgment, and his fidelity to duty were known far and wide by his companions of the staff, by the subordinate commanders of the armies with which he served, and by the leading men of his own State at home. McPherson, Logan, Dodge, Crocker, Ransom, Gresham, and hundreds of other officers of high rank and untarnished character were familiar with his devotion to duty and to his Chief. They knew how solicitous he was for their welfare; and how anxious he was that none should be left behind on the day of battle. They knew also how strongly he favored the maintenance of the recruiting station and the enactment and rigid enforcement of the draft, in order that the ranks should be kept full, and that the trains and transports to the front should be kept crowded with recruits and reinforcements. He was one of the few officers, high or low, who felt deeply and spoke courageously on this vital subject. His declaration that he had more confidence in the "infallibility of numbers than in the infallibility of generals," deserves to pass into an axiom of war. It became known far and wide at the time of its utterance, and was the vital principle upon which Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Meade alike won their final victories.

To Rawlins's fidelity and fearlessness in friendship Grant owed more than to any or all other extraneous influences, for without them and the support which Rawlins gave him with leading Congressmen and the representatives of the press, the work of the detractors must have been successful. Had that support been withdrawn after the Battle of Belmont, the capture of Fort Donelson, the trip to Nashville, the surprise of Shiloh, or during the delays of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg, though Grant had had the genius of a Napoleon or the fortitude of a Washington, his career must have come to an end. Nothing could have saved him from the public clamor, had Rawlins lost faith in him, or in his real merit, at any of these important epochs of his great career.

Among the most trusted correspondents of the war was S. Cadwallader, who joined Grant's headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, in October, 1862, as the representative of the *Chicago Times*, then one of the most influential journals in the West. It was Democratic in politics and hostile to the Administration as well as to the war. On his way to the front Cadwallader made the acquaintance of Colonel Thomas Lyle Dickey, at that time Grant's Chief of Cavalry, and afterwards for many years a justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois. He also met *en route* Captain Bowers, then and afterwards Rawlins's principal assistant. Through these officers he made the acquaintance of Grant and Rawlins, and soon established most intimate relations with them. He messed with the staff, and while he held no official position, he was furnished with shelter and transportation and was treated in all respects as a commissioned officer. Having satisfactorily transacted the business which took him there, he resolved to remain, and during the Vicksburg campaign became the chief correspondent of the *New York Herald*. With the exception of Rawlins, Bowers, and Parker, he was the only other man of importance who accompanied Grant from that time to the end of the war. Throughout the whole of this period, nothing was

concealed from him. He was fully trusted by both the General and his staff, and had early knowledge of everything that was taking place or under consideration. It is but just to add that he never forfeited the trust reposed in him, and was never in the slightest degree guilty of the imprudent revelations which too frequently made the war correspondent of those times an intolerable nuisance. After the war was over he was placed in charge of the *Herald* Bureau at Washington, and kept house for several months with Rawlins. Thus, from the beginning to the end of his association with Grant's headquarters, he shared the confidences and was entrusted with the secrets of those about him.

It will be recalled that Grant's death and the publication of his "Memoirs" gave rise to much discussion in the journals and magazines of the day as to his relations with Rawlins, Halleck, Smith, Butler, and others. Rawlins's Vicksburg letter to Grant and the correspondence between Rawlins and W. F. Smith were then published for the first time. The latter correspondence shows that an unbroken feeling of confidence and coöperation existed between Grant, Smith, and Rawlins down to the time that Smith asked for leave of absence from the Army of the James on account of his health. It shows also that Grant was loath to part with Smith "from the field even for a few days," and makes it clear that the rupture of the friendship between them did not take place till Smith had gone, and that it was due in all probability to the representations of Butler and his staff.

But, above all, the newspaper discussions which followed the publication of Grant's "Memoirs" brought the relations of Grant and Rawlins clearly before the public. Both were dead, and there appeared to be no necessity for further concealment as to the part each had played in respect to the other. Rawlins's friend Cadwallader was still living and felt called upon to give his testimony through the press as to the precise relations between the General and his Chief of Staff. Holding

that the part contributed by the latter to the common success had been insufficiently stated in the "Memoirs," he set it forth fully and circumstantially as he had recorded it from day to day in his own memory, or in his note books and correspondence. It not only upholds the estimate I have given of Rawlins's character and services, but is an independent and valuable contribution to the history of the times.¹

But it should be stated in addition that Parker the Indian, who lived at Galena before the war, and who joined Grant's staff at Vicksburg and remained with him to the end, had ample knowledge of all that took place at headquarters. Silent, reserved, and taciturn, he was a close observer and a good judge of character. His relations were specially close and intimate with Rawlins, whose assistant he was, and for whom he had the highest respect. In a funeral oration to the memory of his friend, he bears independent testimony to his great worth as a staff officer, lawyer, and statesman, and to the influential part he played by Grant's side as Adjutant General, Chief of Staff, and Secretary of War. While this oration contributes but little that is new, it throws a strong light from a disinterested source upon the personality, moral qualities, and character of the remarkable man it describes and commemorates. It emphasizes the fact that Rawlins played an unusual part and had a great influence upon the course of events with which it was his good fortune to be connected. Coming from a witness who knew both Grant and Rawlins while they were still plain citizens who had yet to achieve greatness, this tribute may be accepted as embodying the estimate and opinions of the Army of the Tennessee, to which they had all three belonged.

But the concurrent testimony of those who had the opportunity of knowing, and should have been able to judge dispassionately, seems to leave no doubt whatever as to the na-

¹ See Appendix, pp. 428 *et seq.*

ture and extent of the influence exercised by Rawlins over the personal conduct and military career of Grant. Extending, as it did, over the entire period of their active campaigning, and coming, as it did, to the observation of many besides themselves, there can be but little room for mistake or misunderstanding in reference to it. In this period of their lives "they were, so to speak, as but one soul." They started in the war together from the level of a common citizenship and a common patriotism. If there was any difference in them, Rawlins was at the beginning the more important man of the two. While Grant was always singularly free from the assumptions and superiority of military rank, it must be remembered that he had tasted adversity, and was unusually modest as to himself as well as considerate to others. It was but natural, therefore, that throughout their campaigning days these two should have stood together, and been frank and free from restraint towards each other.

After peace came, however, and Grant had been chosen President by an overwhelming majority, he would have been less than human had he not begun to feel that there must be some personal greatness or some superior quality about him of which even he had been hitherto ignorant. It was but natural that he should consider himself fully able to stand alone, and therefore entitled to assume towards his Cabinet the headship and independence which were his right by both custom and law. He may have been changed by prosperity, but Rawlins was not. Rawlins continued to be bold, independent, and conscientious, although this required more self-possession and prudence on his part after Grant went into politics. Adviser, as he had always been, he doubtless grew more sensitive as well as more reserved and met with greater difficulty in seeing and conferring with Grant in his new estate than he had met in the field. It was but natural, however, that Grant should remain more unreserved and more outspoken with him than with the other members of the Cabinet. Doubtless it is true

that in all matters of real importance their new relations were less intimate than those of the field, but it is evident that Rawlins still retained greater influence with Grant than did any of his associates. He was a bolder and more virile man, and naturally felt less restraint in the presence of greatness than the best of them.

It will not be forgotten that every other member of the first Cabinet was a comparative stranger both to the President and to Rawlins. The only one that either had previously known was Jacob D. Cox, who, on account of the high rank and fine reputation with which he had come out of the war, was appointed Secretary of the Interior. He was a good example of the cultivated and successful citizen soldier, but had never served directly under Grant's observation. What Grant knew about him, therefore, came largely from others. He was an able and learned lawyer, and afterwards achieved distinction as a judge and as Governor of Ohio. On account of his independence and conservatism he disapproved of Grant's policy and associates as President, and after a few months' service, resigned from the Cabinet to resume the practice of his profession. He had necessarily seen much of his official associates while in Washington, and hence his testimony in reference to them and to their relative influence with their common chief, based, as it was, upon actual observation, must be regarded as both trustworthy and important.

In an account of "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney General," which Cox contributed to the *Atlantic Monthly*,^{*} the following important and interesting statement will be found:

. . . General Rawlins had died at the beginning of September, 1869, and his death was an irreparable loss to Grant and to the Administration. Other men might fill the office of Secretary of War, but no other man could be found who could be the successful intermediary between General Grant and his associates

^{*} August, 1895.

in public duty. His friendship for his chief was of so sacredly intimate a character that he alone could break through the taciturnity into which Grant settled when he found himself in any way out of accord with the thoughts and opinions of those around him. Rawlins could argue, could expostulate, could condemn, could even upbraid, without interrupting for an hour the fraternal confidence and good will of Grant. He had won the right to this relation by an absolute devotion which dated from Grant's appointment to be a brigadier-general in 1861, and which had made him the good genius of his friend in every crisis of Grant's wonderful career. This was not because of Rawlins's great intellect, for he was of only moderate mental powers. It was rather that he became a living and speaking conscience for his general, as courageous to speak in time of need as Nathan the prophet, and as absolutely trusted as Jonathan by David.

In military problems Grant had a strong and almost intuitive sagacity in determining upon the path to victory, not always the easiest or the most economical in blood and treasure, but a sure one when his own indomitable courage and will had clear scope. He silently listened to the discussion of such men as Sherman and McPherson, he patiently turned the matter over in his own thoughts and after a while announced a decision which showed the aid he got from intelligent debate, whilst it was clearly marked with his own directness of purpose and boldness of action. Rawlins knew how to bring on such helpful discussion in Grant's presence. He knew how to reënforce the influence of those who deserved to be trusted and to expose insidious and false friendship. He had blunt, wrathful words of objurgation for those who put in Grant's way temptations which he knew to be dangerous. A moral monitor and guide, not hesitating at big oaths and camp expletives, seems a strange type of man, but no one could deny that Rawlins's heart was as true and his perception of the thing demanded by the honor and the welfare of his Chief was as clear as his manners and words often were rough.

It will not need argument to show how useful such a friend and counsellor might be as a Cabinet officer. He could give warnings that no one else could utter; he could insist upon debate and information before settled purposes should be adopted; he would know of influences at work that others would learn of only when some important step was already taken; his own openness of character would make him frank in action with his colleagues

and an honorable representative of their general judgment and policy. Rawlins might have differed from Mr. Fish as to the foreign policy of his government, especially in regard to Cuba, but he would have seen to it that no kitchen cabinet committed the President to schemes of which his responsible advisers were ignorant. Indeed, there was no danger that a kitchen cabinet could exist till Rawlins was dead.

The extract just quoted caused me to write to Cox for further information, and my letter drew from him a reply, dated September 19, 1895, from which I quote as follows:

. . . General Rawlins was, as you know, in failing health when he entered Grant's Cabinet. The spring of 1869 was so completely filled with the business of organization and the making of appointments that very little opportunity was offered for general discussion of affairs which would have enabled me to form a satisfactory judgment of Rawlins's intellectual quality in civil affairs. What I saw of him I greatly liked, but he was not pushing in his method of dealing with others, a little shy and observant, rather than assertive at the beginning, and evidently weakened by disease.

Then he left Washington in the summer, as I recollect, and was taken more seriously ill and died at the beginning of September. I had not the privilege of more than a passing acquaintance with him in the army, for I never served in the columns with which he was immediately connected.

You will see, therefore, that my judgment of him was necessarily based upon what seemed the current opinion of those who knew about him, modified by what I learned from various sources, of his peculiar relations to General Grant and his extraordinary influence over him.

I am far from holding with any tenacity the opinion which you criticize, that is, that Rawlins had no great mental power. On the other hand, I so fully recognize the logical force of the evidence of his capacity, found in his influence over such a man as Grant, that I shall be among the first to welcome the evidence of his powers in every direction.

The noble traits which I have mentioned in several papers (including the one in the *Atlantic Monthly*) seemed to me to deserve a more emphatic recognition than they have commonly

got, and this made me welcome an opportunity to bear testimony to them.

I am sincerely glad to learn that you have in hand Rawlins's Memoirs and shall hope that you may not be much longer delayed in procuring the officially completed records which will round out the materials for your work. . . .

Extracts and quotations from reports, addresses, and articles from the newspapers and magazines, and even from memoirs and histories of the times, bearing positive testimony to the high esteem in which Rawlins was held, might be indefinitely extended; but enough have been given to show even to the most sceptical that he was a man of extraordinary vigor and force of character, who exerted both a powerful and a beneficial influence not only over the personal fortunes of his Chief but over the policies and plans for which in the last resort his Chief was responsible. That he exerted that influence at all times and in all places to the personal and official advantage of his friend and commander as well as for the advancement of his country's best interests cannot be doubted. Indeed, so much has been admitted with singular unanimity by all who knew him at the time, or who have contributed to the history of the period. But more might well have been said. All agree that so long as Rawlins was the final, if not the principal, adviser in all the great emergencies of Grant's life, and that in all military affairs from first to last Grant's efforts were crowned with marked success, and neither hurtful criticisms nor failures overtook him in the field or in the White House, till after death had deprived him of the counsel and advice of his faithful and fearless friend, it must now be evident that Rawlins was a vital and essential factor of the dual character which has passed into history under the name of Grant.

Moreover, it is the firm belief of many that had Rawlins lived in the enjoyment of health and strength, and continued to hold his place and influence with Grant, Grant's political

career must have been much more successful than it was. Who can imagine Rawlins tolerating, or permitting Grant to tolerate, the false friends who afterwards brought so much discredit upon the Administration? He would have been the inflexible enemy of the foul brood of Post traders, fraudulent distillers, and rascally speculators in gold, who defrauded the Government and besmirched so many of the President's official associates. That Rawlins had protected him with a fair degree of success through his military life is ample to warrant the belief, and strongly supports the probability of a like success in political life.

Rawlins has been called by those who knew him but superficially a "fierce" and even a "violent" man. He has been characterized as rough and overbearing by those who felt the heat of his anger or of his indignation, but he was just, patient, modest, considerate, and fearless in the performance of what he conceived to be his duty. With remarkable self-control, with a strong and vehement vocabulary of plain Saxon English, and a full, penetrating voice, he was accustomed to express himself in language which no man could affect to misunderstand. Under the influence of deep feelings or in the advocacy of an important cause, he spoke with extraordinary clearness and deliberation. His dark and flashing eyes would light up with all the fire of an impassioned orator, his lips would curl and recede, leaving his strong and shapely teeth exposed while his dark and swarthy face grew pale and tremulous from the intensity of his emotions. Under these conditions, it was a bold man indeed who stood unblenched before him, or undertook to resist the force and logic of his argument.

It is literally true, as stated by Cadwallader, that, when strongly aroused and in earnest, Rawlins never failed to carry his General with him. It is equally true that when thoroughly interested, no sense of fear, no thought of danger or of personal consequence, ever seemed to enter his mind or to turn

him aside from his purpose so much as by the breadth of a hair. Simple, honest, austere, and abstemious in all his ways, he expected the same virtue in all who were entrusted with power. He had but little patience with the petty foibles of full-grown men. He hated lying and prevarication in others so intensely that they were impossible to himself. He condemned drunkenness and gambling so unsparingly that he could not tolerate even moderate drinking or playing in those that were charged with the responsibilities of high command. Untiring in his industry, sleepless in his vigilance, and unfailing in his devotion to duty, he had no patience with those who wasted their time, or lost their opportunities, in idleness and inattention.

Possessing these high qualities and characteristics, he lacked only the technical education and practical experience of an officer commanding troops to have become, with the opportunities which were within reach, one of the leading generals of the army. While he was never a religious man, he had been brought up in the faith of the Methodist Episcopal Church, conformed to its discipline, and accepted its sacred offices and its consolation as he felt himself nearing the close of his earthly career. His funeral was conducted with the solemnity due to his high rank. The officers of the army wore the usual badge of mourning for three months. The President, who arrived in Washington after his friend's death, with the Cabinet, diplomatic corps, and many officers of the army, attended the ceremonies, while the newspapers of the country were filled with appropriate articles praising the high character, the valuable services, and the extraordinary worth of the departed Secretary.

He was buried in the Congressional Cemetery under a modest monument erected and paid for by his family and kinsmen. Later, a bronze statue, of questionable artistic merit, was erected to his memory by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, at the south side of Pennsylvania Avenue, between

8th and 9th Streets, in Washington city. Still later his remains were reinterred in the National Military Cemetery at Arlington. "Pass them not by for the simplicity of their resting place. Few tombs hold nobler dust."³

In the strong and unassuming modesty of Grant's character, in the unshakable quality of his courage, in his fine sense of duty, in his approved capacity to trample temptation under foot and to bear the responsibility which should not be shifted to another man's shoulders, and, above all, in the magnitude of his victories, as well as in the sufficiency of his rewards, he is undoubtedly great enough to have the simple truth told about himself as well as about the officer to whom he was so deeply indebted. Nor should it be doubted that in the days of his health and strength, and acting under his own generous impulses, he would have been the first to do full justice to the abilities, worth, and services of his only Chief of Staff, his first Secretary of War, and, best of all, his wise, fearless, and indispensable friend in all the emergencies of life.

³ Goldwin Smith's History of the United Kingdom, Vol. I, p. 201.

APPENDIX

I

LETTERS FROM GENERAL RAWLINS—THE GREATER NUMBER TO HIS WIFE

NASHVILLE, Jan. 16, 1864.

I arrived here last night [from the leave of absence which he took to be married] and found all well and delighted to see me. . . . I myself am still troubled with my cold. I mention this not to cause you uneasiness . . . but simply because I promised you I would write you the exact state of my health, whether good or bad, and this I shall always do. This morning was delightful, just cold enough to be bracing to those who sought the street for a stroll either for pleasure or business. Don't understand me to say there were any pleasure promenaders, for, dearest, if there ever was a city over which the shadow of gloom hung darkly it is this. It is literally the City of Woe. Nineteen out of twenty of the inhabitants are in mourning for friends who have been killed in battle. . . . The very buildings seem to lift their darkened and dingy walls in consciousness of the gloom above them. . . .

I have just written a letter to General Ransom, one of my warmest and most intimate friends, and send you an extract from it. "While North, at Danbury, Connecticut, on the 23rd ultimo, I married Miss Mary E. Hurlbut, whom I met first at our headquarters in Vicksburg, where she had been during the siege, having gone South with friends previous to the outbreak of the rebellion. . . . She was for the Union after my acquaintance with her and will instruct and educate my children in the spirit and sentiment of patriotism which I hope will always actuate them." . . .

The following extract from a letter written by Mr. C. A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, to General Wilson I send you, knowing how pleased you are at everything said pleasantly of

me. Don't, however, indulge in Mr. Dana's forebodings as to my health. "Mrs. Rawlins I had no opportunity of seeing, but I hope she will add nothing but happiness to the life of her most excellent husband. His appearance made me somewhat anxious about him. I feared that his lungs might be more seriously affected than I had supposed. His loss would be a great misfortune, not only for his friends, but still more for the country. Public servants of his quality will always be few. There are plenty of men whose names will flourish largely in history without having rendered a tithe of his unostentatious and invaluable contributions to the great work of the nation."

NASHVILLE, Jan. 17, 1864.

. . . Everything is quiet here and will be until supplies can be got forward to the troops at Chattanooga and Knoxville. Had a sufficiency of supplies been at the latter place when General Grant was there a few days ago, he would have undertaken to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. As it was all he could do was to move troops out, to contest with him the foraging ground in the vicinity. Daily collisions may be expected between our forces and the enemy. Sherman has gone to Vicksburg, and will organize there a heavy force for immediate operations. In the meantime we will use all the means in our power to forward supplies to the front and be ready if possible to move when he does; although you may hear of no immediate and startling events, you may know we are not idle, but that every preparation is being made for conflicts which will shake the continent ere this terrible tragedy closes.

NASHVILLE, Jan. 18, 1864.

. . . General Wilson has been ordered to Washington, where he will take charge of the Cavalry Bureau. It is a difficult and responsible position, yet I have faith in his ability to perform its arduous duties. No one wishes more earnestly than I that he may succeed, for he is a brave, faithful officer, a high-minded and honorable man. We shall miss him much. General Grant has not started to St. Louis yet, but is waiting for an answer to his inquiry as to how his son is. Should he be getting better, the General will not go. There is no news to-day from the front, and we presume therefore all is quiet on the Tennessee. A letter from General Halleck to General Grant received to-day states that much opposition will be made to General McPherson's

appointment as brigadier general in the regular army. General Grant has written a strong letter in reply, urging the Senate to confirm him. . . . My cold is still troublesome, but I hope to report differently in a few days.

Jan. 19, 1864.

. . . General Grant and wife start for St. Louis in the morning, and will be absent eight or ten days. Fred is very ill, but will recover. . . . General Wilson also starts in the morning for Washington to assume his new duties. May success attend him, is my sincere wish. Colonel Duff left here on Saturday for Vicksburg with important despatches for General Sherman. Yesterday a message came from him that he was snowed in at Mitchell, Indiana. . . .

A collision between our forces and the enemy on the 14th instant, consequent on the extension of our lines out from Knoxville that I spoke of in a former letter, ordered by General Grant when he was at Knoxville, resulted in the capture by the enemy of a wagon train of ours, some twenty-three wagons, but they were subsequently recaptured by our forces, together with an ambulance of the enemy loaded with medicine, and the capture of the rebel General Vance, his assistant adjutant general, over a hundred of his men and two hundred horses and equipments, which ended the affair decidedly in our favor. . . .

Jan. 20, 1864.

. . . After I wrote you last night, we received a despatch from General Foster at Knoxville, stating that General Longstreet had advanced in heavy force against him and that he was falling back on Knoxville, where he might have to stand a siege. That Longstreet will again lay siege to that place, I can scarcely believe, for he certainly cannot do so with any reasonable hope of success, enabled as we are to move a much superior force from Chattanooga, to the relief of Foster, with the river to supply it most of the way. It is more probable, to my mind, that he has simply advanced to extend his foraging ground and limit ours, and however well we have determined his designs, in the meantime we must be prepared for any emergency. This news has prevented General Grant from going to St. Louis for the present, and he, General Smith (Baldy), and I go forward to Chattanooga to-morrow to look after affairs at Knoxville. We may possibly have to go to Knoxville, but I hope we may be able to put things

into shape without having to go so far. The great question is that of supplies, which is always one of difficulty with an army far advanced in the enemy's country.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS.,
NASHVILLE, TENN., Jan. 20, 1864.

DEAR WASHBURNE:

On my return from the North I was pleased to find your very welcome and interesting letter of the 20th ultimo, and I hasten to assure you, your friendship for the General, your devotion to our common country, and heroic manifestation of interest in the welfare and success of our army here, through evil as well as good report, in the dark hour of the Nation's despondency, as well as in the light of its victories, are truly and honestly appreciated, and to you, more than any one in Congress, the great heart of the army warms with gratitude as its true representative and hold and uncompromising defender. So give yourself no concern in the matter of the cavalry regiment you speak of, for the General fully understands your motives and knows them to be prompted solely by a desire for the public service and in friendship to him.

I see by the papers the bill creating a Lieutenant Generalcy is still undisposed of. So far as General Grant may be regarded in connection with it, I can only say that if the conferring of this distinguished honor upon him would be the taking him out of the field, or would supersede General Halleck, he would not desire it, for he feels that if he can be of service to the Government in any place, it is in command of the army in the field, and there is where he would remain if made a lieutenant general; besides, he has great confidence in and friendship for the General-in-Chief, and would without regard to rank be willing at all times to receive orders through him.

The advocacy of the *New York Herald* and other papers of the General for the Presidency gives him little concern; he is unambitious of the honor and will voluntarily put himself in no position nor permit himself to be placed in one he can prevent that will in the slightest manner embarrass the friends of the Government in their present grand effort to enforce its rightful authority and restore the Union of the States. Of his views in this matter, I suppose he has fully acquainted you.

The presence of Longstreet in East Tennessee is much to be

regretted. Had General Grant's order been energetically and with a broader judgment executed by General Burnside, Longstreet would have been forced to have continued his retreat from Knoxville to beyond the Tennessee line. The General's official report will show the facts and order and be satisfactory, I have no doubt, to the Government. Our forces in the Holsten Valley, east of Knoxville, have been compelled by Longstreet to fall back towards Knoxville. Whether he intends to again undertake the capture of that place, or simply to extend his forage ground, is not as yet known. In either design he must be foiled. General Grant, General W. F. Smith and myself go forward to-morrow to Chattanooga, that the General may be enabled to give his personal attention to affairs in the direction of Knoxville. Fred, the General's oldest son, is lying very sick at St. Louis with the "Typhoid Pneumonia," and he was intending to start to see him this morning, but despatches from Knoxville detained him, and he turns in the direction of duty to his country, leaving his afflicted family to the care of friends.

I am sorry I did not see you when in New York—there is much that I would have been pleased to tell you that one cannot write.

While North, on the 23rd day of December, 1863, at Danbury, Conn., I was married to Miss Mary E. Hurlbut, a native of that place and daughter of S. A. Hurlbut, Esq. I first met her in Vicksburg in the family at whose house we made headquarters after the fall of that place. She was in the city during the entire siege, having gone South with friends previous to the breaking out of the rebellion. From my acquaintance with her, she was in favor of the Union, and will instruct and educate my children in the spirit and sentiment of true patriotism that I hope will ever actuate them in the support and maintenance of the princely inheritance bequeathed us by our revolutionary fathers and now being daily enhanced in value and increased in endearment by the sacrifices we are making for its preservation. She is now with my three little ones at the home of my parents near Galena. I saw few of my friends in Galena, owing to my limited stay, having been there only about six hours of daylight. I had hoped to spend a week, but detention on the cars from snow prevented it. Galena was really lively and all seemed well.

General Grant is in excellent health and is "himself" in all things. Colonel Brown, Major Rowley, etc., all send their re-

gards to you. General Wilson has been ordered to Washington to take charge of the Cavalry Bureau. He is a brave and accomplished young officer, and has rendered valuable services in the field. I hope he may be successful in his new duties and bespeak for him your kind offices of friendship.

I met Russell Jones in Chicago, and he made me go to see Mr. Autrobus's paintings of the General. They are both very fine, and the full-size one I regard as the finest likeness I ever saw. I am no judge of paintings, but I examined this one closely and compared it in my own mind with the General and pronounced it like him, and since my return I have looked at and watched the General with interest and compared him with the picture, and am sure he is like it. . . .

Hoping to hear from you soon, I remain, your friend.

CHATTANOOGA, Jan. 23, 1864.

. . . In one view you behold the mountains of several States, including the gorge in Taylor's Ridge at Ringgold, where was fought the last battle in the Chattanooga series, and the only one in which we were not eminently successful. . . . The mountains to the east and southeast of Lookout (which stands peerless amid its neighbors) so lift themselves up from Lookout that one at first mistakes them for clouds far above the horizon. Through this vast system of mountains meanders to almost every point of the compass the magnificent Tennessee, and perhaps from no point does it present so picturesque and grandly beautiful an appearance as from the top of Lookout. . . .

The news from General Foster at Knoxville is more cheering than when we left Nashville—I might say quite satisfactory—and no danger is now apprehended from General Longstreet's move, notwithstanding the alarming despatch of the 15th instant that brought us so hurriedly to this place. Thus it ever is in war, alarm, alarms allayed, excitement, and excitement subsiding into quiet.

Our greatest and worst apprehension is that we may be delayed in getting forward our supplies, because of the non-completion of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. Had we sufficient supplies here now we should immediately commence active operations which would compel the enemy to give us battle where he is ill prepared or abandon all the country he holds in our front as far back as Atlanta. But as it is, we must wait. The visit of

General Grant to this place has had at least one good effect, and that is it has wakened him up to see what I have been strongly urging upon him since my return, namely, the inefficiency of Mr. Adna Anderson, superintendent of our railroads here, and he has telegraphed the fact to the Secretary of War. I hope a change will at once be made. Nothing could be of more benefit at this time to the service than the relieving of Mr. Anderson by some one who has patriotism, ability and energy, one who will comprehend fully our necessities and supply them.

We are, however, making preparations for a movement within the next two weeks threatening Rome, and will, if opportunity invites, attempt to capture that place. Sherman in the meantime is to move through from Vicksburg to Meridian. Thus menaced I know not what the enemy may do, but we will try and take advantage of any weakness he may disclose. The General, W. F. Smith and myself will probably leave here to-morrow for Nashville. . . .

CHATTANOOGA, Jan. 24, 1864.

. . . The excitement in the vicinity of Knoxville that seemed to be allayed is just renewed. A despatch from General Foster says Longstreet is pressing heavily on that place; that he has received considerable reinforcements, but not enough, he apprehends, to warrant him in again besieging it; that through the cowardice of the drovers a drove of three hundred cattle had already been captured by the enemy and that he feared the loss also of a drove of two hundred hogs, but had sent out active parties to try to save it, and that he is drawing his forces into Knoxville and looking to the security of his communications with Chattanooga. Now this all sounds, to say the least, badly. With a force equal in numbers to Longstreet's, instead of falling back he should have taken up a strong position and given Longstreet battle. If successful it would have been the end of Longstreet in East Tennessee, and if unsuccessful he could still have fallen back with safety to within the defences of Knoxville and there have awaited a siege if it had been the disposition of the enemy to make it. The talk about the cowardice of drovers as the cause of the loss of the cattle is not a sufficient answer for their loss. With an army so destitute and dependent for supplies from afar, it was clearly his duty to have had the drove under the protection of a strong, armed escort, thus insuring it against attack from

the enemy. Situated as we are here, it will be with the greatest difficulty we can relieve him. The great number of the troops that have reënlisted (and gone home on furlough) have so reduced the army here as to leave barely a sufficiency for local purposes. It is really provoking when an army of sufficient force is from some unexplained cause unable to help itself and another has to be ordered to succor it. Somebody is to blame certain; time will show who. Had General Grant's order been carried out this cloud, so threatening disaster in East Tennessee, would never have gathered.

We leave here about 6 o'clock P. M. for Nashville. It may be that I will have to go by Huntsville with orders and instructions for General Logan. If so it will be several days before I reach Nashville. . . . General Grant has had a severe attack of sick headache since our arrival here, but is now over it. He is himself in all respects. He laughs at my writing you daily, wonders how you manage to read my writing, and says he don't think I will hold out so constant and frequent a correspondent as I have begun. . . .

NASHVILLE, Jan. 25, 1864.

. . . After writing you yesterday I had the satisfaction of seeing orders issued for troops to be moved from Chattanooga to Knoxville under General Thomas in person, with directions that on reaching the latter place he assume command of our entire forces there and give Longstreet battle. This is as it should be, and unless orders are changed, which I don't think will be the case, a bloody fight may be expected soon, or East Tennessee will be evacuated by the enemy.

We left Chattanooga about a quarter after six P. M. and arrived here a few minutes before seven this morning, General Grant going directly on to St. Louis and leaving matters here to be attended to by Colonel Bowers and myself. The first thing that met my eye was a despatch from General Foster stating that the enemy had ceased to press him vigorously, that he had no idea they would attack Knoxville, that he had secured the drove of 4,800 hogs he had feared were in danger, but his troops needed rest and he had ordered them into winter quarters.

So you see the difference in the despatches of yesterday and to-day. One was most alarming and the other allays the alarm previously caused. In this manner has the news alternated from

that quarter ever since my return, and yet General Foster is said to be a brave man and perhaps is.

The next was a despatch from General Halleck relating to the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, the security of our present line on the Tennessee River, and future operations. And as the General was absent, and Thomas's orders to go to the relief of Knoxville depended somewhat upon information he might receive from Foster, I determined under cover of sending a copy of General Halleck's letter to him, to make his orders positive, and depend upon nothing less than the result we hoped to accomplish by his going there. Accordingly I directed him "to relax no energy and spare no exertion in his preparations for moving into East Tennessee, no matter what news he might have from Foster, short of the enemy's retreat from the State." So you see that if Longstreet is not driven out of the State, it will not be because I have not in the General's absence made the orders ring with fight.

The Secretary of War has authorized a change of the superintendent of railroads, and if the changes are not made it will be the General's fault, for the moment the despatches came I telegraphed an order for the officer to report here by whom the present superintendent will probably be relieved, and repeated the Secretary's despatch to Louisville, where I have no doubt the General will get it. I also advised him of the action I had taken in the matter. It is now time, but no reply has yet been received. I spoke yesterday of going to Huntsville, but instead I sent the orders to Logan. On the General's return, however, I expect to go down to that place, if not before. . . .

NASHVILLE, Jan. 29, 1864.

. . . All reports confirm the statements you see in the newspapers. President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation is having a very salutary effect. Many are deserting from the Confederate army and coming into our lines to avail themselves of it by taking the oath it prescribes.

My health is good—my cough has ceased to annoy me. General Grant has not returned from St. Louis, but will be back next Tuesday.

NASHVILLE, Jan. 30, 1864.

. . . To the theatre I never think of going, although they have here celebrated star actors and actresses sufficient for a con-

stellation. I attend to the various duties of my position with what abilities I possess and think of home. . . .

NASHVILLE, Jan. 31, 1864.

. . . General Grant has not yet returned, but will leave St. Louis in the morning. I see by the papers he was to have a supper given him at the Lindell last night. I'm sorry it is so, for I had hoped he would go there and return without permitting himself to be paraded before the public, but the fact is—you know the General pretty well—he can't say no, and then there is another thing which may do to tell the masses: that is, he dislikes these public ovations. He may appear awkward in the midst of them, but he likes them nevertheless. At least I've yet to know of his declining one. You are fully aware of my fears in all this. I need not state them.

NASHVILLE, Feb. 1, 1864.

. . . News from Knoxville is uninteresting. So says General Foster, commanding there. Scouts of General Dodge report great commotion among the enemy in front of Chattanooga. They are moving troops from Dalton south on the Mobile road, either for Mobile or Meridian. This is consequent no doubt on the movement of Sherman eastward from Vicksburg and of the cavalry southeast from Memphis, which I mentioned in previous letters. If we had supplies and the reënlisted regiments were back from furlough, we could now strike such a blow as it would be impossible for the enemy to recover from. We are doomed, however, to wait, I fear, till the enemy recovers from the injuries he received at Chattanooga and becomes once more a strong man in the fight.

Hundreds fleeing from conscription are coming into our lines daily; great dissatisfaction exists because the rebel government is conscripting men who have already sent substitutes into the army. This is regarded by the people as an act of great injustice, but what can they do against an organized despotism? Literally nothing. Should this discontent seriously infect the army, we may hope something from it, because, as at the recent battle of Chattanooga, they will not fight with the determination that has characterized them in all the other battles I have been in or known anything about. . . .

If there is anything I can do for your friends at Vicksburg, not inconsistent with the good of the service, I will do it cheer-

fully. I desire you to say this, not more on account of their friendship to you than because of their uniform kind treatment of me and of the general regard shown by them to the military authorities, whatever may have been their feelings.

General Grant has not got back from St. Louis yet, but is on his way and will be here, I suppose, to-morrow evening. I am really anxious for his return, although everything has gone on smoothly in his absence and the public service has not suffered. *Still here is his place*, and when he is about I feel much easier in mind. . . .

The next day he adds:

NASHVILLE, Feb. 3, 1864.

. . . General Grant reached Louisville yesterday afternoon and despatched me he would not come on here till Friday unless it was absolutely necessary. I replied to him that important matters demanded his attention here, to which I have received no answer, and infer he is on his way. The train is behind time, and will not arrive before twelve o'clock to-night. Here is his proper place, and his country and friends may rest assured he will never be absent by any counseling of of mine, while I maintain my present official relations to him.

I received last evening an answer from the Honorable E. B. Washburne to my letter to him dated 20th ultimo, in which he says, after speaking of the efforts he made to see me while in New York: "It would have given me great pleasure to have made my congratulations to you and your wife personally. I communicate them to you now and through you to Mrs. Rawlins. I would always be willing to underwrite for a Connecticut girl at a very small rate of premium." He adds: "The bill creating a Lieutenant Generalcy is sure to become a law and that General Grant will be the hero honored with the rank thus created." If so, I may if I desire it no doubt obtain a prominent position in the army, but as I now view things I shall seek for no situation in that direction. To be at home with wife and children is the highest ambition of my life.

. . . Everything is quiet, no reports of alarm or threatened movements of the enemy from any part of our long-extended lines to-day. Major General Schofield, late of the Department of Missouri, has been assigned to command the Department of the Ohio. He relieved General Foster, and I hope he may prove competent

for his new place. Knoxville is his headquarters and his position is the most difficult of any in the country. He went forward to-day.

Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, whom you met at Vicksburg, and one of his sons, also passed on from here to-day for Knoxville. He did not congratulate me on my new relations. I suppose he is past the age of thinking of these civilities. He is, however, the first of many of my army acquaintances, who had had the pleasure of seeing you, that overlooked this civility. The General was very cordial in his greetings, however, and I have no doubt it was meeting so many here that caused him to neglect the matter alluded to.

On February 4 he wrote:

NASHVILLE, February 4, 1864.

. . . General Grant arrived this evening and is in excellent health. His non-arrival last night made me nervous, and you will not be surprised to know that it caused me to break over my resolution not to swear. I feared everything was not as it should be with him, but his appearance has agreeably disappointed me, and for once I have done him injustice in my thoughts. He left Mrs. Grant in St. Louis with Fred, who is slowly recovering, but is a mere skeleton. I have had no talk with him yet about the supper given him at the Lindell House, business being first in order.

To-day I had the pleasure of meeting Colonel McCallum and of assigning him to duty as General Manager of railways in the Military Division and relieving Mr. Anderson, whose inefficiency has paralyzed the operations of this army very considerably, in my opinion. However, I may be wrong. In Colonel McCallum we look for more energy, greater efficiency, and more cordial subordination to the military authorities. In other words, he will work for the interests of the army and feel that he belongs to and is not independent of it, as did Mr. Anderson.

On the 6th he says:

NASHVILLE, February 6, 1864.

. . . This is the second anniversary of the fall of Fort Henry. How little I dreamed then the war would continue this long. But so it is, and no clear sight is yet had of its close. No break in

the blood-bearing clouds of war reveals to us the sky of Peace beyond. In faith and patriotism we are still strong and hope ere long to welcome the return of peace, and join our wives and children in their happy homes and enjoy with them the remainder of our days, the fruits of our toil and suffering in the cause of right and liberty, as did our fathers after the successful termination of the War of Independence. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 7, 1864.

. . . General Grant has determined to go himself in command of the forces to operate against Longstreet, and we shall leave here for Knoxville within ten or twelve days. I feel he should go. It is too important a matter to trust entirely to others, however competent they may be, for should they fail the country will ask why he was not there.

So far as any news is received, all is quiet in our front to-day. Captain Leet is home on furlough. I don't know whether I mentioned it in my previous letters. He is a fine officer, and I flatter myself for procuring his promotion from a private in the ranks to the position he now fills so well. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 8, 1864.

. . . I am delighted to know that my friends both in the city and country are so kind to you, and also to hear that so many are my friends. I have ever tried to pursue an upright, honorable course through life, that I might always be enabled to look those whom I may meet full in the face without fear of discovering in the countenance or looks of any an expression of "You have done wrong," either in my personal treatment of them or in my failure to discharge my duty, my whole duty to my country to the utmost of my ability. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 9, 1864.

. . . I have written to no one at Washington to look after my confirmation nor sought to influence any one to that end, being content to discharge my duty in any position and with any rank the authorities see fit to confer upon me to the best of my abilities at all times. I doubt not my confirmation, however. Standing as I do in the near relation to General Grant, and the wholesome influence I am supposed to exercise for his good, which is not unknown personally to several gentlemen of great influence in Washington, and who are to be found both in Congress and in

the War Department and belonging to both political parties, I do not fear the result. If I am not confirmed I will necessarily go out of the service or fall back to my rank as assistant adjutant general with the rank of major, my lieutenant-colonelcy being assignable rank only. My impression is that a failure in confirmation will leave me a civilian. In that event I shall at least visit "dear wife and children" before seeking another position in the army. I have never sought promotion, but on the contrary declined a colonelcy when it was offered to me and accepted a majority. To be put out of service with no fault or seeking of my own could attach to me no stain of dishonor or semblance of faltering in this hour of darkness and peril. I am therefore without anxiety as to the action of the Senate in my case. I enclose my proper address.

I shall begin to-morrow in connection with Colonel Bowers to copy up General Grant's official report of the battles of Chattanooga. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 10, 1864.

. . . A division of General Logan's troops moves to-morrow from near Scottsboro to Chattanooga to take the place of troops ordered from the latter place to Knoxville; thus the ball begins to roll, and before many weeks pass the conflict between the Federal and Confederate forces in East Tennessee will commence for the mastery of that section. I have great confidence in our ability to succeed, first, because we will have the superior force unless theirs is greatly underestimated, and, second, because our line of supplies will be well established, insuring us against danger and a deficiency of supplies. Thus with the most men, and them well supplied, and a just cause, victory must incline to perch on our banners, as in times past. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 11, 1864.

. . . General John D. Stevenson, the gentleman who presented me a fine saddle at Vicksburg, is here on his way to Pulaski, and I am of the opinion that he will want a change made in his order, and on the strength of his friendship for me and my reciprocation of it will expect to succeed, but in this he is mistaken. I would do anything in the world for the General, consistent with the public service, but I think in command of Pulaski he will do better than at any other place.

I am much better with my cough to-night than I was yester-

day and hope soon to be well. We will go to Chattanooga in a few days; troops are on the move from Scottsboro to that place, and those to go from the latter place to Knoxville will start Monday next. To-day General Grant received a fine horse as a present from a gentleman in Cincinnati.

The news from the front is "all quiet." Despatches from General Schofield dated 7th instant state that he had assumed command at Knoxville. Many of the ladies here are desirous of going South, and the General has promised to permit them to do so on a certain day in the future, via Decatur. I shall use my influence to prevent it if possible, for I do not believe either in sending persons through our lines by compulsion or permission.

NASHVILLE, February 13, 1864.

. . . This is my thirty-third birthday. In looking back to my earliest remembrance of events, how full of anxiety and fears, of cherished but disappointed hopes my life has been, and still withal how fortunate in the realization of my most extravagant youthful dreams! In some things I flatter myself I have held my own. I entered life poor, and am in that position now. I had the warm love of my parents, and have now, never having for a moment estranged them from me. In my young heart of high hopes they inculcated principles of virtue, honesty and patriotism. In the light of these I have sought ever to walk, but that I have many times deviated, it were sinful to deny. Yet beyond the reach of their pure rays and the whispering of conscience I have never wandered. In youth I had many friends, who in numbers and warmth of affection have multiplied as the sphere of my acquaintance has extended. With only such an education as a sparsely settled country afforded, I passed creditably from manual to mental labor, from the plough to the bar, and from civil to military life, thereby exchanging the sweets of peace for the bitterness of war. I have attained in rank the highest grade but one in the army, and been honorably connected with the most important successes of our arms, passing unharmed, although exposed in person, through the battles of Belmont, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, the siege of Corinth, the battles in the campaign and siege of Vicksburg, and in those about Chattanooga. In my domestic relations I have been peculiarly fortunate and most happy, not without sorrow, however, death having entered and for a while cast a gloom of sadness over my home. This

was the loss of my first wife whom I loved so well for her amiability of manner, gentleness, sweetness of disposition and virtue. Few of earth's daughters were so lovely; none in Heaven stands nearer the throne. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 14, 1864.

. . . I have received the photographs. Mine is miserable; I look in it sad and deathlike, yet I am not prepared to say it is not a correct picture, for perhaps it is. I never sat for one that did not contain that same sad sorrowful expression. It may be that I appear to others as my pictures show me to myself. If so, how miserable I must be deemed. But am I miserable and unhappy? No, I am not. Your sweet and beautiful picture daguerreotypes the feelings of my heart. I am happy in my wife and my children's love, and in great numbers of friends who are ever willing to serve me. So keep not the picture of me, dearest. It is false to my heart, though it may be true to my face. Retain that of yourself and in your warm, loving imagination invest it with all the virtues the original possesses, and say this reflects truly my husband's heart and soul. He loves me and confides in me all things. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 15, 1864.

. . . General Grant talks some of going to Chattanooga this week. I don't know whether he will or not, but if he goes I shall go also.

Colonel Bowers and I are very busily engaged of evenings on the General's official report of the battles of Chattanooga, which I assure you is a very unpleasant and I might say thankless undertaking, for the General is very tenacious of the claim that he writes his own reports, and it is necessary for us to follow the text as nearly as possible. With the transposition of sentences, even pages, and the writing out too of the very plans of the battles, this is difficult.

My cough still continues but I think I am improving. For a while I gained strength but have not done so for several days past. If I could take a trip South, I think it would be of great service to me, but the doctors say there is no danger. They ought to tell me the truth and I hope do. A cough, however, from the 10th of October to the 15th of February is not to be slightly treated. . . .

NASHVILLE, February 16, 1864.

. . . What I owe is in the army, but you shall have a full statement soon. Don't think for one moment, dearest, that I have ever foolishly expended money or recklessly got in debt. I entered the army owing between three and four thousand dollars, nearly all of which I have paid, besides supporting myself and family, and the support of my family has been quite expensive, more so than it is now.

No news of importance from the front except that General Thomas is ready for a move on Dalton, and will perhaps start to-morrow. . . .

LOUISVILLE, March 6, 1864.

. . . I have just returned from the theatre, not at all delighted with having gone, but the General would go, and I deemed it at least courteous to go with him . . . I sat with the General and other officers of rank in a private box, and witnessed the play of Jane Short or the Royal Favorite. During its performance I was supremely disgusted . . . with the eagerness or willingness rather, of him we love to say is so modest and unassuming to acknowledge the notice people are taking of him. In one who had less reputation for modesty it would be pardonable. Oh, greatness, how dost thou lift up . . . those whom thou favorest! I feel that to go with them is ascending heights too far above the level of my plebeian birth; beyond the reach of any influence I can exert for my country's good. A few short weeks will determine this. And believe me, dearest, should my sad forebodings be realized, and I can find an honorable way in which to retire from a service in which my usefulness is questionable, I shall do so. I write this not from anything that has occurred between the General and me, for let me assure you, he was never more kind and mindful of me than now. I had a long talk with him on the subject of General Wilson's letter, as we came from Nashville, and he agrees with me in every particular . . .

I talked to him upon the importance of an able and accomplished corps of staff officers, should he be the recipient of the high honor in connection with which his name is mentioned, namely, the Lieutenant-Generalcy, and before we get to Washington I shall assure him of my readiness to withdraw from his staff in order to enable him to fill my place with an educated

and finished soldier. As Lieutenant-General he will be the first in military position in the United States, and my military education is not such as to fit me for his chief of staff, hence it becomes me to withdraw and allow one who is fitted for it to take the place. True, were I vain enough I might claim to retain the place, for I have been with him throughout his thus far brilliant career; have been his stay and support in his darkest hours, and never I trust his injudicious friend. I have shared with him the hardships of the camp, borne with him the fatigues of the march, and braved with him the dangers of battle from the bloody plain of Belmont to the crimson fields of Chattanooga. In all, to the best of my ability, I have served my country and him; and trust my beloved wife and children will never blush at the mention of my name. But I grow dizzy in looking from the eminence he has attained and tremble at the great responsibility about to devolve upon him.

We leave here in the morning by boat for Cincinnati. . . . Do not forget me in your prayers, but forget me rather than the cause of my country to which I have given the best years of my life. . . .

OHIO RIVER, 4 P. M., March 6, 1864 . . . We shall reach Cincinnati between this and to-morrow morning, in time for the cars, and shall go direct to Washington. Colonel Comstock joined us at Louisville, very much elated at having been ordered to go with the General, and he credits me fully as having had the General make the order.

I hope by the time you get this you will have had a nice horse back ride, and that as a gallant, in the absence of your husband, you will have found Colonel Bowers the excellent gentleman I said he was when I put you in his charge. . . .

General Grant is getting on very quietly and I have hopes he will get on to Washington without a great deal of parade, which is more than I thought yesterday evening.

General William F. Smith and wife are with us. She is feeling terribly over the loss of her child. Coming through Louisville seemed to have revived or opened anew the wounds of her heart. How I sympathize with them in their severe affliction.

BALTIMORE, MD., March 8, 1864. . . . We arrived here at 12 M. to-day, and leave at 3.15 P. M. for Washington. I shall

be heartily glad when we reach our destination, although I cannot say I have had an unpleasant trip, for to me, the hearty and enthusiastic manner in which the people, ladies, gentlemen and children, all greet the General is truly gratifying, knowing as I do how he has triumphed over those who were his enemies. Heaven has blessed him with a disposition of self-satisfaction, that takes from these demonstrations of the people that annoyance I am sure that they would be to me, unless I were engaged in politics. Among other of Heaven's blessings to him, he cannot make a speech. If he could the temptation would be so great, he could not resist, and yielding, unless he far transcended in politics and merit all others who have tried the dangerous experiment, he would surely say that which would be construed to his injury.

The General received a despatch from General Halleck informing him that his commission as Lieutenant General had been made out and signed and would be delivered to him on his arrival at the War Department. General Halleck congratulates him on his well merited promotion and evinces in his congratulations the warmest sincerity.

I spoke to the General on the subject of his staff to-day again, and told him frankly I desired it organized without regard to me, that I feared my health at any rate would require me to leave the service, that should I get no better when warm weather comes, I should have a respite to enable me to recover. So of course that ended further talk. No man perhaps in the country is so great a friend to me, and to feel that I have this friendship is a great satisfaction.

We should have been in Washington before this time, but for the fact of falling behind time at Harrisburg, and having to come from there on the accommodation train. I hope to return to Nashville very soon. What may be the General's orders, however, we cannot yet divine. Should they be such as to detain him East, I shall have to remain with him. In that case I very much desire your return to our Western home. . . .

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 9, 1864. . . . We arrived here yesterday evening, called at General Halleck's office, found he had gone, proceeded to his residence on Georgetown Heights; he was not there; returned to the President's house where a grand levee was being held, and oh what enthusiasm prevailed.

The General was certainly, last night, more than President in the hearts of the immense concourse of ladies attending the White House. It would have filled Mrs. Grant with delight. After the Levee, we visited the Secretary of War.

To-day the General received and accepted his commission as Lieutenant General in the army of the United States. He talks of going out to visit the army of the Potomac to-morrow, but whether he will or not I am unable to say. I am doing all I can to get him away from here. To-night he dines with Mr. Seward, Secretary of State. I shall accompany him though it is not my pleasure to do so. You know where I am wine is not drunk by those with whom I have any influence. Were it otherwise I should consult my pleasure. The new order of things will necessitate breaking up our little home at Nashville, but not, I trust, before I see you again. . . .

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 22, 1864. . . . We arrived here, all but General Grant, Mrs. Grant and Captain Leet, this evening. The General and Mrs. Grant went by Philadelphia, to enable Mrs. Grant to make some additions to her wardrobe. Captain Leet stayed over at Pittsburg to see Mrs. Leet. Notwithstanding two nights' ride in the cars, I feel much better than when I kissed you good night at Cincinnati. The General and Mrs. Grant seem more attentive to me than ever before. I cannot tell the reason why unless it was that they thought my recent separation from you entitled me to sympathy. I certainly feel very kindly to them for their marked interest in my welfare. Be assured, there is nothing the General can do for me but he will do. I have great hopes of being able to withstand the coming campaign and not be compelled to take a leave of absence. To be present at the battle that must decide the fate of Richmond, and that battle a successful one too, would be the height of my ambition. . . .

We will go forward without delay to Culpepper Court House, where headquarters of the armies will be established for the present, and I am pleased to know, we shall have a house in which I can have a room, and thereby be relieved from going into a tent which I so much feared because of my health. . . .

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 23, 1864. . . . To-day the General has been in consultation with the Secretary of War and the President. I know of no plans agreed upon by them as to the

coming campaign, but suppose all will be left to the General. An order for the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, by breaking up the First and Third Army Corps and attaching the troops composing them to other corps, has been issued by the War Department. With this order I am not wholly pleased. I fear it may be the cause of hard feeling in the corps broken up, for it is but natural that these corps should be proud of their former history, and desire to maintain their organization rather than to be attached to any they have sought to rival in the race of glory. I may be mistaken and I trust I am.

General Grant, Comstock and myself go out to the Army of the Potomac in the morning, and will not return here again, so far as headquarters are concerned. I hope our former success in the West will be with us here. . . .

I send you a paper containing a biographical sketch of General Grant. It was written by a personal friend of mine, Mr. J. N. Morris of Illinois, formerly a member of Congress. He is in favor of the General for the Presidency. So am I, if we win here, but this is confidential. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., March 24, 1864. . . . From the address of this you see we have arrived at our destination and oh how glad I am. We have a very nice house for headquarters. One room for an office, one for the General and one for myself. My room contains a nice feather-bed and fireplace, and looks delightfully comfortable. . . .

March 25, 1864. . . . To-day has been unusually stormy; we have had both at once and also in turns rain and snow. I have not ventured out, but in the resolve to regain my health, have remained quietly in doors, and shall continue to so remain except when the weather is favorable to my going out, unless the necessity for doing otherwise shall be very great.

General Grant is fully installed in his new command of all the armies of the United States, and from the ring of his orders and the attention he is giving to the concentration of his forces at points where they may be available for coöperative action, I have greater hopes than ever for the triumph of our arms in the coming campaign. The order breaking up two of the army corps of this army and attaching them to others, I spoke of in my letter of the 23rd, seems to be as satisfactorily received as could be expected, and will, I have great hopes, strengthen the army

very considerably. Three corps, of which this army is now composed, will be more easily handled than five. The danger of making the change was, as I mentioned, in the dissatisfaction it might produce. Such danger is not now apprehended. General Meade was here to-day. He is delighted with General Grant's establishing his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac.

He believes in the ability of his army to cope successfully with that of Lee, and this is the proper spirit for the attainment of the desired end, namely, victory and Richmond. With the feeling of confidence this produces, this entire army and the dispositions of other troops which I am sure General Grant can and will make, I have the highest hopes of success and that too "ere many moons wax and wane."

Our horses and baggage will arrive to-morrow afternoon. They are now at Washington. No review of the troops has yet taken place, nor will one take place. The General will see them in line simply, in front of or near their corps encampments. This will be far better than a grand parade and review, too many of which have already been had on the crimson soil of Virginia. We are here to try for the successes that were ours to enjoy in the West, and if the same Good Providence that gave us victories there, does not frown upon us here, the country will soon witness the dawning of the Day of Peace. . . .

March 26, 1864. . . . To-day has been cloudy, with high winds. The snow has entirely disappeared, except from the slopes of the Blue Ridge, which strange to say is plainly visible from here though twenty miles distant. Unless more rain or snow falls the roads here will soon be in good condition. I feel much better of my cough and when I see you again I hope to be entirely recovered from it. Nothing new here. No information comes from the enemy's lines to break the dull monotony that seems to prevail throughout this entire army. It is greatly different I assure you from what it was out West. There we were always getting some information that kept up an excitement and made it seem that we were doing something. I trust, however, that this monotony will soon be broken by the movement of the unbroken columns of this splendidly equipped and well fed army of veterans against the famed Army of Northern Virginia. For if it fights as it feels, success must attend its next advance towards Richmond. Every day gives me hope of triumph to our country

in the impending conflict. One decisive victory here will go far towards the consummation of the Patriot's hope.

The General goes in the morning to Washington but will return the next day and the talk is now that on Wednesday of the coming week, he and I will visit the army of General Butler. Colonel Bowers and all the members of the staff except Colonel Duff and Captain Badeau have arrived. Our horses and baggage came through safely. Mrs. Grant was to visit the White House to-day. Captain Badeau, who is familiar with Washington society and manners, remained to accompany her. I have no doubt she will be greatly delighted. I send you enclosed a photograph of Colonel T. S. Bowers, with his autograph. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., March 27, 1864. . . . Yesterday Mrs. Grant called upon Mrs. Lincoln accompanied by Colonels Badeau and Duff of General Grant's staff. She was received with great cordiality. Her stay was short and in this manifestation of good sense Colonel Badeau says she will without doubt make friends in Washington. Her inexperience is excusable in her simplicity of manner. In this she is not dissimilarly situated from her illustrious husband . . . He will be back to-morrow.

By the way as I have seen it alluded to though incorrectly in some of the papers, that "U. S." are not the real initials of General Grant's name. In order to put you in possession of the facts, I will tell you his original Christian name and how it came to be changed to what it is now. He was christened "Hiram Ulysses," and by that name he was recognized and known until his appointment to West Point. He was, however, usually called Ulysses and had a brother named Simpson, hence when his father made application to the Honorable Mr. Hamer, representative in Congress, from the district in which the family then resided, he simply asked Mr. Hamer to have his son Ulysses appointed to West Point. Mr. Hamer being somewhat acquainted with the family, got the names of the General and his brother Simpson confused, and gave in the name of his appointee as Ulysses S. Grant, which the General on going to West Point sought to get corrected, but for some cause his application for the correction of the name was not attended to and he graduated and received his commission as Ulysses S. Grant. By that name and the initials U. S. he has ever since been known and called. Thus you have what few persons know, the correct version of

the change of the General's Christian name. This is in no manner whatever confidential, and you are at liberty to speak of it when and where you think it of interest to your company . . . I had the General night before last give me the statement in detail, as I have here written it to you . . .

I am still improving; have a good appetite, and a sound sleep every afternoon. I don't know what it is makes me sleepy, but sleepy I am. Every afternoon, immediately after dinner I get so sleepy I can hardly keep awake if I would, and as the doctor says it is a good sign in my case, and that sleep will do me good, I yield most cheerfully to the soothing invitation. I begin to feel my real self, more than ever since you became acquainted with me. My hopes and purposes of life are higher and brighter than ever before, and why should they not be? . . .

March 28, 1864. . . . To-day has been mild and cloudy, threatening rain. Everything is quiet along our lines, but in our camps is a burning desire for something to be done which will break the monotony prevailing in this vicinity, and the only fear I entertain is that the General's restlessness, and the spirit animating the troops will make him commence operations before he is sufficiently prepared. You know, *I believe more in the infallibility of numbers than in the infallibility of generals, no matter how great their reputation.*

Everything we hold dear as patriots and pride ourselves in as Americans, is staked more certainly upon the impending campaign than upon any which has preceded it. We are close upon the beginning of the fourth year of the war and notwithstanding all our successes in the West and South, our National Capital is still beleaguered by a formidable and unbroken army of the enemy. Unless this army of foes is defeated and broken, and our Capital relieved of its fierce frowns, we cannot hope that the recognition of the rebel government will be much longer postponed by European Governments, a recognition which while it would not necessarily precipitate us into a war with the powers making it, would tend to raise the hopes of our enemy. And worst of all, it would tend much towards the further prostration of our national finances. In this view of the case no steps should be taken that would in the least possible way promise anything less than certain success.

I believe a victory, great and decisive, is within our grasp—

that we have men enough which may be spared from other points, to be brought here, to increase our numbers to so far beyond those of the enemy, do all he can, as to ensure victory. In other words, we may in this manner "organize victory," and this is the only way to organize it.

General Grant returned this afternoon from Washington much disgusted with the news from General Banks, who was to have been at Alexandria on the Red River by the 17th instant, but instead of being there was on the 18th instant still at New Orleans, while the forces from Sherman had promptly reached Alexandria in pursuance of orders, but will have to wait there for weeks for the tardy and I might say immovable Banks. This delay of his may delay greatly our spring operations.

This proves to me that politicians cannot be soldiers and entrusted with great and responsible commands. It may, however, be providential, for it opens the General's eyes to the character of men he has to command, and fixes in a measure the limit to which he may trust them. Thank God there are generals whom he knows and can trust implicitly to carry out his orders, and that promptly. . . .

March 29, 1905. . . . To-morrow the General goes to General Butler's Department. Colonel Comstock and I will accompany him. This may possibly prevent my writing to you for two days. . . .

March 30, 1864. . . . Did not get off to Butler's Department, but will go to-morrow . . . Everything here still and quiet. Deserters from Lee's army say there is a rumor in their camps that General Lee said recently that the Army of the Potomac has been long enough at Culpepper and that he intended to start it from there soon. They keep rations constantly on hand for a march, but whether he designs to attack us here or simply to be in readiness, should we move to attack him, is not known. Probably the latter. . . .

I send herewith the answer to the letter I sent General Grant in rear of Vicksburg, which you will please take special pains to preserve. . . .¹

FORT MONROE, VA., April 2, 1864. . . . We arrived here yesterday about 9 A. M. The General transacted his business with

¹ This letter has not been found, and no member of the Rawlins family knows what became of it.

Major General Butler; reviewed some of the colored troops camped near by; visited the ruins of Hampton; ran down to Norfolk, but the rain setting in just as we reached the landing prevented our going ashore. We returned here with the intention of leaving for Washington at 12 o'clock last night, but the increased violence of the storm rendered the navigation of the bay, with the class of steamers to which ours belongs, so dangerous that the Captain did not venture out, and we are still here, and the storm still raging. When it will cease I know not, but of course like everything else, and all the storms of this world, will end some time.

Had my wishes governed, instead of reviewing troops, visiting ruins, or running down to Norfolk, I should, when through with the conference with General Butler, have gone back to Washington. As it is, we may be here for two days yet. This much for having one's wife with him. If Mrs. Grant had remained in Washington, we would not have mixed with this trip any curiosity or pleasure not strictly in the line of duty. It is true, had not this storm arose no time would have been lost, nor do I imagine the public interests will suffer as it is. Still, I like of all things, to see every one at his post. I am sure my dearest wife will never desire to be with me when it might, by any possibility, seem to influence my judgment in what I should do in the line of duty unless that influence is to hasten me in its performance. When a man's wife is with him he can't help bending a little to the desire of pleasing her, even against her protestations . . .

General W. F. Smith is assigned to duty in this Department and will have a very large command when the spring campaign opens. This is a place of great interest, Fortress Monroe being second to no place in the United States in point of importance or strength, and was to the officers of the old army prior to the rebellion, a sort of paradise, in which they all sought to be ordered on duty. It is in this respect, however, greatly changed and the fine and elegantly furnished officers' quarters are occupied by the volunteers who have leaped ahead of them in rank, and in many instances, in the race of glory. In this I mean no disparagement to them for no more loyal or devoted men can be found anywhere than can be found among the regular officers—a loyalty a devotion, which the advantages of a military education at West Point has enabled them to render signal service in this

our day of severest trial. I am one who admires the men of the old army, who have stood firm, and not one of those who would malign them.

Mrs. Grant is accompanied by Mrs. General Robinson and another lady whose name I do not remember. General Robinson, Mr. Washburne and Colonel Comstock are also along. All are tired and praying for the abatement of the storm, notwithstanding the courtesy of General and Mrs. Butler to every one. I hope we shall be able to start back between this and to-morrow morning so as to reach Culpepper by Monday's train. . . .

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 4, 1864. . . . We have this moment returned from Fortress Monroe and go directly forward to Culpepper . . .

I see by the papers a large number of confirmations of brigadier generals and among them several General Grant has recommended. My name is not in the published list and I begin to think there is a probability that I will not be confirmed. I cannot say I should seriously regret this were it not on your account. If I am not confirmed you will have to give up all hope of going home this summer, and make up your mind to a more plain and economical life than you would perhaps otherwise lead . . . I shall find out soon my true status in this matter of confirmation, and have mentioned the subject here only that you might be prepared for whatever may be in store for us. . . .

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864. . . . I have written you before to-day and mentioned in my letter doubts of my confirmation, which doubts still exist in my mind, but knowing your desire to see and hear everything good of me, in the opinions of my friends I send you a letter from the Honorable E. B. Washburne to me, and a copy of one written by General Grant to the Honorable H. Wilson, Chairman of the Senate Military Committee. These letters were both written without request on my part. The former shows friendship for me personally, I cannot fail to appreciate, and the latter a confidence in me I scarcely could have hoped for. This letter of General Grant's you may copy in your own hand and send to your parents if you wish. Preserve the copy with care, however, for our children. A higher testimonial I would not, could not have. I will add that the Secretary of War says I must be confirmed. The only question is, I am a staff officer, which he says must not be made an objection in

my case . . . The General Wilson mentioned in Mr. Washburne's letter is Senator Wilson and not our General Wilson. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 5, 1864. . . . It has rained throughout the entire day. The last four days have been days of storm. The only consolation to be drawn from it, is perhaps that while such weather continues the weeds of mourning are kept from beneath the roof of many homes, whence the inmates look out hopefully towards the camps of contending armies for the return of sons, husbands and fathers, who after the conflict has closed, will be looked for on earth no more. Oh, that the wisdom of angels governed in the affairs of men, we then should never have been called upon to experience the horrors and sufferings we have in the last three years. When the struggle will cease and Peace, now affrighted, come back and hover with gentle wings and sweetness of spirit over our beautiful land, he who holds the destiny of nations in his hands alone knoweth . . .

It is the love of liberty and the affection for the work of our fathers, in securing it to us, and the admiration of their achievements on the battle field, that bids us struggle on hopefully for its maintenance. If we suffer now they suffered then. Through their suffering was purchased for a few generations of their descendants, peace, prosperity and the privileges of free men. By our sufferings we hope to perpetuate these blessings, "down to the latest syllable of recorded time."

I have been thinking if I might not make it interesting to you by writing a series of letters, commencing back with my first recollections and earliest impressions of life and following them up to the present time, if time can be had to pursue the same to this point. This narrative should contain all that made decided and lasting impressions on my mind; my boy loves, and first instinctive (as it were) but ever unspoken impressions of slavery, how these impressions were smothered, in my heart, and made subordinate to what I conceived and still conceive to be the true construction of our constitution. Say, do you think you would like me to begin writing you as indicated? Of course I should continue to send you the current news of the day, and still assure you and reassure you of my love.

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 6, 1864. . . . The only clear day for some time. I have hopes that the weather will continue so un-

til the roads become fitted for campaigning, and that they then continue in such condition until we try title with Lee, for Richmond. Richmond ours, and all will be well. Nothing after the defeat of Lee and the capture of Richmond by our armies can successfully make head against our onward sweep through the remaining states in rebellion.

Nothing of any interest or worthy of note to-day. Troops are slowly but constantly coming to the front from furlough, gradually swelling our ranks and increasing our strength for the coming conflict. Oh, that we may be as successful in this new field as in the West.

And I must say that everything looks more favorable to success in the coming campaign than it did at Chattanooga. From the most deplorable condition of affairs, we came out most gloriously there. With everything looking so favorable here and the General exerting, as he is, his whole powers, with the immense means he has at his command too, I cannot but hope strongly that all will end well.

The greatest fear now is that General Banks may be tardy in his movements. But the glory that can be secured to him only by activity on his part, and the rich prize held out to him in the orders sent him, I trust will spur him on.

The General has made up his staff and sends forward their names to-morrow to be published in orders for the War Department. I have a little anxiety to know whether they will announce me as chief of staff as the General has requested they should. My anxiety is caused by the position to which General Halleck is assigned. But I have very little doubt that the General's wishes will be complied with. I have thought it possible my confirmation was secretly opposed by some friends of General Halleck through the very plausible objection that I am already a staff officer. Certainly "two chiefs of staff" to one general is beyond all that precedent has established in this war.

But I suppose I do General Halleck injustice by the thought. He has done so much for his country notwithstanding some failures, and the abuse of the press, that his fame is secure, and nothing can be added to it by his being on the staff of one so recently his subordinate, unless one were ungenerous enough to suppose that he might desire the position with a view to sharing with the General any honors that may be hereafter won, if won they are.

To-day is the second anniversary of the first day's fight at Shiloh. At this hour, 10.30 o'clock P. M., I was sleeping in a field hospital with the dead and terribly wounded. Into this hospital I had managed to escape from the most terrible of storms, after having become thoroughly saturated with the falling flood. Yet I went to sleep that night notwithstanding the fierceness of that day's terrible conflict, full of the hope of a glorious victory on the morrow. I realized the fullest consummation of that hope on the afternoon of the next day when the enemy beaten at all points retreated towards Corinth, and had General Buell and his officers concurred with General Grant in the propriety of pursuit that day, the memorable siege of Corinth had never found a place in history.

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 8, 1864. . . . With General Grant and several members of his staff, I visited Cedar Run Mountain, twelve miles distant from here. On the way there, at Mitchell's Station, the General reviewed Leonard's brigade of General Robinson's Division, 5th Corps, and was greatly pleased with it. Cedar Run Mountain was made historic as the scene of the battle fought by our forces under General Banks of General Pope's army and the Confederates under General Stonewall Jackson, in the summer of 1862. The view from the mountains is among the finest I have ever seen and in times of peace I have no doubt would afford one the liveliest pleasure. It rises from the Valley of Virginia and from its summit in any direction you may turn the eye, it is met by once finely improved plantations and forests which stretch off till they meet the highlands that seem to almost surround it. These plantations are now despoiled of fencing and everything of value that industry of man had added. No husbandman ploughed the fields, except beyond the Rapidan where a few spots of cultivated land are discernible. The enemy's camps, one division, are plainly visible, but the river separates our pickets from theirs. I have seen the enemy's camps before this and from other points of view, and in every instance heretofore have been with the advance of the triumphant columns that entered them, and my heart's prayer is that the same fortune, perhaps I should say kind Providence which has attended us heretofore will still be with us and that before many weeks have passed it will be safe for one of our army to pass through the ground where now are picketed the tents of treason. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 9, 1864. . . . Rain. The ride of yesterday was too much for me and has excited my cough.

Read the Sermon on the Mount—"the Lord's prayer lifted the gloom from my soul."

To-day's information is that Lee has but thirty-five thousand infantry in our front, with 15,000 more at Lynchburg under Longstreet, or 50,000 in all, exclusive of cavalry and artillery. The rebel conscription has brought but few men to their ranks.

I am of the opinion that Lee's force is much larger than is stated above, but this statement does not vary much from the estimate made by Generals Meade and Butler.

Enclosed I send you what I had written Enos Ripley in December, 1862, from Oxford, Miss. It is hurriedly written but gives my impression of affairs at the time. It was never finished or sent, but please preserve it, for it may some time be of benefit to me² . . . I send you also a general order issued by General McPherson. You will see the point of interest in it; also the order from the adjutant general's office announcing General Grant's staff, in which you will not fail to see my name. I sent you the other day for preservation, without note or comment, a copy of a letter written by me to Hon. E. B. Washburne from the rear of Vicksburg, also General Grant's original order to his troops after the battle of Port Gibson.

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 11, 1864. . . . I did not write yesterday because the bridges over Bull Run and Cedar Run were carried away and the mails delayed.

. . . I found finally the note from General Wilson accompanying the present which the General and staff sent to you, and will at once draft the reply you desire . . .

It is refreshing to read letters from officers like Sherman in reference to their preparations for the coming campaign. He writes so cheerfully, so full of hope of success that it makes one feel that all must be well. You know my high opinion of him. He is one of the first men of this or any country. In all the points of character as soldier or statesman, he has among our military men no superior. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 13, 1864. . . . I have not been well to-day, owing to the large doses of medicine I have taken for my cough . . . The quantity of opium has affected my whole

² Not found.

system inasmuch as to produce a sensation of numbness and drowsiness and given me a bad headache. I have slept the whole day as it were, and feel considerably better now, but am most miserable. I have seen the doctor and he directs me to diminish the dose.

General Wilson is here. He has been assigned to the command of a cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac. I hope it may secure his confirmation. As for my own, I have little hope. The Senate is holding it over until the papers of another staff officer, General Ingalls, are examined. If his are all right, mine may possibly go through. If not, his will be passed over ostensibly because of his being a staff officer, but really because his accounts are wrong, and mine will meet the same fate.

This is a beautiful story, that the Senate of the United States will make the confirmation of any officer depend upon the character of another. It is all idle talk. I will not be confirmed simply because there are such officers as Kilby Smith for whom places must be kept. He has been confirmed of course. I did not seek my appointment nor have I asked any living man to try to influence my confirmation. All who know me are aware of my devotion to my country. The only poignant grief that pierces my heart is the effect a failure of my confirmation may have upon your mind. If I go out of the service it is to strike hands with poverty and wrestle with existence. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 13, 1864. . . . What I wrote yesterday of my confirmation is perhaps true, but the declared reasons, from a subsequent conversation with General Wilson, I am satisfied are not the correct ones . . . The investigation will affect only the officer named as the subject of it. They have passed over the confirmation of other staff appointments for the present, simply to enable them to get through the investigation of this case in quiet . . . I see nothing wrong in this at all. As I wrote, however, it is more on your account than my own that I should feel badly.

The General will be back from Annapolis to-morrow. This will finish up his visits to points of rendezvous for the troops, until he has tried with Lee the merits of their respective armies. You see, I have no doubt, much in the newspapers as to the plan of coming campaigns. For these of course we care little, but you know my opinion of General William F. Smith, who has

altogether a different plan from that of the General, and feels very badly that Grant don't fall into his views . . . We have not communicated his plans to either General Wilson or General Smith. Of one thing the country can be assured, the General does not mean to scatter his army and have it whipped in detail. No such calamity as this will happen to us, I am certain. If I have ever been of signal service to General Grant, it has been in my constant, firm advocacy of massing large forces against small ones, in other words, of always having the advantage of numbers on our side. Such is the General's notion of battles. . . .

He wrote from Culpepper C. H., April 14, 1864, as follows:

. . . Spring seems really to be here, but it has brought with it no ploughman to "turn the glebe afield." All is barrenness and desolation. The houses of the happy people who once enjoyed their possessions here, stand solitary and alone. No fences surround them to turn aside the horseman from his path of pleasure or of war. How blessed are the people of the North compared to these. Of this you have had personal experience. Would to God that the lessons war teaches a people whom it visits could be truly appreciated by those who have not seen its footprints on their own farms. They could then better understand what we are fighting for, and would with greater alacrity rally to the support and maintenance of the Government left them by Washington and his compeers.

Be assured, I am not one of earth's gloomy children, looking ever to the dark clouds. I am among the most hopeful. When a boy none pictured life more fair and full of pleasure, none looked forward to hope for happiness, with more eagerness or boyish glee, than I. In all this I have not changed. The pleasures of home and the happiness to be found in the bosom of my family alone I estimate above all earthly goods. . . .

Enclosed I send you the telegraphic despatch from the Honorable E. B. Washburne, informing me of my confirmation by the Senate. It is just received, and I have no doubt will make your heart glad. I assure you it pleases me, for while I never sought the rank, yet after having had it conferred upon me by appointment, I should have felt badly if I had been rejected by the Senate, especially when I have striven with whatever

ability I possess to serve my country. You can see in all this Mr. Washburne's warm friendship for me. Enclosed also I hand you two letters from him to me, one dated December 21st, 1861, in reference to General Grant, and one written January 6th, 1862, in reply to mine answering his of December 21st.³ My letter was a detailed statement on the subject to which his alludes. These letters you will not fail to preserve. . . . I confide in you everything. The General is still in Washington, but telegraphs he will be here to-morrow. I am much better than for two or three days past, but not yet well. My appetite is returning, and when it is good I am generally in fair health. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 15, 1864. . . . The General returned this afternoon from his Annapolis visit. The railroad guards at one of the stations between this and Washington were attacked by a party of the enemy, whom they repulsed a few minutes before the arrival of the train the General was on. So you see his good luck still sticks to him. I have not yet talked with him of the result of his visit to Burnside. We have received bad news from the Mississippi Valley, and will continue to receive just such to cheer us, while timid Generals, who have been time-serving politicians, are retained in command. I hope soon to see such changes made as will give at least confidence that all will be done that can be with the forces given to keep matters quiet on the Mississippi River. I am not one of those who think it probable that we will be able to give perfect peace along the banks of that great river until we have entirely defeated the rebel armies elsewhere. . . .

General Grant's official report of Chattanooga is being published all over the country, and is receiving the most favorable notice in all the leading papers. You know I told you it would do much for his reputation. And you know, too, the manner in which I labored for weeks with Bowers on that report to make it show the real truths, the plans and conceptions which matured into the splendid victory of Chattanooga. . . . Enclosed I send you what the *New York Times* says of it. The General fully appreciates the services of Bowers and myself in this matter. He writes his own reports, but they need a great deal of comparing with orders and much rearranging to make them the complete reports that are shown in his reports

³ These letters have not been found.

of Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Few men write with greater terseness that which fills their minds than Grant. . . .

April 16, 1864. . . . I have been very busy, so much so that up to this hour, 10 P. M., I have just found a moment to write to you, and while I write Colonel Bowers is waiting for my assistance in fixing up General Grant's old report of the battle of Belmont, Mo., for his new record book, and I have no idea of getting to bed before one or two A. M. You see I am never where work is not referred to me. Among the letters I wrote to-day was an official letter to General Butler on the subject of the exchange of prisoners. It requires a full acknowledgment of the validity of the Vicksburg and Port Hudson paroles, and a release to us of a number of officers and men equal to those we captured and paroled at those places, before another one of theirs will be exchanged, and also exacts the same treatment for colored soldiers while prisoners and the same conditions in their exchange and release as for white soldiers. I wrote this document with great care, I assure you, and although it is plain and clear in its meaning and seems to be written without labor, yet I measured it with my best judgment. I expect it to end further exchanges for the present.

I am recovering from my recent very sick turn slowly, and hope in a few days to feel as well as I did just preceding it. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 17, 1864. . . . I do hope soon for settled weather and the commencement of active operations. I begin to feel that quite now is more advantageous to the enemy than to us. Already there are indications that Lee's army will be strengthened from Johnston's. One battalion and one regiment of regulars have already gone from the latter to the former. If such is the case it will be the policy of Lee to take the initiative and defeat this army before Sherman is able to move against Johnston. Unless he does this, his reinforcing his army from Johnston's would only expose the latter to certain defeat by Sherman. At any rate I am anxious for a move as soon as the roads will permit it.⁴

Oh, how terribly our Government stands in its own light in not enforcing the conscription law. If it had done this last January we should now have at least 200,000 additional men in the field, and an army would be at General Grant's com-

⁴ On the Chattanooga-Atlanta line.

mand that could not be successfully opposed in any quarter. But why talk over these things? Plain as they are, they have been unheeded, and to-day we have no more force than the enemy is able to oppose to us, and our liberties are still left to be decided by the skill of contending Generals instead of by the great superiority of our resources in materials and more especially in men. God has been most merciful to us as a people. He has preserved us this far, in spite of ourselves, from overthrow and utter ruin. We certainly have not helped ourselves as we might have done. In God therefore patriots must put their trust. I have great and abiding faith in our final triumph. I believe General Grant's plans in the coming campaign will win. Still it might have been put beyond the possibility of doubt by enforcing the draft. . . .

My cough is still getting better and my appetite is being restored. Unless I do get much better I cannot think of trying to remain here, for I had better quit the service than to permanently injure my health. Permanent injury of my lungs would of course be certain death; this, however, I do not seriously apprehend. . . .

April 18, 1864. . . . The General has been reviewing troops to-day. I did not go out with him, but shall to-morrow.

By the latest information in the papers it would appear that the enemy is moving troops from Johnston's army to that of Lee. If so, you may expect battle here before we are prepared to bring it on. Yet, strong as we are, we hope to be able to whip the enemy whenever he chooses to attack. I would much prefer their waiting for us to take the initiative. There is always a moral strength given the attacking party that nothing but strong fortifications can resist. No news from our front. The Richmond papers have it that Macgruder has whipped Banks near Shreveport badly. This can hardly be so. Our forces, if Banks is obeying the orders sent him, should ere this be returning from the Red River. This would naturally give foundation for such a report. The fact is Banks ought now to be back in New Orleans, but I fear he will be tardy in his movements.

I tell you I shall ever look with distrust upon any man who ever in the whole course of his life could conjure up the contingency and give expression to it in which he would "let the Union

slide." Such men are not the ones to trust too much to, I assure you.

The surgeon was here to-day (two of them) and sounded my lungs thoroughly and is satisfied nothing is the matter with them. They say nothing ails me but the chronic bronchitis, which I will recover from with proper care of myself. They also say that I have from over-exertion greatly prostrated my whole physical organization and that I need rest and good living. They have prescribed Codliver Oil as my principal medicine, and I shall follow their prescription most faithfully. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 20, 1864. . . . The news is that Longstreet has at last reached Lee and that thirteen thousand troops are on the way from Mobile to join Lee. There is no doubt of the truth of this information. General Banks has been badly defeated near Shreveport, we learn through the press, but no official intelligence has yet been received from him. The fact is, he has permitted his expedition to straggle in detachments up the Red River, instead of moving in mass, so as to be able to meet the enemy in force should he venture an attack. Finding him advancing in this loose and desultory manner, they concentrated heavily against Banks's advance, and severely defeated it, with a loss of 2,000 men.

Among the killed I notice Cyrus E. Dickey, captain and assistant adjutant general to General Ransom. He was a brave and noble soldier and worth a dozen of the Banks Union Sliding Generals. General Ransom, also a personal friend of mine, was severely wounded. I hope this blunder of Banks may place him where he really belongs—in retirement.

The success of our Republican institutions depends upon our defeating the armies of the rebellion in battle, and while the God of humanity and of liberty is on our side, He will not permit us to triumph except through honest, patriotic, unselfish men. Banks is in the wrong place. I pray God different fortune may attend him hereafter than heretofore. Much, very much, depends upon the faithful execution of the orders entrusted to him in the coming campaign. May he lose sight of self and for once become imbued with the true spirit that ever insures success. Up to this time he seemed to have studied how to make his Government responsible for his failures, and he

certainly reads military instructions with a view to giving them a different construction from that which their author intended. I measure the man aright, you can be assured.

The enemy is reported to be massing a heavy force on our left near Fredericksburg, some suppose with a design to attack us. For my part, I do not believe he means any such purpose, especially in that direction. We are fast assembling a large army here, and perhaps ere you read what I am now penning, especially if it takes my letters as long to reach you as it does yours to reach me, a terrible battle will be fought and the campaign in this quarter ended. I pray for victory to our arms; I know the same prayers go up daily from your pure heart and that our prayers meet in Heaven far separated as we are. Should I meet my fate in the conflict, know, dearest, that one at least has fallen whose every heart's pulsation was for his God, his country's honor and the welfare of his dear wife and children. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 22, 1864. . . . We have been reviewing the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, General Hancock commanding. It was the finest display of troops I ever witnessed at one review, twenty-two thousand men in all, in one clear, open field, with their glittering arms, their banners (many of them battleworn) and bands of music, all conspired to fill one with emotions of pride that he, too, was an American soldier fighting for the perpetuation of the principles of civil and religious liberty for our Republican form of Government. Never on but one occasion before have I seen so many men at one view, and that was not on review. It was in the second day's fight at Chattanooga. The whole of Thomas's army, numbering nearly twenty-five thousand men,⁵ moved upon the enemy's works across an open plain much like the field we were on to-day, but how different were my feelings from what they were to-day. As regiment after regiment of the brave men moved by I could but feel that many a one with proud and elastic step was marching to the end of time, the very farthest verge of which they had already reached, and such was the case. How eagerly my mind contrasted the pageantry, the grandeur of to-day with that of actual conflict at Chattanooga, and the mind would run along the lines of

⁵ Probably considerably in excess of 25,000.

the not distant future and picture these brave men amid the din and heat of the coming terrible conflict. How different will they then appear to those whom Heaven spares to see them. They are full of hope and confidence, and in their buoyancy of spirit, their cheerful soldierly satisfaction I place the fullest confidence. They feel that they can whip Lee. This is much in our favor. I believe they can and will. Every effort is being made to concentrate troops from all sections here, and much has already been accomplished. From New York City alone we get three thousand men, or thereabouts, that have been for months virtually dead to the service. In all the Northern States are many troops, kept mainly that some of our major generals might have commands in Peace Departments commensurate with their rank. These are all being gathered up and brought to the front. I assure you nothing is left undone that should be done to give us victory. Victory here is what would be of much service to us. The Red River expedition appears to have been a terrible failure. Porter has his gunboats, several of them far up towards Shreveport, with the river falling so that he is prevented by sand-bars from either going forward or returning, and is waiting for rain and a rise in the river. I feel much anxiety for him.

You ask me if General McClellan is to have a command. He is not, for the present at least. You also ask me what kind of a general General Meade is. He is a man of real sterling worth, and is evidently the best general who has yet been honored with the command of this army. He is well liked by both men and officers, and no change is demanded by them. This you can rest assured is true, anything in the newspapers to the contrary notwithstanding. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 23, 1864. . . . Clear, dry weather. . . .

Burnside's corps commenced moving up from Annapolis today to join this army. The moment it arrives we will be ready for action. Reports from Sherman, Butler and Sigel are all as cheering as we could hope for under the circumstances. The enemy have attacked Plymouth in Butler's Department and been repulsed. This initiatory move of theirs will delay Butler somewhat in his preparations for coöperation with the movements of this army. Sherman and Sigel will both be in readi-

ness without doubt at the appointed time, as will, we trust, General Butler, notwithstanding this attack at Plymouth. In Sherman, Meade and Butler, General Grant has three Generals, all in important commands, whom he can trust. They are all three loyal to their country, friends of the General, and consequently with no ambitions to be gratified that look not to the success of our arms in obedience to and in accordance with his orders and plans.

General Sigel shows a fine disposition, and I have great hopes that he is a much better officer than General Pope gave him credit for being. He is active in his preparations for the part he is to perform in the coming campaign, is subordinate as far as I am able to judge, and has unquestionably the interest of the country at heart.

As yet no official report has been received from General Banks. General Grant has discharged his duty faithfully in this matter by suggestions to the President that Banks be relieved by General J. J. Reynolds in the command of the Gulf Department. What the President will do we don't as yet know. General Banks may be, and I have no doubt is, a splendid man on presentations, but certainly as a soldier he is a failure. The men under his command are to all intents and purposes dead to the service. Private information would indicate that we have retrieved much that we had lost in the Red River affair. I hope this may be true.

The Fort Pillow Massacre is one of the most brutal and horrible acts of fiendishness on record. If it is true as reported, and the Confederate authorities endorse and approve it, I hope the tongue of every Northern person who would speak in justification of them or their cause may cling to the roof of their mouths. This might make dumb many who profess to be my friends, but certainly could not hush to me the sweet voice of the wife I love, for at such acts of cruelty and barbarism her noble and queenly nature will ever revolt.

Reports from the front are that Lee is massing all his cavalry near Fredericksburg with a view to advance against us, which may be true, but I doubt it. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 24, 1864. . . . The trees are beginning to put forth their leaves, and the fruit trees their blossoms; the green grass is making its appearance, and real

spring is upon us. I rode out for exercise this afternoon and could but contrast the acts of our soldiers in fencing in and caring for the cemetery near here, in which is buried many hundreds of the enemy's dead, with the brutal massacre at Fort Pillow. How full of reverence for Christianity is the contrast in favor of our brave but humane soldiers. The dead and those who are captives with our army cease to be objects against which they war. All that religion demands in reverence of the one, and all that humanity requires in kindness to the other, is freely and willingly given by those who fight for our Democratic institutions beneath the bright banner of stripes and stars.

Enclosed I send you some lines written by Alfred B. Street on the presentation of war banners to the Legislature of New York. I think them decidedly beautiful and hope you will coincide with me in this opinion. I also send you by to-day's mail a late Richmond paper, from which we have the latest news from Plymouth, which is that that place was carried by storm on the 20th by the enemy, with a loss to us of full sixteen hundred men, besides armament, supplies, etc. This place had held out stubbornly, and we were in hopes all would be safe after they had repulsed the first assaults. This comes of the Government persistently urging the holding of places for political effect on the people in the seceding States and abroad, also for the protection of such of the inhabitants as commit themselves to our side. General Butler had asked permission to withdraw the troops from Plymouth some time since, but the reasons urged, as I heard him state to General Grant, were the ones I have just recited. If the force was to stay at Plymouth, then capture will not materially affect us, for they were virtually dead to the service while they remained there, at any rate. I hope that Policy will after a while have discovered that she can only succeed through force of arms, and that force should be made as strong as possible and as compact, and be directed with energy against one point at a time. In this way only can we succeed. . . .

April 25, 1864. . . . News of the capture of Plymouth by the enemy has also been officially received, and does not differ materially from my statement of it in yesterday's letter. I shall write you in a day or two the time fixed for our movements here. This failure of General Banks has greatly discon-

certed us, and will I fear permit the enemy to bring forward here or against Sherman, as they may deem best, from twenty to twenty-five thousand more men than they would were Banks at the place it was ere this intended he should have been.

Mrs. Grant is in New York at Colonel Hilyer's. I see by the papers she attended the great sanitary fair in that city and voted for General McClellan on the sword question. Now I am free to say if she was required to vote at all, she voted right, but I do think her voting at all is decidedly bad taste, to say the least of it. If she desired to go to the fair she could have made her donation in some other manner, one less calculated to get her name in a paragraph of the daily newspapers. The General feels considerably annoyed about the matter; still, of course, it amounts to very little in itself. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 26, 1864. . . . General Grant's request to have General Banks relieved from duty in the field the President declines to accede to till he has heard further from the Red River expedition. I trust in God Banks may retrieve himself. My heart beats fearfully for the brave men he commands. Many of them I know personally. They are of the heroes of Vicksburg. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 27, 1864. . . . A few more days and all will be ready for the spring campaign. General Burnside's corps has reached Washington, and the head of his column arrived at Fairfax C. H., some distance this side, to-night. General Sherman has gone forward from Nashville to Chattanooga, not to return till he has tried with Joe Johnston for the mastery of Georgia. Sigel is in readiness, and all of Butler's troops but six regiments are up. These forces will move simultaneously at the appointed time, which will be before you receive this letter unless other orders than those out are given. So you see we have not been idle.

Colonel Bowers and myself finished yesterday General Grant's report of the battle of Belmont. It is a very creditable one and places that engagement in its true light for transmittal to posterity, so far as could be known to our side. I have long since learned that an action creditable in itself can be best presented in the garb of real facts. So whenever you see any report with which I have had anything whatever to do, depend upon it, the historian who accepted it as true will most certainly

not deceive the searchers after truth. . . . I entered the service September 12, 1861. We shall move from here in a day or two. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., April 28, 1864. . . . The General and I dined to-day with the Honorable John Minor Botts, the man who presents the very remarkable phenomenon of belonging to no Government, although living in the State where he was born. He is one of the most interesting men in conversation I think I have ever met, and at heart I am sure is a truly loyal man, loyal to the Government of the United States, and desires our success above all things. Yet he has managed to remain neutral throughout this struggle. I speak of him thus, however, without approving his course. If a man is loyal to his government he should use whatever influence he possesses in aid of it. There is no excuse in my mind for his doing otherwise.

Everything here progresses as well as could be hoped for. No news of importance from the front. I forgot to mention in my letter of yesterday that it was General Grant's forty-second birthday. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., April 29, 1864. . . . Quite cold and chilly to-day. Rode yesterday without an overcoat, caught cold, which troubles me quite seriously. I am satisfied from the effect these rides have upon me I shall have to take a leave of absence for two or three months unless I get better much faster than I am at present. Do not now understand me to say that I am not better, very much better than I was when I came here. I shall, as I have before stated, unless I get well sooner, get leave of absence the moment this campaign terminates, and whether I spend it East or West must depend very much upon my condition then and the advice of the physician. . . .

CULPEPPER C. H., VA., May 2, 1864. . . . Chilly with cold rain.

The news from Sherman is satisfactory in defeating the rebel army in Georgia. Should victory light upon his eagles, he will avail himself of every advantage of the situation, I assure you. There is a confidence in the Western army of their ability to win that is commendable in every army, and I wish in my heart all our others possessed it.

There is a habit contracted among officers of this army any-

thing but praiseworthy, namely, of saying of Western successes: "Well, you never met Bobby Lee and his boys; it would be quite different if you had." And in speaking of the probabilities of our success in the coming campaign: "Well, that may be, but, mind you, Bobby Lee is just over the Rapidan," when if these very same officers would but look at simple facts they would find that Meade since assuming command of this army has not only outgeneraled General Lee, but has whipped him badly in every considerable engagement they have fought. To wit, at Gettysburg compelling him to flee in haste towards Richmond, and also at the crossing of the Rappahannock, where a division of Sedgwick's corps captured two brigades of Lee's army.

It may be answered by the admirers of Lee and the defamers of the Union Generals that Meade fell back towards Washington last fall, but this was the best thing General Meade could do, for it enabled him to have the full benefit of the 35,000 troops in that garrison, in case Lee gave battle. Finding, however, that Lee had apparently changed his mind, Meade followed him with a large and concentrated force and as rapidly as possible to the south side of the Rapidan. Subsequently Meade crossed the Rapidan in his face, and drove him beyond his works at Mine Run, and then returned, with but little loss to his present position. Here Lee's admirers will interpose the inquiry: "Why didn't Meade fight him at Mine Run?" which may be just as fairly answered as it is put by saying: "Why didn't Lee fight Meade when he followed him to Washington?" No, the facts are, since Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac, it has beaten the Army of North Virginia in every considerable conflict, and truthful history will so record it. The engagements have been few, but all of them have been decisive and the result not doubtful. I am full of hope and trust in God for victory.

This evening I received a note from a lieutenant in our army saying there was a Miss Rawlins at Stephensburg, five miles distant from here, who was desirous of knowing if I was in anywise related to Major Owen, or Thomas, or John Rawlins of Missouri, and that they were all her uncles. They are also uncles of mine, but the two last mentioned are dead, if I remember correctly. I do not know how a cousin of mine, a lady, could get down here. I know my grandfather was from Vir-

ginia, but from what part I cannot state. I had supposed none of my uncles resided in this State. Unless she is the daughter of my Uncle Benjamin, who lived in Kentucky, I cannot guess her parentage. To-morrow if it is clear and I feel able to stand a ride, I shall call on her, for I know it will interest father very much to hear all the particulars and to learn that she is not suffering. I am much better to-day and am taking precious good care of myself. Enclosed find photograph of General Augur, who commanded the defences at Washington. . . .

II

EXTRACTS AND LETTERS

EXTRACTS from an article contributed by S. Cadwallader to the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, dated Springfield, Missouri, February 10, 1884.

. . . The eyes of the nation are now turned for the first time, in any extended sense, to the source and inspiration of General Grant's brilliant achievements. It has long been known to all the intimates of both that Rawlins was the power behind Grant, greater even than Grant himself. All the officers of high rank who had much knowledge of General Grant's headquarters life, or even thrown in frequent personal communication with him, know that I but state the truth. Not one of them but has known and been made to feel that in all public, military and official senses Grant's was a dual existence, composed of Grant-Rawlins, with the Rawlins element in all emergencies strongly predominating. Not one of them but learned to wait for the final decision in any great event until counsel had been taken with the often silent and seemingly taciturn Chief of Staff.

. . . General Rawlins's influence upon the personal habits of General Grant commenced within a week after his arrival at Cairo in August, 1861, to accept the appointment of Assistant Adjutant General with the rank of Captain. He found General Grant's office was substantially in his hat or in his pockets, as convenience prompted, and the camp story was but slightly exaggerated which asserted that half his general orders were

blowing about in the sand and dirt of the streets of Cairo. All was soon reduced to order, and office habits, methods and forms enforced. He also found much roystering and drinking at headquarters among the staff officers and their invited guests. Discipline among them there was none, and as a rule but little deference to rank and military custom. He soon foresaw that if General Grant was to have any future promotion all this must be changed, and, having cast in his lot with him for better or for worse, he set about the difficult and thankless job of correcting their evils.

He obtained General Grant's consent to the issuance of an order forbidding any open use of liquors or public drinking at headquarters. This was the first foundation stone upon which the whole superstructure of Grant's greatness was thereafter erected. Having Grant's authority for this step, given, perhaps, with little thought of the iron determination at its back, it was from that day to the end of the war mercilessly enforced. No one ever saw any open public drinking at General Grant's headquarters from that time forward. There was much rebellion among the staff. Many of them tried to ignore its provisions, but found themselves throttled by the iron hand of Rawlins.

Finding themselves powerless, they next resorted to keeping private stores of bottled liquors in their own tents, inviting their friends in there, dropping the flap of the tent and sometimes having a carouse. It was soon noticed that these officers lost caste, were ordered to their regiments, or in some way removed from headquarters. Later on it was no secret that any staff officer who offered the General a glass of liquor, or drank with him, or in any way whatever connived at his taking so much as a single drink, would be disgracefully dismissed and actually degraded in rank as soon as it could be brought about. There was much indignation expressed at first against this arbitrary authority exercised by Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel Rawlins, as he reached these promotions, by the full Colonels on the staff, who claimed the prerogatives of superior rank. But General Grant maintained his Adjutant, and respected him the more for the stand he took, because he knew it to be a turning point in his own life.

It would be impossible in one communication to enumerate one in a hundred of the instances in which the high vantage

ground of right, first seized and occupied by Rawlins, became Grant's own, reluctantly at first, from which his greatest triumphs were afterwards directed and secured. In the daily routine of business Rawlins seemed endowed with an extra sense. He instinctively discerned fraud and corruption, and kept it at a distance. No rogue ever got a chance to make him a dishonest proposal. In the official correspondence of the office he was a fine judge of the force and interpretation of language. A noted illustration of this occurred during the interchange of notes leading to Lee's surrender. The latter demanded finally what terms would be accorded him provided he surrendered. Grant promptly named them, despatched them to Lee by General Seth Williams, and then with his staff trained along at the head of Meade's column, in Lee's rear, all Saturday afternoon, April 8, expecting their acceptance.

He was at last obliged to stop at a deserted house for the night, twenty-five miles from his own headquarters' train. The only bed in the house was upstairs, and was occupied by Grant and Rawlins. Late in the night a despatch was brought from Lee desiring Grant to meet him next morning at a designated place to arrange "terms of peace." Grant was elated, and proposed doing so. Rawlins objected, because "terms of peace" not being under discussion, it was a complete change of the terms of the correspondence, purposely made to gain time. Grant contended Lee meant precisely the same thing—that they could settle it all in fifteen minutes. But Rawlins carried his point, and Lee's succeeding note, sent in great haste next morning, was an unconditional acceptance.

In planning campaigns it was a common thing for Rawlins to interpose many objections of major or minor importance. Grant would consider, for instance, that his force was now sufficient. Rawlins, who always favored the utmost concentration, would say:

"Well, we have possibly troops enough; but here is such a brigade, division or corps (naming them) that has not marched a mile for months. We will bring them within supporting distance," etc.

It was always done and they were generally used. The last year of the war the West was stripped of troops to reinforce Schofield and Sherman in the Carolinas. Rosecrans complained that he had no force to withstand General Price, who was

overrunning Missouri, and that he could not keep him out of St. Louis if he chose to come there. The War Department finally listened to the extent of calling Grant's attention to it. He came to Rawlins for specific information, and, upon looking the matter over, admitted it was scarcely fair to Rosecrans. Rawlins took the ground that the war had to be fought out in the East; that whether Price captured St. Louis or not cut no figure whatever in the grand drama which would be ended in the spring on the Southeastern seaboard. Grant yielded, and Rawlins kept on drawing from other departments till the end came. After the war Grant became involved with General Buell in a newspaper controversy concerning the latter's marches towards Shiloh. Rawlins summarily ended that.

About the same time Grant and Sherman began an unofficial correspondence concerning reconstruction, as two "old cronies" in private life might properly do. One of Grant's habits was to make rough drafts of all letters of much length, and have them copied by a clerk, when he would sign them and leave them to be mailed. Rawlins had long before made a cast-iron rule that no scrap of correspondence should ever leave the office until it had passed under his personal supervision. One of Grant's letters was quietly pigeon-holed till inquired for. Rawlins apologized for detaining it by saying there was too much politics in it. Grant did not think it had any political significance, but he revised the whole letter, had it recopied when it was again pigeon-holed by Rawlins. This time General Grant said he thought he was competent to manage his own private correspondence and ought to be allowed to do so. But Rawlins laughed him out of it, carried the point, and that particular letter was never sent.

It is safe to say that General Grant never transmitted a line of official correspondence, nor made an official report until Rawlins had examined it carefully and given it his full approval. It is equally certain that he never adopted the plan for a campaign, nor moved an army, nor changed a corps, a corps commander, nor any commissioned officer, without the full consent of General Rawlins. If for any reason Rawlins objected, the matter was taken under advisement, and the proposition so amended, modified or altered as to remove his objections, or it was wholly abandoned. He had such implicit faith in Rawlins's judgment that he distrusted his own plans if they did not also commend

themselves to General Rawlins. His dependence upon him in some of these ways was marvelous. It was also the most touching and convincing proof of genuine esteem and affection. Nor was this friendship between these men one-sided. Rawlins gave himself absolutely to Grant's service, and the latter never questioned it. The combined ingenuity of all the men in the United States could never have disturbed their confidence in each other. It was never demonstrative, but formed the under current in both their lives.

During the war Grant wrote no political letters, expressed no purely political opinions, and the country was for two or three years in doubt whether he was a Democrat or a Republican. The drafts of many such letters were made in response to repeated and pressing inquiries, but the persistent, unyielding opposition of Rawlins to any such a committal by Grant was always respected by the great commander. It was only when Rawlins's own health broke down and he made a trip to California that the politicians got hold of Grant to the extent of putting him in training for the Presidency, to secure their own selfish purposes.

Another fact but faintly understood in the past will become as patent as the noonday sun. The war produced no man who was General Rawlins's superior in strategy. He had no military education whatever, in the tactical sense. He could not have drilled a squad, perhaps, but he had the capacity to plan great campaigns, and could have led any of our great armies from victory to victory. It is too much to expect that the military martinets of to-day will readily concede this. Nor will some having assured military reputations relish the idea. They may even attempt some slight disparagement of Rawlins's great capacity.

General Sherman is credited with pronouncing Rawlins a "fierce man" whereas his normal characteristic was that of the gentlest of men. That he was "fierce" sometimes is undeniable, but it was the fierceness of maternal instinct exhibited in wild animals that leads them to dare anything and rush to certain destruction in defense of those dependent upon them. Whenever, if ever, General Sherman endangered General Grant, that he would be fiercely antagonized by General Rawlins goes without saying to all who knew the man.

These letters of Rawlins, given to the public by Boynton, are

genuine. I know the history of each, and was an important factor in that of the first one. But they are only two out of a large trunk full of invaluable letters, papers, despatches and public and private documents which General Rawlins kept in his private bedchamber when we lived together at the head of Montgomery Street, Georgetown. . . . Should the present custodian of these letters bring them all to light, much of the personal history of the late war will have to be rewritten, many men now esteemed great will find their reputations badly smirched, the stature of others will be dwarfed to more natural proportions, and the country then learn the debt of gratitude to one of the purest patriots, ablest military minds, and finest type of a heroic, self-sacrificing friend ever born on its soil—General John Aaron Rawlins.

Letter from John A. Rawlins to E. B. Washburne, January 30, 1864.

On my return from the North, I was pleased to find your very welcome and interesting letter of the 30th ult., and I hasten to assure you, your friendship for the General, your devotion to our common country and heroic manifestation of interest in the welfare and success of our army here, through evil as well as good report, in the dark of the Nation's despondency as well as in the light of its victories are truly and honestly appreciated, and to you, more than to any one in congress, the great heart of this army warms with gratitude as the true representative and bold and uncompromising defender. . . . So give yourself no concern in the matter of the Cavalry regiment you speak of, for the general fully understands your motives, and knows them to be prompted solely by a desire for the public service and in friendship to him.

. . . I see by the papers the bill creating a lieutenant-generalcy is still undisposed of. As far as Gen. Grant may be regarded in connection with it, I only say that if the conferring of the distinguished honor on him would be the taking him out of the field or with a view to the superseding of Gen. Halleck, he would not desire it, for he feels that if he can be of service to the government in any place it is in command of the army in the field, and there is where he would remain if made a lieutenant-general; besides he has great confidence in and friendship

for the general-in-chief and would, without regard to rank, be willing at all times to receive orders through him.

The advocacy of the *New York Herald* and other papers of the general for the presidency, gives him little concern; he is unambitious for the honor and will voluntarily put himself in no position nor permit himself to be placed in one he can prevent that will in the slightest manner embarrass the friends of the government in their present grand effort to enforce its rightful authority and restore the Union of the states. Of his views in this matter I suppose he has fully acquainted you.

The presence of Longstreet in East Tennessee is much to be regretted. Had Gen. Grant's orders been energetically, and with a broader judgment, executed by Gen. Burnside, Longstreet would have been forced to continue his retreat from Knoxville to beyond the Tennessee line. The General's official report will show the facts and orders and will be satisfactory, I have no doubt, to the government. Our forces in the Holston Valley, east of Knoxville, have been compelled by Longstreet to fall back toward Knoxville. Whether he intends to again undertake the capture of that place, or simply to extend his forage ground, is not as yet known. In either design, he must be foiled. Gen. Grant, Gen. W. F. Smith, and myself go forward to-morrow to Chattanooga that the General may be enabled to give his personal attention to affairs in the direction of Knoxville.

Extract of letter from U. S. Grant to E. B. Washburne, August 30, 1863.

Rawlins and Maltby have been appointed brigadier-generals. These are richly-deserved promotions. Rawlins, especially, is no ordinary man. The fact is, if he had started in this war in the line instead of in the staff, there is every possibility he would be to-day one of our shining lights. As it is, he is better and more favorably known than probably any other officer in the army, who has filled only staff appointments. Whilst others give respectability to the position, Rawlins is in the latter class. My kind regards to the citizens of Galena.

Extract of letter from U. S. Grant to A. Lincoln, July 19, 1864.

In my opinion there ought to be an immediate call for, say 300,000 men, to be put in the field in the shortest possible time.

The presence of this number of reinforcements would save the annoyance of raids and would enable us to drive the enemy back from his present front, particularly from Richmond, without attacking fortifications.

III

ADDRESS OF GENERAL RAWLINS, FIRST PRESIDENT, SOCIETY
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, AT CINCINNATI, NOVEMBER
14, 1865

GENTLEMEN OF THE SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE:

Permit me to thank you for the honor you have conferred upon me in selecting me as your first President.

In the success of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee and the promotion of the objects it has in view, our interests are in common. It concerns us all alike. If it succeeds as well as the Army, from which it derives its name and existence, succeeded in its purposes and destiny, we will have realized our highest expectations.

In April, 1861, the nation was startled by the sound of hostile cannon, the thunder of a storm that had been gathering for some time in the South and Southeast, threatening our national existence.

The people of the great valley of the Mississippi, who gave to the country, with other armies, that of the Tennessee, consulting their maps found that the United States of America consisted then of thirty-four States, besides Territories, and comprised all that portion of the Western Continent lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and between the 49th and 26th degrees of North latitude; that the people of eleven of these States, in which slavery existed, comprised all that portion of this vast extent of country south of Washington on the Potomac river and Wheeling, on the Ohio river, to the Rio Grande, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to Forts Donelson and Henry, on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers and to the Kentucky and Missouri State lines on the Mississippi river, had some of them already denied allegiance to the United States,

refused obedience to its laws, organized State governments in hostility to its authority and confederated together under the name and style of the "Confederate States of America," to maintain their independence of the United States; and that the people of the others were following, as rapidly as possible to join them, while in the remaining, or three principal slave-holding states, every effort was made by the leaders of the Rebellion in the other states, and by some of their own most prominent and influential men and officials, to compel them to cast their lot with those already in or rapidly going into rebellion. So successful were they that thousands of men were recruited for the rebel armies, large amounts of supplies obtained, and the people so divided in their sentiments of loyalty and disloyalty that, throughout the long war which followed, it required quite as great vigilance to protect our lines of communications through these States as in the States in actual rebellion. It was not long either before the people of the Mississippi Valley found the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, one rising way up in Kentucky and the other in the mountains of Virginia and North Carolina, both of them pouring their flood of waters into the Ohio, in danger of being closed at Paducah, while they were shut out from the great Mississippi itself, and all its tributaries below Cairo.

Turning from the map to the flag of their country, they found a constellation of thirty-four stars, each star of equal brilliancy, and each representing a State equal in all its rights to any other State in the Union of States represented by that constellation. Then opening the Constitution of their country and placing it upon the map in the concentrated light of that constellation, they read: "We the people of the United States in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." They saw that it, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, was the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. That new States might come into the Union, but there was no way provided for any State to go out. They saw what the United States could do, and what States could not do. They saw the rights of the general Gov-

ernment clearly defined, and their interest as citizens in maintaining and enforcing these rights, and not only did they see that it was their interest to do so, but that it was their duty—a duty enjoined upon them by the blood of their Revolutionary sires—a duty the performance of which was invoked by all the interests of their posterity.

There, too, was the authority for calling forth militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions. And in the meridian blaze of this contellation, with swelling hearts they lifted their eyes to Almighty God—the God of their ancestors—and resolved that sooner than surrender one of these national rights, bought by the blood and secured by the wisdom of their fathers, they would give up life itself; that, as heretofore, the constellation upon their flag had lighted all the ways upon the seas and upon the land, by which the nation had advanced to greatness and power, so it should continue to do in the future; that no hostile power should remain upon any foot of the soil of the United States of America longer than it was possible to replace the flag there, and that no power should strike from that flag one of its stars or dim the luster of one. In this resolve they rallied to the call of the nation's chieftain, Abraham Lincoln, in the nation's defense.

Cairo, Illinois, was occupied by us April 23, 1861. On the 28th of August following, General (then Brigadier General) U. S. Grant, was assigned to the command of the District of Southeast Missouri, and on the 4th of September following established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois.

From this time, it may be properly said, commenced the growth and organization of the Army of the Tennessee, under General Grant. He was a graduate of West Point, and had served with distinction in the actual command of men in battle in the Mexican war and was thoroughly versed in the details and practical workings of the departmental and staff corps of the army. His command consisted of volunteers, with the exception of one officer, General E. A. Paine, who also had the advantage of a West Point education, but had resigned the service soon after graduating. The men and volunteer officers that formed the nucleus of the Army of the Tennessee, inspired solely by the love of country and a desire for the success of the national arms, believed that, all things else being equal, a military education and actual experience in the command of troops

was of advantage to their possessor, and as there was no one under General Grant possessing these requisites in the same degree, he stood without a rival. This for the country and for himself was most fortunate. A disposition to the greatest degree of subordination prevailed throughout his district.

On the 5th of September he learned that the enemy were moving on Paducah, Kentucky, and on the evening of that day, with a force of two regiments and a battery of artillery, he left Cairo, accompanied by two gun boats, and the next morning, September 6th, took possession in advance of the enemy, and secured to us the Ohio river. General Grant returned to Cairo, leaving General Paine in command of Paducah. On the 7th General C. F. Smith, a graduate of West Point, and commandant of cadets when Grant was there, was placed in command of Paducah, with orders to report directly to General Frémont.

In reconnoissances towards Columbus, Belmont and Charleston and in the erection of fortifications at Cairo and its dependencies, under orders from General Frémont, General Grant kept the forces under him pretty constantly employed.

On the 16th of October, in pursuance of a despatch from General Frémont, he sent a force towards Pilot Knob, which, in conjunction with a force from Ironton on the 21st, attacked and defeated Jeff. Thompson, at Fredericktown. This was the first affair, dignified by the name of battle, in which any of the troops under General Grant had been engaged, and they were welcomed back by their comrades-in-arms as heroes indeed.

In obedience to orders from Department Headquarters, on the 4th of November, General Grant started a force, under Colonel R. J. Oglesby for Indian Ford on the St. Francis river, where Jeff. Thompson was said to be reassembling his defeated forces.

On the morning of the 7th of November, Grant, with five regiments of infantry, some of whom had had arms issued to them for the first time only two days before—a section of artillery, and squadron of cavalry—attacked the enemy in position near Belmont, Missouri, and in a combat, scarcely excelled in fierceness, drove him steadily back more than a mile into and through the open space protected on the land side by fallen forest trees, in which his tents were pitched, opposite Columbus, capturing a six-gun battery, many prisoners, and all his camp and garrison equipage, and the little band of heroes, much re-

duced from what it was when it started as the nucleus around which was to gather the grand old Army of the Tennessee. It stood upon the bank of the great Mississippi, and in the triumphant shout of victory, hushed as it were by the hoarse thunders and screaming shells from the guns of Columbus. In their first fight they witnessed the confusion consequent on victory. Orders were at once issued for the destruction of the property and munitions of war they could not take with them, and to commence the return march to the transports. These orders were but scarcely executed and the head of the column put in motion, when the enemy made his appearance between them and their boats. At this moment it was communicated to General Grant that we were surrounded. "Well," he replied, "we must cut our way out then," and this was the order that passed along the lines; and never did men return more bravely to the fight, and a second time they beat their antagonists, gained their transports, and embarked without serious hindrance, under cover of the gun boats. The Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was four hundred and eight-four, that of the enemy, according to his own historian, was six hundred and thirty-two.

Without saying anything about the purposes of this battle, whether wise or unwise, or its result upon the then military situation, there was this fact—the great majority of men and officers engaged in it felt that they were the victors.

This battle, too, confirmed General Grant in his views, that where neither of the belligerents have a disciplined army, but rely upon volunteers or conscripts, nothing is gained, especially by the one which, from the nature of things would necessarily have to take the offensive before its objects could be accomplished, by delay for the purpose of drilling and disciplining the men, for the other would very naturally use the delay for the same purpose, and at the end of any given time their relative strength would be the same. Hence General Grant was always ready whenever he had what he thought a sufficient number of men, without regard to the number of days, they had had arms in their hands, to give battle.

On the 21st of November, General Grant received General Halleck's orders, assuming command of the Department of the Missouri, and soon after, orders changing the name of his command to the District of Cairo, extending it to include Paducah and leaving off Cape Girardeau, Mo.

In January, 1862, in pursuance of orders from General Halleck, Grant moved a force from Cairo and Bird's Point, via Fort Jefferson and Blandville, and one from Paducah via Mayfield, threatening Columbus and the enemy's line between there and Bowling Green as far as Fort Henry with a view to aiding some movement General Buell was said to be about making. These movements lasted about a week and were very hard on the men, from the heavy fall of both rain and snow. But they have the satisfaction of knowing that while they were thus engaged on their end of the line, on the 19th of January, General George H. Thomas was covering himself and his command with glory at Mill Springs on the other end of the line, and that the information brought back by General C. F. Smith, as to the feasibility of taking Fort Henry induced General Grant and Admiral Foote, on the 28th of January, to telegraph General Halleck for permission to take and occupy it; to which General Halleck replied, January 30th: "Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. I will send you written instructions by mail."

In stating these facts I do not desire to be understood as setting up any special claim in General Grant, Admiral Foote or General C. F. Smith, as originators of this movement, as against any claim any one else may have to that honor. In General Smith's report of his reconnoissance of Fort Henry, on the 22nd of January, he stated that he thought two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of it. Grant, true to his soldierly instincts, said. "Well, if it can be taken it should be taken without delay." Once there we could operate either east or west. Admiral Foote favored it because he could attack from down stream, and if any of his vessels should become disabled, they would be carried *from* the batteries by the current, not *on to* them; besides he could fight to better advantage up stream than down.

On Saturday morning, February 1st, 1862, the gifted and noble McPherson, then Lieutenant Colonel on General Halleck's staff, reported to General Grant for duty as chief engineer of the expedition, bringing with him General Halleck's instructions to General Grant.

On the 2nd Grant left Cairo and on the 6th, while the land forces (General McClernand's division and Colonel Cook with one brigade of General Smith's division) pushed forward on

the east side of the river to the rear of Fort Henry, to cut off the retreat of the garrison, and (General Smith with the other two brigades of his division) moved up the west side to attack Fort Hickman, the navy, under Admiral Foote, attacked Fort Henry and after a severe fight of over an hour, compelled its surrender. But the garrison, save a company of artillerists, had escaped. Thus, within one week from the time it was authorized by General Halleck, was the much vaunted rebel line pierced, and our gunboats went through to Florence, Alabama.

At Fort Henry there was a delay of a few days on account of heavy rains and the rise in the Tennessee river. On the 11th troops arriving on transports from below were ordered to return and follow the gunboats up the Cumberland, landing, under their cover, as close to Fort Donelson as practicable; and the troops under General McClelland moved out three and four miles on the two roads leading to Fort Donelson; and early on the 12th were in rapid motion, followed by three brigades of General C. F. Smith's division, for Fort Donelson. About 12 m. they struck the enemy's pickets, two miles from the Fort. These were rapidly driven in and by dark Fort Donelson was closely invested from a point on Hickman Creek on our left, to well around towards Dover on our right—McClelland holding the right and Smith the left.

On the 13th our lines were still further extended to the right and an attempt was made to capture a battery of the enemy, commanding the ridge road on which we moved. The gunboats and troops commenced arriving in the Cumberland, below Fort Donelson, and the communication was opened with them.

On the 14th General Lew Wallace, with a brigade of Smith's Division, reported from Fort Henry and was assigned to the command of a Division composed of newly arrived troops, and took position in the center of our line. McArthur's brigade of Smith's Division was moved to the extreme right.

In the afternoon the navy attacked the river batteries and, after a most terrible conflict of over an hour and a half, were forced to withdraw.

About 2 A. M. on the 15th, General Grant received a note from Admiral Foote requesting that he come and see him as to the disposition of his vessels, that they were very much disabled; and, in response to this note at early dawn, he started for the river.

He had been gone but a short time when the enemy, massing his forces in front of McClermand, passed out of his works, furiously attacked our extreme right held by McArthur, rapidly extending his attack towards our left, until the whole of McClermand's division was a hot participant in the furious combat, and for hours maintained the unequal conflict. McArthur was compelled to give way. Oglesby's brigade showed signs of wavering, but held on until Cruft's brigade of Lew Wallace's division arrived, when, owing to the want of ammunition and severe losses, it passed out of line by regiments, from right to left, to the rear, leaving a battery in the hands of the enemy. John A. Logan's regiment was the last to leave. Cruft became hotly engaged, and fell slowly back in the direction of our hospitals, repelling several attacks, and attacking the enemy in turn. Colonel W. H. L. Wallace firmly held his part of the line for some time after the giving way of the troops to his right, but with his flank exposed and his ammunition failing he deemed it injudicious to attempt to hold it longer and fell back on the ridge-road towards Lew Wallace's position, for about three-quarters of a mile. Here he met Thayer's brigade of Lew Wallace's division, and immediately opened his lines and allowed it to the front.

Thayer had but got into position when the enemy made his appearance. He immediately opened fire upon him with both artillery and infantry. The enemy responded but feebly, and fell back towards his works. In the meantime, word having been sent to General Grant, he returned to the field, and meeting General Smith, learned from him as far as he knew the condition of things, and at once directed that he get his command in readiness to assault the enemy's works in his front, while he went to the right to see Generals McClermand and Wallace. When he reached there, the battle had greatly subsided and the indications were that the enemy was withdrawing to within his works. He informed Generals McClermand and Wallace of the orders to Smith, and for them to be in readiness to renew the battle the moment he should make his attack. General Grant returned to the left and found General Smith ready to move.

The place selected for the attack was in front of Lauman's brigade. The assaulting column was formed from that brigade, the Second Iowa, being most accessible, having the lead. This

regiment, before giving the word to advance, General Smith formed into two lines of five companies front, thirty paces apart, informed them what they were to do, took his position between the lines thus formed, moved forward to the assault and, under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery, carried the enemy's lines at the point of the bayonet, effecting a lodgment in his entrenchments, and secured the key to Fort Donelson.

General Lew Wallace, reënforced by Morgan L. Smith's brigade of Smith's division and supported on his left by a brigade of McClernand's, found the enemy in position near his works, and, after a short but spirited combat, drove him into them, leaving in our possession the battle field, and guns captured in the morning.

With the early dawn of Sunday, February 16th, 1862, came a communication from General Buckner, through General C. F. Smith, to General Grant in these words:

"In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day."

Reading it himself, Grant handed it to Smith, who also read it, saying as he finished: "No terms with traitors." General Grant without seeming to have noticed what General Smith said sat down and wrote:

"Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

Then, lifting his eyes to his old Commandant, as I fancied he had done many times before at West Point, he handed him what he had written, saying as he did so: "General, I guess this will do." At one glance Smith's soldierly eye caught not only its words but its spirit and with an enthusiasm, that a soldier in the immediate promise of victory only can feel, replied: "It could not be better."

It was sent to General Buckner and brought a response from him in these words:

"The disposition of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming

force under your command, compels me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose."

In this surrender were fifteen thousand prisoners of war, sixty-one pieces of artillery, thousands of small arms, and an immense amount of quartermaster's property and commissary and ordnance stores.

The Army of the Tennessee, the child of heroism, born in battle and baptized in blood, stood forth an existent fact in the country's history, and U. S. Grant, its commander, the successful soldier of the age.

The Tennessee and Cumberland no longer forced their floods, like fugitives, past the guns of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, north to the Ohio, but bearing the banner of the free, reflecting its stars and bright colors on their swelling bosoms, moved majestically onward to mingle their grand destiny with the waters of the Mississippi Valley.

On the 21st General C. F. Smith took possession of Clarksville. On the 23rd, at the request of a deputation of citizens from Nashville, he directed one of the gunboats to proceed to that place, to prevent, by its presence, its destruction, which had been threatened by the rear guard of Johnston's army, but on the afternoon of that day the advance of General Buell's army reached there. On the 24th General Smith received orders from General Buell to move his command to Nashville. Of this order, General Smith advised General Grant, saying that he could see no reason for his going to Nashville, but that he would obey the order.

General Grant having as yet received no specific orders from General Halleck as to the next movement, and feeling considerable interest in the retention of General Smith in his own command, if the interest of the service did not necessitate otherwise; besides inferring from what he had received from General Halleck, and the fact that Johnston's army was said to be in the neighborhood of Nashville, that he would probably be required to coöperate with Buell, on the evening of the 26th, ran up to Nashville to see and confer with him. But save the return of Smith to Clarksville and information obtained from sources other than General Buell as to the whereabouts of Johnston, his trip was barren of results.

General Grant returned to Fort Donelson on the night of the

27th, and early on the morning of the 2nd of March received orders to move his command up the Tennessee River. On the morning of the 4th it was en route for Metal Landing, on the Tennessee—its destination—and on the afternoon of that day Grant was again at Fort Henry.

The next morning without one previous word of disapprobation of any of his acts, and without any opportunity for explanation—when the affording of such opportunity would not have delayed the expedition one moment—he received a despatch from General Halleck directing him to place Major General C. F. Smith in command of the expedition, and to remain himself at Fort Henry. His offences, as alleged, were that his neglect, of repeated orders, to report the strength and position of his command, had created great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with military plans; that his going to Nashville, without authority, and when his presence with his troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that General Halleck was advised to arrest him on his return.

General Grant had received, on the 28th of February, an order to report the strength and position of his command, and was preparing his report as fast as he could get in returns from his subordinates, and it was then almost ready to forward. This was the only order he had received. This explanation as to the neglect of orders, and the reasons, as I have stated them, for his going to Nashville, were received as satisfactory. Who was the author of the charge of his going to Nashville without authority, when his presence was so much needed with his troops? I do not know; but to my mind it was either a personal enemy or one who desired to get rid of one who had so soon achieved military fame. Different, indeed, was the feeling of the Army of the Tennessee, that shared with him the glory of Donelson and those two soldiers, one of whom had already, and the other of whom has since, by their actual achievements, so interwoven their names and their fames with the history of their country that they will remain a part of it forever—Generals C. F. Smith and W. T. Sherman. To show their feelings I need but state their acts. General Sherman succeeded General Grant in the command of the District of Cairo, Grant having been assigned to the District of West Tennessee. On the 15th of February he

wrote to General Grant informing him of his instructions from General Halleck, and added:

I should like to hear from you, and will do everything in my power to hurry forward to you reinforcements and supplies, and if I could be of service myself, would gladly come without making any question of rank with you or General Smith, whose commissions are of the same date.

On the same day he again wrote:

I feel anxious about you, as I know the great facilities they [the enemy] have of concentration, by means of the river and railroads, but have faith in you. Command me in any way.

On the morning of March 7th I met him for the first time at his headquarters in Paducah, and handed him a return of General Grant's forces, with the request that he would forward it by first opportunity to General Halleck. He was busy in arming and embarking his division to join the Tennessee river expedition. I had but a few moments' conversation with him. In that conversation I asked him if he knew what was the real trouble with General Grant at Department Headquarters, and if so, I would like to know, if it was proper for him to tell me. He answered, "No"; then, in apparent hesitancy, said: "I will tell you," breaking suddenly off with, "it will be all right with Grant in a few days. Tell him to give himself no anxiety." In parting with him I expressed to him the many obligations I had heard General Grant say he was under to him for what he had done, and the interest he had manifested in his success. He replied: "Not at all, not at all; I would do as much for Grant as I would for myself." Subsequent history has vindicated the sincerity of this declaration, and although it was not the beginning of the friendship that has since existed between them, it was one of those not easily to be forgotten heart-expressions of sympathy by one soldier for another, over whom rested a cloud.

General Buckner, on meeting General Smith, on the morning of the surrender of Donelson, congratulated him on the gallant manner in which he had stormed and carried the works the night before. "Yes," said the General, "it was well done, considering the smallness of the force that did it. No congratulations are due me; I simply obeyed orders." He set up no claim to honors. He knew if self entered his mind at all, that justice would be done him; and whether it was or not, he knew that it was the way to secure subordination and harmony, and ensure the triumph of our arms.

On the 14th of March, in reply to a note of General Grant of the 11th, informing him that General Halleck had telegraphed him when certain troops arrived, that were to be sent to him, he wanted him to take the general direction, and adding: "I think it is exceedingly doubtful whether I shall accept, certainly not until the object of the expedition is accomplished," he added: "I wrote you yesterday to say how glad I was to find from your letter of the 11th instant that you were to resume your old command, from which you were so unceremoniously and as I think so improperly stricken down.

"I greatly fear your coming here will be a matter of necessity, in consequence of my lameness. I cannot mount a horse. In jumping into a yawl, two days ago, I miscalculated the distance and the seat scraped my leg and shin in a rude manner, hurting the bone. I hope for the best, but it is with great difficulty I can limp through the cabin from one chair to another."

This wound of General Smith, described by him as seemingly slight, resulted in his death on the 25th of April, 1862. A truer patriot had not lived nor a better soldier been developed in the war. In the brightness of fame and in the promise of greatest usefulness he passed away.

General Grant felt that injustice was done him, but never questioned the friendship of his superiors, and I may here add that during the whole of his military career, of which I am cognizant, I never knew him to betray a want of confidence in those above him, nor be drawn into any controversy by one under him.

In consequence of General Smith's lameness, and the question of rank raised by General McClelland, General Grant resumed the immediate command of the Army of the Tennessee on the 31st of March.

On Sunday morning, April 6th, 1862, the Army of the Tennessee was posted as follows: Three brigades of Sherman's division in advance, from Pittsburgh Landing towards Corinth, at Shiloh Church, their right resting on Owl Creek. To Sherman's left and rear was McClelland. As far towards Corinth from the Landing as Sherman, and some distance to the left of McClelland, was Prentiss. To Prentiss's left and covering the crossing of Lick Creek, was Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division. Less than a mile from the Landing, on the Hamburg and Pittsburgh Landing road, was Hurlbut, with roads from his

position to Stuart's, and to Prentiss's, and through McClermand's to Sherman's, and on the ridge to the right of the main road, leading out from Pittsburgh Landing, and extending from near the river to the bridge across Snake Creek, on the Pittsburgh and Crump's Landing Road, was W. H. L. Wallace's (Smith's old Division). At Crump's Landing, and thrown out on the Purdy road, and more accessible to Pittsburgh Landing, should it be required, than if massed at Crump's Landing, was Lew Wallace's division. At Savannah were three regiments of the Army of the Tennessee and Nelson's division of Buell's Army, which had arrived the day before.

Early on this Sunday morning began the battle of Shiloh or Pittsburgh Landing, as you please to call it. According to our own and rebel official reports, the first shots were fired by Prentiss's advance pickets into the rebel's advanced skirmishers. Without entering into detail, however, to show that this battle was not, in a military sense, a surprise to us—that already having been done by one who was in at its beginning and competent to judge, General W. T. Sherman—it is sufficient to say that we did not expect to be attacked in force that morning, and were surprised that we were, but we had sufficient notice, before the shock came, to be under arms and ready to meet it. There was no capturing of commands asleep in their camps that morning, or bayoneting of men asleep in their tents.

General Grant was at Savannah where he was to meet General Buell, but hearing artillery firing in the direction of Pittsburgh Landing, ordered General Nelson to march his command as rapidly as possible to the point on the Tennessee river opposite Pittsburgh Landing, and started on his despatch boat for the scene of action. This was about seven o'clock. Passing Crump's Landing he ran close alongside the steamer on which General Wallace had his headquarters, directed him to send out and ascertain if the enemy might not be making a move on his position, and to be in readiness if such was not the case, to move, on receipt of orders, to Pittsburgh Landing. General Wallace replied that reconnoissances to his front were already out, and that he would be in readiness for any orders that might come.

General Grant reached Pittsburgh Landing about eight o'clock, went immediately upon the field, and found all of Sherman's division at Shiloh Church, and McClermand's and Prentiss's divisions hotly engaged. Hurlbut was moving forward one bri-

gade, to the support of Sherman, and two to the left in support of Prentiss. General W. H. L. Wallace moved forward two brigades to the right of Prentiss and Hurlbut to cover, as far as practicable, the space between Prentiss and McClernand, and one brigade to the rear and left of Hurlbut. Orders were sent to Lew Wallace to move with all despatch to Pittsburgh Landing, and also an order hurrying up Nelson.

By ten A. M. the battle had become general among our lines, and most, if not all, our troops on the field were engaged. Each side fought with a desperation seldom evinced—the enemy to secure victory and its fruits before help could reach us, and we to defeat the enemy in his purposes and hold our own until help came. All day long the battle lasted, and the roar of artillery and the roll of musketry seemed without cessation. The Army of the Tennessee, with varied fortune in different parts of the field, was driven back until its line of battle, late in the afternoon, stood at right angles with the river, covering the road from Pittsburgh Landing to Crump's Landing. From this position our reserve artillery opened upon the enemy with terrible effect—the gunboats giving us a helping hand; and after several ineffectual attempts to advance the enemy fell back, beaten and baffled in his designs, out of range of our guns. Near the close of the fight three regiments of General Nelson's division came on the field, and two went in on the left of the line, firing a few rounds after getting into position. General Lew Wallace arrived after dark. Had he got upon the field with his splendid division at the time his orders contemplated, we might have turned the tide of battle; we certainly would have stayed it much earlier than we did, and would have saved General Prentiss and four regiments of W. H. L. Wallace's division with him from capture.

In this day's battle the enemy's forces greatly exceeded ours. Our men fought with a valor they never themselves excelled. They proved to the nation and the world that the claim set up by the South, of Southern superiority in courage and endurance, was unfounded. Their success fully vindicated the manhood of the soldiers of the Union in their claims that, as men, they were the equals of other men, but as soldiers, under the national flag, they were the superiors of any that dare raise a hand against it. General Grant's "I have not yet despaired of whipping them," in answer to General Buell's inquiry as to the preparations, if any, he had made for retreat, was not more characteristic of the man

than expressive of the sentiment of his army in that Sunday's battle.

During the night the remainder of Nelson's division and the divisions of McCook and Crittenden, of the Army of the Ohio, got on the field, and took position to the left and in advance. Lew Wallace went in on the right. The regiments of the Army of the Tennessee, at Savannah, were also brought up.

Early on Monday morning our whole line moved to the attack. Nelson first struck the enemy, and in a short time the fighting extended along our entire front. It was evident, notwithstanding the fatigue of Buell's men from severe marching, especially during the last twenty-four hours, and the exhaustion of the Army of the Tennessee in Sunday's fight, that if the enemy had superior numbers on Sunday, the tables were now turned. He was attacked and driven from every position, where he made a stand, or attempted to make one, and by four o'clock in the afternoon was in rapid retreat for Corinth.

Thus was fought and won, by your persistent determination and bravery, on the first day, aided by your comrades of Wallace's division and those from Savannah, and Buell's heroic and valorous Army of the Ohio, on the second, the first great field fight of the war.

The Battle of Shiloh, as was afterwards conceded by General Halleck, decided the fate of Corinth and the great line of railroad communication of which it was the strategic point.

Among our loss was that fine soldier and true gentleman W. H. L. Wallace. He fell in the battle's front, and when it fiercest raged, mortally wounded, about four o'clock on Sunday afternoon. He had seen service, under commission, in the Mexican War, and was among the first to respond to his country's call. He had practical sense, cool courage, and great self-possession, and by his splendid fighting at Donelson, had merited and won the admiration of the Army of the Tennessee; and up to the time of his glorious but untimely death, no soldier bade fairer to rise to higher eminence. On the same day the enemy lost his commanding general A. S. Johnston, whose name inspired more confidence among his soldiery than any other of his generals.

On the 12th of April General Halleck arrived at Pittsburgh Landing, and on the 13th assumed personal command in the field. On May 1st, General Pope having arrived with the Army of the Mississippi, the armies operating against Corinth stood

divided into right-wing, center, left-wing, and reserve as follows:

Major General Thomas's division, transferred from the Army of the Ohio to the Army of the Tennessee, and four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, constituted the right-wing, General G. H. Thomas commanding; the Army of the Ohio, the center, General D. C. Buell, commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, the left-wing, General John Pope, commanding; and the divisions of Generals McClelland and Wallace, of the Army of the Tennessee, the reserve, General John A. McClelland, commanding.

General Grant retained the general command of the District of West Tennessee, including the Army of the Tennessee, reports being made to him as theretofore, but in the movement then making, he was acting second in command to General Halleck.

In this order was, thenceforth, prosecuted the siege of Corinth, and the Army of the Tennessee taught what it subsequently found of such great advantage, the art of constructing field defenses.

Friday morning, May 30th, 1862, the siege of Corinth terminating in the evacuation of the place by the enemy, and our entering and taking possession.

June 10th, General Grant was returned to the immediate command of his District and the Army of the Tennessee, and General Thomas, in July, proceeded with his division to rejoin the Army of the Ohio.

From Corinth Wallace's division of the Army of the Tennessee was pushed off to Bolivar, Tennessee, and soon after a part of it to Memphis, and thence to Arkansas to join General Curtis; McClelland's went to Jackson, Tennessee, and Sherman's and Hurlbut's, via LaGrange, to Memphis; Davie's (W. H. L. Wallace's old) division and McKean's (Prentiss's old) division remained at Corinth. On the 21st, with General Halleck's permission to make Memphis his headquarters, General Grant left Corinth for that place, and reached there on the afternoon of the 24th. His reason for selecting Memphis was, that General Halleck said he expected he would have to give him the job of taking Vicksburg.

July 11th, he left Memphis to report to General Halleck in person at Corinth, and July 16th, was assigned to the command not only of the District of West Tennessee, but of all the troops

in the Districts of Cairo and Mississippi, and those operating in Northern Mississippi.

This included the Army of the Mississippi, under General Rosecrans. Three divisions of it were soon after sent away, two to Buell and one to Kentucky, and the remaining two were afterwards submerged in the Army of the Tennessee; therefore, in speaking of any of their achievements under General Grant, we shall speak of them as the Army of the Tennessee. We know that none of the heroes of Donelson and Shiloh or of New Madrid and Island No. 10 will take exception to this, for while the former were gathering laurels on the Cumberland and the Tennessee, the latter were winning honors on the Mississippi.

General Halleck, on giving up the immediate command of the troops in the field, recounted their services and thanked them for the heroic manner in which they had performed them. His military career in the West was successful. When he took command of the Department of the Missouri, there was an enemy everywhere, and the greatest lawlessness and disorder prevailed throughout Missouri. He soon restored comparative good order in the State. His troops, under Grant, were successful on the Tennessee and Cumberland. Those under Curtis beat the enemy in South-west Missouri, and followed him into Arkansas, coming out at Helena. Those under Pope captured New Madrid and Island No. 10, and under his own immediate command drove the enemy from Corinth. And when he was called to the position of General-in-chief of the Armies, the Mississippi was open to our navy from Cairo to Vicksburg, and all the territory north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Chattanooga was substantially in our possession.

Impartial history, too, will find much to commend in him as a General-in-Chief, and will assign to him no unimportant or unenviable page.

From this time forward the greatest activity prevailed throughout General Grant's command. The cavalry in our front commanded by Colonel Philip H. Sheridan (now Major General Sheridan) was kept well out, and came in contact with that of the enemy quite often, but seldom to our disadvantage. Detachments of the enemy sometimes, evading Bolivar, passed north of it, and these with the local or guerilla companies of West Tennessee, threatened our line of communication with Columbus, but they were generally successfully met and driven

off. A large cavalry force of the enemy threatening Bolivar and the line of railroad to Jackson were met by two regiments of infantry and a small cavalry force of ours near Bolivar, and repulsed, August 30th. A part of this same force attacked our railroad guards at Medon Station and were repulsed, August 31st, and the whole force was badly beaten in the battle of Britton's Lane, September 1st. September 9th, General Hurlbut's division reached Bolivar from Memphis.

September 19th was fought and won the Battle of Iuka, October 3rd and 4th was fought and won the second great and decisive battle of Corinth. Among our killed was General P. A. Hackleman, one of the ablest of our brigade commanders. He fell at the head of his command in the first day's fight. General Rosecrans was in personal command here. He was also in immediate command of that part of the line that did the fighting at Iuka. On the 5th was fought and won the Battle of the Hatchie, General Ord commanding, until he was wounded, when General Hurlbut succeeded him. After these reverses the enemy concentrated his main force back of the Tallahatchie, at Abbeville. He kept some force at Holly Springs and LaGrange. Lieutenant General Pemberton superseded Price and VanDorn in the command.

On the 16th of October General Grant's District was constituted the Department of the Tennessee. On the 24th the troops under his command were designated the 13th Army Corps, and General Rosecrans was assigned to the command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.

Early in November the forces at Jackson, Corinth and Bolivar, save the necessary garrisons, were concentrated in the neighborhood of Grand Junction and LaGrange. Frequent reconnaissances were made toward Holly Springs, and several severe skirmishes took place between our own and the enemy's cavalry, resulting generally in our favor, and on the 13th our cavalry entered Holly Springs, Mississippi. On the 28th our whole force, save railroad guards, took up the line of march for Pemberton, and the Tallahatchie. Their movement was timed to form a junction with General Sherman, who was moving out to the same point from Memphis. The junction was formed on the afternoon of the 30th, and on the 1st of December, General Grant had a conference with General Sherman.

On the same day the enemy commenced the abandonment of

his heavy fortifications on the Tallahatchie and retreated on Grenada. His retreat was hastened by General C. C. Washburn, with a force of cavalry from Helena, Arkansas, striking the railroad and telegraph south of him. Our cavalry pursued as far as Coffeerville, and had several severe skirmishes, in which we captured several hundred prisoners. The main army crossed the Tallahatchie and moved forward to Oxford and some distance beyond.

After Pemberton fled from Tallahatchie, General Grant proposed, if he could have the troops at Helena, to send a force under Sherman, by water, to attack and capture Vicksburg, and failing in this to secure Hains's Bluff and the Yazoo River, which was thought could be easily done, while he (Grant) held Pemberton in his front by continually threatening an attack. On the 7th General Halleck directed the movement on Vicksburg, by water, to be made, and on the 9th, Sherman, with one division of his command, was on his return to Memphis, and on the 21st, with about thirty thousand men, left Helena for Vicksburg. In the meantime, Grant pushed slowly forward on Grenada, intending more active movements when he should hear that Sherman was off. December 11th, the enemy was beaten by Dodge's forces under Sweeny, at Tuscumbia, Mississippi.

December 18th, the Army of the Tennessee was divided into the 13th, 15th, 16th and 17th Army Corps, commanded respectively by Generals McClelland, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson.

Raids were made against the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, and considerable damage done to it. But on the morning of the 20th of December, VanDorn with a large force of cavalry surprised and captured Holly Springs, destroyed several trains of cars and a large collection of supplies, on which were dependent our future operations. Forrest about the same time got upon the road between Jackson and Columbus, and destroyed it effectually. VanDorn did very little destruction to the road. He seemed more desirous of getting off with his plunder than anything else. The garrisons of Cold Water, Davies's Mills and Middleburg, on the line of the road toward Jackson, Tennessee, repulsed his attacks most handsomely. Forrest had pretty much his own way until December 31st, when he was brought to battle at Parker's Cross Roads, defeated and driven east of the Tennessee river.

These raids on our lines of communication forced General Grant to fall back. This left Pemberton free to reënforce Vicksburg against Sherman.

On the 29th, Sherman, not having heard of the misfortune to Grant, made a determined attack on the enemy's works at Vicksburg, near Chickasaw Bayou, and was severely repulsed. Disappointed but not disheartened, he reëmbarked his men and began preparations for a movement on Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas river. The enemy had a force of about five thousand there, and were enabled to contest with some success our use of the Mississippi.

On the 4th of January, 1863, General McClernand, with orders from the Secretary of War and subject to the direction of General Grant, assumed the command of the expedition. He made no change in General Sherman's purpose of attacking Arkansas Post, but proceeded at once to carry it out, and on the 11th, in conjunction with the navy, Admiral Porter commanding, attacked and after a severe battle compelled the surrender of the Fort with all its armament and five thousand prisoners.

General Grant fell back to the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which, under the energetic superintendence of Colonel George G. Pride, was soon in complete running order from LaGrange to Memphis. General Grant established his headquarters in Memphis, January 10th, 1863. It was determined now to reënforce the Mississippi river expedition, and turn every effort to the capture of Vicksburg. McPherson's corps was ordered there. General Grant assumed the immediate command of all the forces operating against Vicksburg, January 30th, and General McClernand assumed the immediate command of his corps. After several ineffectual attempts to get below or in the rear of Vicksburg, by canals, bayous, and passes, in February and March, it was decided on the 29th of the latter month to run the Vicksburg batteries with the gunboats, and a sufficient number of transports for ferrying purposes, and to march the army around by land.

The execution of this plan was at once commenced. General McClernand, followed by McPherson, moved via Smith's plantation for New Carthage. On the night of the 16th of April the gunboats, followed by three transports—*Henry Clay*, manned and commanded by volunteers from the army, *Silver Wave*, manned by volunteers and commanded by her own captain,

Captain McMillan, and the *Forrest Queen*, manned and commanded by her own crew and Captain Conway—under a most terrible artillery fire, passed the Vicksburg batteries safely, save the *Henry Clay*. She got on fire and burned up. On the night of the 22nd six more transports ran the batteries, and were all more or less injured. One was a total loss, the others were soon sufficiently repaired for use. These were all manned and commanded by volunteers.

On the 29th the Navy, under Admiral Porter, attacked Grand Gulf, and after a severe fight of five and a half hours, found it could not silence all the guns and drew out. After a consultation with Admiral Porter, General Grant decided to run these batteries, and did so that night without damage.

While the Navy was engaging Grand Gulf, Sherman was threatening Vicksburg from the Yazoo. After sufficiently demonstrating, to accomplish his ends, he withdrew, and took up his line of march for Grand Gulf.

On April 30th, with McClelland's Corps and two divisions of McPherson's, we crossed the Mississippi to Bruinsburg. There was a good road from there out to the highlands, of which information had been given the night before by a colored man. On May 1st you fought and won the Battle of Port Gibson. On the 3rd you drove the enemy, who had evacuated Grand Gulf, across the Big Black river at Hankinson's Ferry towards Vicksburg. On the 8th Sherman got up. On the 12th you fought and won the battle of Raymond. On the 14th you fought and won the Battle of Jackson, Mississippi. On the 16th you fought and won the decisive battle of Champion Hills. On the 17th you fought and won the Battle of Big Black river, and on the 18th you invested Vicksburg and opened communications via the Yazoo and Mississippi with the North. On the 19th and 22nd, you assaulted the enemy's works, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Reënforced by three divisions of the 16th corps from Memphis, General C. C. Washburn, commanding Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and two divisions of the 9th corps, Army of the Potomac, you completed the investment, made a front to the rear, facing the threatened approach of Joe Johnston, and patiently and perseveringly prosecuted the siege. On the 18th of June, 1863, General Ord relieved General McClelland in the command of the 13th Army Corps.

On the 4th of July, 1863, after a siege of forty-six days,

Vicksburg, with its armament and garrison of thirty-one thousand men, was surrendered by Lieutenant General Pemberton to Major General U. S. Grant, commanding the national forces, and on that day the eighty-seventh anniversary of the one on which we had taken our place among the nations of the earth, the Army of the Tennessee and its comrades from other armies, true to the best hopes of their ancestors and unfaltering in their allegiance to the Republic, replaced the national flag on the ramparts of Vicksburg, never to be hurled down again. On the same day the enemy was defeated at Helena, Arkansas.

Sherman at once set out after Joe Johnston, who, with a large force, had for some time been promising relief to the beleaguered garrison of Vicksburg. He fell back on Jackson, Mississippi, pushed so vigorously by Sherman that on the night of the 16th of July he evacuated the place, and the capital of Mississippi was a second time in our hands. From Jackson, Sherman withdrew to the west side of the Big Black. The commander of Port Hudson, receiving information of the fall of Vicksburg on the 8th, capitulated to General Banks, and the great Mississippi went unvexed to the sea.

From the time General Grant left Memphis, in January, to take the immediate direction of the operations against Vicksburg General Hurlbut's command, and especially his cavalry, and the forces under General Dodge at Corinth, were kept busily employed.

On the 7th of April, Colonel B. H. Grierson, with about two thousand cavalry, started from LaGrange, Tennessee, to raid upon the enemy's lines of communications in Mississippi, and on the 2nd of May came out at Baton Rouge. This was among the most brilliant cavalry raids made during the war.

General Halleck in acknowledging the receipt of General Grant's official report of the campaign and capitulation of Vicksburg, wrote as follows: "Your narrative of this campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly and in every respect creditable and satisfactory. In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your army have well deserved the gratitude of your country and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened the Mississippi river."

The 9th Army Corps returned to Kentucky; Herron's di-

vision of the Army of the Frontier and the 13th Army Corps went to the Department of the Gulf; Kimball's division of the 16th Corps went to Arkansas, and John E. Smith's of the 17th soon followed as far as Helena.

Major General Frederick Steele of the Army of the Tennessee and whose command also, save the cavalry, and some of that too, consisted mostly of troops of that army, on the 10th of September, entered and occupied Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas. General Sterling Price, its defender, fled before our pursuing cavalry.

On September 27th, in obedience to orders from General Halleck, General Sherman left Vicksburg, via Memphis and Corinth, for Chattanooga; with three divisions of the 15th Corps, leaving Tuttle's division at Vicksburg, and taking John E. Smith's division, then at Helena, in place of it.

On the 10th of October General Grant also started from Vicksburg, north, to meet orders, and on the 18th met the Secretary of War at Indianapolis and proceeded with him to Louisville, where, on the same day, he was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and General Sherman to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. General Logan succeeded General Sherman in the command of the 15th Corps. General Grant assumed command in accordance with his assignment and proceeded direct to Chattanooga, reaching there on the evening of the 23rd.

On the 23rd of November, after a long and severe march across the country from Memphis, General Sherman with three divisions of the 15th Corps and Jeff. C. Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, was encamped behind the hills opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga, ready, when night came, to secure the south bank of the Tennessee river, and, on a pontoon bridge, which was ready to be put down, cross over and seize the north end of Missionary Ridge, while Osterhaus's division of the Army of the Tennessee was with General Hooker at Brown's Ferry, ready to climb, with one of his divisions, the almost perpendicular front of Lookout Mountain.

On the afternoon of the 23rd, General G. H. Thomas began the battle of Chattanooga by assaulting and carrying Indian or Orchard Knoll and all the enemy's line of defenses on the Chattanooga side of Cisco Creek. By one P. M. of the 24th, General Sherman held in his strong grasp the north end of Missionary

Ridge, and Osterhaus's division, in conjunction with Greary's under General Hooker, passed with an eagle's swoop up the steep front of Lookout Mountain, the enemy though desperately fighting was unable to successfully resist them; and in the middle of the same afternoon when the clouds lifted, they waved the national flag in triumph from the Chattanooga face of the mountain and were hailed with deafening shouts by their comrades in the valley below. A bridge was thrown across Chattanooga Creek and troops sent by General Thomas, who, after some fighting, formed a connection with them. General Howard's corps moved in between Thomas's and Sherman's, making our line of battle continuous from Lookout Mountain—our right, to the north end of Missionary Ridge—our left.

During the night of the 24th the enemy abandoned Lookout Mountain, and concentrated his forces on Missionary Ridge. On the 25th General Hooker pushed forward on the Rossville road, to get on to Missionary Ridge at Ross's Gap and from there fight towards Sherman. Sherman several times assaulted the enemy's works, carried and held some of the outer ones, but met with repulse from others. This compelled the enemy to concentrate heavily in his front, which, with the concentration necessary to meet Hooker, who got on the ridge and turned towards Sherman late in the afternoon, greatly weakened his center. Taking advantage of this General Thomas, with four divisions, about four P. M., stormed Missionary Ridge, carrying the line of rifle pits at its base, climbed it to its top, and under a terrific artillery fire, carried his line there and decided the fate of the day. The enemy fled panic-stricken, from the field, followed by Sherman until two o'clock next morning.

On the 27th, on the heights of Ringgold, Georgia, his rear guard made a stand, and a part of Osterhaus's division attacked him, but met with a severe repulse. This was the end of the pursuit, but not of the Army of the Tennessee's marching.

The 9th Corps, that had come to Vicksburg to help it, and their comrades of the Army of the Ohio, were besieged in Knoxville. With other troops the Army of the Tennessee immediately hastened to their relief. After that relief was afforded it returned to the neighborhood of Scottsville and Huntsville, Alabama.

In February, General Sherman, with a large force under McPherson and Hurlbut, moved from Vicksburg to Meridian and

destroyed nearly two hundred miles of the important railroads, of which it is the center. This was done with a view of shutting the enemy off from railroad communication with the Mississippi and of crippling him in the next spring's campaign to be made from Chattanooga. Had General W. S. Smith, with a force of seven thousand cavalry from near Memphis, Tennessee, joined our forces at Meridian as he was ordered to do, the enemy would have suffered much greater damage, but this officer, on reaching West Point, on the Mobile & Ohio railroad, and finding the enemy in force back of a stream, that could only be crossed at that time by bridges, took up his line of retreat on Memphis.

Sherman returned to Vicksburg. From there he sent about ten thousand men, under General A. J. Smith, to aid General Banks in the Red River expedition, and all other forces that could be spared from the Mississippi were concentrated with their comrades in the vicinity of Huntsville, Alabama.

On the 10th of March, General Grant was appointed Lieutenant General and assigned to the command of the armies of the United States. General Sherman was made Major General in the United States Army, and appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi and General McPherson to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. General Frank P. Blair, Jr., succeeded to the command of the 17th Corps.

With the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio you commenced on the 7th of May, 1864, the campaign of Atlanta and by severe fighting and a series of strategic movements, unexcelled in their masterly conception and execution, forced the enemy with heavy loss in men and war material, to abandon all his great natural positions, strengthened, too, by his labors on mountains, in gorges and on rivers, from Dalton to the Atlanta side of the Chattahoochie which latter place you occupied July 10th. Your terrible and bloody repulse of the enemy at Dallas, May 28th, and your splendid though unsuccessful assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27th, attests the severity of your fighting.

The enemy now changed Johnston for Hood and with this change came a change of tactics. Advancing from the Chattahoochie on Atlanta, on the 21st, you had severe but successful fighting.

On the 22nd you held the left of our line. About noon Hood threw the main strength of his army against it, General McPherson, passing from Sherman, with whom he was in con-

sultation when the attack began, to the front, rode upon the enemy's advance. They called out to him to "surrender," but as McPherson and the army he commanded only knew the word as addressed to a foe, he answered with a soldier's salutation, and wheeled his horse towards his old comrades. One sharp rattle of musketry and the noble McPherson was gathered to his fathers.

General John A. Logan, when the battle's breath was hottest, assumed command, and the words "McPherson and revenge" were the battle cry of the Army of the Tennessee. The advantage of the battle at times seemed to be with the enemy, but the old army fought with all its accustomed bravery and apparently with more than its usual determination. When night came on, the enemy repulsed at all points, retired to within his works, leaving the battle-field and the dead and wounded in our possession. In this battle there were, perhaps, more individual acts of heroism displayed than in any other in which the Army of the Tennessee was engaged during the war.

On the 26th General O. O. Howard was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. He was a graduate of West Point and won great distinction in the war. He was a Christian soldier and a most excellent man and was frequently, and not without reason, called the Havelock of the Army.

Again on the 28th, near the Bell's Ferry road, you were attacked by the enemy in great force, and after a severe battle of nearly four hours, in which he was several times repulsed with great loss, he was driven from the field leaving the dead and wounded in your hands. On the 31st of August, near Jonesboro, the enemy again attacked you, but met with his usual fate—a bloody repulse.

On the morning of September 2nd, Atlanta was in the possession of Sherman's army, and as his telegram "Atlanta is ours and fairly won" flashed North, it revived the hopes of the despondent and sent a thrill of joy through the national heart.

On the 1st of October, Hood started on his Northern invasion, and on the 5th attacked Allatoona Pass, defended by General Corse, with two thousand men of the Army of the Tennessee. He made several desperate assaults during the day, but was every time beaten back with dreadful slaughter, and when night came beaten at every point, he withdrew toward Dallas. In the old army's record of victories there is no brighter one than that

of Allatoona. On the 29th of October you lost the young, gifted and gallant Ransom, near Rome. He died of disease and not in the battle's storm, where his chivalric soul loved to be.

General Sherman having decided upon his ever memorable "March to the Sea," sent General Thomas back to Nashville, with what he thought sufficient force to beat Hood, should he continue northward, and concentrated the remainder of his forces, including the Army of the Tennessee, at Atlanta. On the 14th of November they took up their line of march, and on the 13th of December, Hazen's division of the Army of the Tennessee assaulted and carried Port McAllister, on the Ogechee river, and established communication with the sea and our supplies. Thus, by your valor, one more river went undisturbed by the rebel morning or evening guns to the sea. On the 21st Sherman entered Savannah. Hardee, with its garrison, retreating across the Savannah river northward.

What were your comrades under A. J. Smith doing all this while, and those that remained on the Mississippi? Where was the old 13th Corps?

General A. J. Smith, on his way to join General Banks, assaulted and captured Fort DeRussey, on Red River, on the 14th of March and on the 18th entered Alexandria, where a few days after, General Banks arrived with his main army, consisting of the 19th Corps and the old 13th Corps. In this unfortunate campaign the representatives of the old Army of the Tennessee maintained their high reputation for courage, for patience and endurance; and in their devotedness to the navy when in its greatest distress and their labors to extricate it, when by the falling of the water it was about being entrapped in the Red River, proved that they could never forget those with whom, in common they had braved the dangers of battle and shared the honors of victory.

General A. J. Smith, with his command, returned to Memphis, just after the defeat of General Sturgis, near Guntown, Mississippi, June 10th, and proceeded at once to try his hand against the same force, and met and defeated it, July 14th, near Tupelo, Mississippi. Returning again to Memphis, he proceeded to Missouri and aided in driving Price out of that State. From Missouri he repaired with his command to Nashville and joined Major General Thomas. In the battle of Nashville, December

15th, he bore a conspicuous part, and participated in the pursuit of the enemy.

To coöperate with Banks in the Red River expedition, the forces under Steele in Arkansas moved out via Arkadelphia and Elkin's Ferry to Camden, which place they reached after defeating the enemy in several severe skirmishes, on the 16th of April, 1864. Learning there of the retreat of General Banks, besides losing one of their own trains, they fell back upon the line of the Arkansas. On the 30th of April, while crossing the Saline river, they were attacked by the enemy, whom they repulsed after a severe conflict. They reached the Arkansas, May 2nd.

In February General A. J. Smith with his command of the old Army of the Tennessee went to the Department of the Gulf, and was in the campaign and capture of Mobile, April 12th. The 13th Corps shared too in this triumph. It also participated in the capture of Forts Gaines and Morgan, in Mobile Bay, August 8th and 23rd, 1864. From Mobile they went to the Rio Grande.

In the latter part of December Grierson made a successful and most damaging raid to the enemy, on the lines of the Mobile and Ohio and Mississippi Central railroads, starting from Memphis and coming out at Vicksburg. You had your representatives in the cavalry force engaged in the battle of Nashville and pursuit of Hood and also in the splendid, and to the enemy, terribly disastrous raid of Wilson's, which brought up in the capture of Jeff Davis.

From Savannah on the 1st of February, 1865, Sherman took up his line of march for North Carolina, with the ultimate design of forming a junction with Grant in front of Richmond. The hopes and wishes of the Western armies, especially of the Army of the Tennessee, seemed about to be realized. They had long desired to confront the men that had so long resisted the heroism and prowess of the Army of the Potomac; but in this they were disappointed. Before their arrival Richmond had fallen and the old army of the Potomac with its comrades, had received the surrender of the army that had so long defended it.

On the 17th of February you occupied Columbia and on the 12th of March Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear river. In the meantime the remnant of Hood's army had united with Hardee's forces, with Joe Johnston again in command. On the 15th you

resumed your march on Goldsboro. On the 18th the whole of Johnston's force attacked General Slocum at Bentonville. You hastened to his relief and assisted in defeating the enemy. Your presence defeated any further effort on the part of the enemy to disturb the march to Goldsboro, which was reached by Sherman on the 22nd. On the 10th of April you set out from Goldsboro for Raleigh and on the 26th Sherman received from Johnston the surrender of the army bearing your name, an army which had been driven from every field or forced from every position where you had participated against it.

On the 10th of May you took up your march from Raleigh for the National Capital, passed en route through Richmond, late the capital of the rebel authorities and on the 19th reached Alexandria, Virginia. On the same day General Logan relieved General Howard in the command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Howard having been appointed Chief of the Freedman's Bureau. Major General W. B. Hazen succeeded to the command of the 15th Corps.

On the 24th, in front of the White House, in Washington, you were reviewed by the President and Lieutenant General, in the presence of the Cabinet officers, Foreign Ministers and distinguished officers of the army and navy, and tens of thousands of your countrymen that lined the great avenues of the Capital. From Washington you went to Louisville, Kentucky, and there passed out of existence as an army organization, and returned to your homes.

General U. S. Grant, foremost among the military men of the age, your first commander, accords to your fidelity, to your skill, to your courage and prowess, his world-wide reputation—a reputation that raised him from the command of an army to the command of armies, thence, with increase of reputation and rank, to the command of all the military forces of the United States, where his reputation still increased and honors still thickened around his brow, but none shines so bright as Vicksburg.

Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman, master of the art and science of war, whose fame as a military leader and strategist is not excelled in the annals of warfare—your second commander—he, too, accredits to you a reputation that raised him to the command of armies, with increase of reputation, of rank and of honors. The loved and lamented Major General James

B. McPherson, individualized in his country's history, and up to the time of his glorious death among the foremost of its illustrious defenders—your third commander—achieved his great military reputation in the Army of the Tennessee; and always seemed to share it with every soldier in it. These soldiers while they live will take care of his memory, and our country's history will never be so abridged as to exclude his name and fame. He was the only army commander on the National side who fell in battle. He, too, was raised to a higher command—a higher than Grant or Sherman—to the command of that army of Immortals, the spirits of our martyred dead. Their white tents are pitched in and around the Celestial City. Reputations do not suffer there, nor honors ever fade.

That illustrious soldier, Major General O. O. Howard—your fourth commander—had achieved a national reputation for his splendid fighting in the Army of the Potomac, and as commander of the 11th Corps in the West, before he came to command you. You kept bright his military fame, and he cheerfully accredits to his command of the Army of the Tennessee, his advancement to a Brigadier General in the United States army. His humane and Christian character, his high reputation as a soldier, and the confidence he would inspire throughout the country, pointed to him as eminently fitted for the head of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned lands, and to this position he was called.

Major General John A. Logan, that daring and intrepid soldier of volunteers, who carved his name with his sword as high up on the column of fame, to be as long read there as any commander of the war, was your fifth and last commander. He was emphatically one of yourselves, and was with you from the fiery fight of Belmont to your muster out. When McPherson fell, he succeeded temporarily to the command, and fought the day's battle, just as McPherson would have done had he lived. With the same pride you point to him as one of your representative commanders; he accords to your bravery and courage his high military reputation. With the end of the war and the advent of peace he went with you into civil life.

In the siege of Corinth, the "Right Wing" of the National forces, comprising all but two divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, may boast the honor of being commanded by that distinguished soldier Major General George H. Thomas. His

military reputation is as solid as the fact of the great rebellion itself, and will endure as long.

Major General W. S. Rosecrans, the hero of Stone river, achieved a reputation in the command of troops of the Army of the Tennessee at Iuka and Corinth that gave him increase of rank, and lifted him to the command of the grand old Army of the Cumberland.

Major General E. O. C. Ord, commander of the Army of the James in the battles and campaigns that ended in the surrender of Lee, had distinguished himself in the command of troops of the Army of the Tennessee.

Sheridan who stands in the front rank of the world's heroes with none in advance of him if he did not belong to the Army of the Tennessee, he served with it under its first commander. The English press style him the Desaix of the Civil War. But we style him a more than Desaix. Desaix brought upon the field of Marengo six thousand men and with them turned defeat into victory, while to the field of Cedar Creek, Sheridan's horse brought only Sheridan, whose genius alone retrieved the disaster of the day, and from defeat snatched victory.

In no army did the soldier enjoy greater liberty, consistent with military discipline, than in the Army of the Tennessee, and in none were his rights and his life more carefully guarded. Newspapers, whether they supported the Administration or opposed it were alike permitted to circulate among the men. Correspondents of the press, without regard to the political character of the papers they represented, had the same privileges granted them. Soldiers traveling on furlough were protected from the payment of exorbitant prices for transportation that were frequently sought to be imposed upon them. The mails from the time we left Cairo, kept up with us, and were distributed with almost as much regularity as in our large cities.

Up to the time of its greatest triumph the death penalty had not been inflicted in the Army of the Tennessee. Men had been tried for desertion, and other offenses, the penalty for which was death, and found guilty and sentenced accordingly, but from various causes the sentences were not carried into execution. The discipline of the army was good, and there were no more desertions from it than from other armies, notwithstanding the fact that no man had been made an example of, by shooting in the presence of his comrades.

The subordination of the Army of the Tennessee to the policies and acts of the government affecting the institution of slavery in the prosecution of the war, is worthy of the highest commendation. You had no policy of your own to propose, but went forth as expressed by the Legislative Branch of the Government, to do battle in no spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States in rebellion; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired.

In this purpose and spirit you fought, interfering in no wise with the institution of slavery, save to maintain as free those who, with the consent of his master or lawful agent, might be found in arms or in the performance of any military service against the Government.

September 22nd, 1862, President Lincoln issued his preliminary proclamation of emancipation. You accepted this as a means to the maintenance of the supremacy of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired, and fought on. January 1st, 1863, the great proclamation of emancipation was issued. In March following began the organization of negroes in the military service. Whatever prejudice may have existed against their being elevated to the position of a soldier in the service of the United States, was overcome by your devotion to your country. Their courage and desperate fighting at Millikin's Bend, June 7th, won your sympathy and respect; and the 23rd Iowa—a regiment especially distinguished for its gallantry—that lost in that terrible combat nearly one half of their number it had engaged, but expressed the magnanimity of the old army in accrediting the enemy's severe repulse to the colored soldiers.

The Emancipation Proclamation and the arming of the negroes (formerly slaves) intensified, if such were possible, the enemy's opposition to us. He refused to recognize them as soldiers or accord to them when captured the rights of prisoners of war. July 18th, 1864, it was in effect announced by the President that no proposition, unless it embraced the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union and the abandonment of slavery, would be considered by the Executive Government.

of the United States. This abolition of slavery was thenceforth one of the conditions to peace. You continued to fight on until the enemy not only recognized the colored soldier, when captured, as entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war, but until the Rebel Congress, a Congress of slave holders, notwithstanding the bitterness with which they had denounced the National Government for the same act, passed a law authorizing the arming of negro slaves and putting them in the ranks side by side with the white soldiers of the rebel army. Thus, before the conflict ceased, they stood elevated to the dignity of defenders of the flag they were under, whether national or rebel, representing freedom or slavery.

But you fought on until the military power of the rebellion was destroyed—until the national flag, with two more stars than when you began, waved over every foot of soil of the United States—until the supremacy of the Constitution was maintained, and the Union preserved with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired, and the Southern States, with those of the North, were willing, as they subsequently did, to ratify the constitutional amendment submitted by Congress, forever abolished slavery in the United States; and secure to us, without question, the fruits of the great Emancipation Proclamation—freedom to all. In your burning patriotism the prejudice against race perished as that of party in the commencement of the contest; and you could read the Declaration of Independence as Jefferson wrote it, and see realized the grand truth, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." That which was the subject race under the law was the equal of other races; and if, in the Providence of God, greater privileges were to be extended to it, you could answer in your dead, "The sacrifice has been made, the lamb has been slain upon the altar, and the incense has risen to Heaven."

Such, gentlemen, is a brief presentation of the career and character of the Army of the Tennessee. There are many conflicts and combats reflecting honor upon the national arms, and upon those engaged in them, scarcely or even incidentally alluded to. To collect and preserve reports of all battles, combats, skirmishes and reconnoissances, with the names of the organizations or detachments of troops engaged, and of the officers com-

manding them, of the Army of the Tennessee, would be an object worthy of your consideration.

They were in defense of the nation and the integrity of the whole Union. And if this national Union of ours is to be perpetuated, the heroic achievements of the whole national soldiery, not only of the Army of the Tennessee, but of all the national armies who contributed in an equal degree to the national triumph, must be commemorated as the deeds of Washington and his compeers, as those of the heroes of 1812, and as those of our countrymen in the war with Mexico; they were all alike under the national flag.

The objects of your Society are to keep alive and preserve that kindly and cordial feeling which was one of the chief characteristics of the Army of the Tennessee, and which gave it such harmony of action and contributed so much to its glorious achievements in our country's cause, and to hold in sacred trust the fame and glory of the officers of that army who fell on the field of battle or in the line of duty, or who, since the war, have been or may hereafter be stricken down by death; and to cause proper memorials of their services to be collected and preserved, and thus transmit their names in honor to posterity; and to relieve by the voluntary contributions of its members, whenever brought to their attention, the families of such officers who may be in indigent circumstances—all such families having a claim upon the generosity of the Society.

Your dead line the banks of the great Mississippi and its tributaries and sleep upon every field of conflict in which you were engaged along the line of weary march and in the cemeteries of hospital and of home. To cause proper memorials of their services to be collected and preserved and thus transmit their names in honor to posterity, and to relieve their distressed families as far as we are able, will be to us not only a work of love, but a Christian duty. The Bible commands forgiveness of our enemies, but never forgetfulness of our friends; and in heaven's plan for the restoration of man to the high estate from which he fell—life eternal—remembrance of and belief in, the efficacy of the sacrifice made is especially required. We know the greatness of the sacrifice made that the nation might live—we appreciate its efficacy and will not forget the dead—the sacrificed.

What have the dead—the sacrificed—viewed as individual

men, gained by this? Nothing. But viewed in the aggregate with other men as constituting a nation, in the life and perpetuity of which, under heaven, is involved the highest destiny of the human race—in giving up their lives that the nation might live and be perpetuated—they have gained the end of their existence here and returned to their God.

We will never forget them, but labor to preserve the record of their virtues, their deeds of devotion and self-sacrifice, that it may pass to coming generations so bright that each successively may be inspired to emulate it and forever preserve and perpetuate the national life and virtue. The nation will never forget its dead nor those dependent on them. If it should, it would be like the forest oak girdled in midsummer. The spring would come, but with it no sap to send forth its leaves in beauty again. Dangers would threaten the nation, perils would environ it, but there would be no patriotism to send forth soldiers in its defense—there would be no voluntary offer of lives that it might live. But the nation will not forget them.

IV

ADDRESS OF GENERAL RAWLINS, DELIVERED AT GALENA, ILLINOIS,
JUNE 14, 1867

FELLOW CITIZENS:

When a boy, bringing the produce of my father's farm—of his forests and of his quarries—to your market, I always met with favor and kindness. When grown to be a man, as a student of law I had your words of encouragement. When a practitioner of law, I had your support and patronage; and when the roll call of the nation sounded to arms, with your fathers, your sons, husbands and brothers, I went out from among you, with your blessings and your prayers, to aid in maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution and the Union; and after four years' participation in the bloodiest war ever waged among men, and two years' cognizance of the restoration of civil authority and constitutional government from its wreck and ruin, I come back to you and meet with a welcome that, were it not for the friendship you have always evinced towards me, I should attribute wholly to my long, intimate association with that most

successful of the world's military chieftains, General U. S. Grant, and the great cause in which he achieved success. For this welcome, friends of my boyhood, friends of my manhood, friends of my whole life, accept my sincere thanks.

Many of those who went from among you have not returned, and many who have are battle-scarred and maimed. This glooms your homes, and over your reception hangs like a pall. Where are those unreturned braves? Their bodies sleep in death on every battlefield and in every patriot cemetery in this broad land, but their souls awake in Christ—have found peace with the God of Washington and of Lincoln.

In no spirit of partisanship, but from the eminence of our nationality, let us review the cause of the war, the acts of the Government to prevent it, and while it was raging to induce its abandonment by those who controlled it; its effect upon the Constitution and the people of the United States and upon the governments of the States that made it, and the acts of the Government to restore to their proper efficiency and relation, everything affected by it. They are the questions with which we are dealing to-day, and it is the part of wisdom to consider well the probable effect of this dealing on the future of our country and of mankind.

The Constitution adopted by our fathers, although the word slave or master does not appear in it, recognized their existence in the States, and provided for the protection of the master in his right to his slave, in the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes, and in providing for the delivery up of persons held to service or labor in one State, who might escape into another, on a claim of the party entitled to such service or labor. In accordance with public opinion at the time, the Constitution was so formed that any one or all of the States might abolish slavery without any other effect than the increase of the representatives and taxes of the State or States abolishing it. It was thought by a majority of the distinguished statesmen who formed the Constitution that slavery would gradually and in time disappear from all the States. Massachusetts had abolished it, and it had been forever prohibited in the Northwestern Territory. Seven others of the States abolished it, but the increased value of slave labor put a stop to its abolition in other States, and their legislation tended to strengthen the title of the master and degrade the slave and free persons of his race. All sources

of education were denied to them, and the right of suffrage, which free persons of color enjoyed in some of them, was taken away, and they were prohibited from coming into and settling in these States. In the free States, too, public opinion in support of compromises in the interest of slavery that Southern threats of secession and disunion had forced them into underwent a change, and in many of them disabilities were imposed upon free persons of color nearly if not quite as severe as in the slave States. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which, to get Missouri into the Union as a slave State, forever prohibited slavery in the territory north of 36 deg. 39 min. north latitude, aroused the people of the free States upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, and made a decided change in public opinion. But the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case—that those of the enslaved African race, though free men, were not nor could not be citizens of any State, in the sense in which that word was used in the Constitution, and could not be parties to suits in any Federal Court, not even to those involving their rights, under the laws, to freedom; that neither the enslaved African race nor their descendants, whether free or not, were included or intended to be in the Declaration of Independence, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted the Constitution—returned public opinion in the free States to the point of its departure from the opinion of our fathers.

The correctness of this decision, which involved the right of slavery in the Territories, as well as negro citizenship, was the main issue in the Presidential election of 1860.

Against its correctness and justice, and in favor of Congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories, was recorded a majority of the popular vote, in all the free States, of 293,767, in favor of Mr. Lincoln, and the electoral vote of every one of them, except four from New Jersey. From the slave States there were recorded against it, and in favor of Mr. Lincoln, 26,430. Mr. Lincoln had 180 of the electoral votes to 123 for all others. The result was held by the slave States as destructive of their rights in the Union, and especially endangering their title to their slaves, notwithstanding the fact that in both branches of Congress they had a majority in their favor; that the decisions of the Supreme Court were in their interests, and that Mr. Lincoln on the popular vote was 930,170 in the

minority. With this apprehended danger as a pretext, eleven of the States withdrew their representatives from Congress, and, in hostility to the Union, organized a Government which they styled the Confederate States of America, in which slavery was to be forever perpetuated.

Alexander H. Stephens, the vice-president of this rebel government, in his exposition of its constitution, and contrasting it with the Constitution of the United States, declared that the prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nations; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically; that it was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away; that this idea, though not incorporated in the Constitution, was the prevailing idea at the time; that those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation and the idea of a government built upon it! When the storm came and the wind blew, it fell. "But our new government," he said, "is founded upon exactly the opposite idea. Its foundations are laid; its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth."

Upon the issues so clearly stated by Mr. Stephens, war was made upon the United States, and for more than four years the lawful authority of the Union was resisted. Everything was done that could be done to induce the States and the people in rebellion to lay down their arms and return to their allegiance. The Territories of Colorado, Nevada and Dakota, comprising nearly all our remaining territory, were organized without any prohibition of slavery. President Lincoln in his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, denied the purpose or lawful right of the Government to interfere with slavery where it existed, and declared that he would enforce the provisions of the Constitution for the surrender of fugitive slaves; that the Government would not assail the South, and that they could not have conflict with-

out themselves being the aggressors. And Congress resolved, by an almost unanimous vote, on July 22nd, 1861, that the war was not waged on our part in any spirit of oppression, or for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States in rebellion, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity and equality of the several States unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects were accomplished the war ought to cease. But all these acts, declarations and resolutions had no effect upon those in rebellion. They strengthened, however, our hold upon the border slave-holding States, and made many in the free States, who seemed to hesitate, active supporters of the war measures of the Government, and answered the arguments of Confederate agents to the crowned heads of Europe for recognition, that we were making war upon them with a view to their subjugation and the destruction of their individual rights. No nation ever before so literally obeyed the scriptural injunction, "that ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." It was not until the seceding States opened their guns upon Fort Sumter that the majesty and manhood of the nation was aroused to resistance—a resistance the magnitude and grandeur of which was only equaled by the good resulting from it to the human race.

The only legislation in 1861 affecting slavery, after the war began, was to declare the forfeiture of the master's claim to his slave if he permitted him to be employed in any military or naval service against the Government. April 16, 1862, slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia. July 12, 1862, Congress passed a law declaring, among other things, that all the slaves of those engaged in rebellion thereafter, or were in any way giving aid and comfort therein, coming within the lines of the army and the control of the Government in the manner therein described, should be deemed captives of war and forever free; and authorizing the employment and enlistment of negroes in the army of the United States, and authorizing the President at any time thereafter by proclamation to extend pardons and amnesty to persons who might have participated in the rebellion, with such exceptions, at such times, and on such conditions as he might deem expedient for the public welfare.

September 22, 1862, the President issued his preliminary proclamation of emancipation, in which he proclaimed that on the 1st day of January thereafter all persons held as slaves within any State, or part of a State, to be then designated, the people whereof should then be in rebellion, should be then, thenceforward and forever free; that the fact that any State, or the people thereof, should on that day be in good faith represented in Congress, should, in the absence of strong corroborating testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, were not then in rebellion against the United States.

January 1, 1862, President Lincoln issued the emancipation proclamation as promised. The organization of negro troops was begun, and carried on with great success. During the war we had in the army over 200,000 of them, who, by their bravery and good fighting, proved the wisdom of the Government. They hurt the enemy by leaving his plantations, as well as by the deadly aim of their muskets.

April 24, 1863, Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, published to the country what the United States held to be the laws of war between them and a belligerent, which admitted of slavery, which was that if any person held in bondage by that belligerent was captured, or came as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces of the United States, he was immediately entitled to his freedom, and that a person so made free by the law of war was under the shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State could have by the law of post liminy no belligerent lien or claim of service.

December 8, 1863, President Lincoln issued a proclamation to the States and people in rebellion, extending amnesty and pardon to all, except certain classes therein specified, who would take an oath to support the Constitution and Union and the acts of Congress and the proclamations of the President relating to slaves during the rebellion, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or made void by the Supreme Court, and promising the guarantee of the United States to any republican government in no wise contravening said oath that one-tenth or more of the voters therein mentioned as qualified to vote might establish. This was with the view of forming a nucleus around which the loyal people could gather for protection. Tennessee organized under this proclamation, and abolished slavery. Arkansas and

Louisiana commenced, but did not complete their organization to the satisfaction of the Government.

On the 18th day of July, 1864, President Lincoln gave notice to the people in rebellion that any proposition embracing the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union and the abandonment of slavery, and coming by and with an authority that could control the armies then at war against the United States, would be received and considered by the Executive of the Government of the United States, and would be met by liberal terms on substantial collateral points. The South still persisted in the maintenance of the rebel government and the perpetuation of slavery. Sherman had not taken Atlanta nor made his famous march to the sea. Early had not yet been defeated by Sheridan, nor the Shenandoah Valley so stripped of supplies that, in the words of Grant's order, "Crows flying over it would, for the season, have to carry their rations." Thomas had not broken to pieces Hood's army, nor had Grant destroyed and captured the army of Lee. Enough hundreds of thousands of men had not yet fallen victims to the fury of the rebellion or been sacrificed upon the altar of freedom. The rebel government still maintained its power and authority, and sent forth its edicts of war, bitter war, from the gates of Richmond. It still persisted not only in not giving freedom to the slaves, but in not recognizing them as prisoners of war, when captured in our service, in our uniform, and under our flag. It continued in its ranks tens of thousands of prisoners who had been captured and paroled by us, without giving the equivalents required by the cartel agreed upon for the exchange of prisoners. To redress this gross injustice and violation of the laws of war, all exchanges were suspended, and continued suspended until the cry of our prisoners, "We starve, we starve," came to us from Belle Isle, Andersonville and Salisbury.

February 3, 1866, found Sherman moving from Savannah northward through the Carolinas; the forts at the entrance of Mobile and Fort Fisher, commanding the entrance to Wilmington, in our possession; the troops moving from Thomas's army, both east and south, by rail and river, to complete the capture of these important cities; the fragments of Hood's army moving to join the force under Hardee that had fled from Savannah to interpose between Sherman and Richmond; and rebel commissioners, headed by their vice-president, Alex. H. Stephens, in

conference with President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, in Hampton Roads, on the subject of peace.

Mr. Lincoln still insisted upon the integrity of the whole Union and the abandonment of slavery, and promised great liberality upon all collateral issues. But the representatives of the rebellion declined to accede to these terms. In March the rebel Congress authorized the enlistment of negro slaves in the Confederate service as soldiers. This was the first inroad of the rebel government upon the ideas on which it was founded. It was a concession that there was enough of the man left in the slave for a soldier, and entitled him to be treated when captured as a prisoner of war. It went far, too, toward removing the prejudice against him.

The war for the perpetuation of slavery, however, continued—the earth's thirst was still slaked by freemen's blood until the glittering bayonets of Grant's army flashed the sunlight in the face of Lee's, as they interposed between him and all hope of escape at Appomattox Court House, and Johnston surrendered to Sherman, and Dick Taylor and Kirby Smith to General Canby, and all the conditions of the laws of Congress and of war, as announced by the Government, entitling the slave to freedom, were complied with, and the great emancipation proclamation of President Lincoln obtained throughout the land. The rock upon which the Confederate government was founded was calcined, and the base fabric it supported sunk from the sight of men.

The South was one vast camp of paroled prisoners, and the four millions of slaves constituted as many millions of their free population, and the military authority of the United States alone afforded it protection. If the African or enslaved race had no Moses to lead them from the land of bondage through the Red Sea of deliverance, they had masters whose hearts were hardened by the Almighty, through the agency of the Liberal party, to inaugurate a civil war that made the very land in which they dwelt a sea of blood which, when it arose sufficiently high to slacken their bonds so that they slipped from their limbs, Liberty's God made the earth drink up, and left them free.

The restoration of the States that had been in rebellion to their proper relations with the Government required the action of both the President and Congress. President Johnson, who had succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the lamented

and immortal Lincoln, entered at once upon this important duty, and, had the Southern States filled their offices with men of the most approved loyalty among them, recognized not only the settlement of the question of secession, but also the settlement of the citizenship of the emancipated race among them, and their right to the benefit of all the laws for the protection of life, liberty and property equally with white men, and extended to such as could read or write or paid a certain amount of taxes the right of suffrage, as suggested to them by the President, and chosen representatives to Congress whose loyalty during the war was above question, with what they did do in the ratification of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery and the repudiation of the rebel debt, it might have been concurred in by Congress and approved by the people. But as they did not do this, Congress through a joint committee of fifteen, known as the Committee on Reconstruction, instituted an inquiry into the character of their laws and governments, and their manner of administering justice, pending which their representatives were refused admission into Congress. At this time none of the prominent citizens in these States, or officers of the army and civil departments of the Government, thought it practicable to withdraw the military force, for both whites and blacks mutually required its protection, and it was so reported officially to the Government.

On the 12th of January, 1866, official information from the South made it necessary to protect officers, soldiers and others who had been connected with the army and persons charged with offences done against the rebel forces during the rebellion, and the occupants and custodians of abandoned lands and property, to issue an order from the headquarters of the army directing, where it had not already been done, orders to be issued by local commanders prohibiting the prosecution of these classes for acts done under proper orders, or against the rebellion, in the State and municipal courts, and also to protect colored persons from prosecutions for offences for which white persons were not punished in the same manner and degree.

April 2nd, 1866, President Johnson issued his proclamation declaring the end (except in Texas) of the insurrection which had existed in the seceding States, and that it was thenceforward to be so regarded. On the 1st of May, in an order relating to military courts and commissions in these States, the President directed that thereafter whenever offences committed by civilians

were to be tried where civil tribunals were in existence which could try them, these cases were not authorized to be, and would not be, brought before military courts, but would be committed to the proper civil authorities.

The result of the Congressional inquiry into the character of the laws and governments of the seceding States, and the manner of administering justice there, was to satisfy Congress that the governments in those States were illegal or anti-republican in form, and that the emancipated race was not afforded the equal protection of the laws with the governing class; that many of the disabilities that attached to them when slaves had not been removed, and that in fact in some districts they had no protection at all, owing to the prejudice of the governing class against them and the neglect of the civil authorities to arrest and punish those who committed the crime of murder or other offences against them. Whereupon Congress, by virtue of the constitutional obligation guaranteeing to each State within the Union a republican form of government, and the provision that no person should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and its duty to settle the questions growing out of the war, passed the civil rights bill, and proposed an amendment to the Constitution known as "article fourteen." And as the right of States in this Union to representation in Congress is not greater than their right to republican forms of government, and in fact depends upon the existence of such forms of government, Congress determined to withhold from the States lately in rebellion the enjoyment of the right of representation until they returned to their republican character, or ratified the proposed amendment to the Constitution, which, it was believed, would in the end result in their return to such character of government without further action or interposition of the General Government. This amendment was at once ratified by Tennessee, and her representatives, all of whom were loyal during the war, were admitted to their seats in Congress, and she has since extended the elective franchise to her colored citizens the same as her white ones.

The civil rights bill met with great opposition in the South. The provision therein that citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition, should have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States to the rights therein enumerated, among which was the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-

erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and to be subject to like punishment with the white man and none other, instead of securing to colored persons the protection intended, seemed to increase their danger, in exciting and intensifying the prejudice of certain classes against them, and also against the officers of the army and of the Freedman's Bureau, and those who were Unionists during the war. They were frequently murdered and no attempts were made to arrest their murderers, although they remained quietly in the neighborhood. This failure to enforce the laws was sometimes from fear on the part of the better class of the people that their own lives and property would be endangered thereby, but more frequently from indifference on the subject. And when arrested and tried they were generally acquitted, or the punishment inflicted was but trifling.

To remedy this condition of things, an order was issued from the headquarters of the army, June 6th, 1866, directing the military commanders to arrest all persons who had been, or might thereafter be charged with the commission of crime, when the civil authorities failed, neglected or were unable to arrest and bring them to trial, and to hold them until a proper judicial tribunal might be willing to try them.

August 20th, 1866, President Johnson issued his proclamation, in which, after reciting among other things that adequate provisions had been made by military orders to enforce the execution of the acts of Congress, to aid the civil authorities and secure obedience to the Constitution and laws, if a resort to military force for such purpose should at any time become necessary, he declared the insurrection that had existed in Texas at an end, and was thenceforth to be so regarded as the other States, and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority then existed throughout the whole of the United States.

The Constitution provides that representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The "all other persons" were slaves, and numbered, at the breaking out of the war, nearly four millions. They were regarded in the mixed character of person and property. Each one was three-fifths of a person and five-fifths a chattel. He

was a peculiar kind of property and hard to hold, yet subject to taxation as any other kind of property. He was therefore invested with three-fifths of the human character, which was represented in the person of his owner. This enabled his owner to securely hold and enjoy him in the full character of a chattel, two-fifths of which was exempt from taxation. This was a compromise between those in the interests of slavery and those who desired its extinction. The provision for the return of fugitives from service to their masters was incidental to this, and applied as well to those bound to service for a term of years.

The result of the war was the freedom of all the slaves, who, with the free persons of color, constituted more than two-fifths of the inhabitants in the eleven States in rebellion, and to render surplusage the words "three-fifths of all other persons" in the Constitution, and settled the question of their right to citizenship adversely to the decision of the Supreme Court, as well as the right of secession forever. These were questions directly involved in the contest. These were the auxiliaries to slavery for which the seceding States made war, and with it slavery ended.

To hold otherwise, what would be its effect upon the States and citizens and their rights expressly derived from the Constitution? We would have four millions of people, each one a free agent to come when he pleases and go when he pleases, at least in the State where he resides, free to enter into contracts with States and citizens, contracts that may become subject to litigation. Yet he could not be made a party to any suit in any court provided for by the Constitution, nor could any suit in a State court in which is brought in question the validity of any statute of the United States be carried to any of these courts. He is not a citizen of any foreign Power. No citizen or State can enforce any rights they may have against him in any of these courts, no matter what the magnitude of their interests. This perhaps was a small matter when there was only a few thousands of these people, but when you increase them to millions it becomes a grave and serious one to the State and white citizens, but still more so to the colored race. Should not as many rights be accorded to liberty, under the Constitution, as were accorded to slavery? When the slave escaped into another State the master could follow him into that State, no matter what its laws might be, and carry him back to servitude. Ought not the free man now, that was the slave then, to have the right of a citizen of the United

States to go to any State, and remain there, no matter what its laws?

The next question following that of citizenship is, Have the seceding States any equitable constitutional right to representation for the persons made free by the war, without granting to them the right of suffrage? Had slavery been abolished by an amendment of the Constitution while their relations with the Government were undisturbed—or had they themselves peaceably and in obedience to the laws and provision for the protection of the emancipated and their rights of life, liberty and property—their equitable constitutional right to this representation would not have been questioned. The greatest consideration the party to that compromise in the Constitution that desired the extinction of slavery had, after the securing of the Union, was the hope that the increased representation it would give would induce the States to emancipate their slaves. But the emancipation contemplated was peaceable and in accordance with law, and not the result of violence and wrong.

It may be said that these States have ratified the constitutional amendment, abolishing slavery peaceably and in conformity to law. To this we answer their ratification of the amendment was after their slaves had been freed. It was only a confirmation of that freedom which they were powerless to prevent, and advanced them one step nearer the restoration of their proper relations with the Government; and this advanced step in that direction is the only consideration they are entitled to for their ratification of it. The consideration to the Government was that it put the adoption of the amendment beyond all possible question; but as the destruction of this compromise, in the freedom of the slaves, was the result of their own wrong, they not only can have no equitable claim under the Constitution to any benefits flowing from it, however great they may be, but should forfeit to the persons of these freedmen the right to the three-fifths representation they had for them when they were slaves; and while they withhold from them the right of suffrage they not only are not entitled to representation for them, but they render questionable their republican form of government. These persons are no longer subjects to be bought and sold; their owners no longer pay the taxes assessed upon three-fifths of their value to the General Government, which entitled them to represent their three-fifths human character. But they are now

free, and pay taxes for themselves—all the taxes that are assessed, too, upon the full value of their property. And above and beyond all this, they furnished two hundred thousand soldiers, who freely shed their blood side by side with the two million heroes of our own race in the maintenance of the Union and the Constitution. If ever it could have been plausibly argued that they were not of the people who framed the Government, it can never be said that they were not of those who saved it.

In view of these facts, and the further fact that the representation the States had for them was used as a means to secure and perpetuate their enslavement, ignorance and degradation, now that they are free, in the name of justice and all that is honorable among men, are they not entitled to representation to preserve that freedom and to subordinate the soil they cultivated in slavery and ignorance to taxation for the culture and enlightenment of their children and the elevation of their race? If their ancestors had been freed in the war for independence, and fought side by side with our revolutionary sires in denial of the right of taxation without representation, what would our fathers have done? Why, sirs, they never would have questioned their right to representation. Shall we, their sons, then, after having fought the great battle in support of the idea of man's equality, upon which our Government is founded, which they fought, over again, refuse to avail ourselves of the opportunity we now have to invest the descendants of the enslaved race so far as is within our power with all the rights they would have had if their ancestors had all been free at the formation of the Constitution? When the compromise of human rights made by our fathers to secure the Union has been swept away by the very party in whose interest it was made, in its mad attempt to destroy the Union, will we any longer withhold from those whose liberties and human character were involved in that compromise the inalienable rights of man? No; we will restore to them these rights as our fathers would were they living.

James Madison, one of the authors of the Constitution and its ablest expounder, in discussing the subject of representation, said: "It is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers, and it is admit-

ted if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with other inhabitants." Their right to representation when free was unquestioned. It was admitted by all the leading statesmen of that day. It was a right to be enjoyed by themselves, and not by the other inhabitants for them, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in at least five of the States they were entitled to and did enjoy the right of suffrage, and were represented in the convention that framed that instrument in the persons of every delegate from the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina, and were of the people who, for themselves and their posterity, ordained it to be the Constitution of the United States of America.

By the first section of the constitutional amendment now pending, citizenship of the United States and of the States is clearly defined, and not left to the discretion of the several States or decisions of courts. It provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, and that no State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of life or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The second section, intended as a settlement of the question of representation, apportions representation among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, and excluding Indians not taxed, but when the right to vote is denied to any of the male inhabitants, citizens of the United States, and over twenty-one years of age, except for crime, the basis of representation shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens, twenty-one years of age, in the State. This secures the equal political power of voters in the Government.

In deference to the acknowledged right of the State to regulate the question, suffrage was not expressly conferred upon the emancipated race, but, constituting so large a body of the people of many of the States, and affecting to such an extent as they

do the representation, there was but little doubt that the States would extend to them that right.

The Constitution defines treason against the United States to consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, or giving them aid and comfort, and empowers Congress to declare the punishment of treason, but provides that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person so attainted. Congress declared the punishment of treason to be death or imprisonment for not less than five years, and by a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars, the freedom of slaves and inability to hold office under the United States. Under the Constitution any one charged with treason has a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime may have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained and fixed by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation by presentment or indictment of a grand jury. They cannot be tried in any other place or manner. The war embracing as it did the great mass of the people in the States and districts where it was mostly carried on, and the prevalence of the belief of the people there in the lawful right of secession, together with the conspicuousness of the principal leaders and the notoriousness of their participation in it, in effect put a bar to all punishment for the crime of treason, under the Constitution. All the provisions of the Constitution for its punishment were rendered inoperative, as it were, there was no such thing as jurors, such as the Constitution contemplates, in these States and districts, to sit in cases of treason. All had made up their minds on the question of treason and secession, and those believing in the right of secession would not, of course, find one guilty of treason who has only attempted secession; and the notoriousness of the participation of the principal leaders, the ones that ought to be punished, was such that few, if any, of those who believed levying war against their Government was treason, when examined as jurors could say they had not made up their minds as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Besides, the great majority of them were themselves guilty, and one would scarcely expect them to render verdicts of guilty that might be pointed to as precedents against their own lives, liberty, property and eligibility to office.

The result of the war upon the Constitution, then, in so far as it relates to treason and its mode of punishment, was to render the infliction of punishment so uncertain as to destroy its usefulness as a preventive of treason almost entirely, as well as to render the Government in a measure powerless to inflict any of the pains and penalties prescribed for it upon the leaders of the rebellion; for unless conviction for the offence could be had no punishment whatever could be imposed. No one could be put to death for treason, no matter how much the safety of society demanded it; no one could be imprisoned for it; no confiscation of property or forfeiture of real estate for the lifetime of the person convicted, the constitutional limitation to such forfeitures, could be had, nor could any one guilty of treason be held incapable to hold office under the United States. These convictions could only be asked for from the communities most deeply stained with treason, and their refusal was almost certain.

Thus, at the end of the most gigantic civil war that ever attempted the destruction of a nation, the Government found itself powerless to punish those who inaugurated and directed it in its fell purpose. The third section of the constitutional amendment, now pending, in a measure gets over the obstacles the rebellion has placed in the way of punishing treason, and makes its punishment certain to the extent it goes. It provides that no person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; but Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. This is not only magnanimous to the people in rebellion, but it is a wise precaution against treason; it renders none ineligible to office except those who had, previous to their rebellion, held office under the United States, and taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, which, by the Constitution, they were expressly required to take. To this exception, it seems to me, no reasonable objection can be had. To those

included in it was once intrusted the power of the Government, and had they been true to their offices and their oaths, there could have been no rebellion; and had it been attempted, the Government could have given that protection to the people in the rebellious States they were entitled to; but the unfaithfulness of these officers rendered the Government powerless to prevent the rebellion, or to protect those of its people who would have been loyal could they have had protection. Those rendered ineligible to hold office are not disfranchised, but all the rights appertaining to citizens are theirs to enjoy, save that of holding office. Every other citizen of the United States who has the requisite qualifications, no matter how conspicuous he was in the rebellion, no matter how hard he fought against the Government, is eligible to any office, civil or military, State or Federal, even to the Presidency. If this is not magnanimity, what is?

This amendment empowers Congress, by a two-thirds vote, at any time to remove the disability it imposes. Let the persons to whom the disability attaches pursue a wise course in support of the Government, and they may look forward to a time, and that, too, at no distant day, when their disability will be removed, and all the rights of citizens restored to them.

Another result of the rebellion upon the people of the United States was the entailing upon them of a public debt of two thousand five hundred millions of dollars, and obligating the payment of large sums, for pensions and bounties, for services in suppressing it. The rebel government and States, in aid of the rebellion, had an outstanding indebtedness of about two thousand millions of dollars, and obligations for pensions, too, in aid of it, and the claim of payment for emancipated slaves was unsettled.

Who could say that there might not be danger at some time of the repudiation of our public debt and of our obligations for pensions and bounties, or assumption of the rebel debt and its obligations, and payments be made for emancipated slaves? It is hard to tell what a people who had lost so much by the war as those of the rebellion lost might not be stimulated to do to avoid the payment of a debt and obligations directly incurred in producing that loss, or what two thousand millions of money, aided by the millions claimed for emancipated slaves, might not

effect in the Legislatures of the seceding States, or even in the Congress of the United States.

The purpose of the fourth section of the constitutional amendment is the settlement of these questions. It provides that the validity of the public debt of the United States authorized by law, including debts incurred for the payment of pensions and bounties for services rendered in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall never be questioned; but neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave, but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

It may be said that this amendment is unnecessary, that no one would think of repudiating our national debt or our obligations for pensions and bounties; that if they did, the amendment would be no preventive; they would only have to elect a Congress that would refuse the necessary appropriations to meet them; and that it was idle to think of either the United States or any of the States assuming the rebel obligations of the payment of claims for emancipated slaves. To this it may be replied that it will be difficult to find any one to go before the people and advocate the repudiation of an obligation expressly declared in the Constitution, when, but for its being so declared, they might be found. And as to the rebel obligations and the payment for emancipated slaves, it not only settles them forever, but will make men cautious about giving credit to such rebellions in future.

Of the necessity of these amendments to settle the questions that had been involved in the war and resulting from it there can be no doubt, yet all the seceding States, excepting Tennessee, rejected them as an infringement upon their constitutional rights.

Was Congress correct in its decision that the States lately in rebellion have illegal or anti-republican forms of government? Of the want of protection of the persons and property of freedmen, there is no question. James Madison, in discussing the conformity of our Constitution to republican principles, in answer to the question: "What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?" which he put, said: "If we resort for a criterion to the different principles upon which different

forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable portion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic." This we hold to be the true definition of a republican form of government in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution. Do the forms of Government in these States come up to this definition?

It may be replied that these States had republican forms of government under the Constitution and Union before the rebellion, or the withdrawal of their representation from Congress, and that their rights under the Constitution and Union were not affected by these acts; that they are still in the Union and never were out. To the proposition that they are still in the Union and never were out we subscribe, and still continue to subscribe, while we remember the dead heroes whose eyes, before they were glazed in death, mirrored all the stars upon our flag, and who in their hearts believed, before they had ceased to beat, that they represented freedom, Union, and the indestructibility of States.

But the republican character of their State governments was affected by these acts in so far as they resulted in admitting a class of freemen into, and constituting them a part of, the society or people of these States, so long as the right to participate in the affairs of State is withheld from them. It is only to States in the Union that the Constitution guarantees republican forms of government. In discussing this provision of the Constitution, James Madison, in answer to the questions that it was not needed, and that it might become a pretext for alterations in State Governments without the concurrence of the States themselves, said: "If the interposition of the General Government is not needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity in the Constitution; but who knows what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and

influence of foreign powers. To the second question it may be answered that if the General Government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which supposes a preëxisting government in the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing forms are continued by the States they are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the Federal guarantee for the latter; the only restriction imposed on them is that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions, a restriction which it is presumed will hardly be considered as a grievance."

Before these States attempted secession, and while their relations with the Government were undisturbed, there were about one hundred thousand free persons who, on account of their race and danger to slavery, were denied any voice in their government. And there were of the same race over three and one-half millions who were, in the language of James Madison, "by the compromising expedient of the Constitution, regarded as inhabitants, but debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regarded the slave as divested of two-fifths of the man." Under the Constitution they were not regarded as a part of the society of these States entitled to a voice in the Government; and while this compromise continued, denial of it to them did not affect their republican forms. But these States, in their own caprice and the ambition of enterprising leaders, relying, too, upon the aid of foreign powers, withdrew their representation from Congress, organized a government of their own, declared by themselves to be in direct opposition to the ideas upon which ours was founded, and, by the most bloody war that ever deluged a land with blood, maintained it for more than four years, forcing us, in order to overthrow it and save the Union, for which the compromise of the slaves' manhood was made, to free the slaves, and restore to them their manhood. At the close of this bloody struggle, instead of one hundred thousand free persons to whom is denied a voice in their Government, we find nearly four millions.

The compromise of the Constitution that saved to these States republican forms of government, and exempted them from the

Madisonian definition of one, was swept away in their mad attempt at secession. And their governments, derived as they are in some of them from a minority of the people, an inconsiderable portion of the society, instead of from the great body of it, from which it is essential to the republican character they should be derived, and in all the others from a favored class of society which is destructive of the republican character, and who do not afford to the other class the proper protection of persons and property, guaranteed to them by the Constitution; when that class, too, from whom they are not derived, was the only one in many of them who fought to maintain the Union and the rights of States unimpaired, fall far below the Madisonian definition of a republican form of government in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution. In view of these facts, to hold otherwise would be not only degrading the character of republics, and violative of the laws of nations under whose shield persons made free by war are, but an outrage made upon the rights of those who helped to fight for the Union and the rights of the States under it, and we "would deserve and receive the universal rebuke and reprobation of mankind."

The Constitution guarantees to each State in the Union a republican form of Government, and also provides that no person within this Union shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. That is to say, if any State in this Union, in its own wrong, ceases to be republican in form, the Government will restore it to a republican form; or if a State fails or refuses to protect persons within its jurisdiction in their lives and property, the Government will give that protection.

The manner in which and the means to be used in executing these constitutional obligations are for the President and Congress to decide, and if they deem it necessary they may make use of the army. In fact, ever since those States withdrew their representation from Congress, and organized a Government in hostility to the republican idea upon which the Union was founded, it has been deemed necessary by the President and Congress to use the army—first to break down and destroy their governments in hostility to the Union, and, secondly, to enable them to revive and put in motion the State governments they had when they attempted secession, and adapt them to the new condition of society. But as they, in their adaptation of these governments to the new state of society, failed to come up

to the requirements of the republican form, and refused their assent to the amendments of the Constitution where its provisions had been affected or impaired by the war, and failed to properly enforce the civil rights bill for the protection of life and property, it was continued there.

The manner and means decided to be necessary for the execution of these constitutional obligations, and the restoration of these States to their proper relations with the Government, are set out in what is known as the military reconstruction bills. They are divided into five military districts, subjected to the military authority as prescribed in the bills, and each district is commanded by an officer of the army, whose duty is to protect all persons in their rights of persons and property, to preserve order, and cause criminals and disturbers of the peace to be punished; and to that end he is authorized to allow the local civil tribunals to try offenders, or when in his judgment it is necessary he may organize military commissions to try them, but no sentence of death can be carried into effect without the approval of the President.

To enable the people of each of these States to form a constitution in conformity with the Constitution of the United States in all respects, and extending the elective franchise to their male citizens twenty-one years old and upwards, of whatever race, color, or condition, who have been one year resident of the State previous to any election—except such as may have been disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law—and to enable them to participate in the present governments in those States until the new constitutions shall go into effect, the right of suffrage is extended to all male citizens, irrespective of color or previous condition, who can take an oath that they have been, for one year previous to the election or registration, residents of the State, and twenty-one years old, and have not been disfranchised for participation in any rebellion or civil war against the United States, and have never been members of any State Legislature nor held any executive or judicial office in any State and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof, and have never taken an oath as member of Congress or officer of the United States, or as member of any State Legislature, or executive or judicial office of any State Legislature, or executive or judicial office of any State

to support the Constitution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection and rebellion against the United States, or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof; and to all who cannot take this oath the exercise of the elective franchise is denied, but the moment the new constitutions go into effect the denial of its exercises ceases. Because of their exercise of the offices they once held against the Government and their unfaithfulness to their oaths to support the Constitution—the right to exercise the elective franchise and to hold office is withheld from them until the will of the people of the States shall be made known through their constitutions, respectively. When these States respectively shall have adopted their new constitutions and organized their governments under them, and the Legislatures of their new governments shall have ratified the constitutional amendment now pending, if Congress approves of their new government as republican in form, their representatives will be admitted to their seats in Congress.

These acts and the disabilities they impose are temporary, and are to end upon the accomplishment of their purpose, namely, the restoration of these States of republican forms of government, secure the protection of life and property, and settle the questions of the war affecting the Constitution and people of the United States.

The elective franchise is the only sure protection to person and property. It gives one a voice in government, secures to him respect, and insures him the equal benefit of the laws. And when these acts have accomplished their purpose there will be no male citizen in all these States, of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, except such as are disfranchised for rebellion, or felony at common law, who is not entitled to this right of suffrage, to this voice in their government. The only disability attaching to any such citizens will be that imposed by the third section of the constitutional amendment.

That the objects and purposes of the acts are constitutional, there can be no reasonable question, nor do I think the matter and means adopted by the Government to secure these objects unconstitutional. They are in the nature of a writ or execution issued by a court upon a judgment or decree that it has arrived at after a full hearing of the facts and examination of the law in the case, in the hands of a sheriff to execute. If it is for the possession of houses and lands, he goes to the occupant, and if

he gives up the possession to the person entitled to it peaceably and in obedience to the writ, that is the end of it; but if he refuses to give up the possession, in virtue of the authority of his writ of execution, he calls in the posse comitatus, or power of his country, and puts him out by force, and restores the possession to the rightful person, and that is the end of the writ and the authority of the officer under it.

So the Government having, with a full knowledge of the facts, and their constitutional obligations, determined the necessity of restoring to these States republican forms of government, and of securing to all the people thereof protection in their persons and property, and of settling the questions affecting the Constitution and people resulting from the war, issued its order, the purpose of which is fully set out therein, and placed it in the hands of officers of the army of the rank therein named, with authority to exercise such military power as was necessary to the execution of the purpose of their order, and the moment this purpose is executed their authority ceases. That the use of the military authority contained in these laws was necessary to enable the Government to perform its constitutional obligations, there is no doubt. In all its efforts through the civil authorities it had, we might say, wholly failed. And under the provision of the Constitution authorizing Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out the powers vested by the President and Congress are the judges of the necessity, and having determined it, the validity of their acts, being purely political, cannot be questioned. The decision of the Supreme Court in a case involving the constitutionality of the charter of the United States Bank is applicable to this. In that case the charter was sustained on the ground that the bank was a necessary fiscal agent of the Government, the court holding unanimously that, "If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriated, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect; that if a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers especially given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union be an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question not of judicial cognizance."

It may be asked what becomes of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery which the Southern States have ratified,

if they have illegal or anti-republican forms of government. The answer is they are governments *de facto*, nevertheless, and acts of theirs, especially those directly tending to the settlement of the questions involved in the war, or to render unquestionable the acts of the Government necessitated by the war, if accepted and ratified by the Government, as their action in this case has been, are binding and valid to all intents and purposes. Besides, it is not admitted that the amendment was not valid without their concurrence. To hold that it was not would be to admit a weakness in our Constitution inconsistent with the national life it is intended to perpetuate.

At the time of the attempted secession of the Southern States there were in this Union thirty-four States, twenty-three of which constituted the required two-thirds to apply for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. Had the eleven which withdrew from Congress and made war upon the Government succeeded in getting one more to do so, which they came near doing, one of the modes provided for the amendment of the Constitution would have been gone to us if we held to the construction that those do who insist that an amendment to the Constitution to be valid must be ratified by three-fourths of all the States, no matter what their relations or attitude to the Government may be. And that is not all; it would render questionable the constitutionality of an amendment proposed by two-thirds of a Congress in which less than two-thirds of the States were represented, and might even make questionable the validity of an amendment proposed by two-thirds of a Congress in which only two more than two-thirds of the States were represented.

By this rule of construction, had one more of the States gone into rebellion and no new ones been admitted, the result of the election for President and Vice President in 1864 might have been such as to have ended the Government under the Constitution altogether. Had General Frémont continued in the canvass and divided the electoral vote between the three candidates for President and Vice President, respectively, so that no one had the required majority to an election, as was the case in 1824, there would not have been a quorum of two-thirds of all the States in the House of Representatives, or of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators in the Senate, for the election of either President or Vice President, as provided by law for the

case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, and not for the case of a failure to elect a President or Vice President, on the 4th day of March, 1865, the office of President and Vice President of the United States would have expired, with no authority in the Constitution for their revival, and our Government under the Constitution would have been at an end. Even with the States that were represented, had the election resulted as supposed, by this rule of construction the eleven States at war against the Government and their Senators would have counted against the candidate having the highest number in either House, getting a majority of all the States, or of the whole number of Senators. The Constitution should never be construed so as to defeat itself, or the rights of the people and States under it.

It is to be hoped that all the States that have not conferred the right of suffrage on the emancipated race may deem it the part of wisdom, as well as justice, to do so at the earliest practical period, and not by delay in doing so compel an amendment of the Constitution for that purpose—an amendment which, with the aid of the eleven Southern States, in which it is extended to them, would be sure to be adopted. It may be thought by some that these States could not be relied on for such aid, because of the hope that may exist among their white citizens of securing at some time the disfranchisement of the colored citizens, as was once done in North Carolina and Tennessee; but if there is any such hope it will be forever dissipated by a clause that I have no doubt will be inserted in all of their constitutions, providing that no amendment to them shall ever be made abridging the elective franchise as therein declared.

There need be no apprehension of danger to our institutions from the extension of the elective franchise to the African race on account of their great number and ignorance. The love of liberty and of the forms of free government are too much a part of the American character ever to be affected in any such way. The men of the South who made the determined and desperate fight for the enslavement of the African because of his value as property, nevertheless love and appreciate liberty for themselves. And the African, elevated from the degradation of slavery, rendered respectable by his voice in government, admitted to all sources of intelligence, inspired by the same love of

freedom, speaking the same language and worshipping the same God, will rise rapidly in the scale of knowledge and the cloud of ignorance that envelops him will as rapidly pass away, and he will not fail "to help to keep the jewel of liberty in the family of freedom." And that peace so long desired, but which can never be had in a government like ours while a political right accorded to one is denied to another, will prevail through all the land.

Nor need fears be entertained of danger to the people's liberties from the army. The army is of the people, and has ever been with the Government, and no one has been, or ever will be, mad enough in their purpose to destroy the liberties of the country to rely upon its assistance. On the contrary, the first thing they would do would be to get rid of it. What did the leaders in the rebellion just closed do? With the Secretary of War (Floyd), the adjutant general of the army (Cooper), the quartermaster general of the army (Joe Johnston), and the chief of staff to the lieutenant general commanding the army (Lee)—all in their interest, did they concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Richmond or Harper's Ferry, that they might at the opportune moment seize the capital and Government of the United States? Far from it. They placed it beyond the people's reach, virtually abolished it, and sent our ships of war into the furthest seas. They knew too well, when the hour of trial came, on which side the army and navy would be found; that "Yankee Doodle," and not "Dixie," would be the tune they would march and fight to.

At the close of the rebellion among no part of the people of the country was there a greater desire to be found than in the army for the immediate restoration of the people in the rebellious States to their rights of civil government, and the withdrawal, at the earliest practicable moment, of military authority from among them. And to-day, whatever may be said to the contrary, there are no men in all the United States more anxious to have the people of the South comply with the requirements of the Government, that they may be relieved of the exercise of the authority that has been imposed upon them, than are the five military commanders there. And whatever they may do, you may rest assured, is intended by them to facilitate the complete restoration of civil authority, and to end their military power.

Nor need the people have fears of danger to their liberties from the Supreme Court of the United States. Its recent decisions on the military commission and test-oath cases, that seemed to create such uneasy apprehensions in the public mind, were in the interest of individual liberty and the vindication of men's rights under the Constitution, and not the imposing of disabilities on them. They do not seek to deny the validity of military tribunals in States and districts where all civil tribunals were suspended or destroyed by actual war, or where, resultant from that war, the civil tribunals had ceased to protect society by the punishment of offenders against it. They are far different from the decision in the Dred Scott case, which, after denying a man's right to a hearing in court on the question of his freedom and remanding him to bondage, sought to doom the very earth to constitutional slavery.

Government, in the exercise of its war powers, may find it necessary sometimes to deal arbitrarily with individual rights, or in the tread of mighty armies they may be trampled under foot, but they are never lost sight of by an independent and honest judiciary. Much has been said of the power of one of the judges of the Supreme Court, in cases where the court is equally divided, to declare unconstitutional and void a statute or act of the United States which has met the approval of both the other departments of the Government, or been passed by the requisite majority in both Houses of Congress, who, equally with the Supreme Court, are judges of the constitutionality of their own acts. By the Constitution the people vested the establishment of the Supreme Court in Congress, and extended its jurisdiction to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which might be made, under the authority of the United States.

Suits are usually brought to obtain decisions, and the simpler and less difficult the mode of arriving at them is the better it is for the suitors. And Congress and the President in its establishment, perhaps, had more in view the interests of suitors than decreasing the chances of their own acts being declared null and void by requiring the concurrence of a greater number of the judges in any opinion having that effect. Otherwise they would have gone to the Constitution and ascertained what rule the people, whose agents they were, adopted relative to the other departments of Government, or affecting the Constitution, and

applied the rule they there found to all decisions of the court invalidating any law or act of the United States.

If the executive department of Government disapproves of any law or resolution of Congress requiring its approval, two-thirds of both houses are required to concur in its passage or adoption. To convict the President in case of impeachment two-thirds of all the Senators present must concur. To expel a member from either branch of Congress, two-thirds of the branch to which he belongs must concur. When the choice of President and Vice President devolves upon Congress, it requires a quorum of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators to enable the Senate to choose the Vice President. To propose amendments to the Constitution, two-thirds of both branches of Congress must concur, or the Legislatures or conventions of two-thirds of all the States must join in proposing them. To enter into any treaty with foreign nations, requires the concurrence with the President of two-thirds of the Senate. To require the concurrence of all the judges would enable any one of them to prevent any decisions, and destroy the greatest constitutional purpose of the court altogether.

At the commencement of the rebellion, in fifteen States of this Union, except in one or two places, that provision of the Constitution that Congress shall never make any law abridging freedom of speech or of the press was, when they related to the subject of slavery, entirely nullified. No one could speak or print anything against the impolicy or evil of it, or in favor of its abolition, and in the other States and Territories it was seriously impaired by the same subject—the only one that did ever seriously affect it. Now that it is gone, and the people whose rights it involved are having those rights restored to them, may we not reasonably hope that freedom of speech and of the press may obtain to their pristine vigor in all the United States of America, never again to be impaired?

When the measures of the Government for the restoration of the seceding States to their proper relations in the Union are consummated, the supremacy of the Constitution will be maintained, and the Union preserved with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired. There will be representatives in Congress from every one, and the State governments of each will alone afford protection to persons and property, and regulate in their own way their domestic affairs.

And in our example "of a government of the people and by the people" will be echoed back to Ireland through the extension of the elective franchise to all classes of Englishmen, rich and poor alike; her shout of "manhood suffrage" in her recent but vain attempt to throw off the yoke of the oppressor, and the land of Burke, who fought in America for that high boon to all, through it will be free.

The right of searching merchant ships and vessels of neutrals in time of war, in denial of which we made the war of 1812, which ended in peace without its settlement, has been settled in the one just closed, by Great Britain's taking substantially the same ground that we then held, and still hold, in her denial of it in the *Trent* case. The reason for this change of ground was her impatience to see perish from the earth the only Government whose example, if a success, endangered the titles of English peers and princes to their right to govern, without its having been, in each individual case, confirmed by the people through the ballot box.

The practicability and effectiveness too of the Monroe Doctrine, which was regarded by foreign powers as American electioneering buncombe, has been firmly established by the result of the war, by Louis Napoleon's withdrawal, at our behests, of his troops, and abandonment of his idea of empire on this continent, although it left the one on whose brow his hand had placed an Imperial crown to be captured, and notwithstanding our intercession, shot by the people whose rights he had usurped.

Russia in a spirit of amity had relinquished to us all her vast possessions in America, and England is quietly preparing for separation from the Canadas. Separation is what their Confederation means. England, too, manifests a disposition to settle the claims for damages done our merchantmen by privateers fitted out in her ports in aid of the rebellion; but should she fail in properly adjusting them, it may become the duty of the people's representatives to issue their writ in the form of a declaration of war for the seizure of her possessions in America in satisfaction of these claims, and thereby facilitate the departure of the last foreign power from this continent.

We are coming into the realization of a republican government, the grandeur and glory of which was in the contemplative minds of Jefferson and Madison, and had the same state of society existed at the end of their rebellion as existed at the

end of ours, the inheritance of it and its blessings from them would have been all that remained to us to do. But as it unfortunately was not the same, it has cost us more than half a million of lives of the flower of youth, intelligence and energetic manhood, and a national debt and obligations of nearly three thousand millions of dollars. To meet the accruing interest on this indebtedness, and the payment of pensions, and bounties, and the current expenses of the Government, which are large, requires millions of revenue, which is derived through taxes and tariffs. In view of these facts, is it not the part of wisdom and sound policy to aid in the settlement of the questions now in process of settlement, rather than put obstacles in the way? When this is done the military force in the South can be withdrawn, and employed in the protection of the great routes across the continent, and the settlement of our Indian troubles, and exploration of our yet unexplored mining regions, if their services should be required there, and if not, the army could be reduced to the standard necessary to these purposes. The Freedman's Bureau would no longer be a drain upon the national treasury; the civil rights bill would enforce itself. And Congress could give its undivided attention to our financial policy, national economy, and development of our resources.

Political economy would then become the study of our representatives to the proper discrimination of the articles to be taxed, or on which duties are to be imposed, that their burdens and benefits may be extended equally to all sections of the country, as well as the best mode of their reduction.

With a wise and economical administration of public affairs, and all the energies of this mighty people directed to the development and making available of our unsurpassed mineral and agricultural wealth, may we not confidently hope the financial future of our country will equal the desires of its most ardent friends?

Our geographical position, the development of our great military character and resources, and our leniency to the subdued, give us a power and influence among the nations none other ever had. And, if we are but true to the principles of our Christianity and republican government—making honesty and virtue necessary passports to private and public station, we may hope to see the "standard of our Republic still high advanced," and the ægis of our power spread over this continent protecting

our sister republics—grown strong in virtue and self-reliance, in our example—from the influence and dangers of monarchism.

And if our experiment of manhood suffrage to all, without distinction of race, proves the success we believe it will, we may hope to see our republican principles engrafted upon all the other governments of the world, and the inalienable rights declared by our fathers, in their Declaration of Independence, enjoyed by all mankind.

V

EXTRACTS FROM THE FUNERAL ORATION OF GENERAL ELY S. PARKER, TO THE MEMORY OF JOHN A. RAWLINS—LATE SECRETARY OF WAR IN THE CABINET OF PRESIDENT GRANT

. . . He went to the field of blood. But not professionally a soldier—

. . . The plumed troop, and the big wars,
That make ambition virtue;
. . . The neighing steed, and the shrill trump,
The spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife,
. . . The pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war,

with all its ghastly carnage and heart-rending spectacles, had no charms for him. But he did not shrink from it. He entered the service from a profound sense of duty to his country and his God. His knowledge of the cause of the war; his acquaintance with men, and, above all, his integrity and talent, made him a valuable aid to the General commanding. From the battle of Belmont to the final surrender of the opposing forces at Appomattox he did not miss a battle in which his chief participated. He was a most valuable executive officer. Though not educated in arms, his knowledge of legal forms and of the law made him an almost indispensable aid to his chief. In his counsels he constantly kept the main end in view, viz., the suppression of the rebellion and the reestablishment of one flag, one Constitution, and one Government over our common country. He discarded collateral and new issues, and turned neither to the right nor left in the discharge of what he deemed a sacred duty. Having entered the military service, he was

subordinate and obedient to all orders emanating from superior authority. So far as it became him to do, he exacted the same subordination and obedience from the men and officers around him. He was just to the last degree. Being of the people, and educated to believe in the practical doctrines of equality, he had no horror or fear of caste. To him there was one law of equal and exact justice for the high and low. He was no believer in hereditary aristocracy. His sole faith was in the distinction created by true merit. He was therefore preëminently the friend of every soldier and officer of the army. He excused their shortcomings, and palliated their supposed offenses. No enlisted man ever received injustice at his hands, and no officer ever applied to him for counsel, aid, or advice without receiving it. He was consequently beloved as a near and dear friend by all who knew him. Those who knew him best loved him most. His mind was methodical in its reasoning, and, as is generally true of upright and true natures, his conclusions were equally just and correct. He was a

“ . . . Friend to truth! of soul sincere,
In action faithful, and in honor clear.”

. . . It cannot be said that our noble brother-in-arms distinguished himself as a soldier, inasmuch as his every duty was altogether executive. He never had the personal command of troops, but was ever the true and trusty confidential adviser of the commander of the armies. That he was susceptible, however, of the highest order of military culture, will not admit of discussion.

The war ended, the great contending armies were disbanded, and the breaches caused by the shock of arms required to be healed. One section needed what was termed reconstruction, the execution of which was placed by Congress mostly in the hands of the General of the army. In this difficult task he was ably assisted by the talent and legal acumen of his chief of staff. The most complicated and conflicting questions were presented almost daily, and though for a long time in the most feeble health, his anxiety and watchfulness to see the whole country once more united and prosperous, prevented him taking time to recruit his shattered frame. He was eminently a patriot. He loved his whole country.

He entertained no enmity against any part of it. He had

once believed that inherited slavery was a necessary evil. Its existence was sustained by the highest tribunal of the land. By the arbitrament of arms it lived no longer. The voice of God and the will of the sovereign people had dissipated the sophistries of the courts, and at last the immortal truths of the Declaration of Independence were vindicated, and he who was lately in bondage could now raise his unfettered hands towards high heaven and thank his Maker that he, too, was a freeman. Yet there was much to be done before the broad ægis of the law could be made to overshadow all alike. To accomplish this end, and again settle this country in a lasting peace, with every interest harmonized, was the great study and labor of General Rawlins. He daily advised with his chief, and took his orders upon all matters requiring his attention and action.

He carried the same views and principles with him in the Cabinet. He believed in maintaining by legislation the results of the war. A wonderful change and advance had been made in the progress of civilization. Millions of human beings recently enslaved had become free, and their newly acquired rights demanded many guarantees by legislation. This Rawlins was willing to give them to the fullest extent. He did not believe in a temporizing policy and in doing things by halves. If he was a friend, he was a friend indeed, and many there are among his comrades-in-arms and others who are willing living witnesses of the fact.

In the early summer of 1867 he visited his native county, and before those who had known him from infancy and among his boyhood acquaintances, all now grown to manhood, he face to face with them reviewed the causes of the war and its results, which under Providence was after all to become one of the greatest blessings to the whole human race, and then in his straight, clear and forcible manner elucidated and eliminated the lessons the war taught us as individuals and as a nation.

In 1868 during the Presidential campaign, he again visited his native town and county, and again, in a well-digested and prepared speech, did he impress his old friends with his views of their duty to themselves and their country. He now regarded the question of the capacity of the people to govern themselves as no longer a doubtful one, and that monarchial croakers might safely hang their doubting harps upon the willow, and mourn the sad progress and spread of republican principles. The

isothermal line of liberty was no longer to be regarded as a mere belt reaching from ocean to ocean, but it was to become a republic embracing a continent. The leaven of republican liberty was already working in the new dominion of the North, and the Mexican republic on the south was rapidly assimilating its traditions of liberty to ours, and the index of destiny seemed already to indicate that the beautiful gems of the Greater and Lesser Antilles would soon fall into the queenly lap of America. This General Rawlins believed and declared to his neighbors and the country. What he preached he carried into every-day practice. Hence, when he was admitted to a voice in the Cabinet, he was always to be found on the side of right against wrong, freedom against oppression. He was so progressive in his ideas that he chafed and fretted, as the untamed steed, whenever, in his attempts to befriend a people struggling for liberty he found himself fettered by the vague generalities of international law. He claimed that as a republican government, a model republic, it was our duty to insert such laws in the international code, at least for ourselves, as were in accord with our free institutions, that it was base in us to yield implicit obedience to laws enacted by governments founded on principles antagonistic to our own, and that, moreover, did conflicts arise by reason of our course we were strong enough to maintain them, and that God would decide for the right.

He was no sycophant to those in power, no respecter of those boasting of a long line of ancestry, no stickler for blood, except the blood of honesty, and was in favor of no government except a government of the people, where the lowest, poorest and humblest individual had the same voice and weight in the affairs of the nation as the highest, wealthiest, and proudest of the land. He was in the largest sense of the term a democrat in all his instincts, not one as now understood in this country, but a republican democrat, which constitutes the only true democracy in the whole world. The pomp and glitter of wealth never dazzled his clear eagle vision as he searched for the talisman which would bring the largest happiness to the greatest number. He never seemed to have a thought for self, but was ever intent upon plans to benefit his fellow men, whether high or low, black or white. Hence, he took the liveliest interest in the struggles of the people everywhere for popular liberty and republican institutions.

This idiosyncrasy of his mind had but one prayer for the oppressed among all nations, and to give them the largest liberty consistent with the interests and welfare of all human kind. He was too direct in his speech ever to be a flatterer, nor was he at all susceptible to that subtle weapon of the politician and demagogue. His integrity of purpose in the advocacy of any question, whether of a public or private character, was unimpeachable, and, therefore, whether he was right or wrong, his opinions commanded respectful attention. Jealousy was utterly foreign to his character, hence he rejoiced whenever success crowned the right, no matter by whom achieved.

In the prime of manhood, as his name and character were just becoming known to the general public, and just when he hoped from the high position he had attained to press for humanity's good his convictions of political expediency, General Rawlins was laid low by disease contracted while a soldier in the service of his country. In the black days of October, 1863, while passing around from Vicksburg to Chattanooga, whither General Grant had been ordered, he took cold, from which he never recovered. Though at times suffering severely from it, he never left his post of duty at the side of his beloved chief. It is true he hoped that with the close of the war he would be enabled to devote ample time to the restoration of his health. Of a strong physical frame, and always a stranger to sickness, he made light of the fell disease which had fastened itself upon him.

The close of the war imposed new responsibilities and duties upon his chief and his most cherished friend and fellow soldier. The new order of things was not less difficult of management than those of the field, and General Rawlins still felt it his duty, and perhaps his right, to continue his aid and counsels, until perfect peace and order were restored to a distracted country. A good captain never deserts a sinking ship; but if a captain has safely weathered a desolating hurricane, he takes pride in guiding his vessel into a safe harbor. Thus General Rawlins, finding so much imposed upon his commander, felt it his duty, as his first mate, to stand by him until permanent peace had found a resting place upon every foot of our country. Though every day and week and month found him worse and weaker, he never abandoned his post of duty as chief of staff or as a cabinet minister. His mind, ever vigorous, never for one moment lost its strength to the day of his death. I repeat again

that his every thought was for his country's good, and all who knew him will cheerfully testify with me that he never seemed more inspired or eloquent than when with burning words he portrayed the future glory and destiny of this country. His eagle eye and face, illumined with glowing enthusiasm, was wont to animate and transport his hearers into the same belief. He was ever earnest in whatever he undertook, as all his comrades in the field will aver, and as his colleagues in the Cabinet will attest.

Many rejoiced when a seat in the executive councils was given him, because they believed that his indomitable will, his force of intellect, his earnestness in putting forward his convictions, would have their proper influence with his colaborers upon the great measures pending before them, and upon which the public mind is ill at ease. He himself stated that, at the last cabinet meeting he ever attended, he made a labored effort to secure a certain recognition by our Government of the struggling Cubans, and feared that in his enfeebled condition he had overexerted himself, which, alas! was too true, for from that excitement his disease redoubled its violence, and his frame, already exhausted, was too weak to resist, and on the 6th of September, 1869, at 12 minutes past 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the thirty-eighth year of his age, he quietly and peaceably resigned his noble spirit to the God who gave it. But to the last his words evinced that his thoughts were intent upon his country's good, and upon the success of republican principles everywhere. The nation knew not the value of the rough diamond it possessed until it had passed beyond its reach. He had ever wished to die doing his duty, and his wish was gratified; and if his spirit still takes cognizance of the concerns of this earth and his country's welfare, it is with a clearer view of the wise purposes of God in the conduct of human affairs, and that whatever is done is for the best. . . .

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